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Soon after Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) began in March 2003, RAND Ar-
royo Center began a research project at the request of the U.S. Army. This project set 
out to prepare an authoritative account of the planning and execution of combat and 
stability operations in Iraq and to identify key issues that could affect Army plans and 
goals, operational concepts, doctrine, and other Title 10 responsibilities.  
The resulting body of work will interest those involved in organizing, training, 
and equipping military forces to plan for, deploy to, participate in, and support joint 
and coalition operations. Although focused primarily on Army forces and activities, 
the analysis also describes other aspects of joint and combined operations. RAND 
analysts collected the information in these volumes from many sources, including 
unit after-action reports, compilations of lessons learned, official databases, media 
reports, other contemporary records, and interviews with key participants in OIF. 
The results of this project are documented in multiple volumes, some not avail-
able to the general public, as described below: 
• Decisive War, Elusive Peace: Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, MG-641-A, Richard 
E. Darilek, Walter L. Perry, Laurinda L. Rohn, and Jerry M. Sollinger, editors. 
This volume is an overview of the research findings. 
• After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq, MG-642-A, Nora 
Bensahel, Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Richard R. Brennan, Jr., Heather S. 
Gregg, Thomas Sullivan, and Andrew Rathmell. This volume is a treatment of 
the prewar planning for the postwar situation and of postwar military and re-
construction activities. 
• Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: Executive Summary, MG-643-A, Walter L. Perry, 
Laurinda L. Rohn, and Jerry M. Sollinger. This volume, not available to the 
general public, presents an executive summary of the research findings. 
• Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: Volume I, The Genesis, MG-643/1-A, Jefferson P. 
Marquis, Walter L. Perry, David E. Mosher, Stephen T. Hosmer, Andrea  
Mejia, Richard E. Darilek, Jerry M. Sollinger, Vipin Narang, Charles W. Yost, 
John Halliday, and John R. Bondanella. This volume, not available to the gen-
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eral public, describes the political and military activities leading up to the opera-
tion. 
• Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: Volume II, Defeating Saddam, MG-643/2-A, 
Bruce R. Pirnie, John Gordon IV, Richard R. Brennan, Jr., Forrest E. Morgan, 
Alexander C. Hou, and Charles W. Yost. This volume, not available to the gen-
eral public, covers major combat operations in Iraq. 
• Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: Volume III, Managing the War, MG-643/3-A, 
Walter L. Perry, Edward O’Connell, Miranda Priebe, Forrest E. Morgan, 
Lowell H. Schwartz, and Alexander C. Hou. This volume, not available to the 
general public, describes the command and control (C2) of the forces and sup-
porting operations. 
• Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: Volume IV, Prewar Planning and the Occupation 
of Iraq, MG-643/4-A, Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Richard R. 
Brennan, Jr., Heather S. Gregg, Thomas Sullivan, and Andrew Rathmell. This 
volume, not available to the general public, describes the prewar planning for 
the postwar situation and postwar military and reconstruction activities. 
• Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: Volume V, Sustaining the Force, MG-643/5-A, 
Eric Peltz, David Kassing, Jerry M. Sollinger, Marc Robbins, Kenneth J. Girar-
dini, Peter Schirmer, Robert Howe, and Brian Nichiporuk. This volume, not 
available to the general public, covers the mobilization and sustainment of the 
forces. 
This report provides an unclassified treatment of the post–major combat mili-
tary and stabilization activities. It begins by examining prewar planning for postwar 
Iraq, in order to establish what U.S. policymakers expected the postwar situation to 
look like and what their plans were for stabilization. The report then examines the 
role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003. Fi-
nally, the report examines civilian efforts at reconstruction, focusing on the activities 
of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its efforts to rebuild structures of 
governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services prior to June 28, 
2004, the day that CPA dissolved and transferred authority to the Iraqi Interim Gov-
ernment. The research for this volume was completed in September 2004 and the 
final draft was submitted in October 2004. 
The purpose of this analysis is to find out where problems occurred and to sug-
gest possibilities to improve planning and operations in the future. The results of 
such analysis can seem therefore to be overly focused on the negative. This should 
not be taken to mean that no good was done. In fact, dedicated U.S. and coalition 
personnel, both military and civilian, engaged in many positive and constructive ac-
tivities, individually and collectively. That this analysis does not highlight all those 
activities should not in any way detract from their value. Our focus, however, re-
mains on finding ways to improve. 
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Major combat operations in Iraq lasted approximately three weeks, but stabilization 
efforts in that country are, as of this writing, ongoing. The U.S. Army and the U.S. 
Marine Corps are increasingly taxed by the demands of the continuing insurgency, 
with more than 100,000 troops expected to remain in Iraq for the foreseeable future. 
The evidence suggests that the United States had neither the people nor the 
plans in place to handle the situation that arose after the fall of Saddam Hussein. 
Looters took to the streets, damaging much of Iraq’s infrastructure that had remained 
intact throughout major combat. Iraqi police and military units were nowhere to be 
found, having largely dispersed during combat. U.S. military forces in Baghdad and 
elsewhere in the country were not prepared to respond rapidly to the initial looting 
and subsequent large-scale public unrest. These conditions enabled the insurgency to 
take root, and the Army and Marine Corps have been battling the insurgents ever 
since. 
Why was the United States so unprepared for the challenges of postwar Iraq? As 
part of a larger study of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), RAND Arroyo Cen-
ter examined prewar planning for postwar Iraq and the subsequent occupation to 
seek an answer to this question and to draw lessons and recommendations from the 
Iraq experience. 
It is not the case that no one planned for post-Saddam Iraq. On the contrary, 
many agencies and organizations within the U.S. government identified a range of 
possible postwar challenges in 2002 and early 2003, before major combat com-
menced, and suggested strategies for addressing them. Some of these ideas seem quite 
prescient in retrospect. Yet few if any made it into the serious planning process for 
OIF. 
They were held at bay, in the most general sense, by two mutually reinforcing 
sets of assumptions that dominated planning for OIF at the highest levels. Although 
many agencies and individuals sought to plan for post-Saddam Iraq, senior policy-
makers throughout the government held to a set of fairly optimistic assumptions 
about the conditions that would emerge after major combat and what would be re-
quired thereafter. These assumptions tended to override counterarguments elsewhere 
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in the government. Meanwhile, senior military commanders assumed that civilian 
authorities would be responsible for the postwar period. Hence they focused the vast 
majority of their attention on preparations for and the execution of major combat 
operations. That both sets of assumptions proved to be invalid argues for the devel-
opment of a new and broader approach to planning military operations, and perhaps 
a louder military voice in shaping postwar operations. 
Military Planning for Phase IV 
The notion of a “Phase IV” in OIF came out of the war planning process that com-
menced in the fall of 2001, shortly before the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan. On 
November 27, 2001, the Secretary of Defense directed U.S. Central Command 
(CENTCOM) to develop a plan to remove Saddam Hussein from power. The plan 
that emerged for OIF, later called OPLAN 1003V, outlined four phases: establishing 
international support and preparing for deployment; shaping the battlespace; major 
combat operations; and post-combat operations. The final version of OPLAN 1003V 
provided guidance and responsibilities for Phase IV operations, giving CENTCOM’s 
land component, the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), 
primary responsibility for post-combat operations.  
Both CENTCOM and CFLCC developed supporting OPLANs in early 2003 
that focused on Phase IV operations. Elements of each of these plans appear fairly 
prescient in retrospect. Yet they were always a low priority at CENTCOM, which 
focused the vast bulk of its time, attention, and resources on major combat opera-
tions. Although CENTCOM’s commander, General Tommy Franks, refers to Phase 
IV frequently in his memoirs, for example, he never identifies the specific mission 
that U.S. forces should have had during that time. To the contrary: He expresses the 
strong sentiment that his civilian superiors should focus on postwar operations while 
he focused on the war itself.1 He goes on to argue that civic action sets the precondi-
tions for security rather than the other way around.2 And he justifies his decision to 
retire right after combat ended because the mission was changing and a new com-
mander should be there throughout Phase IV.3  
____________ 
1 Franks states, “While we at CENTCOM were executing the war plan, Washington should focus on policy-level 
issues . . . I knew the President and Don Rumsfeld would back me up, so I felt free to pass the message along to 
the bureaucracy beneath them: You pay attention to the day after and I’ll pay attention to the day of.” Tommy 
Franks, American Solider, New York: Regan Books, 2004, p. 441. Emphasis in the original. 
2 Franks writes, “As I had said throughout our planning sessions, civic action and security were linked— 
inextricably linked. There was a commonly held belief that civil action would not be possible in Iraq without 
security. I would continue to argue that there could be no security without civic action.” Franks, p. 526. Empha-
sis in the original. 
3 Franks, p. 530. 
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In short, General Franks saw major combat operations during Phase III as fun-
damentally distinct from Phase IV stability and reconstruction requirements, and as 
the military’s primary task. That mindset reinforced an understandable tendency at 
CENTCOM to focus planning on major combat as an end in itself rather than as a 
component part of a broader effort to create a stable, reasonably democratic Iraq. 
The result, arguably, was a military operation that made the latter, larger goal more 
difficult to achieve. 
Civilian Planning for Phase IV 
General Franks was correct in seeing the need for greater civilian involvement in the 
stabilization of Iraq, since civilian agencies possess many of the capabilities needed 
for post-conflict operations. In fact, several U.S. government organizations, particu-
larly the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the State Department, the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID), and the National Security Council 
(NSC) conducted separate studies of postwar possibilities. The problem, therefore, 
was not that no one in the U.S. government thought about the challenges of post-
Saddam Iraq. Rather, it was the failure to coordinate and integrate these various 
thoughts into a coherent, actionable plan. 
At the center of the interagency planning process lay the NSC, which, starting 
in the summer of 2002, oversaw several interagency working groups that brought 
together representatives from the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of 
State, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and other organizations. Most of these 
working groups focused on the conduct of the war, but the working group on Iraq 
Relief and Reconstruction (IR+R) focused on postwar plans. This group produced 
fairly detailed humanitarian relief plans, but its reconstruction plans remained vague, 
reflecting a sense that reconstruction would not be necessary and stabilization would 
be handled by the Iraqis themselves. 
If the NSC staff failed to consider alternative scenarios that might pose differing 
requirements, neither did it provide strategic guidance on various aspects of U.S. pol-
icy during the postwar period. Repeated requests for policy guidance from 
CENTCOM, Task Force IV, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assis-
tance (ORHA), and others went unanswered, leaving each agency to make its own 
assumptions about key aspects of the postwar period. Key questions, such as whether 
the U.S. postwar authority would be military or civilian in nature, went unanswered 
throughout the planning process. When the NSC issued strategic guidance in late 
March 2003 (as will be discussed in Chapter Three), the war was already under way. 
As a result, the various planning processes that occurred across the U.S. government 
were neither coordinated nor guided by a set of consistent goals and objectives. 
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Above all, the NSC seems not to have mediated persistent disagreement be-
tween the Defense Department and the State Department that existed throughout 
the planning process. Secretary of State Colin Powell influenced a few key diplomatic 
decisions—notably the decision to take the case for war with Iraq to the United Na-
tions in September 2002—but the Defense Department controlled most planning 
decisions. State’s main postwar planning effort, the Future of Iraq project, may not 
have been a workable plan for post-Saddam Iraq, but it raised many of the right 
questions about that phase of OIF. Yet the Defense Department largely ignored this 
project, to the point of preventing Tom Warrick, the study’s leader, from working 
for ORHA in the weeks just before the war began.  
The Defense Department created a new office to handle the increased workload 
associated with potential military operations in Iraq. It was called the Office of Spe-
cial Plans (OSP), so as not to draw attention to the preparations for a possible war 
while President Bush simultaneously sought international support at the United Na-
tions. OSP developed policy guidance on a wide range of issues, including the ques-
tion of postwar governance, the future of the Iraqi army, and the de-Ba’athification 
process. Because the DoD exercised a great deal of control over planning for OIF, 
and ultimately took full control of the operation in January 2003, OSP exerted sub-
stantial influence over U.S. planning for Iraq.  
Two particular sets of assumptions guided U.S. prewar planning for the postwar 
period. First, administration officials assumed that the military campaign would have 
a decisive end, and would produce a stable security situation. They intended to 
shrink the U.S. military presence down to two divisions—between 30,000 and 
40,000 troops—by the fall of 2003. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz 
succinctly expressed this assumption during congressional testimony on February 27, 
2003, when he stated, “It’s hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide 
stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and to se-
cure the surrender of Saddam’s security forces and his army.”4 Second, they assumed 
that the Iraqi population would welcome U.S. forces. Three days before the war, 
Vice President Richard Cheney clearly articulated this view by stating, “My belief is 
we will, in fact, be greeted as liberators.”5 Iraqi exiles supported this belief by empha-
sizing that the Iraqis would greet U.S. forces with “sweets and flowers.”6 
The one post-Saddam challenge for which the U.S. government actually 
planned was that of a possible humanitarian emergency brought on by the possibly 
massive flow of refugees, combined with shortages of food, water, and medicine. An 
interagency planning team started meeting in the fall of 2002 and worked with in-
____________ 
4 Paul Wolfowitz, testimony to the House Budget Committee, February 27, 2003. 
5 Vice President Richard Cheney, remarks to Meet the Press, March 16, 2003. 
6 Kanan Makiya, as quoted in Joel Brinkley and Eric Schmitt, “Iraqi Leaders Say U.S. Was Warned of Disorder 
After Hussein, but Little Was Done,” New York Times, November 30, 2003. 
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ternational organizations (IOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to gen-
erate detailed humanitarian relief plans across a range of possible scenarios. As it 
turned out, because of the speed of military operations, which left supply networks 
largely intact, the war in Iraq did not generate significant humanitarian require-
ments. 
Task Force IV 
Significantly, observers at CENTCOM’s Internal Look exercise, held in December 
2002, noted that the warplans for Iraq did not include detailed planning for the 
postwar period. Later that month, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered 
Joint Forces Command to create a new organization, based on the Standing Joint 
Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) concept, that would plan for Phase IV and form the 
nucleus of a postwar military headquarters in Iraq. This new organization, called 
Task Force IV (TFIV), was placed under CENTCOM’s operational control and 
started assembling in Tampa in January 2003.  
Although the Joint Staff had identified an extremely important problem with 
the existing warplans, Task Force IV proved to be an unworkable solution to it. Hav-
ing been created very late in the planning process, and coming from outside 
CENTCOM, it had little influence. The fact that the task force’s director was a one-
star general, outranked by key players in CENTCOM’s planning process, only com-
pounded the problem. By March 2003, it was clear that Task Force IV would not 
become the nucleus of a postwar military headquarters, and it was officially dis-
banded by the end of the month. 
The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) 
On January 20, 2003, the National Security Council issued NSPD-24, which gave 
the Department of Defense primary responsibility for postwar Iraq and tasked DoD 
to form a new office to take charge of planning. Retired Army Lieutenant General 
Jay Garner was named to lead this new office, which became known as ORHA. 
Many of ORHA’s early staff members were military personnel because U.S. agencies 
proved reluctant to provide staff for ORHA, though its composition grew more bal-
anced over time. 
ORHA personnel soon discovered that the many administrative issues involved 
in setting up their organization left little time to deal with substantive issues and 
long-term planning. ORHA did plan for possible humanitarian relief operations, 
drawing on interagency relief plans prepared elsewhere. It also developed the concept 
of Ministerial Advisory Teams to ensure that Iraqi ministries continued to function 
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between the fall of Saddam Hussein and the establishment of a new permanent gov-
ernment. These concepts were discussed at a meeting held at the National Defense 
University on February 21 and 22, 2003, which included representatives from every 
U.S. government agency that would have a role in reconstruction. The meeting re-
vealed several serious shortcomings in preparations for dealing with postwar Iraq: 
U.S. agencies were reluctant to provide personnel for the ministerial teams, and the 
question of who would provide postwar security in Iraq remained unaddressed. Both 
of these issues would later pose significant problems for both ORHA and its succes-
sor, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). 
ORHA deployed to Kuwait in mid-March 2003, although many staff members 
would have preferred to remain in Washington longer to continue developing work-
ing relationships with their counterparts throughout the U.S. government. Once in 
Kuwait, ORHA learned that, for security reasons, the CFLCC commander did not 
want ORHA collocated with his forces at Camp Doha. ORHA thus set up its head-
quarters at the Kuwait Hilton, approximately 45 minutes away from Camp Doha 
and lacking rudimentary communications and infrastructure.  
Significantly, ORHA’s personnel were not privy to the warplans until shortly 
before the war started. ORHA had planned to enter Basra and start reconstruction 
efforts as soon as coalition military forces secured that city, but during the second 
week of March, Garner learned that the warplans called for most military forces to go 
straight to Baghdad instead of remaining in rear areas to provide security, thus ren-
dering many of ORHA’s plans obsolete. CFLCC directed ORHA to remain in Ku-
wait while major combat operations were conducted throughout Iraq. Not only did 
this render its plans ineffective, but once Baghdad fell and the looting started, it ex-
posed ORHA to charges that it was doing nothing to stop destruction around the 
country.  
ORHA began entering Baghdad on April 21, after Garner personally asked for 
and received permission to do so from General Franks. ORHA quickly discovered 
that conditions in Iraq were markedly different from those originally anticipated. 
The expected humanitarian crisis never materialized, while extensive looting dam-
aged much of the infrastructure that the military campaign had deliberately left in-
tact. Furthermore, the unsettled security situation significantly hindered ORHA’s 
reconstruction efforts.  
ORHA’s planning problems quickly became irrelevant, however, as on April 24, 
three days after Garner arrived in Baghdad, the Secretary of Defense informed him 
that President Bush intended to appoint L. Paul Bremer as his permanent envoy to 
Iraq. U.S. officials announced Bremer’s appointment on May 6, and he arrived in 
Baghdad on May 12 with a mandate to create a new Coalition Provisional Authority. 
Unlike ORHA, CPA would possess all the powers of an occupation authority. 
ORHA’s staff shrank as CPA’s grew, with few ORHA personnel choosing to stay on 
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and work for CPA. Garner left Iraq on June 1, almost two weeks after ORHA had 
been superseded by CPA. 
The Coalition Provisional Authority 
In May 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority took over from ORHA, and  
L. Paul Bremer became the administrator of Iraq. From then until Bremer handed 
power over to the Iraqis on June 28, 2004, the United States and the United King-
dom were the legal occupiers of Iraq. They had two simultaneous and sometimes 
competing missions: to run the country and to build up Iraqi institutions that would 
enable self-rule. The November 2003 decision to accelerate the handover of power 
by July 1, 2004, exacerbated the tension between the two missions.  
Although CPA was the governing body of occupied Iraq, it was not the only 
coalition structure in country, and it did not have authority over all other structures. 
Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7), the military command, which reported to 
CENTCOM, functioned separately, as did various intelligence agencies (including 
the CIA), and the Iraq Survey Group, which continued its hunt for weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD). In the absence of a detailed plan, these groups had to work out 
relations on the spot. While personal relations were often good, failures of coordina-
tion and information sharing sometimes created significant tensions, most commonly 
between the civilian and the military arms of the occupation.  
This problem was further exacerbated by the structural weaknesses of the CPA. 
It remained limited throughout its existence by the fact that the United States had 
never planned to be an occupying authority, and that it was quickly assembled on an 
ad hoc basis. It was staffed at half its authorized level, and many on its staff lacked 
government experience and only served short rotations. The lack of personnel, com-
bined with the deteriorating security situation, also meant that CPA had a negligible 
presence outside Baghdad, leaving military forces throughout the rest of the country 
to fill the gap left by the lack of civilian authority and reconstruction capacity. The 
Army and Marine Corps thus carried the major share of the stability and reconstruc-
tion missions outside Baghdad. 
Building governance structures. CPA worked hard to build governance struc-
tures under the tremendous strain of a deteriorating security situation that did not 
welcome exiles. At the same time, the CPA staff’s lack of access to other Iraqis re-
sulted in continued reliance on exiles in the building of a new Iraq. The CPA ap-
pointed the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC)—a multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian, and 
exile/Kurdish-dominated body—on July 13, 2003, after considerable debate and dis-
cussion about what form the new Iraqi government should take. While it was never 
popular with Iraqis, this 25-person body became over time an increasingly independ-
ent actor and CPA’s primary Iraqi interlocutor. 
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The IGC and CPA jointly issued the November 15 agreement, promising that 
the CPA would transfer authority to an interim Iraqi government by July 1, 2004, 
and requiring that a “basic law” or interim constitution be drafted by February 28, 
2004. The process of drafting the basic law, or Transitional Administrative Law 
(TAL), as it came to be called, took place largely in the first two months of 2004. A 
variety of issues surfaced during the TAL discussions, which kept the IGC from 
reaching full agreement on the TAL by the deadline. Ambassador Bremer and his 
staff pushed the drafters to continue work on the document into the early hours of 
March 1, 2004, when agreement was finally reached.  
On June 1, 2004, the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) was formed, with Iyad 
Allawi, formerly chair of the IGC security committee, as prime minister and Sheikh 
Ghazi al-Yawer as president. Two deputy presidents, as prescribed in the TAL, and a 
new cabinet were also selected. This new government then worked with CPA, the 
United Nations, and coalition capitals to facilitate the transfer of authority, which 
took place on June 28.  
Creating security forces and institutions. One of the greatest challenges faced 
by CPA and CJTF-7 was the creation of new Iraqi security forces. Prewar planning 
assumptions—that the old Iraqi military could undergo a process of disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) while helping ensure security during the 
interim period, and that police forces would remain largely intact and ensure law and 
order—proved deeply flawed. CPA was soon rebuilding both a military and a police 
force. 
CPA Order Number 2, issued on May 23, 2003, formally dissolved Iraq’s 
armed forces and its defense ministry, along with a number of other Saddam-era  
security-related structures. The Iraqi police service, historically a powerless and cor-
rupt structure, was suddenly expected to be the front line for internal security—in a 
deteriorating security situation. CPA’s advisors to the interior ministry, which had 
responsibility for police, were short-staffed and constantly torn between the effort to 
build effective structures and the need to get police on the streets and patrolling. This 
tension was exacerbated by a failure on the part of coalition capitals to recognize the 
crucial nature of the police mission and allocate sufficient resources to it.  
Military training was better structured, since there was less immediate need for 
Iraqi military forces and more prewar planning existed (CENTCOM had always 
planned on a new military for Iraq, but had expected to be able to rely more on the 
structures of the old one). Military personnel could readily be hired, trained, and 
then deployed. In addition to the Iraqi armed forces, coalition troops also developed 
the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC), which served as an Iraqi auxiliary of various 
sorts to coalition troops.  
Several problems plagued the building of Iraqi defense ministry forces. Crucial 
was the question of mission—whether such forces should be built for defense against 
external threats, or to help in the current conflict. Early efforts to use units domesti-
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cally led to refusals to fight and desertions. Militias also posed ongoing challenges for 
the CPA, since they had to be either disbanded or somehow brought under the con-
trol of the new Iraqi government. Although discussed for many months, efforts in 
this area did not begin in earnest until February 2004. Critical to these efforts was 
the adoption of the TAL, which would make all armed forces and militias not under 
federal control illegal in the new Iraq, except as provided by law. However, the im-
plementation of this process had barely begun at the time the IIG took power, and its 
future remained in doubt. 
Economic policy and reconstruction. Economic policy was another area for 
which there was little planning prior to the war. Under the CPA, coalition advisors 
sought to create an economic structure that would foster entrepreneurship and for-
eign investment. They faced opposition in some of these efforts from the IGC, which 
tended to prefer the status quo. 
The CPA was successful in reviving the Central Bank of Iraq, implementing a 
new currency and exchanging it for the old. It declared a tax holiday and lifted tariffs 
and import restrictions for 2003, and it issued a law on foreign direct investment. 
CPA also defined a budget for the second half of 2003 and for 2004: the first in dol-
lars, the second in dinars. More problematic were efforts to liberalize prices, particu-
larly for gasoline and fuel, to reform the food rationing system fully, and to restruc-
ture state-owned companies so that they could function in a modern economy. Plans 
to downsize and close such structures encountered stiff opposition from the Iraqi 
Governing Council. CPA’s failures to reform Iraq in these areas led to both contin-
ued economic waste and potentially slowed reconstruction. 
CPA also had the task of restoring essential services. It hoped to improve provi-
sion of services to about what it had been under Saddam Hussein, but soon found 
that the best it could do was to focus on the basic provision of water, oil, and elec-
tricity. Iraqi infrastructure was damaged both by the 1991 Persian Gulf War and by 
years of sanctions and neglect afterward. OIF and particularly the looting that ensued 
did additional damage to the capacity to produce electricity, oil, and water. This was 
a surprise to coalition forces, who expected to provide food and water to refugees and 
to protect the oil sector. They did not, however, expect to carry out large-scale recon-
struction.  
Reconstruction was mostly pursued through contracting mechanisms. Because 
there was some expectation of work in this area, USAID awarded a number of con-
tracts early on. Kellogg, Brown and Root (a Halliburton subsidiary), Bechtel, and 
other contractors were awarded large contracts to work on the oil fields, electricity, 
government buildings, ports, airports, and so forth. Other contracts were let 
throughout 2003. These were funded through a variety of mechanisms, including 
U.S. appropriations; Iraqi oil export earnings, deposited in the Development Fund 
for Iraq; accrued assets, including seized assets of Saddam or the Ba’ath party; funds 
from the UN Oil for Food account; and promises of assistance from other donors.  
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The success of reconstruction during the occupation period was mixed. At the 
time CPA handed over power to the IIG, electric power generation was near prewar 
levels, while oil production was below its preconflict peak and hampered by sabotage. 
Water provision, however, had improved, and mobile telephone service helped com-
pensate for lagging fixed-line provision.  
The Army and Postwar Planning 
Looking back, we can see that the failure to plan for and adequately resource stability 
operations had serious repercussions that affected the United States throughout the 
occupation period and continue to affect U.S. military forces in Iraq. Because U.S. 
forces were not directed to establish law and order—and may not have had enough 
forces for this mission anyway—they stood aside while looters ravaged Iraq’s infra-
structure and destroyed the facilities that the military campaign had taken great pains 
to ensure remained intact. Because Iraq’s own police and military evaporated shortly 
after Saddam fell, ordinary Iraqis lived in a basically lawless society for months, dur-
ing which, among other things, insurgents, terrorists, and criminal gangs assembled 
with impunity. And because U.S. forces have had to focus on providing security for 
their own personnel (both military and civilian) as much as for Iraqis, the buildup of 
coalition forces did not bring the degree of safety and security it might have brought 
had order been imposed from the start. 
The situation has only gotten worse since the insurgency began. U.S. forces 
have had to assume that ordinary citizens may be potential belligerents, often leaving 
Iraqi civilians in the crossfire. A consistent majority of the Iraqi population identified 
security and safety as the most urgent issue facing Iraq throughout the occupation 
period.7 The failure to stabilize and secure Iraq has therefore had the inadvertent ef-
fect of strengthening the insurgency, as Iraqis witness many of the negative effects of 
the U.S. military presence without seeing positive progress on the issues that matter 
to them most. The insurgency has also been aided by the failure of U.S. military 
forces to emphasize the mission of sealing the country’s borders—a mission that still 
ranks relatively low on the list of important coalition missions—enabling critical for-
eign support to flow into Iraq. 
____________ 
7 This trend continued after the June 28, 2004 transfer of authority. Results do vary somewhat by city. Between 
January and August 2004, the percentage of the population identifying safety and security as the most urgent 
issue averaged 63 percent in Baquba; 60 percent in Mosul; 53 percent in Baghdad; 47 percent in Najaf; and 30 
percent in Basra. When asked “How safe do you feel in your neighborhood?” the number of respondents who 
answered “not very safe” or “not safe at all” averaged 63 percent in Basra; 58 percent in Baquba; 57 percent in 
Baghdad and Najaf; 46 percent in Mosul; and 33 percent in Karbala. See “Opinion Analysis,” U.S. Department 
of State Office of Research, M-106-04, September 16, 2004, Appendix 6A. 
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This is not to say that stability and order would rule in Iraq today had U.S. 
planners only spent more time planning for post-Saddam operations. Counterfactu-
als like this lie beyond proof. Still, a strong inference can be drawn that, had security 
been imposed across Iraq from the moment Saddam fell, the insurgency that so af-
flicts Iraq today would not have had the political “space” in which to take root. And 
the Iraqi people themselves, however resentful they might have been of occupation 
forces, could have at least thanked those forces for enforcing law and order and thus a 
degree of public safety. In terms of its status with ordinary Iraqis, after all, U.S. forces 
were in the worst possible situation: there in numbers sufficient to be resented as oc-
cupiers but insufficient to impose order. It seems highly likely that the situation in 
Iraq today would be more manageable had U.S. planners spent more time thinking 
through post-Saddam scenarios and planning for both combat and post-combat with 
the worst of those scenarios in mind. 
Instead, U.S. government planning was based on a set of optimistic assumptions 
that was never seriously challenged: that the military campaign would have a decisive 
end and would produce a stable security environment; that U.S. forces would be 
greeted as liberators; that Iraq’s government ministries would remain intact and con-
tinue to administer the country; and that local forces, particularly the police and the 
regular army, would be capable of providing law and order. Those assumptions 
channeled the interagency planning process, such as it was, into a focus on humani-
tarian relief, on the assumption that reconstruction and stabilization would not be 
required. And they made it very difficult—because they made it seem unnecessary—
to assign responsibility and resources for providing security in the immediate after-
math of major combat operations, perhaps the single most important failure of the 
prewar planning process. 
In a very real sense, key officials predicted the future with sufficient confidence 
to rule out alternative plans. In fact, of course, the future is always unpredictable, 
which is why planners routinely explore alternative scenarios in search of the “worst 
cases” that can pose the greatest challenges to their plans. Their plans then reflect ac-
tions that either cover or hedge against those possibilities. This is in some sense the 
basis for the standard military planning and decision process. 
Yet in this case, few military voices besides that of Army Chief of Staff General 
Eric K. Shinseki called attention to the possibility of a major, long-term security 
challenge in post-Saddam Iraq. One reason other military voices remained muted 
was that the military operated within the prevailing assumptions set by senior civilian 
officials, which did not identify security as a problem. Also, as General Franks makes 
clear in his memoirs, the senior Army planner for OIF was reluctant to take respon-
sibility for security and stabilization missions in the aftermath of major combat. This 
was not seen as the military’s role or mission.  
Yet it is precisely through General Franks that the military could have voiced its 
concerns, since it is the combatant commander, far more than the “institutional” 
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services, who plays a strong role in the interagency planning process. Yet the institu-
tional services are not irrelevant, since it is from them that the combatant command-
ers are drawn. And those commanders reflect a view of war and stabilization that can 
only be taught in service schools and other institutions. What Franks lacked was a 
complete view of what his forces were about to undertake. A more holistic view 
would be informed by three key assumptions: 
• First, it should be clear from U.S. interventions not just in Iraq, but in Afghani-
stan, Kosovo, and Bosnia, that wars do not end when major conflict ends. Wars 
emerge from an unsatisfactory set of political circumstances, and they end with 
the successful creation of new and more favorable political circumstances—in 
this case, circumstances more favorable to U.S. interests. Creating those new 
circumstances may not involve continuing conflict, and even if conflict is pre-
sent, it may not be as intense as the counterinsurgency operations confronting 
U.S. forces in Iraq today. But given the likely security vacuum following major 
conflict, planners cannot avoid considering a variety of forms of conflict. 
• Second, these post-conflict missions will almost unavoidably fall to forces pre-
sent on the ground at the time. To some extent the security missions that follow 
major conflict are legitimate tasks for ground forces that, by virtue of their pos-
session of the instruments of violence, can impose security in such situations. 
But the absence of security makes it unlikely that the civilian organizations that 
would normally handle reconstruction tasks will be available quickly to take on 
those roles. In the immediate aftermath of major conflict, and perhaps for a 
good deal longer, “civilian” as well as “military” missions will fall to forces on 
the ground. 
• Finally, it should be clear that the way the actual conflict unfolds exerts enor-
mous influence over the situation that emerges and evolves after the major con-
flict ends. To provide security in the aftermath of Saddam’s fall, the invading 
force needed more troops. A larger force might also have been able to force 
Saddam’s military to surrender rather than simply melt away, weapons in hand. 
These observations testify to the dangerous artificiality of the distinction be-
tween Phase IV, on the one hand, and the phases that preceded it. They are not 
distinct phases; planning for each in sequence can produce unhappy outcomes. 
These lessons have significance for the U.S. Army’s Title 10 role of organizing, 
training, and equipping forces for use by combatant commanders in major conflicts. 
The Army must put real meaning into the phrase “full spectrum force.” It must be 
able to fight and dominate an adversary in major conflict. But as we can see in Iraq, 
Army forces must also be prepared to provide security to a civilian populace, recon-
struct infrastructure as necessary, escort children safely to school, perhaps even help 
clear raw sewage from the streets. They will usually do so in a cultural environment 
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foreign to them, yet those missions will require them to have at least enough cultural 
awareness to avoid undermining the mission. 
But the more crucial significance of these basic lessons comes at the level of 
military and strategic planning. Clearly these lessons produce a very different view of 
the military planning process than the one for OIF. Military planners must start with 
a view of the desired outcome of the war—not the outcome of major conflict, but 
the creation of the desired political circumstances that signal the real end of the war. 
They must do so both because their forces, and especially forces on the ground, will 
be intimately involved in creating those circumstances, and because the way in which 
military action unfolds will heavily shape the way the rest of the war unfolds. 
One way to capture this lesson is to say that military planners must “start with 
Phase IV.” But a more accurate solution is to dispense with phases, which inevitably 
produce sequenced plans that risk missing crucial connections from phase to phase. 
Planners must start with strategic guidance from the civilian leadership on where 
they want to be, strategically, when the war ends. They can then work backward to 
points of major conflict, shaping plans for those in ways that contribute to the larger 
and longer-term strategic goal. 
Starting planning this way will ensure that “Phase IV” will not be ignored or 
underplayed in the planning process. But as planning for OIF makes clear, it is essen-
tial that planners entertain a full array of possible scenarios for getting to that strate-
gic end point. Even the most reasonable assumptions must be challenged, and hedg-
ing actions must be an integral part of the plan. Recognizing that military forces— 
largely U.S. Army forces—will play a role in these activities should give the combat-
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After more than 15 months of planning, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) com-
menced in March 2003. Major combat operations in Iraq lasted approximately three 
weeks, but stabilization efforts in that country are, as of this writing, ongoing. The 
U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps are increasingly taxed by the demands of the 
continuing insurgency, with more than 100,000 troops expected to remain in Iraq 
for the foreseeable future. How did Iraq get to this point? Why was the United States 
so unprepared for the challenges of postwar Iraq? 
The evidence suggests that the United States had neither the people nor the 
plans in place to handle the situation that arose after the fall of Saddam Hussein. 
Looters took to the streets, damaging much of Iraq’s infrastructure that had remained 
intact throughout major combat. Iraqi police and military units were nowhere to be 
found, having largely dispersed during combat. U.S. military forces in Baghdad and 
elsewhere in the country were not prepared to respond rapidly to the initial looting 
and subsequent large-scale public unrest. These conditions enabled the insurgency to 
take root, and the Army and Marine Corps have been battling the insurgents ever 
since. 
It is not the case that no one planned for postwar Iraq. On the contrary, many 
agencies and organizations within the U.S. government did identify a range of possi-
ble postwar challenges in 2002 and early 2003, before major combat commenced, 
and suggested strategies for addressing them. Some of these ideas seem quite pre-
scient in retrospect. Why, then, were they not incorporated into the planning proc-
ess? As part of a larger study of OIF, RAND Arroyo Center examined prewar plan-
ning for postwar Iraq and the subsequent occupation, and drew lessons and 
recommendations from the Iraq experience. 
U.S. civilian planning was driven by a particular set of assumptions, held by 
senior policymakers throughout the government, about the conditions that would 
emerge after major combat and what would be required thereafter. These assump-
tions—which included U.S. forces being greeted as liberators, the emergence of a 
stable security situation, and the continued functioning of the Iraqi government min-
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istries—remained largely unchallenged. No contingency plans were developed in case 
these assumptions proved to be incorrect.  
Furthermore, senior military commanders assumed that civilian authorities 
would be responsible for the postwar period. They focused the vast majority of their 
attention on preparations for and the execution of major combat operations, and as-
sumed that their responsibilities largely ended there. They assumed, incorrectly as it 
turned out, that the war would have a clearly defined end and they would quickly 
transfer responsibility for Iraq to civilians. This overlooked the lack of a standing ci-
vilian organization capable of taking such responsibility, and the possible require-
ment that military forces provide basic law and order during any transition period. 
Furthermore, civilians did not participate in the highly classified war planning proc-
ess, which would have made coordinated planning for the transition period extremely 
challenging even if such a standing authority had existed.  
This report examines the range of U.S. government planning efforts for postwar 
Iraq, as well as the challenges that emerged for both military and civilian authorities 
during the occupation period. Chapters Two through Six examine prewar planning 
efforts for postwar Iraq. Chapter Two examines military planning, including the 
plans developed by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and the Combined 
Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC). Chapter Three examines civilian 
planning, starting with an overview of the interagency process and examining the 
specific roles of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the State Department, 
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the National Security 
Council (NSC) staff. It also summarizes some of the reports and recommendations 
issued by think tanks and academic institutions that were published before the war. 
Chapter Four describes Task Force IV (TFIV), an organization created by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff to fill some of the gaps in CENTCOM’s postwar planning efforts. 
Chapter Five tells the story of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assis-
tance (ORHA), the organization created within the U.S. Department of Defense 
(DoD) after it had been designated the official lead agency for postwar Iraq. Chapter 
Six focuses specifically on planning for humanitarian assistance. Such assistance is 
often considered to be part of reconstruction, but it warrants a separate discussion 
because humanitarian assistance planning proved to be far more coordinated and ef-
fective in this case than reconstruction planning.  
Chapter Seven provides an overview of combat operations between the middle 
of April 2003 and August 2004. It examines the security situation in Iraq in the im-
mediate aftermath of major combat operations, looks at the military organization in 
theater for Phase IV stability and support operations, describes the major types of 
attacks conducted by and against coalition forces, and analyzes events reported as 
significant. This analysis provides a snapshot of continuing combat operations in Iraq 
through the occupation period. 
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Chapters Eight through Twelve examine the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA), the organization established in May 2003 to oversee the reconstruction of 
Iraq. CPA possessed a much more robust mandate than ORHA, one that confirmed 
its role as an occupying authority. CPA’s orders had the force of law throughout Iraq 
during its 14-month existence. Its goal was to create a democratic and free Iraq by 
the end of the occupation period. Chapter Eight starts by discussing the origins, 
goals, structure, and functions of CPA. The next four chapters examine each of 
CPA’s four core “foundations”: Chapter Nine focuses on building Iraq’s new security 
forces; Chapter Ten addresses governance and political reconstruction; Chapter 
Eleven assesses economic policy; and Chapter Twelve examines the restoration of 
essential services in Iraq. 
Chapter Thirteen concludes the report by analyzing why the United States 
failed to prepare adequately for the challenges and remained unprepared for the con-
ditions that emerged in postwar Iraq. The chapter identifies some of the unchal-
lenged assumptions and political constraints that limited the planning process, indi-
cates some of their consequences, and concludes with recommendations for U.S. 
policy and for the U.S. Army. 
The purpose of this analysis is to find out where problems occurred and to sug-
gest possibilities to improve planning and operations in the future. The results of 
such analysis can seem therefore to be overly focused on the negative. This should 
not be taken to mean that no good was done. In fact, dedicated U.S. and coalition 
personnel, both military and civilian, engaged in many positive and constructive ac-
tivities, individually and collectively. That this analysis does not highlight all those 
activities should not in any way detract from their value. Our focus, however, re-
mains on finding ways to improve. 
This volume draws on a wide range of sources, including government docu-
ments, press reports, numerous interviews with U.S. civilian and military officials, 
and, for Chapters Eight through Twelve, the personal experiences of several authors 
who worked for CPA. Most of those interviewed chose to remain anonymous, but 
their affiliations are noted so that their statements can be put into context. We have 
tried to corroborate their statements wherever possible, and we have noted when in-




Military Planning Efforts 
The rapid and decisive defeat of Iraq’s military forces, and the subsequent advance to 
Baghdad, Tikrit, Kirkuk, and Mosul, clearly demonstrated the dominance of the 
U.S. military on the battlefield. The success of its campaign plan during major com-
bat operations ensured that coalition forces simultaneously attacked Iraqi forces 
throughout the depth and breadth of Iraq, including major operations in the north 
with the Kurds, in the western desert, along the eastern border with Iran, and 
throughout the central Tigris/Euphrates river valley from Umm Qasr to parts of the 
Sunni Triangle north of Baghdad. Initially, most Iraqis viewed coalition forces as lib-
erators. Before long, however, an organized resistance began to undermine the early 
military success and erode Iraqi public support. 
From May 2003 and continuing beyond June 2004, an insurgency mounted 
within Iraq. This new enemy, consisting of loose coalitions of former Ba’athists, Iraqi 
Islamists, and foreign fighters, has waged a relentless war against coalition operations 
and the new Iraqi government by attacking infrastructure, government officials, civil-
ian targets, and coalition military. Moreover, by June 2004 an overwhelming major-
ity of the Iraqi public had come to view U.S. military forces as foreign occupiers 
rather than liberators.1 The question becomes, then, to what extent did planning 
shortfalls contribute to this situation? In retrospect, what could have been done to 
prevent or mitigate the difficulties the United States and its coalition partners began 
experiencing in Iraq? What does this mean for Army forces, and for Army planning? 
This chapter examines the military planning for postwar operations—often re-
ferred to as Phase IV—that took place at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and 
at Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC). The chapter concludes 
with conclusions and recommendations concerning the planning process in general 
and the specifics of Phase IV planning for OIF in particular. 
____________ 
1 Interview with NSC official, July 2004.  
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CENTCOM Operational Planning 
On November 27, 2001, shortly before the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the 
Secretary of Defense directed CENTCOM to develop a plan that would forcibly re-
move Saddam Hussein from power.2 As part of its deliberate planning process, 
CENTCOM had developed Operations Plan (OPLAN) 1003 in 1998 in the event 
that the United States found itself in another war with Iraq. On December 7, 2001, 
the CENTCOM Commander, General Tommy Franks, presented Secretary of De-
fense Donald Rumsfeld with the first iteration of his Commander’s Concept of Op-
erations.3 According to Franks, although the existing plan provided an operational 
construct for removing Saddam Hussein and eliminating the threat of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) use by Iraq, it did not address the current disposition of 
U.S. forces, advances in precision-guided munitions made since the end of the Per-
sian Gulf War, or the lessons being learned from U.S. operations in Afghanistan. By 
the time Franks’s new OPLAN was finished it grew to 89 pages, with thousands of 
pages of specialized appendices. 
Early in the iterative process of developing his Commander’s Concept, General 
Franks limited participation to a small number of senior officers. By December 8, 
2001, he had developed a working matrix that highlighted what he called “Lines and 
Slices.” The slices can best be understood as target sets he wanted to affect, while the 
lines were the means he would use against particular targets. Together they represent 
what General Franks considered to be the primary focus areas of the operation. This 
matrix demonstrates that even at this early stage, Franks was envisioning a plan that 
focused not only on defeating the Iraqi military and removing Saddam Hussein from 
power, but also on doing it in a way that achieved his overall strategic goals, particu-
larly as they related to the Iraqi population. According to Franks, the challenges asso-
ciated with the “day after the war” were being considered early in the planning proc-
ess.4 
On December 28, 2001, General Franks briefed his Commander’s Concept to 
President George W. Bush and identified four major phases of operations. Each 
phase had specific end-state objectives that had to be achieved before moving to the 
next phase. Phase I included establishing international support and creating an “air 
bridge” that would be used to transport forces and capabilities into the theater. Phase 
____________ 
2 Tommy Franks, American Solider, New York: Regan Books, 2004, p. 315. 
3 The Commander’s Concept of Operations communicates the basic principles that should guide detailed plan-
ning efforts. As Franks describes, it contains “the philosophical underpinnings of what might eventually become a 
plan.” See Franks, p. 329. 
4 Franks, pp. 340–341. The “Lines and Slices” matrix developed by General Franks in December 2001—which is 
reproduced in his book on p. 340—remained the foundation for campaign planning for OIF. As late as April 
2003, CFLCC referenced a more refined variant of this template when it published a draft of OPLAN ECLIPSE 
II. 
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II was designed to “shape the battlespace” before ground operations were initiated. 
Phase III identified two primary goals: “regime forces defeated or capitulated” and 
“regime leaders dead, apprehended, or marginalized.” Finally, Franks briefed his 
overarching concept for Phase IV, “post hostility operations,” arguing that this phase 
would be the longest—“years, not months” in duration. In fact, the briefing chart 
used to discuss Phase IV split the arrow representing a timeline into segments and 
identified its duration as “unknown.” The end-state objectives for Phase IV were 
identified as “the establishment of a representative form of government, a country 
capable of defending its territorial borders and maintaining its internal security, 
without any weapons of mass destruction.”5 While many details had yet to be re-
solved, the President approved the overarching concept of a four-phased campaign.6 
On January 7, 2002, General Franks assembled his small group of planners en-
gaged in compartmentalized planning for OPLAN 1003V and charged them with 
developing options in the event that President Bush decided to initiate an attack in 
response to action taken by Iraq. For the next three months, a handful of officers on 
the CENTCOM staff continued to plan for all four phases of OPLAN 1003V. As 
the Commander’s Concept matured, it eventually involved a five-pronged attack 
with ground forces simultaneously advancing into Iraq from Kuwait and Turkey, 
special operations forces (SOF) moving into the western desert areas to prevent 
SCUD missiles from being employed, a comprehensive information and psychologi-
cal operations (PSYOP) “front” being launched to erode the resolve of the Iraqi mili-
tary, and an operational fires attack targeting Baghdad and the Republican Guard 
forces defending the city. At this point in the planning process, Phases I through III 
were expected to take up to 135 days.7 A central part of the Phase IV plan was the 
continued deployment of additional forces until a sufficient number of forces were in 
theater to accomplish the mission. As General Franks stated to President Bush in 
February 2002, “[a]s stability operations proceed, force levels would continue to 
grow—perhaps to as many as two hundred and fifty thousand troops, or until we are 
sure we’ve met our end-state objectives.”8 This aspect of the plan is critically impor-
tant to highlight, because military leaders in the operational headquarters and on the 
Army staff assumed that forces would continue to flow into theater even after the end 
of Phase III.  
____________ 
5 Franks, p. 351. 
6 The briefing prepared for the President did not include a discussion of phasing. However, after General Franks 
concluded his briefing, Secretary of State Colin Powell asked a question that resulted in the need to refer to back-
up slides detailing CENTCOM’s phasing concept. It was not until Franks’s February 3, 2002, briefing to the 
President that these slides on phasing made their way into the formal briefing.  
7 Franks, p. 366. 
8 Franks, pp. 361–363, 366, and 376–377. 
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It was not until March 21, 2002, that General Franks met with his component 
commanders for the first time to discuss the “shape and scope” of a potential military 
operation against Iraq. While the compartmentalized nature of the planning process 
continued, small planning staffs for each of the components were established to begin 
working in parallel on their supporting OPLANs.  
On August 5, 2002, Franks again briefed President Bush and the National Se-
curity Council (NSC) on OPLAN 1003V. What had begun as a concept nine 
months earlier had now become a full campaign plan. The expected length of Phase 
III had been shortened to 90 days, but the time required to meet Phase IV objectives 
remained indeterminate. Franks raised what he called the potential for “catastrophic 
success,” which would occur if the Iraqi military resistance fractured early in the 
campaign, if a military coup toppled Saddam Hussein, or if Shi’ite and Kurdish re-
bellions occurred in Iraq.9 He expressed particular concern about the potential for 
lawlessness and violence in the immediate aftermath of military operations. There 
was wide agreement within the NSC that, if this occurred, coalition forces would 
continue with the campaign plan until order was restored and the Iraqis were able to 
govern themselves. At the conclusion of the briefing, Franks stated that he envisioned 
having a maximum of 250,000 troops in Iraq at the end of Phase III.10 These forces 
would be necessary to help create a new Iraqi military and establish a constabulary 
force.11 Franks further stated that “well-designed and well-funded reconstruction pro-
jects that put large numbers of Iraqis to work and quickly meet community needs—
and expectations—will be the keys to our success in Phase IV.” He made it clear that 
it was important to enable Iraqis to gain control of their own governance as soon as 
possible. Significantly, Franks told President Bush that the U.S. exit strategy had to 
be linked to effective Iraqi governance rather than to any artificial timeline, a conclu-
sion not challenged by any member of the NSC.12 
____________ 
9 Franks, pp. 380–393. 
10 Franks first mentioned that Phase IV might require as many as 250,000 troops in a February 2002 briefing to 
Secretary Rumsfeld. Franks, p. 366.  
11 It is important to note that the total number of troops in Iraq never reached 250,000. Moreover, as soon as 
U.S. forces marched into Baghdad, General Franks made the decision to stop the deployment of the 1st Cavalry 
Division, even though the end-state objectives of his plan had not yet been met. It is also unclear how it was de-
termined that 250,000 troops would be sufficient for the tasks likely to be required in a postwar Iraq. As will be 
discussed later, U.S. military experience in postwar situations in Bosnia and Kosovo suggest that postwar opera-
tions require a ratio of 20 soldiers for every 1,000 inhabitants. With an Iraqi population of 25 million, historical 
experience suggests that a minimum of 500,000 soldiers would be required. That number is in addition to the 
numbers of police, gendarmerie, and carabinieri units that would be of vital assistance in maintaining public or-
der. Obviously, the number of troops and police required for any post-conflict operation will be affected by a 
number of different factors, including population, terrain, assigned missions, level of violence and organized resis-
tance, and the degree to which neighboring countries and the local populace are supporting the resistance. For a 
more detailed analysis of this subject, see James Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany 
to Iraq, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MR-1753-RC, 2003, pp. 149–153.  
12 Franks, pp. 392–393. 
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Franks and his planning staff had numerous discussions about what a postwar 
Iraq might look like and what type of interim political government might best be 
established. While members of his staff argued that rebuilding the infrastructure 
could not take place without security, Franks believed that security would not be 
achieved without reconstruction and civic action. There was, however, wide agree-
ment that the two issues were inextricably linked.13 
CENTCOM assumed it would help the interim government establish a para-
military security force that would be drawn from some of the better units of the de-
feated Iraqi army. It was envisioned that these units would work in conjunction with 
coalition military forces to help restore order and prevent armed conflicts among 
ethnic, religious, or tribal factions. Franks concluded that “this model had been used 
effectively in Afghanistan,” and CENTCOM planners believed it was the best solu-
tion they had to the challenge of providing security in the immediate aftermath of 
major combat operations.14 Questions remained, however, about the effectiveness of 
the Afghanistan model, especially outside Kabul, and whether that model would 
work in a country that is largely urbanized, has clear fault lines among three major 
ethnic and religious groups, and had no clear successor government.  
CENTCOM planners believed that additional forces would be required for 
Phase IV operations. However, there was substantial agreement among the planning 
staffs in theater that surrendering Iraq divisions and corps could be quickly employed 
to help maintain security, and that they would facilitate a rapid transition back to 
Iraqi control. The final version of OPLAN 1003V assumed that these surrendering 
Iraqi forces would be available to the coalition, and that additional U.S. forces would 
continue arriving in theater as stability operations commenced after Phase III, or, as 
the OPLAN stated, “until we are sure we’ve met our end-state objectives.”15 
After OPLAN 1003V was published in February 2003, the CENTCOM future 
planning staff began developing a detailed plan for Phase IV operations called 
OPLAN IRAQI RECONSTRUCTION. It was developed in collaboration with the 
planning staffs of the main ground force units in Iraq, the 1st Marine Expeditionary 
Force (I MEF) and the U.S. Army’s V Corps. This plan identified seven focus areas 
for the postwar period: maintain the rule of law, provide security, support civil ad-
ministration, provide necessary assistance to civilian governance, maintain and en-
large the coalition, provide emergency humanitarian assistance as required, and assist 
in the assessment, restoration, and repair of critical life support infrastructure.16  
____________ 
13 Franks, pp. 422 and 424. 
14 Franks, p. 419. 
15 Franks, p. 366. 
16 Interview with CENTCOM official, May 2005. See also Kenneth R. Timmerman, “Details of the Postwar 
Master Plan,” Insight on the News, November 24, 2003. 
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OPLAN IRAQI RECONSTRUCTION suffered from three significant limita-
tions. First, it was completed at the end of April 2003, after the fall of Baghdad and 
after subsequent looting destroyed much of the infrastructure left intact by the mili-
tary campaign and expanded the range of reconstruction requirements. Second, it 
lacked any additional resources; the forces and capabilities that had conducted major 
combat operations were the ones that would be available for postwar stability and 
reconstruction operations. Finally, the plan envisaged military forces supporting civil-
ian reconstruction efforts, not playing the lead role. Yet, as will be discussed in Chap-
ter Five, civilian reconstruction efforts suffered from unchallenged assumptions, a 
very short planning time, and a lack of coordination with the military. 
Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) Phase IV 
Planning 
As specified in OPLAN 1003V, the Combined Forces Land Component Command 
(CFLCC) was given primary responsibility for Phase IVa—stability operations. Lieu-
tenant General Paul Mikolashek, then the commander of the U.S. Third Army, 
which had been designated the CFLCC, was informed of his responsibilities for 
Phase IV when the Third Army was directed to begin planning in January 2002, just 
days after General Franks met with President Bush at Crawford, Texas. Colonel 
Kevin Benson, who had been selected to be the Director of Policy, Plans and Strategy 
(C5), was given access to the developing warplans.17 He immediately concluded that 
the CFLCC needed to put more emphasis on Phase IV planning and, consequently, 
spent the next two months making contact with people—inside both government 
and academia—who were involved in projects that examined issues associated with 
postwar Iraq.18  
The C5 also led a group of strategic planners who developed CFLCC’s support-
ing plan for OPLAN 1003V—called OPLAN COBRA II. From the very beginning, 
COBRA II was an all-inclusive OPLAN that addressed all aspects of the ground 
campaign, beginning in Phase I and continuing through Phase IV redeployment. 
During the first few months, however, access to OPLAN 1003V was limited to a 
handful of senior officers at CFLCC. Colonel Benson was the only officer below the 
rank of brigadier general who was “read-on” to OPLAN 1003V. Consequently, the 
CFLCC C5 planning team was constrained in its efforts to build a comprehensive 
____________ 
17 Within Joint and Combined Headquarters, the J5 and C5 respectively provide political-military oversight for 
all aspects of the operation, including interacting with the host nation, nongovernmental organizations, civil af-
fairs, and other U.S. government and coalition civilian organizations. For a more detailed description of the du-
ties and responsibilities of the J5 and C5, see Joint Publication 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and 
Procedures, January 13, 1999. 
18 Interview with CFLCC official, August 2004. 
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supporting plan.19 In October 2002, the classification of OPLAN 1003V was down-
graded to Secret and a larger number of the CFLCC planning staff gained access to 
it. 
As CFLCC started to ramp up for the possibility of war, the size and composi-
tion of its staff, including the planning staff, grew. By January 2003, nine graduates 
from the Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) had been assigned to 
CFLCC because of their unique skills.20 In fact, the Army transferred many of these 
officers from other duty assignments well in advance of their normal rotation dates 
specifically because of their schooling.21 
As we shall discuss in Chapter Four, a newly created Task Force IV (TFIV) 
headquarters, commanded by Brigadier General Steven Hawkins, forward deployed 
in late January 2003 from Tampa to Kuwait and was placed under the operational 
control of the CFLCC. TFIV had been established by order of the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), who intended it to be the nucleus around which Phase 
IV operations would be planned and conducted. However, by the time TFIV arrived 
in theater, CFLCC had already done considerable planning for post-conflict opera-
tions, and there was considerable confusion over exactly what this new headquarters 
would do.22 
CFLCC’s planning staff envisioned that TFIV would only assume responsibili-
ties for Phase IV operations after the CFLCC redeployed to the United States. How-
ever, the commander of TFIV believed he was given full responsibility for Phase IV 
planning. As a result, the CFLCC C5 and TFIV conducted parallel planning for the 
same mission. Little direct coordination occurred between the two planning staffs, 
though the TFIV commander met regularly with the C5 and the deputy commander 
of CFLCC to share information. It is important to note that as late as mid-February 
2003, the exact role of TFIV was undefined. On February 15, 2003, Lieutenant 
General David McKiernan (who had taken command of U.S. Third Army in Sep-
tember 2002) was presented with two options for employing TFIV: embedding the 
task force within a three-star headquarters or building a three-star headquarters 
around TFIV. The ultimate decision was to do neither: TFIV was disbanded and the 
Phase IVb mission was assigned to V Corps.23  
Once COBRA II was completed, the C5 began a series of wargaming efforts to 
test the plan’s assumptions and to identify any potential shortcomings that could be 
____________ 
19 This is a common occurrence in the development of OPLANs. 
20 Interview with CFLCC official, August 2004. 
21 Lieutenant Colonel Steven W. Peterson, “Central but Inadequate: The Application of Theory in Operation 
Iraqi Freedom,” a paper presented in partial completion of the course of study at the National Defense Univer-
sity, undated, p. 3. 
22 Interview with CFLCC official, August 2004.  
23 At mission assumption, this military headquarters became known as Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7). 
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rectified before the initiation of hostilities. To facilitate this wargaming effort, Lieu-
tenant Colonel Steven Peterson, the chief of intelligence planning within C5, di-
rected an aggressive “Red Team” effort.24 By the middle of February 2003, thanks in 
part to this effort, some in the C5 staff concluded that, as planned, “the campaign 
would produce conditions at odds with meeting the strategic objectives” established 
by CENTCOM.25 Members of the C5 staff further concluded that the “joint cam-
paign was specifically designed to break all control mechanisms of the regime and 
that there would be a period following regime collapse in which [CFLCC forces] 
would face the greatest danger to [U.S.] strategic objectives.” The assessment went on 
to describe the “risk of an influx of terrorists to Iraq, the rise of criminal activity, 
probable actions of former regime members, and the loss of [any weapons of mass 
destruction] that was believed to exist.”26 This assessment did not foresee all chal-
lenges that would confront CFLCC during the transition from Phase III to Phase IV, 
but it did identify a number of actions that needed to be addressed in the OPLAN, 
including “planning to control the borders, analyzing what key areas and infrastruc-
ture should be immediately protected, and allocating adequate resources to quickly 
re-establish postwar control throughout Iraq.”27 
Although a complete consensus within the C5 staff concerning the magnitude 
of the problem could not be reached, it was clear that if the ground war went as fast 
as some expected, and if the regime collapsed suddenly, then coalition forces most 
likely would not be in place where needed for Phase IV stability operations.28 When 
this assessment was communicated to the commander of CFLCC, C5 staff members 
reported that Lieutenant General McKiernan chose not to change the ground com-
bat plan that had been developed with CENTCOM and subordinate commands be-
cause the Iraqi military remained the greatest immediate threat to coalition forces. 
After they briefed CFLCC commander Lieutenant General McKiernan in February, 
no one on the staff was willing to bring the issue back to the surface later and make 
the argument that combat forces needed for the warfighting effort should be reposi-
tioned in order to better prepare the forces to respond to situations that might occur 
after the battle had been won.29 Although members of the planning staff recognized 
that forces would have to conduct major repositioning at the end of major combat to 
be in place for their assigned Phase IV missions, their first priority remained the de-
struction of Iraqi forces, and they believed that the existing plan offered the best way 
____________ 
24 Interview with CFLCC official, August 2004. 
25 Peterson, p. 11. 
26 Peterson, p. 10. 
27 Peterson, p. 10. 
28 Interview with CFLCC official, January 2005. 
29 Peterson, pp. 10–11. 
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to accomplish this objective. In essence, sufficient forces were not available to con-
duct both missions simultaneously. In the end, Lieutenant General McKiernan and 
his staff decided to accept risk during the early stages of Phase IV rather than during 
major combat operations.30 
In fact, the CFLCC planners had correctly anticipated that coalition forces 
would not be in position to address the immediate security challenges brought about 
by the collapse of the Iraqi government. As anticipated and planned for in ECLIPSE 
II, a major repositioning of forces was required during the latter part of April and 
early May to ensure even a minimum level of security throughout the country.31  
Even though the C5 staff was unwilling to press CFLCC’s commander to fun-
damentally reshape the conduct of Phase III operations, their analysis of Phase IV did 
convince Lieutenant General McKiernan to create a sequel OPLAN in the event that 
the end-state conditions envisioned for Phase III did not materialize. With CFLCC’s 
approval, the C5 began writing OPLAN ECLIPSE II as a sequel to the existing 
OPLAN. The plan had been through 15 revisions by the middle of March 2003, and 
the final coordinating draft was released on April 12.32 As with all other OPLANs, 
the subordinate and supporting commands all produced their own annexes to this 
sequel. Each draft plan was shared with V Corps as it was being written, in order to 
inform the corps’ planning efforts for Phase IV. This type of distributed and parallel 
planning for Phase IV ensured that V Corps and I MEF—along with their subordi-
nate divisions and brigades—were near-equal partners in the planning process.33 
While it is clear that CFLCC was gaining a realistic appraisal of the potential 
security challenges that would confront coalition forces in the postwar period, the 
planning staff never formally challenged some of the basic assumptions outlined in 
COBRA II. For example, ECLIPSE II assumed that Iraqi civil authorities would 
“continue to run local and regional essential services.” Moreover, although this was 
not listed as a planning assumption, CFLCC envisioned that civil order would be 
controlled “through published proclamations and the existing legal system where 
possible.” ECLIPSE II also overestimated the degree to which the remnants of the 
Iraqi government would provide essential services and security in the immediate af-
termath of major combat operations. Consequently, military resources were allocated 
based upon a fundamentally flawed view of both the friendly and enemy situations 
that would exist during the transition from Phase III to Phase IV. It would, however, 
be inaccurate to conclude that military planners accepted the rhetoric coming out of 
____________ 
30 Interview with CFLCC official, January 2005. 
31 See Chapter Seven for more on the repositioning of these forces. 
32 Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) OPLAN ECLIPSE II BASE PLAN, Coordinating 
Draft, April 12, 2003.  
33 Interview with V Corps and CJTF-7 official, January 2005. 
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certain portions of the policy community in Washington that military forces would 
be welcomed with open arms. Indeed, they had numerous discussions about the pos-
sibility of an insurgency. However, they did not believe that the potential insurgency 
against U.S. forces and the future Iraqi government would affect any of the courses 
of action being developed.34 
Planning at V Corps and Subordinate Commands 
It is important to note that planning for Phase IV operations occurred at all levels of 
military command down to division and sometimes brigade level. Modern military 
planning occurs simultaneously at various levels of command through a distributed 
and collaborative planning process. This type of distributed planning is more diffi-
cult once units have forward deployed into a theater of operations. For OIF, how-
ever, division battle staffs were brought into the planning process during the summer 
of 2002. As noted earlier, these plans were developed without any clear strategic 
guidance for integrating political, economic, and military efforts for stabilization and 
reconstruction. Military commanders at all levels were unprepared for the magnitude 
of the policy and legal issues that they confronted during the initial stages of Phase 
IV operations. 
V Corps also faced a unique challenge associated with transforming itself into a 
combined joint task force for Phase IVb. Until the beginning of combat operations 
in March, no decision had been made about which headquarters would assume re-
sponsibility for Phase IV operations once CFLCC redeployed at the conclusion of 
Phase IVa. Thus, while V Corps was fighting the war during Phase III and conduct-
ing stability operations during Phase IVa, it also had to reorganize its staff to become 
a CJTF headquarters. The lateness of this decision suggests the degree to which sen-
ior civilian and military leaders within DoD underestimated the challenges that 
would confront coalition military forces after the defeat of Iraqi forces. 
Observations 
The coalition achieved a quick and decisive military victory that resulted not only in 
the destruction or collapse of the Iraqi military, but also in the disintegration of the 
command and control capacity of the Iraqi government. Despite the success it pro-
duced on the battlefield, the planning process failed to include sufficient flexibility to 
enable the CFLCC to respond rapidly to Phase IV security requirements. 
____________ 
34 Interview with CFLCC official, February 2005. 
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Although collaborative, iterative, and continuous planning took place at all lev-
els of command, no record exists showing that CENTCOM or CFLCC participated 
in a similar process with civilian governmental agencies, international organizations, 
or nongovernmental organizations; military planners believed such collaboration 
would not be necessary for stability, reconstruction, and transition activities to suc-
ceed. Additionally, and not inconsequentially, CENTCOM and OSD did not sys-
tematically assess the forces and capabilities that would be required for Phase IV op-
erations.35 Finally, the decision by General Franks and Secretary Rumsfeld to stop 
the deployment of the 1st Cavalry Division and other reinforcing forces when coali-
tion forces entered Baghdad further exacerbated a shortfall in the number of troops 
required to simultaneously complete Phase III and begin Phase IV.  
As noted earlier, the CENTCOM plan specified that the force level would con-
tinue to grow until end-state objectives had been met. The decision to stop the flow 
of forces into theater prior to that point was, in effect, a change to the plan that had 
been agreed to by subordinate commanders. The planning staffs within 
CENTCOM, CLFCC, and V Corps were never asked to provide input for this 
change. According to one officer, the V Corps staff would have preferred for the 
force flow to continue as originally envisaged.36 
The potential for unforeseen challenges during Phase IV was anticipated prior 
to the initiation of hostilities. General Franks first expressed his concern about the 
possibility for “catastrophic success” in a meeting with President Bush and the NSC 
on August 5, 2002. According to Franks, he and Secretary Rumsfeld used this phrase 
to refer to the possibility that large-scale combat operations could be over much 
sooner than anyone imagined and, consequently, that functional plans and policies 
needed to be created in Washington to be prepared for the “occupation and recon-
struction.”37 In essence, with the exception of immediate security concerns and ac-
tions necessary for emergency restoration of critical infrastructure, the majority of 
activities required for Phase IV were perceived by the Department of Defense to be 
the responsibility of civilian agencies and departments. The Department of Defense, 
of course, was responsible for providing resources to support these efforts—to the 
extent they were available and did not conflict with ongoing military operations.  
____________ 
35 According to one official, OSD did not conduct an estimate of the number of troops required for Phase IV 
operations because that was the responsibility of CENTCOM planners and the Joint Staff. However, senior offi-
cials within OSD questioned why more troops might be required for Phase IV operations than were needed for 
major combat operations. For example, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz testified to Congress that 
General Eric Shinseki’s estimate of “several hundred thousand soldiers” to conduct post-conflict operations was 
“wildly off the mark.” Wolfowitz went on to state that he found it “hard to conceive that it would take more 
forces to provide stability in a post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and to secure the 
surrender of Saddam’s security forces and his army—hard to imagine.” See testimony of Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz to the House Budget Committee, February 27, 2003. 
36 Interview with V Corps and CJTF-7 official, January 2005. 
37 Franks, pp. 392 and 442. 
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The CFLCC planning staff had come to similar but more ominous conclusions. 
From their wargaming efforts in January and February 2003, members of the C5 
planning staff had come to believe that not only was there a possibility that warfight-
ing would be over much faster than anyone had anticipated, but a possibility also 
existed that the operation would cause disintegration of the entire Iraqi regime. They 
further concluded that this governmental collapse could result in some form of civil 
unrest, lawlessness, or a rise in acts of terrorism. Finally, the C5 planning staff con-
cluded that the rapid advance of maneuvering units would place ground forces in 
positions that might not enable them to adjust rapidly to the immediate postwar 
situation. A troop-to-task analysis was conducted to determine how many brigade 
equivalents would be necessary to maintain security, but the analysis was predicated 
on the existence of an effective local police force. No one anticipated, and therefore 
no one planned for, the requirements for maintaining security in the absence of local 
police. Most importantly, the troop-to-task analysis was constrained by the number 
of battalion- and brigade-sized units available in theater to conduct Phase IV opera-
tions. According to one official, an unconstrained analysis to determine requirements 
was not undertaken.38 In effect, planners took the forces that they had available and 
spread them throughout Iraq, even though the number of forces were insufficient for 
simultaneous combat and stabilization operations during the transition from Phase 
III to Phase IV. 
If the possibility of “catastrophic success” was shared by both CENTOM and 
CFLCC, why were they not prepared for the postwar looting and violence that took 
place in Baghdad and other urban areas in Iraq in the immediate aftermath of major 
combat operations? While critics have argued that this was the result of a lack of 
planning, it is clear that detailed Phase IV planning was conducted at CENTCOM, 
CFLCC, V Corps, and subordinate commands. Both OPLAN 1003V and ECLIPSE 
II established end-state conditions and directed specific actions to ensure a successful 
transition to post-combat operations. In fact, having been designated the supported 
command within CENTCOM for Phase IV operations, CFLCC developed OPLAN 
ECLIPSE II specifically to address Phase IV operations as a sequel to major combat 
operations. Thus, it was not a lack of planning for Phase IV that led to the coalition’s 
military forces being unprepared for the immediate postwar challenges. Instead, 
problems arose from the ineffectiveness of the planning process in identifying the 
likely requirements for the transition from Phase III to Phase IV, and the failure to 
challenge set assumptions about what postwar Iraq would look like. Thus, the real 
question becomes: Why was the planning process that resulted in the quick and deci-
sive defeat of the Iraqi military so ineffective in preparing for postwar operations? 
____________ 
38 Interview with CFLCC official, January 2005. 
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The full answer to this question requires an analysis of civilian policy and plan-
ning within and among the numerous U.S. governmental agencies and departments 
with responsibilities relating to reconstruction. As General Franks pointed out, deci-
sions and plans had to be made within the NSC in advance of the war to enable the 
full weight of U.S. government capabilities to be brought to bear quickly on stability 
and reconstruction tasks in Iraq. As will be discussed in Chapters Three through Six, 
prewar interagency planning and collaboration fell far short of what was necessary.  
As depicted in Figure 2.1, the number of troops on the ground in Iraq, and in 
Baghdad, at the beginning of Phase IV was far less than those deployed in either 
Bosnia or Kosovo.39 According to a RAND report published in 2003, if the levels of 
troops committed in Kosovo are used as a guide, 526,000 troops would have been 
needed to address immediate postwar security concerns in Iraq.40 Drawing from his 
 
Figure 2.1 
Military Presence at Outset of Post-Conflict Operations 









































39 The numbers used for Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo are taken from another RAND study. Deviating 
from that study here, we have combined the total number of peacekeepers in Kabul with the 8,000 members of 
the U.S. military operating elsewhere in Afghanistan where they are conducting combat operations to arrive at the 
ratio of 0.46 (rather than the 0.18 one derives if one only counts the international peacekeeping forces). The ratio 
for Kabul is computed using the 5,000-man international peacekeeping force compared with an estimated popu-
lation of 1 million. The ratio for Baghdad is based on a population figure of 6.2 million, and it assumes that six 
brigade equivalents could muster no more than 15,000 soldiers for active security responses.  
40 Dobbins et al., p. 197. For a broader discussion about required force sizes, see James T. Quinlivan, “Force 
Requirements in Stability Operations,” Parameters, Winter 1995–96, pp. 59–69. 
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personal experience in the Balkans and a number of studies produced by and for the 
Army prior to the initiation of war with Iraq, then-Army Chief of Staff General 
Shinseki concluded that it would require approximately 400,000 soldiers to maintain 
security in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations.41 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that other Army general officers shared General 
Shinseki’s main concern, namely, that more troops would be needed immediately 
following combat with Iraqi forces than would be required to defeat those same 
forces; however, none spoke up publicly before the war.42 What has become clear is 
that the military was unprepared for the immediate aftermath of the war. Perhaps the 
commander of V Corps, Lieutenant General William Wallace, summed it up best 
when he stated: 
The military did their job in three weeks. I give no credit to the politicians for de-
tailed Phase Four planning. But I don’t think that we, the military, did a very 
good job of anticipating [that] either. I don’t think that any of us either could 
have or did anticipate the total collapse of this regime and the psychological im-
pact it had on the entire nation. When we arrived in Baghdad, everybody had 
gone home. The regime officials were gone; the folks that provided security of the 
ministry buildings had gone; the folks that operated the water treatment plants 
and the electricity grid and the water purification plants were gone. There were 
no bus drivers, no taxi drivers; everybody just went home. I for one did not an-
ticipate our presence being such a traumatic influence on the entire population. 
We expected there to be some degree of infrastructure left in the city, in terms of 
intellectual infrastructure, in terms of running the city infrastructure, in terms of 
running the government infrastructure. But what in fact happened, which was 
unanticipated at least in [my mind], is that when [we] decapitated the regime, 
everything below it fell apart.43 
The sentiment expressed by both Generals Shinseki and Wallace has also been 
echoed by L. Paul Bremer, the administrator for the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA). On October 4, 2004, Bremer stated that the United States made two major 
mistakes in Iraq: not deploying a sufficient number of troops and not adequately 
controlling the looting and lawlessness that ensued in the immediate aftermath of 
major combat operations. Bremer continued by saying, “We paid a big price for not 
stopping [the looting] because it established an atmosphere of lawlessness.”44 In an 
____________ 
41 Interview with James Fallows for Frontline: The Invasion of Iraq. As of August 2007: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/invasion/interviews/fallows.html 
42 For more information on this point, see Chapter Four. 
43 Interview with General William Scott Wallace for Frontline: The Invasion of Iraq. As of August 2007: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/invasion/interviews/wallace.html 
44 Robin Wright and Thomas E. Ricks, “Bremer Criticizes Troop Levels: Ex-Overseer of Iraq Says U.S. Effort 
Was Hampered Early On,” Washington Post, October 5, 2004. 
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earlier speech delivered on September 17, 2004, Bremer is reported as having said: 
“The single most important change—the one thing that would have improved the 
situation—would have been having more troops in Iraq at the beginning and 
throughout” the entire occupation of Iraq.45 
The U.S. military experience in Iraq points to a shortcoming in U.S. military 
doctrine, which is predicated on existing military theory. Defeating enemy military 
forces must always remain a focus of military doctrine, but picking the right “end 
state” is crucial for planning. More emphasis needs to be placed on what it takes to 
“win the war”—from a broader context than simply defeating the enemy’s military. 
The success of the ground campaign in OIF demonstrates the importance of theory 
as an effective guide to how battles should be prosecuted. However, the warfighting 
bias in existing theory leaves the military ill prepared to complete the overarching 
task of winning the peace—the ultimate objective of war. 
____________ 




Civilian Planning Efforts 
In addition to the U.S. military, several civilian government agencies invested time 
and effort in thinking about the challenges of postwar Iraq during 2001 and 2002. 
This chapter starts by examining the official interagency process that guided postwar 
planning for Iraq, which started in the summer of 2002. It then examines the work 
of the four government agencies that conducted the broadest planning efforts for 
postwar governance and reconstruction: the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD), the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID), and the National Security Council (NSC) staff. It concludes by examining 
several analyses of postwar requirements in Iraq, which were sponsored by think 
tanks and academic organizations in the months before the war and which were in-
tended to inform and influence U.S. government planning efforts.  
Interagency Planning: The ESG and the IPMC 
During the spring and summer of 2002, CENTCOM and the Joint Staff ran a series 
of exercises as part of the war planning effort.1 The Joint Staff wanted to include the 
interagency community in these exercises, but there was no standing interagency 
structure to plug into the process. Lieutenant General George Casey, then the Direc-
tor for Strategic Plans and Policy (J5) on the Joint Staff, developed a structure for a 
new coordination body, called the Executive Steering Group (ESG), that would 
bring together representatives from the Joint Staff, the State Department’s Bureau of 
Political-Military Affairs, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 
(OUSD(P)), the Office of the Vice President (OVP), and the Central Intelligence 
____________ 
1 Prominent Hammer was one of the most important of these exercises; it was sponsored by CENTCOM in 
March 2002 to assess the feasibility of the emerging warplans. Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack, New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 2004, p. 114; Rowan Scarborough, Rumsfeld’s War, Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishers, 2004, 
pp. 45 and 175. 
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Agency (CIA).2 The ESG started meeting in August 2002 under the chairmanship of 
Frank Miller, the NSC official to whom the Deputies Committee (see footnote 4) 
had delegated responsibility for Iraq policy.3 
The ESG addressed a wide range of political-military planning issues, such as 
securing basing, access, and overflight rights, accelerating military construction, and 
identifying allied capabilities that could contribute to military operations. These is-
sues formed the core of the interagency agenda, and if the ESG members could not 
reach agreement, the issue would be passed to the Deputies Committee (and on to 
the Principals Committee, if necessary) for resolution.4 The ESG met three times a 
week from the time that it was formed until the war started in March 2003, and its 
membership grew as time went on.5 By early 2003, its meetings regularly included 
representatives from other offices in the State Department (including the Bureau of 
European and Eurasian Affairs and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs), the Comp-
troller’s office from OSD, OVP, the Joint Staff Directorate of Logistics (J4), and 
various NSC offices when specific agenda items addressed their areas of responsibil-
ity.6 Such frequent meetings were needed to prepare for the twice-weekly Deputies 
Committee meeting and the weekly Principals Committee meeting on Iraq.7 
The interagency structure proposed by Lieutenant General Casey also created 
several other organizations that supported the work of the ESG. To secure agreement 
on strategic planning guidance received from higher levels, the Iraq Political-Military 
Cell (IPMC) sat directly below the ESG and brought together working-level officials 
from each of the agencies participating in the ESG. It is important to note that the 
IPMC was never intended to do any independent planning; instead, it would enable 
agencies throughout the U.S. government to conduct their own planning efforts 
within a coherent strategic framework.8 Unlike the ESG, the IPMC had a dedicated 
staff to oversee the coordination process. Normally the NSC would have been re-
sponsible for such a coordination function, but its small staff size prevented it from 
dedicating many personnel to this organization. Instead, the Joint Staff provided 
____________ 
2 “Pre-war Planning for Post-war Iraq,” information sheet published by the Office of Near East and South Asian 
Affairs within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. As of April 2004:  
http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/sections/policy_offices/isa/nesa/postwar_iraq.html 
3 Peter Slevin and Dana Priest, “Wolfowitz Concedes Errors on Iraq,” Washington Post, July 24, 2003; interview 
with U.S. government official, April 2004.  
4 The Principals Committee includes the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the National Security 
Advisor; the Deputies Committee, as its name suggests, consists of their deputies.  
5 The ESG stopped meeting when OIF began, but after major combat operations ended it was reconstituted to 
address emerging postwar issues. Interview with NSC official, April 2004. 
6 Interview with NSC official, April 2004; “Pre-war Planning for Post-war Iraq.” 
7 Interview with NSC official, April 2004, and OSD official, August 2004. 
8 Interview with NSC official, April 2004; “Pre-war Planning for Post-war Iraq.” 
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most of the IPMC staff members, since it contained action officers who could be re-
assigned relatively easily.9  
Several working groups, reporting to the ESG, were established to focus on spe-
cific issues. The Iraq Relief and Reconstruction working group (IR+R) had primary 
responsibility for postwar issues, although some of the other working groups touched 
on these issues during their work. IR+R was co-chaired by Elliott Abrams from the 
NSC and Robin Cleveland from the Office of Management and Budget; it included 
representatives from the OSD Office of Stability Operations, the Joint Staff J5, the 
State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), USAID, 
the CIA, and occasionally other agencies such as the Treasury and Justice Depart-
ments.10 As its name suggests, IR+R focused on providing humanitarian relief in the 
immediate postwar period, as well as on reconstruction over the longer term.11 
The ESG, IPMC, and the various working groups represented a fairly signifi-
cant effort to reach interagency consensus on strategic guidance for Iraq. Neverthe-
less, this structure ended up being less effective than it might otherwise have been, 
for two main reasons. First, ESG meetings were not always attended by every agency, 
or by the same representatives of each agency. CIA representatives missed many 
meetings, for example; one official speculated that this might have stemmed from the 
distance of their headquarters in Langley.12 Attendance from OSD offices was report-
edly inconsistent, with different people representing organizations at different times 
and with representatives often lacking the seniority necessary to make decisions.13 
Interagency coordination suffered as a result, because OSD was the only organization 
that would link those planning the war with those responsible for issuing strategic 
guidance. Other DoD offices arrived at meetings with different positions, rather than 
one coordinated DoD policy.14 
Second, postwar issues were not well coordinated through this structure. The 
IPMC spent much of its time working on postwar issues, using the work of the IR+R 
working group as a basis for its efforts. However, the ESG focused primarily on war 
planning issues and devoted much less attention to postwar planning.15  
____________ 
9 Interviews with CENTCOM official, November 2003, and NSC official, April 2004. 
10 “Pre-war Planning for Post-war Iraq.” 
11 Interviews with OSD officials, November 2003 and March 2004, and NSC official, April 2004. 
12 Interview with NSC official, April 2004. 
13 Interviews with NSC and Joint Staff officials, April 2004. The reasons for OSD’s inconsistent representation 
remain unclear. One official noted that DoD officials generally displayed ambivalent feelings about the inter-
agency process—that it provided a useful mechanism for gathering support from other agencies but required 
DoD to cede too much control—and speculated that this may have been one reason that OSD did not make a 
firmer commitment to participating in this process. 
14 Woodward, p. 321. 
15 Interview with NSC official, April 2004. 
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The Office of the Secretary of Defense 
From the fall of 2001 through the spring of 2002, planning within the Department 
of Defense for possible combat and post-combat operations in Iraq was concentrated 
in the hands of the department’s senior leadership. Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz were deeply involved in 
the development of the warplans during this time, but few other DoD officials were 
involved.16 As the interagency process geared up during the summer of 2002, the 
planning process within the Pentagon expanded to include many other defense offi-
cials, including those within OSD. OSD representatives participated in the inter-
agency meetings that started in July 2002, including the humanitarian relief planning 
efforts that are discussed in Chapter Six.  
The Office of Special Plans 
In August 2002, OSD renamed and expanded an existing office to handle the in-
creased workload associated with potential military operations in Iraq. According to 
the DoD organizational structure depicted in Figure 3.1, the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)) is responsible for formulating national 
security and defense policy. Within OUSD(P), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Security Affairs (ISA) focuses on four regions of the world, including 
the Near East and South Asia (NESA).17 Within NESA, the Office of Northern Gulf 
Affairs was responsible for coordinating policy toward Iraq and Iran. Northern Gulf 
Affairs had two people working on Iraq when the summer started, and it quickly be-
came clear that additional personnel would be needed to handle the ever-expanding 
workload and interagency coordination. In August, the Office of Northern Gulf Af-
fairs was renamed the Office of Special Plans (OSP) and augmented with more than 
a dozen temporary personnel.18 Its responsibilities included developing policy rec-
ommendations for a wide range of issues, including coalition building, troop de-
ployments, government reorganization, de-Ba’athification, maintaining the oil sector, 
training a police force, and war crimes prosecution.19 
____________ 
16 Woodward. 
17 More information about the responsibilities of OUSD(P) and ISA can be found at the following web site. As 
of August 2004: 
http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/# 
18 Interviews with OSD officials, August 2004.  
19 “Pre-war Planning for Post-war Iraq”; Dana Priest, “Feith’s Analysts Given a Clean Bill of Health,” Washington 
Post, March 14, 2004. 
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Figure 3.1 
OUSD(P) and NESA Organization Chart 
SOURCE: Department of Defense.
RAND MG642-3.1









































































































Its nondescript name was chosen deliberately to avoid drawing attention to the 
fact that the Pentagon was considering the possibility of war and its aftermath in Iraq  
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while simultaneously seeking international support at the United Nations.20 As 
Douglas Feith, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, noted after the war, “The 
Special Plans Office was called Special Plans because, at the time, calling it Iraqi 
Planning Office might have undercut our diplomatic efforts.”21 The name provoked 
a lot of criticism from observers, who wondered why Iraq planning was occurring in 
such a seemingly secretive environment and what such an ambiguously named office 
was really working on. One OSD official later noted that the name caused such a stir 
that it might have been better to give the office a more substantive name, despite any 
possible diplomatic repercussions.22 
OSP has been mistaken in the press for the Counter Terrorism Evaluation 
Group (CTEG), which was a two-person cell designed to review intelligence pro-
duced on terrorist networks.23 The CTEG was established within OUSD(P) in Oc-
tober 2001, with the mission of investigating the linkages between international ter-
rorism, state sponsors, and Iraq. CTEG proved to be a very controversial 
organization, with both the House Permanent Committee on Intelligence and the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence investigating its role in prewar intelli-
gence.24 For the purposes of this report, however, it is important to note that OSP 
was not linked to the CTEG, and was not involved in intelligence activities. 
Policy Guidance 
OSP developed policy guidance for the Secretary of Defense on a wide range of is-
sues. One policy area that consumed a great deal of time and energy was postwar 
governance and, specifically, the process through which an interim government could 
be established. The key debate centered around the question of “externals versus in-
ternals”—whether the interim government should be constituted with exiles who had 
lived outside Iraq, or with people who had remained inside the country and endured 
Saddam’s rule. OSP staff recommended that the interim government incorporate 
mostly externals because their objective was to turn power over to the Iraqis as 
____________ 
20 Interviews with OSD officials, August 2004. The United Kingdom was also concerned about this tension. 
After major combat ended, the British government noted, “We felt that overt planning for the post-conflict 
[phase] would make it appear that military action was inevitable (which it was not) and could seriously prejudice 
ongoing attempts to reach a diplomatic solution.” House of Commons Defence Committee, Lessons of Iraq: Gov-
ernment Response to the Committee’s Third Report of Session 2003–04, May 26, 2004, p. 41. See also United King-
dom Ministry of Defence, Operations in Iraq: Lessons for the Future, December 2003, p. 61. 
21 Douglas Feith, quoted in Mark Fineman, Robin Wright, and Doyle McManus, “Preparing for War, Stum-
bling to Peace,” Los Angeles Times, July 18, 2003. 
22 Interview with OSD official, August 2004. 
23 Articles that confuse these two offices include Paul Harris, Martin Bright, and Ed Helmore, “U.S. Rivals Turn 
on Each Other as Weapons Search Draws a Blank,” The Observer (London), May 11, 2003; Seymour M. Hersh, 
“Selective Intelligence,” The New Yorker, May 12, 2003; Julian Borger, “The Spies Who Pushed for War,” The 
Guardian (London), July 17, 2003.  
24 Dana Priest, “Pentagon Shadow Loses Some Mystique,” Washington Post, March 13, 2004. 
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quickly as possible. OSP staffers concluded that it would take a long time to identify 
and vet internals to ensure that no Ba’athists participated in the new government; 
they argued that it was better to stand up a government of externals quickly— 
possibly even in exile before the war started—rather than wait for this process to un-
fold after the war.25 However, they were not able to secure interagency agreement on 
this point because agencies including State and the CIA argued that an interim gov-
ernment composed solely of externals would have no domestic legitimacy.26 
As part of its focus on governance issues, OSP spent a lot of time working with 
exile and Kurdish opposition groups. Staff members participated in a number of 
meetings with such groups in the late summer and fall of 2002.27 These meetings 
helped pave the way for the major conferences of opposition groups held in London 
in December 2002 and in northern Iraq at the end of February 2003.28 The office 
was also involved in efforts to create the Free Iraqi Forces (FIF), a military force of 
exiles that would be under CENTCOM’s command and trained to fight alongside 
U.S. forces during the war in Iraq. OSP officials thought that the FIF would be help-
ful on the battlefield practically, by serving as a focal point for Iraqi defections, and 
symbolically, showing Iraqis liberating their own country. Although several hundred 
potential FIF members were trained in Hungary, less than a hundred of them de-
ployed to Iraq.29 In addition to the lack of willing Iraqi volunteers, the FIF suffered 
____________ 
25 Interviews with OSD officials, August 2004. 
26 OSD officials later expressed a great deal of frustration with this decision, arguing that the interim government 
that took power on June 28, 2004, was composed exclusively of exiles. They argued that the same government 
could have been in place in the fall of 2003 but for interagency opposition to their plans, and the faster transition 
would have resulted in much less opposition to the continuing U.S. presence in Iraq. Interviews with OSD offi-
cials, August 2004. 
27 Interviews with OSD officials, August 2004. Some of these meetings were co-sponsored with the State De-
partment. See Peter Slevin, “Iraqi Opposition Pledges Anti-Hussein Unity,” Washington Post, August 10, 2002; 
Michael R. Gordon, “Iraqi Opposition Groups Meet Bush Aides,” New York Times, August 10, 2002; Michael R. 
Gordon, “Iraqi Opposition Gets U.S. Pledge to Oust Hussein for a Democracy,” New York Times, August 11, 
2002. 
28 The December and February meetings were officially organized by Zalmay Khalilzad, who was appointed Special 
Presidential Envoy and Ambassador at Large for the Free Iraqis on December 2, 2002. See Michael Howard, “Con-
ference Delegates Vie for Political Role in New Iraq,” The Guardian (London), December 16, 2002; Andrea Gerlin, 
“Iraqi Opposition Groups Agree on Power-Sharing Plan,” Philadelphia Inquirer, December 18, 2002; Gareth Smyth, 
“Emboldened Opposition Gathers,” Financial Times (London), February 27, 2003; Judith Miller, “Iraqi Leadership 
Team to Prepare for a Transition to Democracy,” New York Times, February 28, 2003; Judith Miller, “Ending Con-
ference, Iraqi Dissidents Insist on Self-Government,” New York Times, March 3, 2003. 
29 After the fall of Baghdad, the U.S. military airlifted Ahmed Chalabi and several hundred armed personnel to 
the northern part of Iraq. These people were described as part of the FIF, but it is unclear whether they received 
official training in Hungary as part of that program or were more hastily assembled and designated as part of the 
FIF. On prewar FIF training, see Greg Jaffe, “On a Remote Base, U.S. Drill Sergeants Train Iraqi Exiles,” Wall 
Street Journal, February 24, 2003; Adam LeBor, “Exiles Prepare for a Happy Return at Camp Freedom,” The 
Times (London), February 24, 2003; Ian Traynor, “U.S. Closes Exiles Training Camp After Only 100 Show 
Up,” The Guardian (London), April 2, 2003. On the airlift into northern Iraq, see Peter Finn, “New Force 
Moves to Gain Sway,” Washington Post, April 12, 2003; Rupert Cornwell, “U.S.-Backed Iraqis Launch Bid for 
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from a lack of enthusiastic support within the Department of Defense. In particular, 
CENTCOM opposed relying on large numbers of Iraqis during the military cam-
paign, reportedly because they would not add significant military capabilities and 
might increase risk to U.S. military personnel if they were not vetted properly.30 
OSP also developed policy guidance on the future of the Iraqi army and the de-
Ba’athification process, both of which became controversial issues after the Coalition 
Provisional Authority took power. They assumed that the army would continue to 
exist after the war ended and that it could be used for reconstruction projects while 
its personnel were being vetted and its units reconstituted.31 OSP also helped develop 
a de-Ba’athification policy that would prevent senior Ba’ath Party officials from hold-
ing public positions in the new government.32 
OSD’s Role in Policymaking 
Many of the people interviewed for this report claim that OSD officials were dictat-
ing policy to other U.S. government agencies.33 The very existence of the Office of 
Special Plans—and the confusion surrounding its creation, purpose, and name—may 
have given its guidance disproportionate weight during the interagency planning 
process, thus leading many government officials to believe that OSP’s “contribu-
tions” were de facto instructions. Clearly, frustration arose over the lack of coordina-
tion of OSP’s guidance papers with other agencies before the meetings in which they 
were presented.34 OSD officials counter that all of their planning efforts fed into the 
interagency process discussed at the beginning of this chapter, and that they lacked 
both the authority and intent to dictate policy to their counterparts in other agen-
cies.35 Furthermore, at least one senior State Department official reported receiving 
directions that OSD was in charge of both war and postwar planning efforts.36 In any 
case, because the Department of Defense seems to have been perceived by others as 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Power,” Independent on Sunday (London), April 13, 2003; Peter Finn, “Pentagon’s Iraqi Proteges Go Home to 
Mixed Welcome,” Washington Post, April 17, 2004.  
30 Interviews with OSD officials, August 2004. 
31 This assumption was incorporated into the planning efforts of the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitar-
ian Assistance (ORHA), as discussed in Chapter Five. 
32 Interviews with OSD official, August 2004. 
33 Interviews with State Department official, October 2003, and ORHA officials, November 2003 and January 
2004. 
34 Interviews with State Department official, October 2003, ORHA officials, November 2003 and January 2004, 
and OSD official, August 2004.  
35 Interviews with OSD officials, August 2004. 
36 Greg Suchan, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, has been quoted as 
saying that “the direction had come from the 7th floor [Secretary of State’s office] that OSD was in charge and 
State was to help out in anyway [sic] possible, but not to rock the boat.” See Donald R. Drechsler, “Reconstruct-
ing the Interagency Process After Iraq,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1 (February 2005), p. 8. 
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first among equals within the interagency planning process, OSD’s influence may 
indeed have been disproportionate. 
This perception was likely exacerbated after the Department of Defense was of-
ficially designated as the lead agency for postwar planning. The President apparently 
reached this decision in October 2002, to ensure that there would be one U.S. gov-
ernment agency in charge of postwar Iraq. The President wanted to avoid some of 
the problems plaguing postwar Afghanistan, where responsibilities for reconstruction 
were divided among several different coalition partners and U.S. agencies.37 All the 
postwar planning efforts that were under way would be centralized in a single office 
within DoD, though it would have extensive interagency representation.38 OSD de-
veloped a few wiring diagrams to show how such an office might be organized.39 A 
delay occurred after this decision was reached in October, for as discussed in Chapter 
Five, the Department of Defense was not designated as the postwar lead agency until 
January 2003. None of the officials interviewed for this report could explain that de-
lay, though some speculated that senior officials may have had difficulty selecting a 
person to lead the new office or that naming a postwar coordinator in October might 
have undermined ongoing diplomatic efforts at the United Nations.40 
State Department Planning 
The State Department participated in all of the interagency planning processes de-
scribed above, which formed the core of its contribution to the planning effort. In 
addition, State sponsored the broadest assessment of postwar requirements that 
would be conducted within the U.S. government, the Future of Iraq project, a proc-
ess that correctly identified many of the reconstruction and governance problems that 
would be faced after the war ended. Yet the information and insights it generated 
were not well integrated into other U.S. government planning efforts. State Depart-
ment officials believed that they were marginalized because State was seen as not 
supporting the possible war with Iraq.41 Whatever the cause, State ultimately lost 
more battles than it won during the interagency planning process.  
____________ 
37 Interview with OSD official, August 2004. 
38 As Douglas Feith later noted, “Bush gave Rumsfeld overall authority for the postwar plan, to maintain what he 
called ‘a unity of concept and a unity of leadership’ . . . Since so many of the responsibilities were military security 
responsibilities, the only person who could really do that was the secretary of defense.” Fineman, Wright, and 
McManus. 
39 These organization charts are depicted in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. 
40 Interviews with OSD officials, August 2004. 
41 Interviews with State Department officials, October 2003 and July 2004. See also the discussion of Tom War-
rick and ORHA in Chapter Five. 
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The State Department and Interagency Planning 
Though the Future of Iraq project continued its work throughout 2002 and early 
2003, the State Department as a whole remained on the margins of the postwar 
planning process. Representatives from various offices within State did participate in 
and influence the outcomes of the official interagency planning process described at 
the end of this chapter, but State as a whole never effectively influenced the planning 
process. Why was this the case? According to one official, one reason is that State 
never developed a single agency position. Tensions among the various bureaus within 
the State Department are a perennial problem, and the individuals who participated 
in the planning process reflected the views of their own bureau rather than a coherent 
position of the Department of State. These views emphasized different points at best, 
and directly contradicted each other at worst. This reduced State’s ability to influence 
policy formation and frustrated many other agency representatives, who observed 
that interagency meetings work only when each agency shows up with a single coor-
dinated position.42 
A second, and perhaps more important, reason for State’s lack of influence is 
that senior U.S. officials believed that State opposed the possibility of war with Iraq. 
Many State Department officials supported strengthening the United Nations sanc-
tions regime before threatening regime change, while senior policymakers— 
apparently including Vice President Richard B. Cheney and Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld—had reportedly concluded that diplomatic approaches, particu-
larly through the UN, would be ineffective.43 OSD officials remained concerned 
throughout the planning process that any criticism from State was ultimately de-
signed to undermine the policies they supported. State Department officials report 
that representatives from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) were largely 
ignored during scenario planning meetings they attended and claim they were delib-
erately not invited to a DoD-sponsored wargame during the summer of 2002.44 
These two factors combined to make the State Department a weak player in in-
teragency preparations for postwar Iraq. Even though the Future of Iraq project was 
the most comprehensive effort within the U.S. government to examine the challenges 
and requirements of Iraq after Saddam, its insights and suggestions were not used as 
____________ 
42 Interview with former State Department official, October 2003. 
43 The Bush administration opposed involving the United Nations or discussing sanctions until August 2002, 
when Secretary Powell convinced the President that a renewed diplomatic effort involving the United Nations 
was a necessary precondition for building international support for possible military operations against Iraq. 
Woodward describes part of this discussion as follows: “Powell believed he had Cheney boxed in, and to a lesser 
extent Rumsfeld. [Powell] argued that even if anyone felt that was the only solution, they could not get to war 
without first trying a diplomatic solution. It was the absolutely necessary first step . . . Powell believed he had 
them, although he sensed that Cheney was ‘terrified’ because once the diplomatic road was opened up, it might 
work.” Woodward, pp. 154–157; quote from pp. 156–157. 
44 Interview with former State Department officials, October 2003 and March 2004. 
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a basis for postwar planning efforts within the interagency process. The project re-
mained stovepiped within the State Department, and those who were not directly 
involved with it knew very little about its efforts or even its existence. In fact, the 
project was not allowed to be officially briefed to the interagency community until 
October 2002, reportedly because of concerns that it would be dismissed as another 
State Department effort to undermine support for the war by identifying postwar 
challenges.45 Internal bureaucratic challenges and external suspicion about State’s true 
motives, therefore, combined to marginalize State’s influence on the postwar plan-
ning process, as well as to limit the dissemination of ideas and information from the 
Future of Iraq project. 
The Future of Iraq Project 
The Future of Iraq project was initially conceptualized during the fall of 2001, as a 
way to identify the challenges that might occur after Saddam Hussein was removed 
from power and to develop expertise among those who might serve in a new Iraqi 
government. On February 4, 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell approved the 
formation of the project and the outline of subjects that it would contain. State De-
partment officials soon started working on proposals for the various working groups 
within the project. They believed that the project should be sponsored by a neutral 
nongovernmental organization, and the project’s initial planning meeting in April 
was sponsored by the Middle East Institute (MEI). However, senior U.S. govern-
ment officials opposed the involvement of MEI, and by late April 2002, State de-
cided to sponsor the project itself.46 The project was coordinated by Tom Warrick, a 
foreign service officer from the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. 
By June, Congress approved $5 million in funding for the project, and the first 
working group met in July. Most of the working groups’ meetings were held in the 
United States, though some were held in the United Kingdom and one was held in 
Italy. Each meeting lasted approximately a day and a half, including some informal 
gatherings to facilitate discussion and the exchange of information. 
The project consisted of 17 working groups, across a wide range of functional 
areas.47 The organizers knew that the quality of the working groups would be un-
____________ 
45 Interview with State Department official, July 2004. 
46 These senior officials reportedly opposed MEI sponsorship for two reasons. First, the president of MEI had 
publicly criticized the administration’s policies on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Second, some members of the Iraqi 
political opposition reportedly opposed the existence of the project, since they were not invited to participate in 
most of the working groups and feared that the project would reduce their influence. Ahmed Chalabi reportedly 
asked senior U.S. officials to prevent MEI from sponsoring the project, in the hopes that it would not be able to 
find a different sponsor. Interview with a State Department official, July 2004, and David Phillips, Losing Iraq, 
New York: Westview Press, 2005, p. 37. 
47 The 17 working groups, in alphabetical order: Anti-Corruption Issues; Building a Free Media; Civil Society-
Capacity Building; Defense Policy; Democratic Principles; Economy and Infrastructure; Education; Foreign 
Policy; Local Government; Oil and Energy; Preserving Iraq’s Cultural Heritage; Public Finance; Public Health 
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even, but they thought that it was important to start dialogue in as many of these 
areas as possible. The State Department solicited as many nominations for Iraqi par-
ticipants as possible, demonstrating its intent to be as inclusive as possible and to 
reach people who were not active in political opposition groups. Each Iraqi nomina-
tion was vetted by several U.S. government agencies, and the final participants were 
selected by State to ensure that a wide range of views was represented. Each meeting 
was chaired by a U.S. government official, usually from the State Department. The 
Iraqis conducted the bulk of the discussions at the main table while observers from 
other U.S. government agencies sat behind them, deliberately symbolizing their sec-
ondary role in these discussions.48  
The working papers developed by the Future of Iraq project encompass more 
than 2,000 pages in 13 volumes.49 The output of the various working groups was un-
even, as expected, with some groups producing hundreds of pages of documents and 
others producing only a few pages.50 Nevertheless, State Department officials be-
lieved that the process of holding the meetings was as important as their output. As 
one participant later noted, “It involved Iraqis coming together, in many cases for the 
first time, to discuss and try to forge a common vision of Iraq’s future.”51 
Press reports have widely described the Future of Iraq project as a State De-
partment “plan” for the reconstruction of Iraq. Such a characterization is unwar-
ranted. Plans require a concrete set of prioritized steps that should be taken in a given 
situation, and a plan ideally assigns responsibility for each of those steps. The Future 
of Iraq project did not contain any such prioritization; it was not something that 
could be taken off the shelf and immediately executed.52 The collected papers of the 
project fill 13 volumes, so it was clearly not something that Jay Garner (or, later, Paul 
Bremer) could easily digest. The project was designed not as a plan but as a process, 
which would help collect Iraqi expertise on the major reconstruction challenges and 
generate ideas on how to address those challenges. It was also designed to help pre-
pare project members to participate directly in reconstruction efforts, and the fact 
that some project members became members of the new Iraqi government suggests 
__________________________________________________________________ 
and Humanitarian Issues; Public Outreach; Return of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons; Transitional 
Justice; and Water, Agriculture, and the Environment. See “Prepared Testimony of Marc Grossman before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” February 11, 2003. 
48 Interview with State Department official, July 2004. 
49 Phillips, p. 37. Most of these papers were declassified in September 2006 and are available on a National Secu-
rity Archive web site. As of February 2008:  
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB198/index.htm 
50 James Fallows, “Blind into Baghdad,” The Atlantic Monthly, January/February 2004, p. 57. 
51 David L. Phillips, quoted in David Rieff, “Blueprint for a Mess,” New York Times Magazine, November 2, 
2003. 
52 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith reportedly described the Future of Iraq project as “a 
bunch of concept papers.” Jeffrey Goldberg, “A Little Learning,” The New Yorker, May 9, 2005. 
Civilian Planning Efforts    33 
that the project succeeded in this area.53 In that sense, the project has had an impor-
tant, though indirect, impact on the long-term reconstruction of Iraq. 
Though the project was not a plan, its insights and suggestions could certainly 
have been used as the basis for a postwar plan. This did not occur because senior U.S. 
government officials marginalized the project’s influence in the postwar planning 
process. As will be described in Chapter Five, Tom Warrick, the project’s planning 
leader, briefly worked for the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance 
(ORHA) before Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld told Jay Garner to fire him. Had 
Warrick remained with ORHA, insights and expertise from the project might well 
have been used as the basis for some of ORHA’s plans. But he did not, and ORHA 
planners had only a passing acquaintance with the Future of Iraq project and its con-
tents.54 
USAID Planning 
USAID’s planning for postwar Iraq began informally in the summer of 2002, al-
though it did not receive formal tasking to begin planning until early 2003. The 
agency was instructed to develop plans for actions and responses in the event of a war 
in Iraq. USAID developed a plan in the fall of 2002, even though it—like other U.S. 
agencies—did not have personnel on the ground in Iraq at that time and lacked reli-
able information about conditions there. The plan included “branches” for several 
possible contingencies, such as the use of WMD, and was continually refined 
through the winter and early spring.55 
Reconstruction Planning and Contracting 
USAID’s planning efforts drew on its considerable experience with post-conflict hu-
manitarian relief and reconstruction activities throughout the world.56 Its plans for 
Iraq focused on providing and reconstituting electricity, water and sewers, public 
health, education, local government, agriculture and food supply, and roads and 
buildings, among other issues. USAID tried to gather as much current information 
about Iraq as possible, but such information was spotty. For example, the CIA pro-
____________ 
53 Eric Schmitt and Joel Brinkley, “State Dept. Study Foresaw Trouble Now Plaguing Iraq,” New York Times, 
October 19, 2003; interview with State Department official, July 2004. 
54 Interviews with ORHA officials, November 2003 and December 2003. 
55 Interviews with OSD official, November 2003, and USAID official, May 2004. 
56 USAID planners successfully argued that humanitarian relief and reconstruction were interrelated tasks and 
needed to be addressed together, rather than as separate steps in a process. USAID’s planning for Iraq thus con-
sidered both relief and reconstruction to be part of a single operation. Interview with U.S. government official, 
May 2004. For more on U.S. government planning for humanitarian relief, see Chapter Six. 
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vided very good information about ports, airports, and targeting issues, but its in-
formation about infrastructure and basic services was thinner and less reliable because 
of Saddam’s efforts to disguise their true level of degradation. CIA information did 
help USAID planners understand that they would probably need to import fuel be-
cause of the limitations of the Iraqi oil refineries. USAID was then able to contract 
with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and others to provide fuel. Plans were also 
developed to increase electrical production and to connect Iraq to local and regional 
power grids.57 
USAID carries out the vast majority of its projects by contracting with interna-
tional organizations (IOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private 
companies. USAID reportedly began assessments to support contract allocations as 
early as August 2002, and in mid-September it started holding weekly coordination 
meetings with relief agencies and NGOs.58 On January 16, 2003, the director of 
USAID, Andrew Natsios, signed the order authorizing local procurement for Iraqi 
relief and reconstruction. A sum of $63 million was initially allocated for this mis-
sion, and USAID let 11 contracts almost immediately after the order was signed. Be-
fore the war commenced in March 2003, USAID had awarded numerous contracts 
and grants for key tasks in infrastructure reconstruction, education, and government 
support.59 Some NGOs chose not to sign contracts with USAID, seeing U.S. gov-
ernment money as tainted by the continuing preparations for war.60 
Coordination with Other Agencies 
From the fall of 2002 through the spring of 2003, representatives from USAID par-
ticipated in the interagency planning process described below as well as the 
CENTCOM planning efforts described above. USAID planners had participated in 
CENTCOM planning during the preparations for and execution of Operation 
ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan, and that model was successfully contin-
ued in the buildup to OIF.61 At these meetings, USAID representatives had the op-
portunity to voice their concerns and requirements for logistics, food, tents, genera-
tors, and other supplies. They urged CENTCOM to avoid bombing telephone 
____________ 
57 Interview with USAID official, May 2004. 
58 Fallows, p. 62; interview with USAID official, May 2004. 
59 Contracting in the areas of health and economic growth reportedly lagged behind. Treasury was the lead 
agency for contracting on economic growth, which posed interagency coordination challenges, and USAID 
health personnel found that integrating a possible combat environment into their plans posed some unexpected 
challenges. Interviews with U.S. military officer, November 2003, and with U.S. government official, May 2004. 
60 Interview with USAID official, May 2004. For more on contracting issues, see Chapter Twelve. 
61 For more on the preparations for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, see Olga Oliker et al., Aid During 
Conflict: Interaction Between Military and Civilian Assistance Providers in Afghanistan, September 2001–June 2002, 
Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MG-212-OSD, 2004.  
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exchanges and to maintain as much long-term electrical capacity as possible while 
targeting the power grid.62 
USAID representatives also had opportunities to discuss these issues with Gen-
eral Tommy Franks, the CENTCOM commander, and the staff of Lieutenant Gen-
eral David McKiernan, the commander of land forces. During all of these meetings, 
USAID representatives noted consistently that CENTCOM personnel maintained 
that the military would not be responsible for public security and policing, humani-
tarian relief, any civilian effects of WMD use or unexploded ordnance, or civilian 
government. Responsibility for these tasks remained undefined, although the military 
assumed that USAID would be involved in at least some of them.63  
USAID’s Iraq Task Force Chief, Lewis Lucke, was one of the first civilians to 
arrive in theater, deploying to Kuwait in November 2002. He spent the balance of 
that year traveling between Kuwait and the United States, focusing on reconstruction 
planning. Humanitarian planning was outside of the USAID mission’s scope, al-
though some was considered in the assistance context. In Kuwait, coordination was 
with the U.S. military, with the World Food Program, and with the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP).64 Lucke returned to Kuwait early in 2003 as the 
reconstruction coordinator (in addition, George Ward served as humanitarian coor-
dinator and Michael Mobbs as civil affairs coordinator), with Lucke’s deputy, Chris 
Milligan, remaining as the senior USAID representative at ORHA in Washington.65 
The National Security Council 
The NSC staff coordinated the interagency process described earlier in this chapter. 
Additionally, the Deputies Committee tasked the NSC staff to pull together materi-
als on likely postwar issues.66 The work done by the IR+R and IPMC postwar efforts 
(discussed above) informed this NSC staff effort, although the ESG’s failure to 
achieve consensus on these issues meant that the NSC staff had to secure interagency 
approval through the usual formal process. The NSC staff briefed President Bush on 
its recommendations for postwar reconstruction during March 2003, which he en-
dorsed. Some of these recommendations were presented and endorsed after OIF had 
already begun. These recommendations did not constitute a plan for reconstruction, 
but instead provided strategic guidance for all U.S. agencies to follow as they started 
____________ 
62 Interview with USAID official, May 2004. 
63 Interview with USAID official, May 2004. 
64 Interview with USAID official, July 2004. 
65 ORHA’s structure is discussed at greater length in Chapter Five. 
66 Unless otherwise noted, the information in this section is drawn from an interview with an NSC official, April 
2004. 
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engaging in reconstruction activities. Two of the most important substantive areas—
both of which were to become highly controversial—were de-Ba’athification and the 
restructuring of Iraqi military and security institutions. 
De-Ba’athification 
The NSC staff recommendations called for 25,000 full members of the Ba’ath Party 
to be removed from their positions. This number represented just over 1 percent of 
the 2 million people on the government payroll, enabling government agencies to 
retain many people in managerial and technical leadership positions while removing 
the most senior Ba’athists.67 The NSC staff guidance charged DoD and the State 
Department to develop a coordinated vetting policy that would apply to most gov-
ernment officials68 and to generate a de-Ba’athification plan that could be imple-
mented by ORHA. All personnel would have to be vetted for involvement in human 
rights abuses and war crimes, as well as whether it would be politically acceptable to 
let them retain their positions. Ba’ath Party membership would not constitute auto-
matic grounds for removal, but the burden of proof would fall on the individual to 
demonstrate why he should retain his position. Coalition officials would not pursue 
any subsequent rounds of de-Ba’athification, but the NSC guidance stated that when 
Iraq was ready to hold elections, regime records should be made public so that the 
voters could decide on the candidates’ suitability for office.  
Restructuring Iraqi Military and Security Institutions 
The NSC staff also established some guidelines for the process of disarmament, de-
mobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of the Iraqi military. This guidance stated 
that the Iraqi military should become a de-politicized military force under civilian 
control that would no longer threaten Iraq’s neighbors and could defend the territo-
rial integrity of the country. Its composition would also reflect Iraq’s population, in-
cluding a diverse set of ethnic and sectarian groups. Existing army units should be 
told to stay in garrison, since immediately demobilizing hundreds of thousands of 
army personnel would only put them out on the street. Army units should be used to 
assist with reconstruction tasks in the immediate postwar period, even as their orga-
nizational structures were being reformed. Three to five regular army divisions would 
need to be established and trained during the transition period, in order to form the 
core of the new army. The Special Republican Guard, Republican Guard, and para-
military forces would be disarmed and dismantled during this transition as well. 
The guidance also emphasized the need to reform the government’s security in-
stitutions as part of the transition process, particularly by inculcating the principle of 
____________ 
67 Woodward, p. 339. 
68 Iraqi military and intelligence services would be vetted separately by DoD and the CIA. 
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civilian control over the military. An Iraqi national security council should be 
formed, controlled by the civilian commander-in-chief and various civilian deputies. 
The new civilian minister of defense would control all of Iraq’s military forces, while 
the new minister of the interior would control the internal security institutions, in-
cluding the national police and border guards. 
Other Analyses of Postwar Requirements 
In the months before the war, a number of think tanks and NGOs released reports 
on postwar requirements in Iraq. Even though many of these reports were not spon-
sored by the U.S. government, they were available to U.S. decisionmakers, and they 
demonstrate the range of issues that were identified before the war started. These re-
ports are listed and discussed by date of release. 
Council on Foreign Relations, Guiding Principles for U.S. Post-Conflict Policy 
in Iraq. The Council co-sponsored a working group on postwar policy in Iraq during 
the second half of 2002 and released a report of its findings that December. This re-
port stresses a theme that emerged repeatedly in later reports: unless the U.S. gov-
ernment develops detailed plans for how to govern and reconstruct Iraq, “the United 
States may lose the peace, even if it wins the war.”69 The group distinguishes between 
short-term, medium-term, and long-term objectives. For each of these three phases, 
it identifies the type of leadership that should be in place as well as key security, eco-
nomic, and governance objectives.70 The report specifically notes that in the immedi-
ate postwar period, the United States will have to establish a single coordinator for 
Iraq within the U.S. government; establish law and order; preserve Iraq’s territorial 
integrity; and distribute humanitarian assistance and reestablish vital services, among 
other tasks.71 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, A Wiser Peace. The first para-
graph of this report notes that the success of any war with Iraq “will be judged more 
by the commitment to rebuilding Iraq after a conflict than by the military phase of 
the war itself.”72 It argues that postwar planning efforts conducted to that point had 
____________ 
69 Edward Djerejian and Frank G. Wisner, Co-Chairs, Guiding Principles for U.S. Post-Conflict Policy in Iraq, 
Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations and the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice 
University, December 2002, p. 1. 
70 Djerejian and Wisner, pp. 28–30.  
71 Djerejian and Wisner, pp. 4–9. 
72 Frederick D. Barton and Bathsheba N. Crocker, A Wiser Peace: An Action Strategy for a Post-Conflict Iraq, 
Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2003, p. 6. This study was released at 
the same time as a parallel study on general post-conflict government. See Play to Win: Final Report of the Bi-
Partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International 
Studies and the Association of the U.S. Army, January 2003. 
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been incomplete and insufficient and identifies persistent mistakes that had occurred 
during recent post-conflict reconstruction efforts. The second part of the report in-
cludes the following ten recommendations to be undertaken to achieve success dur-
ing the reconstruction period: 
• Create a transitional security force that is effectively prepared, mandated, and 
staffed for post-conflict security needs, including the need for a constabulary 
force. 
• Develop a comprehensive plan for securing and eliminating weapons of mass 
destruction. 
• Plan and train for other post-conflict missions that create a foundation for a 
peaceful and secure Iraq that will enhance regional security. 
• Establish an international transitional administration and name a transitional 
administrator. 
• Develop a national dialogue process and recruit a national dialogue coordinator. 
• Recruit a rapidly deployable team of international legal experts, judges, prosecu-
tors, defense attorneys, corrections officers, and public information experts. 
• Identify and recruit international civilian police officers. 
• Call a debt-restructuring meeting and push the UN to review past war-related 
claims against Iraq. 
• Immediately review sanctions against Iraq and prepare the documentation nec-
essary to suspend them. 
• Convene a donors’ conference.73 
The report concludes by noting that preparations for this wide range of recon-
struction tasks must be undertaken before conflict starts in order to be effective after 
the conflict ends.74 
The Atlantic Council of the United States and American University, Winning 
the Peace. During the second half of 2002, the Atlantic Council and American Uni-
versity co-sponsored a working group on postwar Iraq, and it published a policy pa-
per containing the group’s findings in January 2003. The paper emphasizes four 
main themes: developing a common vision of Iraq’s future that is widely shared 
within the international community; U.S. power sharing with the United Nations 
____________ 
73 Barton and Crocker, pp. 14–25. 
74 Barton and Crocker, p. 26. On March 25, 2003, the center issued a follow-up report that assessed the Bush 
administration’s progress on implementing the ten recommendations listed above. It concluded that the admini-
stration earned “a mixed grade on its planning and preparations, which have been significant in certain areas but 
are still seriously lagging in others.” Bathsheba N. Crocker, Post-War Iraq: Are We Ready? Washington, D.C.: 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 25, 2003. 
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and some sort of interim ruling council; investing in the Iraqi economy and oil sec-
tor; and ensuring that Iraq no longer poses a threat to its neighbors. It stresses that 
international cooperation will be critical to these fundamental reconstruction tasks 
and that a substantial peacekeeping force will be required after combat operations 
end.75 
U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, Reconstructing Iraq. This 
report, released in February 2003, provides a historical review of past U.S. occupa-
tions and identifies challenges that the United States would be likely to face during a 
military occupation of Iraq. The main theme of the report: 
The possibility of the United States winning the war and losing the peace in Iraq 
is real and serious . . . Preparing for the postwar rehabilitation of the Iraqi politi-
cal system will probably be more difficult and complex than planning for combat. 
Massive resources need to be focused on this effort well before the first shot is 
fired.76 
This report notes that U.S. and allied forces would be required to occupy Iraq 
for an “extended period of time,” but warns that “long-term gratitude is unlikely and 
suspicion of U.S. motives will increase as the occupation continues.”77 It expresses 
doubt that the exiles would be welcomed as the new leadership in Iraq, and it dis-
cusses the religious and tribal cleavages that might cause some political fragmenta-
tion. It also analyzes the size and costs of an occupation force, the potential for ter-
rorism against U.S. forces, and requirements for economic assistance.78 
The most important part of this report is the mission matrix for Iraq, which we 
reproduce here as an appendix. It provides the single most comprehensive list of 
postwar reconstruction tasks produced either inside or outside the U.S. government. 
It lists 135 tasks that must be accomplished throughout four phases of the recon-
struction period: providing security (up to six months), stabilization (six months to 
one year), building institutions (one to two years), and handing power to local 
authorities (more than two years). Thirty-five of these tasks are considered critical for 
the military, meaning that there is a serious risk of mission failure if they are not im-
mediately addressed and resourced. The matrix shows, however, that military forces 
will bear responsibility for the vast majority of reconstruction tasks during the imme-
diate postwar period. During the first six months, the military will have to be in-
____________ 
75 Richard Murphy, Chair, Winning the Peace: Managing a Successful Transition in Iraq, Washington, D.C.: The 
Atlantic Council of the United States and the American University Center for Global Peace, January 2003. 
76 Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military 
Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, February 
2003, p. 42. 
77 Crane and Terrill, p. 18. 
78 Crane and Terrill, pp. 23–42. 
40    After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq 
volved in almost three-quarters of all reconstruction tasks: it will bear sole responsi-
bility for 70 of the 135 reconstruction tasks (52 percent) and will share responsibility 
with civilian authorities for another 28 tasks (21 percent). While it may be possible 
to dispute the authors’ specific assignments of responsibility in individual cases, the 
unmistakable thrust of their work is that the military will bear heavy responsibilities 
during the first phase of any occupation, before civilian authorities are capable of tak-
ing on many of these responsibilities. The report concludes that military leaders, par-
ticularly within the U.S. Army, should conduct more detailed analyses of their re-
sponsibilities and missions in postwar Iraq.79 
Council on Foreign Relations, Iraq: The Day After. In March 2003, the Coun-
cil issued the findings of a second working group that picked up where the December 
2002 report left off. This report contains specific recommendations about humani-
tarian issues, structuring a transitional administration immediately after the war, re-
constructing the oil industry, and maintaining regional stability.80 
____________ 
79 Crane and Terrill, p. 53. 




Task Force IV 
Establishing Task Force IV 
In December 2002, CENTCOM sponsored a wargame called Internal Look, which 
exercised the plans for the invasion of Iraq.1 The wargame focused almost exclusively 
on Phases I through III of the warplans involving major combat operations, with lit-
tle attention paid to Phase IV, the postwar period.2 Little consideration was given to 
ways in which postwar requirements might affect the conduct of combat operations.3 
There was general discussion about the postwar period at the end of the exercise, 
which included broad statements that the State Department would largely be respon-
sible during that time but did not include any specifics. Retired General Gary Luck, 
who was serving as a senior advisor during the exercise, asked what the military’s role 
would be during Phase IV, but no ready answers to his question were forthcoming. 
He commented that the military needed to stand up a planning cell to fill this gap in 
the planning, as well as start coordinating with the other U.S. government agencies, 
international organizations, and NGOs that would be involved in Phase IV.4 In sub-
sequent discussions, it was suggested that the Standing Joint Force Headquarters 
(SJFHQ) concept, developed by U.S Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), might serve 
as a good organizational model for such a planning cell.5 Lieutenant General George 
____________ 
1 Internal Look is an annual CENTCOM exercise that does not always focus on Iraq. The 2002 version, held 
between December 8 and 17, was used to exercise the developing warplans for Iraq. Daniel Williams and Vernon 
Loeb, “At Qatar Base, U.S. Begins a Test Run for War,” Washington Post, December 10, 2002; Woodward, pp. 
237 and 244; Scarborough, Rumsfeld’s War, p. 176. 
2 As CENTCOM commander General Tommy Franks named the phases: “Phase I—Preparation. Phase II— 
Shape the Battlespace. Phase III—Decisive Operations. Phase IV—Post-Hostility Operations.” Franks, p. 350. 
3 One observer noted that there was no interest in postwar civilian objectives during this exercise. Interviews with 
USAID official, February 2004. 
4 Interview with TFIV official, March 2004.  
5 For more on the SJFHQ concept, see United States Joint Forces Command, “Doctrinal Implications of the 
Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ),” Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series, Pamphlet 3, June 
16, 2003. As of June 2004: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/other_pubs/jwfcpam3.pdf 
Also see Colonel Douglas K. Zimmerman, “Understanding the Standing Joint Force Headquarters,” Military 
Review, July–August 2004, pp. 28–32. 
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Casey, then J5 Director on the Joint Staff, took the lead in developing the concept 
for the proposed planning cell. 
The members of Task Force IV (TFIV) arrived in Tampa during the second 
week of January 2003 and quickly found themselves amidst much chaos and confu-
sion. Their offices were still being wired, and their computer hardware and software 
systems were in the process of being installed. The new staff members spent several 
days meeting each other and trying to figure out what to do, because the TFIV 
commander, Brigadier General Steven Hawkins, was often away from the office re-
ceiving briefings on postwar planning efforts conducted by the U.S. government and 
other organizations. They also tried to learn more about the joint planning process 
and the SJFHQ concept, because this was the first time it had ever been put into 
practice.6 
Task Force IV Planning 
TFIV did not receive any formal planning guidance, so its members relied heavily on 
public statements by key administration officials to provide some broad principles on 
which to base their planning. In particular, they used the testimony that Douglas 
Feith, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, provided to the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee on February 11, 2003.7 In his testimony, Feith outlined five spe-
cific objectives of the postwar period:  
• To “demonstrate to the Iraqi people and the world that the United States as-
pired to liberate, not occupy or control them or their economic resources”; 
• To “eliminate Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons, its nuclear program, the 
related delivery systems, and the related research and production facilities”; 
• To “eliminate likewise Iraq’s terrorist infrastructure”; 
• To “safeguard the territorial unity of Iraq”; 
• To “begin the process of economic and political reconstruction, working to put 
Iraq on a path to become a prosperous and free country.”8 
Feith also noted that if there were to be a war, the United States would need a 
“commitment to stay as long as required to achieve the objectives I have just listed,” 
____________ 
6 Interviews with TFIV officials, March and April 2004. 
7 Interview with TFIV official, March 2004. 
8 Douglas J. Feith, prepared statement submitted to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 
11, 2003. 
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but also “a commitment to leave as soon as possible, for Iraq belongs to the Iraqi 
people.”9 
TFIV conducted planning efforts in a number of important areas, though much 
of its work remains classified. Initially, TFIV planners focused on how they would 
organize themselves and how they would assess the power grid, water supplies, gov-
ernment structures, and security needs that would form the baselines for their work. 
TFIV then addressed many substantive topics, including food distribution, infra-
structure maintenance, and what to do with the Iraqi army after the war.10 
TFIV also planned extensively for the military headquarters that would conduct 
post-conflict operations. The plans called for TFIV to expand through augmentation 
into a fully functional coalition headquarters called the Combined Joint Task Force-
Iraq (later renamed CJTF-7). TFIV planned for CJTF-Iraq to divide Iraq into seven 
multinational sectors, as shown in Figure 4.1, each commanded by a two-star gen-
eral. 
Based on a troops-to-task analysis, TFIV concluded that CJTF-Iraq would re-
quire at least 90 battalion equivalents, as detailed in Figure 4.2. When the requisite 
headquarters, maintenance units, hospitals, and other support structures were added 
to this combat force, TFIV estimated that CJTF-Iraq would require a minimum of 
approximately 200,000 U.S. military personnel and most likely more.11 The CJTF-
Iraq headquarters would have a relatively traditional military staff structure. It would 
consist of separate sections for personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, planning, 
engineering, and so on, each commanded by a two-star general. The plan deliberately 
sought coalition participation in the command structure, with the personnel, intelli-
gence, and logistics billets slated for U.S. officers and the rest slated for coalition offi-
cers.12  
____________ 
9 Feith, prepared statement. 
10 TFIV’s recommendations on the Iraqi army paralleled the guidance subsequently issued by the NSC. TFIV 
advocated removing the top two or three levels of the army command structure, leaving the rest of the soldiers in 
garrison, and gradually using the units to rebuild roads and to undertake other reconstruction tasks. Interview 
with TFIV official, April 2004.  
11 In late February 2003, General Eric Shinseki, then the Army Chief of Staff, asked TFIV for its estimates on 
how many troops would be required for postwar operations. Shinseki was told that depending on initial condi-
tions, anywhere between 300,000 and 500,000 troops would be needed. These figures were similar to those gen-
erated by Shinseki’s staff and helped form the basis for his congressional testimony that “something on the order 
of several hundred thousand soldiers” would be required for postwar operations in Iraq. Note that these figures 
were higher than the 250,000 troops that General Franks had estimated. Interviews with TFIV officials, March 
and June 2004; General Eric Shinseki, testimony to the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, February 25, 
2003; Franks, pp. 366 and 393. 
12 The engineering billet was initially slated for a coalition officer, but Hawkins changed it to a U.S. officer. In-
terview with TFIV official, March 2004. 
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Figure 4.1 

















As part of its planning efforts, TFIV identified ten key policy issues that re-
mained unaddressed. On February 21, 2003, TFIV briefed the CFLCC on the areas 
for which it needed more interagency guidance, so that the request could be submit-
ted up the chain. The ten issues were: 
• Under what mandate will the transitional civil authority and coalition forces be 
operating? Is there a specific UN mandate for civil and military authority? 
• What will be the coalition policy toward surrender and capitulation? Will there 
be a national ceasefire agreement? 
• Who sets vetting policy? Who does the vetting? How quickly can it be done? 
What will be the criteria for criminal referral, government employment, police 
service, border guard service, and military service? 
• What is coalition policy on disarming Iraqi military, security, and police forces? 
What is coalition policy on suspension and reactivation of the Iraqi military? 
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Figure 4.2 
Proposed Force Structure for CJTF-Iraq 






































































































































































• What is the policy on return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refu-
gees?  
• What Iraqi political, ethnic, and opposition groups will be allowed to partici-
pate in the interim government? 
• What legal system will Iraq be under during coalition control? 
• What currency or currencies will be legal tender? 
• What is the funding mechanism? Who controls funds at the national, regional, 
and local levels? 
• What should coalition forces do with Iraqi prisons and prisoners?13 
TFIV did not receive any feedback on these questions; as the previous chapter notes, 
the interagency community was in the process of formulating guidance on many of 
these issues. 
The lack of timely planning guidance was only one factor that hampered 
TFIV’s ability to achieve its mission. TFIV’s planning problems were exacerbated by 
____________ 
13 “Resourcing Nation Building,” Task Force IV briefing to the CFLCC, February 21, 2003. 
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a series of serious operational challenges that were encountered throughout the task 
force’s existence. 
Operational Challenges 
During its ten-week life span, TFIV faced several bureaucratic and organizational 
challenges. These are easier to address functionally rather than chronologically. Three 
of the most important challenges were staffing issues; difficult relations with 
CENTCOM and CFLCC; and an unclear relationship with the Office of Recon-
struction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), which was established by DoD in 
January 2003 to plan and execute the postwar mission as well.14 
Staffing Issues 
No procedures existed to guide the process of staffing TFIV. It had slots for 58 per-
sonnel plus the commander, the same number envisaged in the SJFHQ concept. Yet 
SJFHQs were deliberately designed to be standing organizations staffed by perma-
nently assigned personnel who worked together in peacetime as well as in times of 
crisis. TFIV, by contrast, had no standing organization upon which to draw, and it 
had to be assembled very quickly. Because the SJFHQ concept assumed that these 
organizations would be established well in advance of a crisis, it offered no guidance 
for TFIV. 
Staffing for TFIV occurred on a completely ad hoc basis. The services were 
tasked to provide personnel to TFIV, and the 58 slots ended up being divided 
roughly evenly among them. The services scrambled to fill these slots quickly, though 
their procedures for identifying relevant personnel varied considerably. The Air 
Force, for example, searched through its personnel database to identify O-5s and O-
4s who had completed both weapons school and their professional military education 
requirements, ideally at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. The Army, 
by contrast, sent out a general tasker through Forces Command (FORSCOM) with-
out any specific requirements. Because most Army staffs were stretched thin as they 
prepared to execute the Iraq warplan on top of ongoing operational commitments, it 
was harder for the Army to identify any personnel who could be quickly reassigned 
to TFIV, much less those who had specific expertise or educational backgrounds. 
While such personnel constraints were understandable, there was a general belief—
both inside and outside TFIV—that the Army did not send its best people to par-
ticipate in this organization.15 
____________ 
14 See Chapter Five for more on ORHA. 
15 Interviews with TFIV officials, March and April 2004. 
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As a whole, TFIV’s staff lacked the specialized expertise needed to fulfill its mis-
sion. Few of the staff members had previous experience in a joint environment, and 
that lack of experience caused many coordination problems. Staff members fre-
quently used terminology and concepts unfamiliar to staffers from other services. The 
planning process posed particular challenges in this regard. TFIV chose to use Army 
planning procedures, because the organization’s senior leadership came from the 
Army, but these procedures sometimes confused TFIV personnel from other serv-
ices.16 
Detailed regional expertise was also lacking, because Middle East experts were in 
high demand throughout the military during the buildup to the war. For example, 
TFIV did have a slot for a political advisor (POLAD)—a critical function for recon-
struction planning—yet the person assigned to fill that slot was a POLAD with ex-
pertise on China.17 TFIV members tried to learn as much as they could about the 
region in a short amount of time, but their efforts could not substitute for true re-
gional expertise. 
Questions also arose about whether TFIV’s leaders possessed the rank and ex-
pertise necessary for their positions. The December 2002 order from the CJCS speci-
fied that a one-star general would command TFIV, a rank that personnel both inside 
and outside the task force considered insufficient for an organization that had to co-
operate closely with three- and four-star commanders.18 Brigadier General Hawkins 
was reportedly picked by Lieutenant General Casey to lead TFIV because of his expe-
rience with reconstruction activities in the Balkans, but his largely tactical back-
ground was not as well suited to this assignment—nor were the background and ex-
perience of the people he picked to serve as his deputy and as his chief of staff.19 
TFIV members were also frustrated by the funding arrangements for their orga-
nization. The Joint Staff did not provide funding for TFIV, which meant that all 
costs would have to be borne by the services through the component commands. 
TFIV staff members quickly became frustrated by this arrangement, because it effec-
tively left them without a budget.20 
Relations with CENTCOM and CFLCC 
Task Force IV suffered from difficult relations with both CENTCOM and CFLCC 
throughout its existence. Part of the reason was structural: one observer described 
TFIV as an “orphan command,” because no single organization took ownership of it 
____________ 
16 Interview with TFIV official, November 2003. 
17 Interview with TFIV official, November 2003. 
18 Interviews with TFIV officials, November 2003, March 2004, and April 2004. 
19 Interview with TFIV official, November 2003. 
20 Interviews with TFIV officials, November 2003 and March 2004. 
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and managed and reviewed its work.21 Bureaucratic politics compounded this prob-
lem, because both CENTCOM and CFLCC viewed TFIV as an outside organiza-
tion that the Joint Staff had forced upon them.22 
According to the orders issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
TFIV would be established by JFCOM and would then be placed under the opera-
tional control (OPCON) of CENTCOM. Yet TFIV and CENTCOM, particularly 
the CENTCOM J5, never developed a close working relationship. Most interaction 
between TFIV and the CENTCOM staff occurred at relatively senior levels, usually 
at the O-6 level and above. Hawkins met frequently with Generals John Abizaid, 
David McKiernan, and William Wallace, and with General Tommy Franks when he 
was in Tampa. At the working level, however, coordination consisted of little more 
than informal conversations among staff members. While this is common for subor-
dinate staffs, it made formal coordination, when that was required, problematic in 
the absence of higher-level guidance from their leaders. Some CENTCOM officials 
resisted cooperation with TFIV, because they viewed the organization as an effort by 
the Joint Staff to interfere with the planning process.23 Such bureaucratic frictions 
were exacerbated by TFIV’s physical separation from the CENTCOM staff, operat-
ing from a building outside the main headquarters and lacking connectivity to the 
SIPRNET (the military’s classified intranet) for much of its time in Tampa.24 Al-
though CENTCOM headquarters certainly faced space constraints during this time, 
the arrangements for locating TFIV in Tampa posed significant challenges for its 
staff. 
In late January 2003, TFIV deployed from Tampa to Kuwait. Hawkins and 
Abizaid reportedly debated whether the task force should deploy to Qatar and collo-
cate there with the CENTCOM forward headquarters, or to Kuwait, where it could 
collocate with CFLCC, so the staff could coordinate with those planning the land 
campaign and with the new DoD-sponsored Post-War Planning Office (which later 
became ORHA), which would spend time in Kuwait before the war started.25 Haw-
kins arranged for CENTCOM to add another plane to the group of aircraft moving 
CENTCOM headquarters forward to Qatar at the end of January; the plane carrying 
TFIV continued on to Kuwait.26 The Joint Staff was not involved in this decision, 
and it continued to assume that TFIV would remain in Tampa at least through 
____________ 
21 Interview with TFIV official, November 2003. 
22 Interview with TFIV official, March 2004. 
23 Interviews with TFIV officials, November 2003 and June 2004. 
24 Interviews with CENTCOM official, January 2004, and TFIV official, April 2004. 
25 Interview with TFIV official, June 2004.  
26 Interview with TFIV official, March 2004. 
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March. Some members of the Joint Staff expressed a great deal of frustration at not 
knowing where TFIV was for almost two weeks.27 
The decision to deploy forward at the end of January created two significant 
problems that hampered TFIV throughout its further existence. First, TFIV was not 
able to develop all the interagency relationships it needed to operate effectively. TFIV 
had only existed for two weeks before it deployed; this was barely enough time to get 
up and running, much less identify points of contact and coordinate with various 
U.S. government agencies. TFIV had started making these connections during the 
third week of January, during a CENTCOM meeting that involved interagency rep-
resentatives as well as various NGOs and IOs, but the organization deployed forward 
before these connections had developed into working relationships. Connectivity 
challenges in Kuwait compounded the problem, since it took a couple of weeks for 
TFIV to establish telephone service and internet access from its new location. In ret-
rospect, some members of TFIV thought that it might have been better for the orga-
nization to remain in Tampa, to facilitate cooperation with the other U.S. govern-
ment agencies involved in postwar planning.28 
Second, the decision to deploy forward created frictions with CFLCC that were 
never resolved. General Franks transferred OPCON of TFIV to General McKiernan 
once TFIV arrived in theater,29 but the CFLCC staff generally viewed TFIV with 
suspicion. It did not understand the purpose of TFIV, or why an organization cre-
ated by JFCOM, with ties to the joint community, was suddenly becoming involved 
in planning efforts that had been going on for months. Most of CFLCC’s staff did 
not know that TFIV existed until it arrived at Camp Doha in Kuwait. It was further 
frustrated by Hawkins’s continuing efforts to take charge of all postwar planning ac-
tivities. Many members of TFIV believe, in retrospect, that Hawkins pushed it into a 
turf battle that it was destined to lose, since McKiernan had two more stars than 
Hawkins, and that the resultant friction made it impossible for them to fulfill their 
responsibilities.30 
Relations with CFLCC did not improve once initial impressions had been set. 
For example, TFIV lacked access to the warplans until late February, which directly 
affected its ability to plan for the postwar period.31 Also in February, McKiernan de-
cided that TFIV should report to British Major General Albert Whitley, who filled a 
new position as the deputy commander for post-conflict operations, instead of di-
rectly to him. This decision was widely interpreted as an effort to constrain and fur-
____________ 
27 Interview with TFIV official, April 2004, and Joint Staff officials, April 2004. 
28 Interviews with TFIV officials, March 2004 and April 2004. 
29 Interview with TFIV officials, June 2004. 
30 Interviews with OSD official, November 2003, and TFIV officials, March 2004 and April 2004.  
31 Interview with TFIV official, April 2004. 
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ther marginalize Task Force IV. One observer noted that by this time, CFLCC 
viewed TFIV as a grain of sand in an oyster, posing constant irritations for the rest of 
the command.32 Instead of working closely with CFLCC, as JFCOM and the Joint 
Staff had originally envisaged, Task Force IV never effectively coordinated its work 
on Phase IV with the CFLCC planners responsible for Phases I through III. 
Relations with ORHA 
The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance is discussed at length in 
the next chapter, but it is worth noting here that it and TFIV did not work closely 
together. The missions of both organizations were somewhat related: TFIV was in-
tended to plan and lead military efforts in the immediate postwar period while 
ORHA focused on both short-term and long-term civilian reconstruction efforts. 
Members of TFIV and ORHA spent time trying to determine how they should relate 
to each other, but they were never able to figure out an effective working relation-
ship.33 
The two organizations also suffered from a competition for personnel and, in an 
environment that lacked robust communications, the fact that they were not collo-
cated. Because both organizations shared a similar mission, they found themselves 
competing for trained planners and regional experts for their staffs, which meant that 
this valuable expertise was divided rather than concentrated in a single effort. The 
distance between the two headquarters compounded their problems. As discussed in 
the next chapter, ORHA set up its headquarters in the Kuwait Hilton, which meant 
that the two organizations were separated by a 45-minute drive and a security pe-
rimeter that ORHA personnel were not automatically cleared to enter. The physical 
distance, combined with both TFIV’s and ORHA’s lack of robust communications, 
made coordination difficult.34 The staffs did make some adjustments to facilitate co-
ordination; TFIV, for example, scheduled more of its personnel to work overnight 
shifts after realizing that ORHA worked late hours to facilitate coordination with 
Washington.35 Yet most communication between the two organizations remained 
informal rather than institutionalized.  
At several points, the head of ORHA—retired Army Lieutenant General Jay 
Garner—asked TFIV to come work for ORHA instead of working for CFLCC, so 
that all postwar planning could be consolidated into a single organization. Some of 
those involved in the discussion report that Hawkins supported this idea but that 
Franks, Abizaid, and McKiernan were all reluctant to do so; others report that Abi-
____________ 
32 Interview with OSD official, November 2003. 
33 Interviews with TFIV officials, November 2003, April 2004, and June 2004. 
34 Interviews with TFIV official, November 2003, and ORHA officials, November 2003 and December 2003. 
35 Interview with TFIV official, March 2004. 
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zaid had already approved the idea and that Hawkins resisted the move.36 It is not 
clear why this did not occur, though placing a military organization such as TFIV 
under the civilian command of ORHA might have posed significant legal challenges. 
In any event, the confusing command relationships for oversight of TFIV made it 
difficult to determine who had final authority to make such a decision. CENTCOM 
and CFLCC argued that they did not have the proper authority to issue an order 
transferring TFIV to ORHA, because they only maintained operational control over 
TFIV. Yet the Joint Staff, which had established TFIV, does not maintain oversight 
of military organizations, since it is not in the chain of command. Because no one 
could figure out who had the ultimate authority to make this decision, TFIV and 
ORHA remained separate organizations. Many members of TFIV thought their fail-
ure to join ORHA was a crucial missed opportunity to consolidate planning efforts 
under the civilian organization that would ultimately oversee postwar reconstruction 
and assistance.37 
TFIV became increasingly marginalized over time. As ORHA got up and run-
ning, it became the main point of contact for both military and civilian efforts to 
plan for the postwar period. ORHA could credibly claim to be in charge of these ef-
forts because it received its mission directly from a presidential directive. Further-
more, Garner possessed much more influence throughout the chain of command 
than Hawkins. Garner was a retired three-star general whose subordinates, while he 
was on active duty, had included both Franks and McKiernan. Members of TFIV 
and ORHA both acknowledged that Garner “outranked” Hawkins, even in retire-
ment, because of his wide network of contacts and direct access to these commanders 
and to Secretary Rumsfeld.38  
The Dissolution of Task Force IV 
By the end of March, it became clear that TFIV would have no direct role in post-
combat operations. TFIV had nowhere near the number of personnel necessary to 
become the nucleus for the military headquarters overseeing post-conflict operations, 
as had originally been intended, and CFLCC continually argued that it was not re-
sponsible for running such a headquarters.39 Because ORHA would be responsible 
for postwar civil assistance and administration, TFIV lacked any distinctive areas of 
responsibility. Members of TFIV started hearing rumors about the organization’s 
____________ 
36 Interviews with TFIV officials, November 2003, March 2004, and June 2004. 
37 Interviews with TFIV officials, November 2003, March 2004, and June 2004. 
38 Interviews with TFIV officials, November 2003, December 2003, and March 2004. 
39 When this headquarters (called CJTF-7) was eventually established, it was run by V Corps and not by 
CFLCC. 
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impending dissolution soon after combat operations started on March 19, and dur-
ing the last week of March, CFLCC commander McKiernan announced that TFIV 
would be disbanded.40 Hawkins protested that McKiernan did not have the authority 
to make that decision, because CFLCC only had operational control of TFIV. Yet 
McKiernan remained steadfast, and Hawkins did not further protest this decision.41 
By this time, many members of TFIV had moved on. Some staff members were 
reassigned to other positions within CFLCC, and about half of the TFIV staff went 
to work for ORHA. The work that they had done as part of TFIV served as useful 
background for their new responsibilities, and some ideas and concepts from TFIV 
worked their way into ORHA documents. For example, the ORHA campaign plan 
drew heavily on the campaign plan that TFIV had developed. However, ORHA was 
so busy with the challenges of getting itself organized and deployed that it never sys-
tematically assessed or integrated the work that TFIV had done.42 
Because combat operations had commenced by this point, the departing TFIV 
members who went to work for CFLCC were spread across the command into the 
areas where additional personnel were needed, rather than kept together to continue 
working on postwar issues. Some TFIV personnel went to the postwar planning cell 
that had been established within the CFLCC C5, but that organization focused ex-
clusively on military planning and did not incorporate TFIV’s broader focus on in-
teragency coordination. Others went to work for the CFLCC C9, the office that 
planned civil-military operations. As a result, virtually no institutional memory sur-
vived about what TFIV had done. Some individual staff members took their hard 
drives with them when they left, but no single office took responsibility for maintain-
ing or analyzing the gigabytes of documents that TFIV had produced.43 
____________ 
40 Some members of TFIV suspect that British Major General Whitley, then McKiernan’s deputy for postwar 
planning, was responsible for the decision to disband TFIV. Interview with TFIV official, June 2004.  
41 Interview with TFIV official, March 2004. 
42 Interviews with ORHA official, December 2003, and TFIV official, March 2004. 
43 Interview with TFIV official, March 2004. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance 
Organization and Staffing 
On January 9, Douglas Feith, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, notified 
retired Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner that the Department of Defense was 
about to be tasked to stand up a new office to plan for the postwar administration of 
Iraq, and that Secretary Rumsfeld wanted Garner to lead this office and assemble its 
staff.1 Garner’s background seemed ideally suited for this assignment: as a retired 
Army lieutenant general, he understood the military and the DoD bureaucracy, and 
as a former commander of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, he knew a great deal 
about Iraq and maintained a network of contacts there. Feith told Garner that a wide 
range of planning efforts had already been conducted throughout the U.S. govern-
ment and that his job would be to coordinate and integrate these previous efforts 
rather than to generate new plans.2 This office, which became known as the Office of 
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), would start work in Wash-
ington; in the event of war, ORHA would deploy to Iraq as the nucleus of the office 
that would administer the country after conflict ended. Garner was told that he 
would hand off responsibility to a new presidential envoy within a few months—
perhaps even before the organization deployed forward.3  
After agreeing to take the job, Garner started assembling his staff. He asked two 
of his former colleagues, retired Lieutenant General Ron Adams and retired Lieuten-
ant General Jerry Bates, to be his deputy and his chief of staff respectively. He also 
brought in several other retired military personnel, leading one of them to quip that 
they were the Department of Defense’s version of the Space Cowboys—referring to 
the Clint Eastwood movie in which aging astronauts return to space for one final 
____________ 
1 Fineman, Wright, and McManus; Transcript of Jay Garner interview, dated July 17, 2003, for a Frontline epi-
sode called “Truth, War & Consequences,” first aired October 9, 2003. As of October 2007: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/truth/interviews/garner.html 
2 Garner interview with Frontline. 
3 Garner interview with Frontline; Woodward, p. 283. 
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mission.4 Once the senior leadership was in place, staffing the rest of the organization 
proved to be an ongoing challenge. It took several weeks to get a core staff in place, 
and even then the staff was largely military. It was extremely difficult to get various 
U.S. government agencies to provide personnel for ORHA—including civilian repre-
sentatives from the Department of Defense. In late January, Garner met with Na-
tional Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and other members of the National Secu-
rity Council to discuss which federal agencies would provide personnel for specific 
positions within ORHA. The NSC staff verbally tasked the agencies to support 
ORHA, but few agencies followed through and provided the requested personnel. In 
mid-February, senior ORHA officials asked the NSC staff to press the agencies to 
provide their personnel as quickly as possible. Although the NSC staff agreed to do 
this, many interagency representatives did not join ORHA until after the organiza-
tion moved to Baghdad—and some did not arrive until ORHA had been replaced by 
the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in June.5 
The initial organization chart for ORHA, shown in Figure 5.1, was drafted 
through the interagency process described in Chapter Three and was given to Garner 
when he arrived.6 It established three separate pillars within ORHA: humanitarian 
affairs,7 civil administration, and reconstruction.8 Each pillar would be led by a senior 
U.S. government official and would be staffed by lower-level experts in each area. 
The deputy coordinators for each of the three pillars, as well as the chief of staff, were 
designated as nondeployable positions to ensure that ORHA maintained an organiza-
tional presence in Washington. The chart also contained a fourth branch, called Ex-
peditionary Support Staff, to help get the organization up and running and prepare 
for its eventual deployment to the theater. 
This initial organization scheme raised some significant concerns among the 
ORHA leadership. It envisaged each of the three pillars operating independently. It 
lacked some important functions, including political and legal advisors, security, a 
dedicated communications support team, and public affairs. It tasked OSD to pro-
vide the civil administration coordinator, a task that might have been more appropri-
ate for State, and it was not clear why the deputy coordinators of the three pillars  
 
____________ 
4 Brigadier General (ret.) Buck Walters, quoted in Richard Woods, Tony Allen-Mills, and Nicholas Rufford, 
“Painful Rebirth of Iraq in Cauldron of Defeat,” The Sunday Times (London), April 13, 2003. 
5 Interviews with OSD official, November 2003, and ORHA officials, December 2003, March 2004, and April 
2004. 
6 Interview with ORHA official, April 2004. 
7 ORHA’s role in humanitarian relief is discussed in Chapter Six. 
8 The civil administration pillar started off as a pillar dedicated solely to oil reconstruction. Some ORHA staffers, 
however, expressed concern that a reconstruction pillar would imply control over all of the other government 
ministries, even those that did not include reconstruction tasks. The oil pillar’s mandate was expanded as a result, 
and it was renamed civil administration. Interview with ORHA official, August 2004. 
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Figure 5.1 
Initial ORHA Organization Chart 
SOURCE: Chart provided to ORHA, January 17, 2003.
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would be military personnel provided by the Joint Staff rather than civilian personnel 
from other U.S. government agencies. Perhaps most important, the organization 
chart contained a strict dividing line between ORHA and a separate Security Coor-
dinator, who would have responsibility for all military, security, WMD, and terror-
ism issues within Iraq. This separation posed potential problems for ORHA’s leader-
ship; they believed that their reconstruction tasks would need to be closely 
coordinated, if not directly linked, with the security missions defined on the left side 
of the dotted line in Figure 5.1.9 
____________ 
9 Interview with ORHA official, May 2004. 
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In late January, the ORHA leadership received a revised organization chart, 
shown in Figure 5.2, which included three major changes. First, the chief of staff and 
deputy coordinators were no longer described as nondeployable, meaning that 
ORHA could deploy to the theater as an intact organization. Second, the chart added 
three regional group directors10—one group for the northern part of Iraq (essentially 
the Kurdish areas), one group in the southern part of the country, and one for Bagh-
dad and other cities in the center—to extend ORHA’s reach throughout Iraq.11 
Third, it added details about the role of the new Security Coordinator. The Security 
Coordinator would now report to the CJTF Planner—intended to be General Haw-
kins of Task Force IV, though his name was not explicitly noted on the chart—who 
would report up to the three-star commander of CJTF-Iraq. The chart also added a 
liaison relationship between the ORHA director and the CJTF-Iraq commander. 
ORHA leaders thought that a liaison relationship would still be insufficient for the 
close coordination they anticipated would be needed between reconstruction and 
security activities. They were also highly concerned that the new structure did not 
provide sufficient unity of effort between its military and civilian elements. Both 
ORHA and CJTF-Iraq would ultimately report to the Secretary of Defense, but no 
single person in theater could coordinate and oversee the actions of both organiza-
tions.12 
The ORHA staff started assembling and quickly found that the many adminis-
trative issues involved in setting up the organization left little time for substantive 
issues and long-term planning. Because it had only recently been established, the first 
members of the staff were crowded into a small space in the Pentagon that had few 
desks, phones, or computers. New staff members were arriving every day, which not 
only posed ever-increasing requirements for office space and supplies but also re-
quired a great deal of time for orientation, training, and personal introductions. 
ORHA also had to prepare for deployment to the theater on short notice, which in-
volved medical exams, weapons training and certification, and many personal ar-
rangements. The ORHA staff did manage to do some substantive work while jug-
gling the many administrative demands but lacked the time, energy, and senior-level  
 
____________ 
10 Later, some controversy arose over the decision to divide Iraq into three regions, because it seemed to reify 
some of the country’s ethnic and sectarian differences. ORHA maintained that these divisions were based solely 
on geographic criteria, and that Iraq was divided into regions only to facilitate administrative management of the 
country. Interview with ORHA official, May 2004. 
11 The regional group director for the north was Bruce Moore, a retired Army major general; the director for the 
south was Roger “Buck” Walters, a retired Army brigadier general; and the director for the central region was 
Barbara Bodine, a former U.S. ambassador. David Phillips, Losing Iraq, New York: Westview Press, 2005, pp. 
126–127. 
12 Garner reported directly to the Secretary of Defense, while the CJTF commander reported to the CENTCOM 
commander who then reported to the Secretary of Defense. Interview with ORHA official, May 2004. 
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Figure 5.2 
Revised ORHA Organization Chart 
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attention required for real strategic planning.13 The staff nevertheless firmly believed 
in the mission they were being asked to conduct and developed such a strong esprit 
de corps that they soon started referring to themselves as “ORHAnians.”14 
Even though new personnel showed up regularly through February and March 
2003, staffing remained an ongoing challenge for ORHA. Many U.S. government 
____________ 
13 Interviews with ORHA officials, November 2003 and December 2003. 
14 Interviews with ORHA officials and U.S. military officers, November 2003, December 2003, April 2004, and 
May 2004.  
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agencies delayed or resisted providing personnel to ORHA, despite being directed to 
do so by the NSC staff. ORHA leaders were particularly frustrated by the failures of 
both civilian and military agencies within the Department of Defense to provide re-
quested personnel. For example, when Garner asked the Joint Staff for the logistics, 
transportation, personnel, and communications experts it was tasked to provide for 
ORHA, the Joint Staff responded that most of these functions could not be provided 
until ORHA arrived in the theater—though none of these were in fact provided 
when ORHA arrived in Kuwait or Baghdad.15 ORHA only deployed 151 staff mem-
bers to Kuwait on March 16, even though Garner had estimated that ORHA would 
need a minimum of 300 people before it deployed.16 
ORHA Planning 
As ORHA got up and running, Garner identified several issues it would have to be 
prepared to address in the immediate aftermath of the war. First and foremost, Gar-
ner expressed concern that the war would trigger a major refugee crisis, particularly if 
Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons. Garner also worried that Saddam might 
choose to set the oil fields on fire and explode dams throughout the country, which 
would require extensive cleanup efforts; that epidemics of cholera and other diseases 
would erupt as sanitation and electrical systems failed; and that starvation would 
spread as the food distribution system broke.17 In these areas, ORHA was able to 
draw on the extensive interagency planning efforts for humanitarian issues, which are 
discussed at length in the next chapter.  
Garner also identified one other major problem: ORHA would have to ensure 
that the Iraqi ministries continued to function between the fall of Saddam Hussein 
and the establishment of a new permanent government.18 ORHA, like many other 
organizations within the U.S. government, assumed that the Iraqi ministries would 
remain functional after the war. Although little was known about the inner workings 
of these ministries, Saddam’s regime depended on a highly centralized government 
structure in which all important decisions were made in Baghdad.19 It was therefore 
____________ 
15 Interview with ORHA official, April 2004. 
16 Interview with ORHA official, May 2004. 
17 Garner interview with Frontline, July 2003; interview with former U.S. government official, March 2004. 
18 Garner interview with Frontline, July 2003. 
19 The U.S. intelligence community had great difficulty determining how the Iraqi government worked during 
Saddam’s rule, because it was extremely hard to get reliable human intelligence (HUMINT) reporting from 
sources within such an absolutist regime. The intelligence community provided its best estimates of the strength 
and functioning of the Iraqi government, but after the war it became clear that much of its HUMINT was unre-
liable and inaccurate. Interviews with OSD official, November 2003, and ORHA official, November 2003. 
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assumed that the senior-most levels of ministry leadership—the minister and some 
senior Ba’athist officials—could be removed and replaced without substantially un-
dermining the work of the ministries.20 The large civil service staffs in the ministries 
would keep them running under new leadership. 
How would this new leadership be determined? A Ministerial Advisory Team 
would be established for each ministry, and each team would be organized in the 
same way. The team would consist of a senior advisor, a senior government official 
from the United States or coalition partner who would guide ministry decisions but 
would retain veto authority during the transition period; expatriate Iraqi technocrats, 
who would provide technical expertise in the issues addressed by that ministry; and 
the “last Iraqi standing,” who would be the most senior technocrat remaining in the 
ministry after the top-level Ba’athists were removed and would oversee the rest of the 
ministry personnel. Working together, the members of the team would serve as care-
takers of the ministry until a permanent government was named.21 
The February Rock Drill 
On February 21 and 22, 2003, ORHA held a meeting at the National Defense Uni-
versity to vet the plans developed by each of ORHA’s three substantive pillars. The 
meeting, which became known as the February rock drill,22 included representatives 
from every U.S. government agency that would have a role in reconstruction, as well 
as from CENTCOM and TFIV.23 Garner later noted that this “standing-room only” 
meeting involved several hundred people.24 A large amount of time was spent dis-
cussing the Ministerial Advisory Teams that would be established for 23 Iraqi minis-
tries.25 As summarized in Table 5.1, the discussion of each ministry included an over-
view of its specific functions, the U.S. lead agency in charge of reconstruction, the 
name of the senior advisor, and the Iraqi expatriates who would be involved. 
____________ 
20 One source reports that the number 50 came up frequently during discussions of how many senior officials 
would need to be removed. Gordon Corera, “Iraq Provides Lessons in Nation Building,” Jane’s Intelligence Re-
view, January 2004, p. 31. 
21 Interviews with OSD official, November 2003, and ORHA official, November 2003. 
22 As Garner later explained, the meeting was called a rock drill because “you turn over all the rocks” to identify 
any problems or shortcomings with the plan. Garner interview with Frontline, July 2003. 
23 This meeting marked the first time that ORHA had any official contact with TFIV. Interview with ORHA 
official, March 2004. 
24 Garner interview with Frontline, July 2003. One participant quipped that the meeting was so big that it “was 
like a cast call for the remaking of Ben-Hur.” Fineman, Wright, and McManus. 
25 Upon arriving in Baghdad, ORHA officials were quite surprised to learn about the existence of a few other 
ministries that the intelligence community had not previously known about, including the Youth Ministry. They 
had also been told that the Atomic Energy Ministry had been disbanded, but they discovered that it had been 
demoted from a ministry to an office and was still fully functional. Interview with ORHA official, November 
2003. 
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The February rock drill was supposed to ensure that all interagency members 
knew what their responsibilities were and to help them define timetables, identify 
shortcomings, and generate personnel requirements. However, as Garner later noted, 
the meeting exposed “tons of problems” with planning and coordination efforts.26 
Two particularly serious shortcomings were identified, both of which foreshadowed 
problems that later plagued ORHA and, ultimately, CPA. First, it proved difficult to 
get various organizations within the U.S. government to provide personnel for the 
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Agriculture Land ownership 
 Price and marketing supports 
 Animal/crops production 
support 
 Iraqi grain board 




Awshalim Lazar Khamu 
Zuher Mushan 
Sarbagh Saleh 
Central Bank Bank supervision Treasury N/A 
 Currency issuance   
 Exchange rate management   
 Monetary policy   




Culture State N/A 
 
Preservation of cultural sites 
and museums   
   
 
Oversight of all publications 
and artistic expression   
 Propaganda   






John Limbert  
Defense Border control DoD Walter Slocombe N/A 
 National defense   
   
Interim: George 
Oliver  
Education Primary and secondary 
education 
USAID 















Finance Budget Sinan Al-Shabibi 
 Customs duties collection 
David Nummy, 
Treasury  





Foreign Affairs Diplomatic representation State Mowafak Abboud 
 Diplomatic - public policy  
Ambassador 
Keith Kenton Kais Al-Fahed 
 Consular affairs   
 Protocol  
Interim: Drew 
Erdmann, State  
 Research and analysis    
____________ 
26 Fineman, Wright, and McManus. 
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Health Hospital management USAID Said Hakky 
 Child malnutrition programs  
Skip Burkle, 
USAID Abdul Khaliq Hussein 
 Medicine production, import, 
distribution 
   
 Social welfare programs    









   





    
 
Iraqi national computer center 
Diplomatic – public policy 
Training/testing facilities of 
WMD 
Recruitment of scientific 
personnel for WMD pursuits    
USAID Suher Al-Musely  Housing and 
Construction 
Construction of bridges, roads, 
mosques, and buildings  Usef Aziz Seherety 
 Land surveying  
Dan Hitchings, 
U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers  
 Urban planning   





    
 
Operations and maintenance of 
government facilities    
DoD Ramsey Jiddou Industry and 
Materials 
Production of military 
equipment (conventional)  
Ambassador Tim 
Carney  
    
 
Generation and distribution of 
electricity    
 Treatment and distribution of 
water 
   
Information DoD James Woolsey Sam Alaskary 
 
Management and operation of 
internet/Iraqi web sites   




Reilly, DoD  
 Monitoring of foreign 
journalists 
   
Interior Justice Robert Gifford 
 
Administration of provinces 
(local government)  
Ibraham Mostafa Jamal 
Ildin 
 Census  
Interim: Dick 
Mayer, Justice Sami Izara Al Majoun 
 Sanitation   Sadoon Al-Dulaimi 
   
 
Internal security, law 
enforcement, prisons   
Brig. Gen. Tawfeek  
Al-Yasiri 
 Border and immigration control    
 Oversight of president's farms    


























Supreme law college 
Administration of public 
prosecution 
Administration of court system   
Riyadh Abdel Majid 
Prof. Munther Al Fadhal 
Salem Cheleby 
Hon. Zakia Hakki 
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Labor laws/labor conditions 
Social security 
Social welfare program 
Women's issues 
USAID Interim: Karen 
Walsh 
Lori Latif 
Shak Bernard Hanish 
Khalid Hassan 
Foreign procurement DoD DoD – TBD Garabeet Ishaqian Military 
Industriali-
zation 
Military production (WMD) 
Arms development 
 Interim: Tom 
Gross 
 
    
 
Sanctions evasion (through 
front companies)    
Oil USACE DoD – TBD 
 
Exploration, production, 
distribution, and marketing 




Vogler, Dept. of 
Energy 
 
Refining and distribution of 




Muhammed Ali Zainy 











Isam al Khafaji 
Mohamed Alhakim 
Osama Al-Naeb 
    
 
Telecommunications networks 







   
Ali Al-Qizweeni 




Supervising mosques, Islamic 
schools and Islamic charities 
Oversight of imams/ 
Friday prayers    
 Collection/distribution of 
zakat 
   
Trade State Bassim Abbas Hilmi 
 
Administration of Oil for Food 
program (contracting)  
Ambassador 
Robin Raphel  
   
 
Iraq-Jordan trade protocol, 
other trade pacts  
Interim: Frank 
Ostrander  
 Computing center    














    
 
Air traffic control system, 
maritime traffic 
Management of bridges, 
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seaports, 
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networks, broadcast media, 
and telephones 
   
    
 
Distribution of food from Oil 
for Food program    
 Transportation of weapons    
    
 
Management and operation 
of internet    
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ministerial teams, particularly given the very short timeframes involved. ORHA had 
existed for barely a month by the time of the February rock drill, which did not allow 
much time to identify appropriate personnel and have them arrange for leaves of ab-
sence from their current positions.27 This posed a particular problem for those desig-
nated as senior advisors, since most of these people held high-level positions within 
the U.S. government and could not quickly transfer their responsibilities to a succes-
sor. As Table 5.1 shows, interim senior advisors were named for 17 out of the 23 
ministries. Few of the permanent senior advisors joined ORHA before it deployed to 
Kuwait in March 2003, and some had still not arrived in theater by the time that 
ORHA was replaced by CPA in June.28 
But time was not the only reason why ORHA had difficulty getting secure 
commitments from U.S. government personnel. Bureaucratic resistance also played a 
role, with many agencies wary of putting their personnel under the control of a new 
organization within the Department of Defense. Furthermore, senior U.S. govern-
ment officials often reviewed the personnel selected to work for ORHA (and later 
CPA) and occasionally intervened in the personnel process. In one well-known case, 
Garner was overruled when he attempted to get Tom Warrick, the director of the 
Future of Iraq project at the State Department, to join ORHA. Warrick had briefed 
some of the findings of this project at the February rock drill, which was the first 
time Garner had heard of it. Garner asked Warrick to work for ORHA, and Warrick 
readily accepted. Three days later, however, Secretary Rumsfeld told Garner that 
Warrick would have to be removed from the team. Garner protested the decision, 
arguing that ORHA needed Warrick’s expertise,29 but Rumsfeld responded that the 
decision had come from “such a high level [of the U.S. government] that I can’t 
overturn it.”30 According to Bob Woodward, Rumsfeld later explained this decision 
to Secretary of State Powell by saying that work on postwar planning “had to be 
done by those who were truly committed to this and supportive of the change and 
____________ 
27 Knowing that it was critical to their efforts, ORHA officials had hoped to hold such a coordination conference 
even earlier, but they were unable to make the arrangements in time. As it turned out, some of them were frus-
trated with the level of coordination that did occur as a result of this conference. One participant described the 
rock drill as a BOGSAT—a derogatory acronym for “bunch of guys sitting around a table”—rather than a real 
analysis of the problems that lay ahead. Interview with ORHA official, April 2004. 
28 Some of those named in the table never went to Iraq at all. Interview with State Department official, January 
2004; interview with ORHA officials, April 2004 and August 2004. 
29 As George Ward, the ORHA official responsible for humanitarian operations, later noted, ORHA saw War-
rick’s knowledge as an important asset, because “we had few experts on Iraq on the staff.” Eric Schmitt and Joel 
Brinkley, “State Dept. Study Foresaw Trouble Now Plaguing Iraq,” New York Times, October 19, 2003. 
30 Corera, pp. 30–31. Garner later speculated that “people in the executive branch” did not like some of the work 
that Warrick had done, and that Warrick “just wasn’t acceptable” to them. Garner interview with Frontline, July 
2003. Rumsfeld’s comment has led to speculation that the decision was made by Vice President Cheney or some-
one in his office. Peter Slevin and Dana Priest, “Wolfowitz Concedes Errors on Iraq,” Washington Post, July 24, 
2003; John Barry and Evan Thomas, “The Unbuilding of Iraq,” Newsweek, October 6, 2003; Fallows, p. 72; 
Woodward, pp. 283–284. 
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not those who have written or said things that were not supportive.”31 Despite con-
tinuing appeals, Warrick never returned to ORHA. ORHA staffers remained largely 
unaware of the details contained in the Future of Iraq project’s report; those who 
were aware of it noted that they were not sure what happened to the project or its 
findings.32 
The February meeting also revealed a second serious shortcoming: several criti-
cal issues remained unaddressed, including the crucial question of who would pro-
vide security in postwar Iraq. When this question arose during the meeting, 
CENTCOM’s representatives made clear that the military would only be responsible 
for removing Saddam Hussein from power and defeating his forces, not for provid-
ing security after the fall of the regime.33 It was not clear, however, who would be 
responsible for ensuring law, order, and stability if the military did not take on this 
mission.34 Other unresolved issues that surfaced during the meeting included how 
the Iraqi military would be restructured; court reform; the role of indigenous media; 
and salaries for civil servants, police officers, and military personnel. ORHA officials 
raised these unresolved issues many times during the subsequent months, particularly 
during videoconferences with General Franks, Secretary Rumsfeld, and NSC offi-
cials. Yet few of these issues were addressed until ORHA was replaced by CPA in 
June 2003.35 
ORHA’s Role in Reconstruction 
ORHA’s primary mission was to facilitate reconstruction efforts after the fall of the 
regime rather than directly conduct reconstruction activities itself.36 USAID would 
be responsible for letting most of the major reconstruction contracts, as discussed in 
Chapter Three, and it was in the process of picking contractors for more than $1 bil-
lion worth of contracts when the war started. Yet the USAID personnel in theater 
____________ 
31 Woodward, p. 284. David Phillips suggests that one reason for this decision may have been the fact that War-
rick had criticized the Defense Department during a meeting with Iraqi exiles in Michigan. According to Phillips, 
one exile recalled that Warrick told those assembled at the meeting that “if you work with Paul Wolfowitz, the 
State Department will not give you anything.” See Phillips, Losing Iraq, New York: Westview Press, 2005, p. 127. 
32 Stephen J. Glain, “Chaos Thrives in Baghdad Despite Prewar Planning,” Boston Globe, June 10, 2003. 
33 ORHA officials later put together what they described as the “cop on the beat” briefing, which showed that 
coalition military forces would have to be prepared to provide security if the Iraqi police forces were not up to the 
task. The briefing went at least as high as the Deputies Committee. The consistent response to this briefing was 
that the military was not going to undertake that task, with no clarification about who would be responsible. 
Interview with ORHA official, April 2004. 
34 ORHA officials were particularly concerned about their own security, since they had been explicitly told that 
security would be provided for them when they arrived in Iraq. ORHA ended up hiring 100 Ghurkas and a per-
sonal security team from South Africa to provide security for the organization. Interviews with ORHA officials, 
January 2004, March 2004, and April 2004. 
35 Interviews with ORHA officials, November 2003, January 2004, and March 2004. 
36 Its mission also included facilitating humanitarian relief assistance, as discussed in Chapter Six. 
The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance    65 
reported to Garner, as did all other U.S. personnel involved in reconstruction ef-
forts.37 
The contracts that were let during this time included some fairly ambitious 
plans and timetables for reconstruction activities. According to one report, ORHA 
and USAID plans for rebuilding the Iraqi school system called for the following tasks 
to be accomplished within one year: launching a new nationwide accelerated learning 
program; getting “all children back in school,” since only one-third of Iraqi children 
had been attending secondary school before the war; providing books and other sup-
plies to all of Iraq’s students; and ensuring that 25,000 schools would be able “to 
function at a standard level of quality.”38 At the end of the year, responsibility for the 
school system would be returned to the Ministry of Education. Similarly, USAID 
sought a private contractor to run the Iraqi health system, which consisted of 270 
hospitals and 1,000 clinics. The USAID contract proposal in this sector stated that 
after a year, the Ministry of Health “will be reformed and prepared to take over op-
eration of the health care system.”39 
Deploying to Kuwait 
After the February rock drill, ORHA continued planning and absorbing new staff 
members at a rapid rate. At the end of the first week of March, a senior U.S. De-
partment of Defense official told ORHA that it should deploy to Kuwait immedi-
ately—a move that many at ORHA interpreted as a signal that war with Iraq would 
most likely commence soon.40 Since ORHA had been focusing on establishing itself 
in Washington, the members of ORHA spent a week scrambling to get ready for the 
deployment—getting inoculations, processing forms, receiving training in weapons 
handling and chemical protection, and so on—while still absorbing new staff mem-
bers.41 The organization grew from 90 to 151 people during this time, and all of the 
new staff members had to prepare for deployment as well. Many members of ORHA 
thought that they needed more time in Washington to solidify their relationships 
with other U.S. government agencies, especially since the revised ORHA structure 
(shown in Figure 5.2) called for the entire organization to deploy to the theater with-
____________ 
37 Neil King, Jr., “Bush Has an Audacious Plan to Rebuild Iraq Within a Year,” Wall Street Journal, March 17, 
2003; Karen DeYoung and Dan Morgan, “U.S. Plan for Iraq’s Future Is Challenged,” Washington Post, April 6, 
2003. 
38 Quotes taken from the USAID contract proposal. Also see King. 
39 King. 
40 Interviews with OSD official, November 2003, and ORHA official, April 2004. 
41 The majority of ORHA staff members were civilians rather than military personnel, which meant that many 
people were receiving this kind of training for the first time. Interview with ORHA official, April 2004. 
66    After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq 
out leaving a back office in Washington.42 Garner told his staff that he thought the 
deployment would serve as a forcing mechanism: once ORHA got to Kuwait, agen-
cies would have no choice but to support ORHA by breaking through bureaucratic 
and logistics logjams.43  
ORHA staff members started deploying to Kuwait as soon as they were ready, 
and once Garner arrived on March 16, the deployment was complete. However, 
ORHA discovered that no one in the theater had been expecting them. General 
McKiernan, the CFLCC commander, did not want ORHA to collocate with his staff 
at Camp Doha, because he worried about the security implications of allowing a 
mostly civilian organization within the perimeter of his military headquarters.44 In 
the absence of any alternatives, ORHA started setting up its headquarters at the Ku-
wait Hilton, where it remained for several weeks. The Hilton was approximately 45 
minutes away from Camp Doha, and the normal coordination problems caused by 
that distance were exacerbated by the lack of functioning communications in theater 
and the requirement that ORHA personnel go through extremely lengthy security 
checks before being allowed inside the Camp Doha perimeter.45 Furthermore, 
ORHA had to build an office infrastructure from scratch, since it had never planned 
to locate at the Hilton. It had no desks, chairs, telephones, computers, internet ac-
cess, or office supplies; thus, it had to scavenge for all these resources for the second 
time since its inception.46 
ORHA faced many challenges while in Kuwait. One of the most important was 
that it never developed an effective working relationship with CFLCC. The exact 
command relations between the two organizations were a source of confusion at the 
outset,47 but it was clear that the two organizations would need to work together 
closely so that ORHA could access the land assets that CFLCC controlled. In prac-
tice, however, CFLCC’s warfighting needs always had a higher priority than 
ORHA’s reconstruction needs. Whenever ORHA requested the security, communi-
cations, and transportation support that the Joint Staff had promised would be avail-
able in theater, CFLCC responded that those assets were not available because they 
were involved in combat tasks. While no one at ORHA wanted to undermine the 
____________ 
42 Interviews with OSD official, November 2003, and ORHA officials, December 2003 and May 2004. 
43 Interview with OSD official, November 2003. 
44 Interview with ORHA official, April 2004. 
45 Interviews with ORHA official, November 2003, and TFIV official, March 2004. 
46 Interviews with ORHA officials, November 2003, December 2003, March 2004, and April 2004. 
47 Garner and many other ORHA staff reportedly told the CFLCC staff that ORHA worked directly for Secre-
tary of Defense Rumsfeld. CENTCOM and CFLCC, by contrast, believed that ORHA had been put under the 
OPCON of CFLCC during Phase IVa. Donald R. Drechsler, “Reconstructing the Interagency Process After 
Iraq,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1, February 2005, p. 20. 
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war effort, they grew frustrated that reconstruction needs were always subordinated 
to combat needs.48 
Furthermore, ORHA’s planning efforts were limited by its lack of knowledge of 
the content of the warplans until shortly before the war started. Garner’s original 
concept of operations called for ORHA to go into Basra and start reconstruction  
efforts as soon as U.S. and coalition military forces secured that city. During the sec-
ond week of March, Garner reportedly had a videoconference with General McKier-
nan, who informed him that the warplans called for most military forces to go 
straight into Baghdad. McKiernan told Garner that he should not expect to go into 
Basra, immediately rendering many of ORHA’s plans obsolete. The Phase IV plan 
envisaged ORHA entering Baghdad after 120 days, by which time most of the coun-
try would be pacified and the military would have the necessary resources available to 
support this civilian organization.49 This came as quite a shock to ORHA, especially 
coming just a few days before the onset of major combat operations. Garner had 
briefed his concept of operations to senior civilian and military officials for several 
weeks, without ever being informed that the warplans might require him to operate 
differently. ORHA could have developed an alternative plan if it had known crucial 
components of the warplans from the outset of its efforts.50 Furthermore, ORHA was 
directed to remain in Kuwait during major combat operations. General McKiernan 
argued that he did not have enough forces to provide security for ORHA, and that 
ORHA would therefore have to wait in Kuwait until combat ended and the security 
situation stabilized.51 Not only did this render ORHA’s plans ineffective, but once 
Baghdad fell and the looting started, it exposed ORHA to the charge that it was do-
ing nothing to stop the destruction of the country. 
While in Kuwait, ORHA continually refined its reconstruction plans. The 
ORHA staff held meetings almost every day to posit different scenarios and deter-
mine how they would provide humanitarian assistance, rebuild infrastructure, and 
develop local governance in each one.52 They developed detailed timetables and 
checklists of issues that would need to be addressed during the initial transition pe-
riod. Garner repeatedly emphasized to his staff—and later to the Iraqi people—that 
ORHA’s mission remained limited and that they should be prepared to “work their 
way out of a job within 90 days.”53 This led some observers to question whether 
____________ 
48 Interviews with ORHA officials, November 2003, December 2003, and April 2004. 
49 Drechsler, p. 20. 
50 Interviews with ORHA officials, December 2003 and April 2004. 
51 Interviews with ORHA officials, December 2003 and April 2004. 
52 Interview with ORHA official, April 2004. 
53 Susan B. Glasser and Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Reconstruction Planners Worry, Wait and Revaluate,” Washing-
ton Post, April 2, 2003. 
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ORHA’s plans would adequately address the complexity of the postwar situation in 
Iraq. One participant likened a briefing in one of ORHA’s planning sessions to “a 
Boston Consulting Group presentation to IBM. It was so different than what the 
situation really is in Iraq. That is going to be a big, big shock to them.”54  
Arriving in Baghdad 
Garner entered Iraq for the first time on April 11, 2003—two days after the toppling 
of the statue of Saddam Hussein—on a day-long visit to the southern port of Umm 
Qasr.55 He traveled to Nasiriya a few days later but again returned to Kuwait at the 
end of the visit.56 Garner understood that CENTCOM did not want ORHA to go 
into Baghdad while the security situation remained unstable, but he grew increas-
ingly concerned that they were losing valuable time for the reconstruction process. 
On April 17, Garner met with General Franks in Qatar and later described the meet-
ing as follows: 
[I] said, “You got to get me into Baghdad.” He said, “You know, it’s really hot 
there right now, it’s really going to be hard to protect you.” I said, “I think we’ll 
take our chance.” He said, “Well, let me talk to the military commanders.” It was 
either the night of the 17th, [or] the night of the 18th, he called and said, “Go 
ahead, and we’ll give you all the support we can.”57 
An ORHA advance party went into Baghdad on April 19. Garner arrived in 
Baghdad on April 21, and the majority of the ORHA staff followed on April 24.58 
ORHA quickly discovered that conditions in Iraq were quite different from the 
conditions they had anticipated. They had expected and planned for an extensive 
humanitarian crisis, but as discussed in the next chapter, that crisis never material-
ized. As Garner later noted, “I thought the first 30 days were going to be all food, 
water, and medicines.”59 Instead, they were confronted by two major reconstruction 
challenges that they had not expected. First, looting destroyed far more of Baghdad’s 
infrastructure than ORHA had ever anticipated. The war itself caused little damage 
____________ 
54 Glasser and Chandrasekaran. 
55 Garner had hoped to travel farther north to Basra, but his aides reportedly said that the longer trip would not 
be safe. Jane Perlez, “Aid Groups Urging Military to Protect Essential Services,” New York Times, April 12, 2003. 
56 See Chapter Ten for more on Garner’s meetings in Nasiriya. 
57 Garner interview with Frontline, July 2003. 
58 Monte Reel, “Garner Arrives in Iraq to Begin Reconstruction,” Washington Post, April 22, 2003; interview 
with ORHA official, March 2004. 
59 David Luhnow, “Shortages, Lack of Time to Plan Bedevil New U.S. Agency in Iraq,” Wall Street Journal, June 
5, 2003. 
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to infrastructure, largely because of heavy reliance on precision weaponry, but the 
looting destroyed almost three-quarters of the government ministries and many other 
structures and facilities.60 As Garner explained, 
What happened in Baghdad is not only did they take everything out of the build-
ings, but then they pulled all the wiring out of the buildings, they pulled all the 
plumbing out of the buildings, and they set it on fire. So the buildings were not 
useable at all. In fact, some of them probably are not structurally sound enough 
to ever be used—they’ll have to be torn down and rebuilt . . . I knew that there 
would be looting. I think all of us knew that. But I never anticipated we would 
not be able to use the buildings, unless they were destroyed by the military.61 
The destruction of the ministries also made it very difficult for ORHA to iden-
tify ministry personnel, since they had nowhere left to work. The ministerial senior 
advisors had to rely on word of mouth to identify these people. As Garner recalls, 
“we literally had to put our people on the streets of Baghdad walking around and 
asking if they knew anyone” who worked in the various ministries.62 The ministries 
set up temporary offices within the palace that ORHA used as its own headquarters, 
with each ministry identified by a piece of paper taped on the outside of the door.63 
These conditions meant that most of the ministerial advisory teams could not take 
over functioning ministries as planned but, instead, had to start with the very chal-
lenging task of rebuilding the ministries, often from scratch. 
Continuing combat operations posed the second unanticipated challenge to 
ORHA. All the military plans for Iraq envisaged that combat operations would come 
to a definitive end, to be followed by post-conflict stability operations in a relatively 
benign environment. Instead, both kinds of operations ended up overlapping to a 
great extent. The fall of Saddam’s regime created a power vacuum that enabled for-
mer regime loyalists, insurgents, and foreign fighters to compete with one another for 
power, as well as organize and execute attacks on coalition forces. The unsettled secu-
rity environment slowed reconstruction efforts because of the ongoing looting and 
sabotage and the increasing fearfulness of the Iraqi population. 
ORHA therefore found itself operating in a risk-filled environment, in which 
U.S. and coalition military forces continued to conduct military operations against 
the growing insurgency. As ORHA grew increasingly dependent on U.S. military 
forces to provide security, it became more difficult for ORHA to establish effective 
working relationships with Iraqis, which were essential for reconstruction. Garner 
____________ 
60 The headquarters of 17 out of the 23 government ministries were destroyed. Garner interview with Frontline, 
July 2003. 
61 Garner interview with Frontline, July 2003. 
62 Corera, p. 31. See also Garner interview with Frontline, July 2003. 
63 Luhnow. 
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told Lieutenant General William Wallace, the commander of V Corps, that ORHA 
needed security provided in 30 different locations around the city. Wallace re-
sponded that he did not have enough forces to fill all the requests for security he was 
receiving and that he could only provide ORHA with some, not all, of the security 
forces Garner had requested. This limited the ability of ORHA personnel to move 
around Baghdad and get their work done. In some cases, ORHA personnel were 
stranded at their ministries because they were not supposed to leave without security 
escorts.64 This problem was never satisfactorily resolved, and it limited the amount of 
contact that ORHA (and later CPA) officials could have with the Iraqi people. As 
one British ORHA official later noted, “at the U.S. military’s insistence, we traveled 
out from our fortified headquarters in Saddam’s old Republican Palace in armored 
vehicles, wearing helmets and flak jackets, trying to convince Iraqis that peace was at 
hand, and that they were safe.”65 
The Transition to CPA 
Unbeknownst to most of its staff, ORHA was already being phased out of existence 
within days of arriving in Baghdad. On the evening of April 24, Secretary Rumsfeld 
called Garner and told him that President Bush planned to appoint L. Paul Bremer 
as his permanent envoy to Iraq.66 The reasons for the timing of this decision remain 
unclear. From the outset, the plan was to replace Garner with a presidential envoy. 
Yet the fact that Garner was notified of this transition almost as soon as he arrived in 
Baghdad led to much speculation that he was being held responsible for the looting 
and the chaos that emerged in his absence—despite the fact that the military com-
manders had prevented him from entering the country any earlier.67 Press reports 
stated that the decision to replace Garner with Bremer was reached hastily, after 
President Bush and his senior advisors decided that both the perception and the real-
ity of reconstruction efforts were deteriorating.68 
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64 Corera, p. 32. 
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U.S. officials first discussed Bremer’s appointment with the press on May 169 
and officially announced the appointment on May 6.70 It immediately set off specula-
tion that Garner had been fired because ORHA was unable to address the postwar 
challenges.71 Garner has explicitly denied that he was fired, stating that the plan had 
always been for him to stand up the organization and then transfer power to a per-
manent presidential envoy after a few months.72 Others, both inside and outside the 
administration, interpret these events less charitably, arguing that their timing was 
designed to convey the impression that Bremer was making a clean start, even though 
Garner did exactly what senior U.S. officials had told him to do. Critics expressed 
great frustration that no one in the Bush administration said anything to support 
Garner after this dismissal or to correct the impression that he had been fired.73 
Bremer arrived in Baghdad on May 12, 2003,74 with a mandate to create a new 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Whatever the exact circumstances of Gar-
ner’s removal, CPA represented a fundamental shift in U.S. policy. Whereas ORHA 
was a temporary organization designed to assist a new Iraqi government during a 
short transitional period, CPA would possess all the powers of an occupation author-
ity. It therefore signified an implicit acknowledgement that the reconstruction of Iraq 
would be a much longer and more complicated endeavor than U.S. policymakers had 
anticipated. Bremer arrived from Washington with what Garner later referred to as 
“a suitcase full of directives,”75 which represented major changes in U.S. policy.76 The 
two decisions that proved to be the most controversial later on—disbanding the Iraqi 
military and de-Ba’athification—deliberately changed the policies that had been ap-
proved through the interagency process earlier in the year and implemented by 
ORHA.  
The transfer of power from ORHA to CPA did not progress smoothly. Bremer 
arrived in Baghdad with a staff that he had assembled in Washington and started 
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building the new organization largely from scratch. Although Garner and Bremer 
worked together closely, their staffs did not. Many ORHA officials grew frustrated 
that Bremer’s staff not only assumed control so quickly, but also largely dismissed the 
work and expertise that ORHA had generated during the past six months as not rele-
vant to the new mission.77 As CPA staff started to grow, the ORHA staff started to 
shrink. Some ORHA staff members stayed on to work for CPA, but most of them 
decided to return home. Garner left Iraq on June 1, almost two weeks after ORHA 
was replaced by CPA. 
____________ 
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The U.S. government conducted extensive planning for the humanitarian relief ef-
forts that any war with Iraq might require. An interagency planning team started 
meeting in the fall of 2002 and worked with international organizations (IOs) and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to generate detailed humanitarian relief 
plans for a wide range of possible scenarios. As it turned out, the war in Iraq did not 
generate a significant humanitarian emergency, largely because of the ways in which 
the war was fought. This does not mean that the humanitarian planning efforts fo-
cused on the wrong areas: they helped ensure that humanitarian concerns were fac-
tored into the warplans, and worst-case scenario planning for any potential humani-
tarian disaster is prudent. However, it is important to note that humanitarian relief 
plans are not the same as reconstruction plans. Relief requires intensive short-term 
efforts, while reconstruction requires steady efforts over a prolonged period. The 
preparations for providing food, water, and shelter to needy Iraqis stand in contrast 
to the problems with reconstruction planning noted in previous chapters. 
Interagency Humanitarian Planning 
During the summer of 2002, representatives from the Office of the Secretary of De-
fense, CENTCOM, and the Joint Staff started meeting to develop humanitarian re-
lief plans for a possible war in Iraq.1 They soon expanded to form a Humanitarian 
Planning Team (HPT), which brought in representatives from the NSC staff, 
USAID, and the State Department.2 In late September 2002, the HPT started work-
ing with the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction working group (IR+R), one of the inter-
____________ 
1 The OSD representatives came from the Stability Operations office within the office for Special Operations and 
Low Intensity Conflict; the Joint Staff representatives came from the J7, Operational Plans and Interoperability. 
Interview with OSD official, November 2003. 
2 Interview with CENTCOM official, January 2004. 
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agency groups discussed in Chapter Three.3 Humanitarian operations were seen as a 
critical component of operations in Iraq, with President Bush stressing that humani-
tarian assistance needed to be part of the operation from the very beginning.4 
The HPT and IR+R working group assessed potential humanitarian relief needs 
in a wide range of areas, including relocating refugees as well as providing food, wa-
ter, and electrical power.5 They were well aware that significant humanitarian chal-
lenges already existed in Iraq. Approximately 60 percent of the population depended 
on food distributions from the United Nations Oil for Food (OFF) Program, and 
the United Nations estimated that 800,000 people were internally displaced within 
Iraq and an additional 740,000 Iraqis were refugees in neighboring countries.6 Al-
though exact scenarios were hard to predict, it was expected that any war with Iraq 
would displace as many as 2 million additional people; disrupt and perhaps destroy 
key parts of the food distribution network; disrupt the electrical supply, which would 
directly affect water and health services; and cause many UN and NGO personnel to 
leave the country, thus reducing the services they provided.7 These interagency plan-
ners, therefore, assumed that the Iraqi population would require extensive humani-
tarian assistance both during and after combat operations.  
Although the detailed plans remain classified, they were based on six main prin-
ciples, as follows.8  
1. Minimize displacement, infrastructure damage, and disruption of services. 
The military campaign was designed to minimize the number of civilian casual-
ties, through careful vetting of targets and high reliance on precision munitions. 
The humanitarian mapping program was a key element of this process, which 
involved U.S. military outreach to humanitarian IOs and NGOs to identify 
important humanitarian facilities, key infrastructure, and cultural and historical 
sites so that they would not be unintentionally targeted during combat opera-
tions. USAID started holding weekly meetings with humanitarian organizations 
in late 2002 in order to facilitate the exchange of information.9 Some IOs and 
NGOs were reluctant to share this information with the U.S. military, lest they 
____________ 
3 Remarks of Andrew Natsios, Administrator of USAID, “Briefing on Humanitarian Reconstruction Issues,” 
White House Office of the Press Secretary, February 24, 2003. 
4 Woodward, p. 147. 
5 Interview with OSD official, November 2003. 
6 Remarks of Elliott Abrams, NSC Senior Director for Near East and North Africa, “Briefing on Humanitarian 
Reconstruction Issues,” February 24, 2003. 
7 United Nations, Likely Humanitarian Operations, December 10, 2002, paragraph 17; Joseph J. Collins, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, “DoD News Briefing,” February 25, 2003. 
8 Abrams, “Briefing on Humanitarian Reconstruction Issues,” February 24, 2003. 
9 Abrams and Natsios, “Briefing on Humanitarian Reconstruction Issues,” February 24, 2003; Collins, “DoD 
News Briefing,” February 25, 2003.  
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be seen as supporting the war. Some organizations refused to cooperate officially 
but quietly provided the requested information through informal channels or 
during several highly confidential, off-the-record meetings with U.S. govern-
ment representatives.10 The U.S. government also provided IOs and NGOs 
with a phone number and a web site where they could nominate targets to be 
placed on the no-strike list.11 
2. Rely primarily on civilian relief agencies. IOs and NGOs, and not the U.S. 
military, would take the lead in providing humanitarian assistance. The U.S. 
military would focus on providing a secure environment in which those civilian 
and international agencies could do their work. It would provide limited hu-
manitarian relief in cases where these agencies did not have the presence or ca-
pability to act on their own—such as during the early phases of a war—but the 
planners anticipated that this would occur for only a short time before the relief 
agencies would be capable of operating on their own. In short, no one expected 
serious security problems to arise. 
3. Develop effective civil-military relations. USAID assembled and trained a Dis-
aster Assistance Response Team (DART), which was designed to enter Iraq 
alongside U.S. military forces. Its tasks would be to assess immediate humani-
tarian needs; coordinate the provision of relief with the military, IOs, NGOs, 
and other donors; and make local grants for immediate relief projects. It was the 
largest DART ever assembled, composed of more than 60 humanitarian relief 
experts from USAID; the State Department’s Bureau for Population, Migra-
tion, and Refugees (PRM); and the Department of Health and Human Services’ 
Public Health Service. The DART would consist of a core team, with three 
mobile field offices that would report to the DART leader.12 The interagency 
team also prepared to establish a Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) in 
Kuwait, so that U.S. military, U.S. civilian, UN, IO, NGO, and coalition rep-
resentatives would all be located in one place and be able to coordinate their re-
lief efforts.13 
4. Facilitating IO and NGO operations. In addition to establishing coordination 
centers such as the HOC, the U.S. government also supported IO and NGO 
____________ 
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operations in a number of ways. The State Department’s PRM gave more than 
$15 million to international agencies, particularly the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR), for prepositioning supplies and contingency planning. 
USAID gave more than $9 million to UNICEF, the World Food Program, and 
other agencies for contingency planning efforts. Much U.S. financial assistance 
was provided very quietly—and in some cases was disguised as general contribu-
tions—because these organizations did not want to be seen as supporting the 
war.14 The U.S. government also provided indirect assistance, such as simplify-
ing the licensing process for them to operate inside Iraq and funding the Joint 
NGO Emergency Preparedness Initiative (JNEPI), which provided coordina-
tion and support to NGOs preparing to work in Iraq.15 Other countries also 
contributed to these efforts. The UK’s Department for International Develop-
ment, for example, contributed £16.5 million for the prepositioning of humani-
tarian supplies, largely to UN agencies, NGOs, and the International Red Cross 
and Red Crescent.16 
5. Prepositioning U.S. government relief supplies and response mechanisms. 
The United States stockpiled more than $26 million worth of supplies in the 
region, including water, medicine, shelter supplies, and blankets, that would 
serve an estimated one million people.17 It prepositioned more than three 
million humanitarian daily rations (HDRs), each of which contains enough 
calories for one person for one day.18 The United States also had plans to 
quickly restore essential services, such as water supplies, sanitation systems, and 
health services. All of these depended on the quick restoration of electrical 
power throughout the country.19 
6. Restoring the food distribution system. As noted above, more than 60 percent 
of Iraqis depended on the rations provided by the OFF program. It was a com-
plex food distribution system that involved more than 55,000 ration agents 
throughout the country. U.S. planners aimed to disrupt that system as little as 
____________ 
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possible during the war and to reestablish it as quickly as possible after the con-
clusion of hostilities.20 
On February 25, 2003, USAID officials estimated that they had already spent 
$26 million on preparing for possible humanitarian relief efforts in Iraq, and noted 
that they were in the process of reallocating another $56 million of USAID funds 
toward this mission.21 
ORHA was also involved in efforts to prepare for humanitarian relief during 
this time, since it was one of the organization’s three core pillars. ORHA would not 
become directly involved in the provision of relief, since that would be done mostly 
by various IOs and NGOs, but it would assist the many humanitarian coordination 
efforts described above. The interagency planning team and ORHA officials particu-
larly sought to engage the United Nations in cooperative planning efforts. While the 
various UN technical agencies (including UNHCR and the World Food Program) 
worked closely with ORHA and other U.S. government organizations, relations with 
the UN Secretariat were reportedly much more problematic, largely due to the ongo-
ing political debates at the Security Council about whether or not to go to war.22 
IO and NGO Frustrations 
Despite the coordination efforts described above, many IOs and NGOs nevertheless 
remained frustrated by the perceived lack of support from the U.S. government. In 
one important example, the existing sanctions regime prevented U.S. humanitarian 
relief organizations from operating inside Iraq. During the fall of 2002, representa-
tives from U.S. NGOs asked for a presidential directive that would exempt them 
from the sanctions, so that they could start operating inside Iraq and developing the 
infrastructure necessary for relief efforts. They were told that a decision would be 
made by December, but no such decision was made. The point was soon moot, since 
by early 2003 the NGOs had come to fear that the situation on the ground was too 
dangerous. Moreover, the U.S. government feared that relief workers might be taken 
hostage in the event of war; but the NGOs’ frustrations lingered.23 The frustrations 
were exacerbated by the fact that senior representatives from these NGOs regularly 
interacted with working-level U.S. government officials on humanitarian relief issues. 
In January 2003, the humanitarian groups that had been meeting with USAID asked 
to meet with either Secretary Rumsfeld or Paul Wolfowitz to discuss their concerns. 
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Such a meeting was never scheduled, and they never met with anyone more senior 
than a deputy assistant secretary.24 
Furthermore, some NGOs remained skeptical that relief plans were being based 
on relevant scenarios. They expressed concern that demands for humanitarian assis-
tance in Iraq might dwarf the plans that had been developed to provide relief assis-
tance. As the head of Interaction, an umbrella organization representing more than 
100 U.S. NGOs, said two days before the war started, “We don’t think the relief and 
reconstruction needs of the Iraqi people will be adequately met, based on the overly 
optimistic scenarios we understand the U.S. government is using.”25 
Actual Humanitarian Requirements 
The vast majority of these plans were never needed, because the humanitarian situa-
tion turned out to be much better than expected during major combat. The conflict 
produced few refugees and displaced persons, essential services remained largely in-
tact, and no significant food shortages occurred throughout the country. Why was 
there no humanitarian crisis? The answer falls into two broad categories: factors re-
lated to the conduct of the war itself, and the extensive preparations for humanitarian 
assistance. 
First, the rapid speed of military operations and the swift fall of the Iraqi regime 
prevented major humanitarian needs from developing throughout the country. On 
the ground, U.S. military forces moved quickly toward Baghdad and avoided major 
combat in most of the population centers in southern and central Iraq. Combat op-
erations in Baghdad caused the fall of the regime far faster than either U.S. military 
or civilian decisionmakers had expected.26 In the air, the extensive reliance on preci-
sion munitions and the focus on leadership targets minimized the damage to Iraq’s 
infrastructure. For both of these reasons, the vast majority of Iraqis chose to stay in 
their homes during the war rather than flee to other parts of the country or across the 
border. If combat operations had inflicted more damage on civilian residences and 
infrastructure—i.e., during a prolonged urban siege, through less discriminate target-
____________ 
24 They did meet with Joseph Collins, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations. Fal-
lows, p. 69; Hammer and Soloway. 
25 Mary McClymont, quoted in Neil King, Jr., “Bush Has an Audacious Plan to Rebuild Iraq Within a Year,” 
Wall Street Journal, March 17, 2003. These sentiments were echoed by Sandra Mitchell, the vice president of the 
International Rescue Committee, who testified to Congress that “The logistical and operational framework is not 
in place to support a humanitarian response.” Barbara Slavin, “Rebuilding Iraq to Start Quickly,” USA Today, 
March 20, 2003. 
26 U.S. officials were extremely concerned that Saddam would pursue a “Fortress Baghdad” strategy, digging into 
the city and causing prolonged and highly destructive urban warfare. Woodward, pp. 64, 126, 134–135, 147, 
174, and 205–206; Franks, pp. 349 and 391.  
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ing, or because of a decision by Saddam to use chemical weapons, as many feared 
before the war—the number of refugees could easily have approached or even sur-
passed the estimated one million mark.  
Second, food and supply distribution networks remained largely intact. Before 
the war, Saddam ordered the distribution of three months’ worth of food rations, as 
opposed to the usual one-month supply. Humanitarian planners feared that many 
Iraqis might have sold some of their rations in a desperate move to get cash before 
the conflict, but this ended up not being the case. Furthermore, the humanitarian 
mapping effort proved quite successful. No major incidents were reported of U.S. 
military forces mistakenly targeting humanitarian facilities. The food distribution 
network resumed its full functioning in June 2003,27 which obviated the need for the 
large relief stockpiles that had been prepositioned throughout the region.28 
As a result, the expected humanitarian crisis never materialized. Relief agencies 
did enter Iraq after the war, but few emergency services were required. The DARTs 
did go into the country, but because humanitarian aid was not needed, they focused 
on facilitating reconstruction by assessing needs, working with military civil affairs 
personnel, and contracting for community projects.29 ORHA did not need to im-
plement its humanitarian plans, and its humanitarian assistance pillar was disestab-
lished during the transition to CPA in June 2003.30 
Assessing Humanitarian Planning 
After the war, ORHA was heavily criticized for having planned for the wrong events. 
Its extensive humanitarian plans were not needed, and it remained unprepared to 
address the looting, lawlessness, and eventually the insurgency that emerged after 
Saddam was removed from power. These criticisms are largely unfair, however. That 
____________ 
27 One observer reported that the distribution of rations for June 2003 was delayed by only one day and was on 
time after that. Interview with ORHA official, January 2004. 
28 Many of the supplies contained in these stockpiles could be reallocated to relief efforts in different parts of the 
world. As one U.S. official noted, the government was trying to maximize the number of nonconsumables in the 
stockpiles, because “if you don’t use a water bottle in the Middle East, you can use a water bottle somewhere 
else.” McConnell, “U.S. Humanitarian Planning and Relief Efforts,” February 25, 2003. 
29 There was a fair amount of dissatisfaction with the DARTs in Iraq. Both military and civilian personnel note 
that the DARTs were slow to arrive in country because they were accustomed to operating in a permissive envi-
ronment, and the opposite situation in Iraq hampered their ability to work. ORHA officials grew frustrated with 
their slow deployment, because they expected that the teams would conduct most of the assessments of assistance 
needs throughout the country. Bureaucratic and organizational tensions also caused some friction with ORHA, 
because the DARTs were accustomed to operating independently and were reluctant to follow Garner’s direc-
tions. Interviews with OSD official, November 2003; with ORHA official, January 2004; with State Department 
official, January 2004; and with civil affairs officer, June 2004. 
30 CPA did retain ORHA’s mandate for humanitarian assistance, which had grown to encompass human rights 
and a few other issues by that time. Interview with ORHA official, January 2004. 
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humanitarian plans were not needed does not mean they were faulty, and the hu-
manitarian planners maintain that they did focus on the right areas. They argue that 
massive refugee flows and food shortages would have been catastrophic—both for the 
local populations and for the progress of the military campaign—if they had oc-
curred and no plans had existed to address them.31 The plans that were implemented, 
particularly the stockpiling of food and other supplies in the region, were executed 
effectively. It is always prudent to plan for worst-case scenarios. These planners 
clearly identified refugee flows and mass starvation as the major challenges they 
might face, and they developed potentially workable plans to address them. 
It is true that they did not prepare for the looting and chaos that occurred. 
However, it is not clear that humanitarian relief planners should have been planning 
to address looting and other public security issues. Humanitarian relief and post-
conflict stabilization are not the same things, though both tend to get lumped to-
gether in the category of post-conflict reconstruction. In the months before the war 
with Iraq, humanitarian relief planners correctly identified the major problems that 
would be faced in this area, and through a relatively effective interagency process they 
developed plans to deal with these contingencies. Responsibility for post-conflict sta-
bilization requirements lay with the government agencies and organizations ad-
dressed in the previous chapters, not with those that were working on humanitarian 
relief issues. 
____________ 
31 Interviews with OSD officials, November 2003. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Combat Operations During Phase IV 
Military plans for Phase IV included three different stages. Phase IVa would com-
mence immediately after major combat operations and would focus on stability, se-
curity, and the emergency restoration of essential services. Combined Forces Land 
Component Command (CFLCC) would be the supported military headquarters 
during this stage, which was envisioned to last approximately 90 days. Phase IVb, 
reconstruction, would be marked by a handover of military control from CFLCC to 
Combined Joint Task Force-Iraq, commanded by the U.S. Army’s V Corps. During 
this stage, military forces would provide support to a coalition-led transitional civil-
ian agency. Finally, Phase IVc would be initiated when an Iraqi interim government 
was established. Control of military operations would then transfer from CJTF-Iraq 
to a new coalition headquarters to be named the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I). 
During this final stage of Phase IV, large-scale military operations were to be con-
ducted with the consent of a sovereign Iraqi interim government. This chapter exam-
ines Phases IVa and IVb; Phase IVc did not commence until after the transfer of 
authority on June 28, 2004, which is the cutoff date for this report. 
Phase IVa: Stability Operations 
Although CFLCC anticipated a number of specific post-conflict security challenges, 
most did not materialize. Rather, wide-scale looting and civil violence became the 
primary security concern in the first few months of the post-combat phase of opera-
tions. This civil unrest would later be eclipsed by organized terrorist activities and 
attacks conducted against coalition forces, the Iraqi National Guard, Iraqi police, the 
new Iraqi government, Iraqi infrastructure, and Iraqi civilians by a growing insur-
gency. 
Anticipated Security Challenges 
U.S. and coalition forces had prepared for four primary security problems. First, 
drawing on lessons from the 1991 Persian Gulf War, coalition forces had planned to 
secure Iraq’s oil fields and protect them from sabotage. To counter this threat, the 
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United States deployed special operations forces (SOF) in the north near Kirkuk and 
in the south near the Al-Faw Peninsula to protect the oil fields, critical pipelines, and 
offshore oil terminals. 
Second, coalition forces anticipated large numbers of refugees fleeing combat 
zones, creating the possibility of a massive humanitarian crisis.1 This expectation was 
drawn from CENTCOM’s experience during Operation DESERT STORM, during 
which an estimated 5 million people fled their homes and sought protection in both 
Iran and Turkey.2 To prepare for this possibility, the United States deployed civil 
affairs units near the Iraqi border and prepositioned food and other provisions to 
prevent the expected flow of refugees from turning into a humanitarian crisis.3 These 
prepositioned resources would also be available in the event that Saddam Hussein 
used WMD to attack Iraqi citizens as he had in the aftermath of DESERT STORM. 
Third, CFLCC was concerned about the challenges associated with securing 
and managing a large number of surrendering Iraqi prisoners of war (POWs). Con-
sequently, coalition forces planned to have the capability to detain and process large 
numbers of POWs. Coalition forces anticipated using a portion of surrendering Iraqi 
forces to form an interim Iraqi National Guard that could be used to help local Iraqi 
police maintain law and order and prevent widespread civil unrest during Phase IV.4  
Finally, coalition forces anticipated violence occurring within the Iraqi popula-
tion, particularly ethnic violence between different factions in Iraqi society and repri-
sal attacks against Ba’ath Party members loyal to Saddam Hussein. CFLCC was pre-
pared to dispatch civil affairs units to contact and work with local leaders to stem 
ethnic, religious, and political violence.5 
Security Challenges During the Transition to Phase IVa 
As coalition forces stormed across Iraq and pushed toward Baghdad, a plan of action 
for policing the country was publicly released. The plan specified that, immediately 
following major combat operations, U.S. forces would maintain security and con-
tinue to root out resistance fighters. During the initial stage of Phase IV, coalition 
forces would work with international law enforcement advisors to train an Iraqi po-
lice force, a task to be completed “as quickly as possible.” Finally, the coalition would 
take action to prevent riots and restore security.6 
____________ 
1 For more on humanitarian planning assumptions, see Chapter Six. 
2 Judith Miller, “Displaced by the Gulf War: Five Million Refugees,” New York Times, June 16, 1991. 
3 Joel Brinkley and Eric Schmitt, “The Struggle for Iraq: Postwar Planning,” New York Times, November 30, 
2003; Bathsheba N. Crocker, Post-War Iraq: Are We Ready? Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies, March 25, 2003, p. 2. 
4 Eric Schmitt, “Plans Made for Policing Postwar Iraq,” New York Times, April 9, 2003. 
5 Peter Baker, “Top Officers Fear Wide Civil Unrest,” Washington Post, March 19, 2003. 
6 Schmitt, “Plans Made for Policing Postwar Iraq.” 
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Baghdad fell to U.S. forces on April 10, 2003, with little resistance from Iraqi 
troops. Soon afterward, on April 15, coalition forces secured Tikrit, bringing the en-
tire country under coalition control. Most of the post-conflict challenges for which 
coalition forces had planned did not arise. Iraqi civilians did not flee their homes, 
and most had stockpiled food. Moreover, the rapid collapse of the Iraqi military pre-
vented the type of extended combat that might have caused large numbers of civil-
ians to flee combat zones. Therefore, the predicted exodus of refugees, with the asso-
ciated need for refugee camps near Iraq’s borders, did not materialize.7 
Similarly, while extensive planning had occurred to ensure that coalition forces 
could accommodate a large number of Iraqi POWs, this capability was never needed. 
Rather than being destroyed or surrendering, the Iraqi military generally melted away 
into the civilian population. Coalition forces reportedly were prepared to accommo-
date 50,000 POWs at a detention center in the port city of Umm Qasr, but only 
6,200 Iraq soldiers were captured.8 One official stated that there was no need to dis-
band the Iraqi army because “[t]hey simply laid down their arms and went home.”9 
The protection of Iraq’s oil infrastructure was one major success in the immedi-
ate aftermath of major combat operations. Although the Iraqi regime was in the 
process of implementing plans to sabotage oil fields and related pipeline and transfer 
facilities, the unexpectedly fast pace of operations left the regime ill prepared to initi-
ate such operations. Moreover, the protection of the oil infrastructure had been both 
planned and resourced to facilitate success. For example, 5,300 U.S. and coalition 
special operations forces were deployed to northern Iraq in part to prevent destruc-
tion of the oil-producing facilities located in and around the oil-rich city of Kirkuk.10 
Following the start of major ground combat, 2,300 soldiers from the Army’s 173rd 
Airborne Brigade were also deployed to the theater and given the primary mission of 
securing Kirkuk’s oil fields. Likewise, a smaller number of Navy SEALs and Polish 
special forces seized key facilities along the Al-Faw Peninsula in southern Iraq. 
A second major success story in the transition from Phase III to Phase IV opera-
tions was the protection of major dams and hydroelectric facilities. For example, the 
destruction of the Hadithah Dam—located on the Euphrates River approximately 
125 miles northwest of Karbala—could have had catastrophic effects throughout the 
country. In addition to the adverse effect that flooding would cause for the U.S. mili-
____________ 
7 See Chapter Six for more details. 
8 Jonathan Weisman, “Iraq Chaos No Surprise, but Too Few Troops to Quell It,” Washington Post, April 14, 
2003. 
9 Esther Schrader, “Attack Puts Emphasis on Recruits,” Los Angeles Times, November 3, 2003. 
10 U.S. Army Special Operations Command, “Global Scouts,” a briefing presented at the NDIA Symposium, 
February 5, 2004. Working alongside coalition SOF were 69,000 militia controlled by the Kurdistan Democratic 
Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). These units were under the operational control of the 
U.S. special operations commander in northern Iraq.  
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tary’s march to Baghdad, the resultant water shortage was likely to cause severe hard-
ships for the Iraqi people during the summer months.11 On April 1, soldiers from the 
3rd battalion, 75th Infantry (Ranger) conducted an airborne insertion to seize the 
Hadithah Dam during the hours of darkness. The raid took the small number of 
Iraqi defenders by surprise, and Rangers quickly gained control of the structure and 
the adjacent hydroelectric generating facility. The Rangers continued to hold this 
position until April 19, when the 1-502 Infantry Battalion from the 101st Airborne 
Division relieved them.12 Navy SEALS and Polish special forces conducted a similar 
action when they seized the Mukarayin Dam, located approximately 57 miles north-
east of Baghdad along the Diyala River, during the last week of April. 
Initial Response to Civil Unrest 
The planning documents for post-combat operations specified that Phase IVa opera-
tions would be conducted with forces deployed for Phase III. But because Phase III 
was supposed to take significantly longer than it did, initial security operations had to 
be undertaken with two full Army divisions less than had been anticipated.13 In addi-
tion to having fewer forces for Phase IVa than originally planned, the forces that 
seized Baghdad on April 9 were armored and mechanized infantry units, primarily 
trained and equipped for combat against other military forces. These forces were em-
ployed in Baghdad because a major military confrontation was expected between 
Iraq’s best forces, its Republican Guard, and U.S. troops. While armored and 
mechanized units served U.S. forces well in combat, they were not ideal for confront-
ing challenges encountered in the post-combat phase of the operation. 
On April 10, while Baghdad and other cities across the country were spiraling 
into looting, vandalism, and civil unrest, U.S. government officials responded to 
criticisms about the lack of law and order by suggesting that this was a normal turn 
of events that would play itself out in short order. For example, Deputy Secretary of 
State Richard L. Armitage argued that while coalition forces in Iraq were equipped 
for combat, “tens of thousands of U.S. troops” intended to stabilize the country were 
on the way. Armitage concluded this briefing by stating: “[w]e think the fractious 
behavior that you witnessed in Basra, and to some extent in Baghdad, will settle 
____________ 
11 Debbie Quimby, “ERDC Contributes to Operation Iraqi Freedom from the Home Front,” ERDC Information 
Bulletin, December 5, 2003. 
12 Colonel Gregory Fontenot (USA, ret.) and Lieutenant Colonel Edmund J. Degen, On Point: The United States 
Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2004, p. 310. 
13 The 4th Infantry Division was still offloading in Kuwait when major combat operations ended. In addition, 
the 1st Cavalry Division was in the deployment process at the end of April 2003 when it was told it would not be 
deployed for OIF. 
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down.”14 In a similar manner, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld described 
Iraq’s lawlessness as “untidiness” that would soon subside.15 
The expectations expressed by Armitage and Rumsfeld did not materialize; 
rather, the country continued to experience wide-scale violence and destruction, par-
ticularly in Kirkuk, Mosul, and Baghdad. In Kirkuk, Kurdish peshmerga troops suc-
ceeded in driving out Saddam’s forces at the beginning of the war. However, these 
forces failed to prevent the city from falling into chaos. In addition to wide-scale 
looting, the city’s substantial Arab population came under attack, forcing many to 
flee south to Sunni Arab cities such as Tikrit.16 
In the northern city of Mosul, Saddam’s troops and police fled on April 11, 
leaving the city’s residents without any local or coalition security forces to keep the 
peace.17 The city erupted into looting and ethnic violence, leading to 31 deaths and 
150 wounded in the first day of unrest.18 In an effort to control the outbreak of vio-
lence, 200 special operations soldiers were dispatched to the city, where they encoun-
tered hostility and gunfire. To help restore law and order to a city that the Com-
mander of Joint Special Operations Task Force–North (JSOTF-N) considered 
“reminiscent of Dodge City and the Wild West,” CENTCOM directed that the 
26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), which was afloat in the Mediterranean, 
immediately deploy to northern Iraq.19 The 26th MEU was placed under the opera-
tional control of JSOTF-N on April 12 when it landed at the Irbil airfield in north-
ern Iraq. At the direction of JSOTF-N, the 26th MEU deployed to Mosul, with its 
lead elements arriving on the morning of April 13. After securing the airfield, the 
Marines began to establish a presence in the city by setting up roadblocks, conduct-
ing urban patrols, ensuring that roads remained open and passable for both military 
and civilian vehicles, and searching for weapons caches.20 The 26th MEU remained 
in Mosul until the 101st Airborne Division assumed responsibility for the city on 
April 22. Marine commanders also met with the tribal leaders of Mosul to gain their 
support in establishing local control of the population.21 
____________ 
14 Peter Slevin and Bradley Graham, “U.S. Military Spurns Postwar Police Role,” Washington Post, April 10, 
2003. 
15 Daniel Williams, “Rampant Looting Sweeps Iraq,” Washington Post, April 12, 2003. 
16 C.J. Chives, “Marines Keep Order in Saddam Hussein’s Hometown,” New York Times, April 16, 2003. 
17 Williams, “Rampant Looting Sweeps Iraq.” 
18 David Rhode, “Deadly Unrest Leaves a Town in Northern Iraq Bitter at U.S.,” New York Times, April 20, 
2003. 
19 Interview with JSOTF-N personnel, February 2004. 
20 1st Lieutenant (USMC) Christopher Mercer, “Charlie Company Leads BLT into Northern Iraq,” 26 MEU 
Public Affairs Office, 2003, pp. 1–2. 
21 Interview with JSOTF-N personnel, February 2004. 
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Although the United States deployed a force of around 2,300 paratroopers from 
the 173rd Airborne Brigade to the north under the operational control of JSOTF-N, 
this force was not scheduled to arrive in Kirkuk until April 15. But when violence 
erupted in Kirkuk on April 10 when the Iraqi military collapsed, the ground move-
ment of the 173rd Airborne Brigade was expedited, with the lead elements arriving at 
Kirkuk’s airfield on April 13.22 Working with the SOF units that had arrived days 
earlier, the 173rd Airborne Brigade assumed responsibility for maintaining law and 
order within the city. At April’s end, the newly arrived 4th Infantry Division (ID) 
moved into Tikrit and conducted a link-up with the 173rd Airborne Brigade. Once 
this link had been established, operational control of the 173rd Airborne Brigade was 
transferred from JSOTF-N to the 4th ID. The force began working with local leaders 
to address grievances, restore order, and build rapport within the region. By May, 
northern Iraq was relatively stable, particularly in comparison with Baghdad.23 
As anticipated by CFLCC planners in February 2003, maneuver forces were not 
in optimal positions when major combat operations ended to provide security for a 
subsequent occupation. The 1st Marine Expeditionary Force had forces as far north 
as Tikrit even though its occupation zone was in the south. The 4th ID had to move 
north rapidly from Kuwait to relieve Task Force Tripoli in the Tikrit area. Similarly, 
elements of the 3rd Infantry Division had to move into the eastern and northern por-
tions of the Baghdad area to relieve the 1st Marine Division. In turn, the 1st Marine 
Expeditionary Force relieved the 82nd Airborne Division in southern Iraq. The 
173rd Airborne Brigade secured Kirkuk and linked with the 4th Infantry Division. 
The 101st Airborne conducted a long-distance air assault to secure Mosul, where it 
assumed operational control of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit and expanded 
its operations to include all of northern Iraq. The 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment 
took responsibility for western Iraq, including the upper reaches of the Euphrates 
and the entire western desert to the borders with Jordan and Syria. Thus, by early 
May, coalition forces were conducting stability and support operations in newly as-
signed sectors as depicted in Figure 7.1. Within weeks or days, these forces were in 
position to take more forceful stands to maintain security, but as will be discussed 
below, substantial damage to government facilities and infrastructure had occurred 
during the intervening period. 
Stabilization Efforts, March to June 2003 
Coalition forces, including British troops and U.S. Marines, took the port city of 
Umm Qasr in the first days of ground combat and immediately began working with  
 
____________ 
22 The 173rd first arrived in northern Iraq through an airborne insertion but then moved to Kirkuk over land. 
23 Marni McEntee, “173rd Airborne Brigade Takes to the Streets of Kirkuk,” European Stars and Stripes, May 7, 
2003; Scott Wilson, “A Mix of ‘President . . . and Pope,’” Washington Post, May 16, 2003.  
Combat Operations During Phase IV    87 
Figure 7.1 




SOURCE: V Corps, “The Road to Victory in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” brieﬁng, Heidelberg, Germany, 2003.
RAND MG642-7.1
Northern Iraq:
 101st Airborne  
 Division
Central Iraq:
 4th Infantry  
 Division
 173rd Airborne  
 Brigade
Western Iraq:
 3rd Armored  
 Cavalry Regiment
Baghdad Area:
 3rd Infantry Division  
 (Mechanized)
 3rd Brigade, 1st  
 Armored Division
 2nd Brigade, 82nd  
 Airborne Division


















local leaders to restore order and provide basic services for its citizens. The United 
States deployed civil affairs units to Umm Qasr, and they worked alongside British 
civil affairs soldiers to rebuild the city’s infrastructure and government. In addition, 
the State Department dispatched a permanent team of USAID officers to help with 
reconstruction and, specifically, the reopening of the port.24 Coalition forces suc-
ceeded in coordinating efforts with local leaders, mostly Shi’ite Muslim clerics, to 
restore order and services to Umm Qasr. On May 15, British forces handed over the 
southern port city to a 12-member council, followed by the transfer of the port to 
Iraqi leaders on May 22.25 
____________ 
24 Thanassis Cambanis, “Forces Get First Test of Building New Order,” Boston Globe, April 4, 2003; Glenn 
Frankel, “British Troops Bring Their Brand of Civic-Minded Peacekeeping to Iraq,” Washington Post, April 4, 
2003. 
25 Tini Tran, “First Iraqi City Handed Over to Civilian Government,” Washington Times, May 16, 2003; Marc 
Lacey, “British Give Port Control to the Iraqis,” New York Times, May 23, 2003; Michael Smith, “British Patrols 
Vital for Law and Order,” Daily Telegraph (London), May 26, 2003. 
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Baghdad, in contrast, continued to experience wide-scale crime and unrest 
throughout the reconstruction phase. In Baghdad, chaos erupted in most neighbor-
hoods after the fall of Saddam’s regime. Initially, U.S. forces did little to stop the 
looting. Major General David H. Petraeus, commander of the 101st Airborne Divi-
sion and the first officer in charge of central Iraq, told reporters that “we should dis-
courage looting, but we’re not going to stand between a crowd and a bunch of mat-
tresses.”26 Within days virtually every government building was sacked and burned 
along with most of the city’s hotels, department stores, museums, schools, universi-
ties, hospitals, and Saddam’s palaces.27 A notable exception was the Ministry of Oil, 
which was heavily guarded by a company of Marines. One reporter in Baghdad ob-
served that in the neighborhoods where U.S. forces were positioned, looters were de-
terred, “but there were far too few American soldiers to make a difference in most 
neighborhoods.”28 
On April 11, following nearly a week of looting and lawlessness in the capital, 
the State Department announced that it would send a team of 26 police and judicial 
officers to Iraq to prepare for the deployment of law and order experts.29 On April 
12, the Washington Post reported that U.S. Marines were not endowed with “policing 
authority” and could only detain individuals directly hostile toward U.S. forces.30 
The following day, the New York Times reported that policing the streets and restor-
ing law and order had become the priority of the Marines in Baghdad.31 However, 
this proved to be a difficult task, and one for which many of the troops in Baghdad 
had not been trained.32 In addition to policing, Marines were assigned as mayors of 
certain neighborhoods in Baghdad and tasked with hearing complaints from local 
Iraqis and restoring law and order. One Marine stated, “It’s one of the hardest things 
I’ve ever been asked to do, because I have almost no training to fall back on.”33 
In addition to coalition efforts to curb looting, Iraqi citizens banded together to 
begin policing their neighborhoods and cities. Shortly after chaos erupted in Bagh-
dad, a cleric in the Shi’ite section of the city issued a fatwa banning looting and 
____________ 
26 William Branigin and Rick Atkinson, “Anything, and Everything, Goes,” Washington Post, April 12, 2003. 
27 Dexter Filkins, “In Baghdad, Free of Hussein, a Day of Mayhem,” New York Times, April 12, 2003; Rajiv 
Chandrasekaran, “‘Our Heritage Is Finished,’” Washington Post, April 13, 2003. 
28 Chandrasekaran, “‘Our Heritage Is Finished.’” 
29 Filkins, “In Baghdad, Free of Hussein, a Day of Mayhem.” 
30 Jonathan Finer, “Marines Get New Mission: Restoring Law and Order,” Washington Post, April 12, 2003. 
31 Dexter Filkins and John Kiefner, “U.S. Troops Move to Restore Order in Edgy Baghdad,” New York Times, 
April 13, 2003. 
32 Brett Lieberman, “Marines Uneasy About Shift to Humanitarian Mission,” Newhouse.com, April 15, 2003. 
33 Jonathan Finer, “Marines Get Hands-On Civics Lesson,” Washington Post, April 14, 2003; Filkins and Kiefner, 
“U.S. Troops Move to Restore Order in Edgy Baghdad.” 
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helped organize joint civilian and military patrols.34 These ad hoc forces put up road-
blocks and searched cars for looted materials, taking the confiscated goods to a 
nearby mosque where they were returned to their rightful owners. Items whose own-
ership could not be determined were distributed to the poor.35 Before long, soldiers, 
Marines, MPs, and other U.S. security forces in Baghdad patrolled alongside civilian 
groups to stabilize the city.36 
As Baghdad and other major cities in Iraq continued to experience violence and 
unrest, coalition forces came under increasing international criticism for failing to 
establish law and order. They were particularly criticized for their failure to uphold 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions, which require that an occupying force estab-
lish law and order following the end of major combat.37 In addition, coalition forces 
were criticized for failing to return basic services to Iraq’s cities, particularly Baghdad, 
which regularly lacked potable water, electricity, garbage collection, and a function-
ing phone system.38 
Officials in Washington responded to these charges by claiming that the speed 
with which coalition forces had succeeded in toppling Saddam had left them without 
sufficient forces in the theater to stabilize Iraq. They claimed that other troops had 
been slated to handle the stabilization of the country, such as the 4th Infantry Divi-
sion and the 1st Armored Cavalry Division, both of which contained MPs and civil 
affairs units.39 Furthermore, restoring law and order was complicated because coali-
tion troops on the ground lacked proper equipment to act as policing forces. As the 
New York Times reported, 
The armored forces stationed in the city [Baghdad] have found it difficult to ma-
neuver through the streets in their M1 Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehi-
cles. Many tank crews cannot even carry out foot patrols, because it was never en-
visioned that they would play a peacekeeping role and they were never issued the 
heavy body armor to operate outside their vehicles.40 
____________ 
34 Chandrasekaran, “‘Our Heritage Is Finished.’” 
35 Alissa J. Rubin, “Crowds Seize Loot to Return to Owners,” Los Angeles Times, April 17, 2003. 
36 Esther Schrader, “Fighting Force Is Giving Way to Police Force,” Los Angeles Times, April 16, 2003. This arti-
cle reported that U.S. forces have 2,000 “civil affairs and military police specialists attached to forces in Iraq.” 
37 Schrader, “Fighting Force Is Giving Way to Police Force”; Weisman, “Iraq Chaos No Surprise, but Too Few 
Troops to Quell It.” One article noted that applying these laws is not always clear-cut. In the Iraqi case, portions 
of the country were still involved in major combat, thus making it difficult to categorize the country as “post-
combat,” which would require the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention’s laws. Seth Stern, “U.S. Strug-
gles with New Rules as War Turns to Occupation,” Christian Science Monitor, April 21, 2003. 
38 Marcus Stern, “Uncertain Road to Rebuilding,” San Diego Union-Tribune, April 21, 2003. 
39 Weisman, “Iraq Chaos No Surprise, but Too Few Troops to Quell It.” 
40 Michael R. Gordon, “Baghdad’s Power Vacuum Is Drawing Only Dissent,” New York Times, April 21, 2003. 
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In the middle of April, Washington announced plans for a “rolling Phase IV” in 
which coalition forces would move toward greater restoration of law and order in 
addition to performing other tasks such as finding Saddam Hussein, rounding up 
leading Ba’ath Party members, and searching for Iraq’s purported WMD.41 To this 
end, Washington also announced that it would deploy 4,000 more troops to Bagh-
dad—raising the number of U.S. forces in the city from 12,000 to 16,000—in addi-
tion to sending 2,000 more MPs and extra civil affairs units.42 It further proclaimed 
that Iraq would be divided into three zones: north, central (including Baghdad), and 
south.43 By mid-May, the number of coalition troops in Baghdad had risen from 
16,000 to a reported 25,000.44 
Along with the increase in U.S. troops to Baghdad, coalition commanders also 
reviewed their strategies for mitigating civil unrest and looting throughout the coun-
try. On May 1, the CFLCC Commander, Lieutenant General David McKiernan, 
issued a proclamation forbidding “looting, reprisals and criminal activity.”45 At the 
same time, coalition forces also began using lethal force against looters raiding a mu-
nitions warehouse in Tikrit, killing 14 Iraqis.46 In mid-May, the newly appointed 
civilian administrator of Iraq, L. Paul Bremer, publicly announced that coalition 
forces would begin shooting looters in Baghdad.47 This was backed by a statement 
from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who announced that “The forces there 
will be using muscle to see that the people who are trying to disrupt what’s taking 
place in that city are stopped and either captured or killed.”48 To this end, they shot 
and killed a looter in one of Baghdad’s Shi’ite slums, Sadr City, which prompted 
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demonstrations in protest.49 Coalition forces also stepped up patrols across the city, 
arresting hundreds of looters and detaining them for a standardized 21 days.50 
On May 20, in another effort to stem violence in the capital city and elsewhere, 
coalition forces announced that they would require Iraqi citizens to hand over their 
automatic and heavy weapons by June 14. Those who refused would be subject to 
arrest.51 No incentives, such as payment for each forfeited weapon, were given for 
Iraqis to comply with this order.52 After an initial outcry from Iraqi citizens who 
complained that they needed these weapons in their homes to protect against looters, 
the coalition announced that citizens would be allowed to keep small firearms and 
AK-47s but would require a permit to carry them outside the home.53 Coalition 
forces estimated that Iraq contained more than 24 million firearms in addition to an 
enormous cache of light and heavy military armament, such as rocket-propelled gre-
nades, anti-aircraft guns, and surface-to-air missiles; at the time of the proclamation, 
AK-47s were selling on the streets of Baghdad for a reported $10.54 
Coalition forces had hoped that requiring Iraqis to hand over their automatic 
and heavy weapons would reduce attacks on coalition forces, slow the spread of 
weapons to neighboring countries, and curb rampant looting. However, the amnesty 
program proved to be a failure. By June 14, Iraqis had forfeited “123 pistols, 76 
semiautomatic rifles and shotguns, 435 automatic rifles, 46 machine guns, 162 anti-
tank rocket-propelled grenade launchers, 11 antiaircraft weapons, and 381 hand gre-
nades.”55 One U.S. soldier noted that Iraq had a gun culture not unlike certain re-
gions in the United States and that disarming the country “would be like trying to 
disarm Texas. It isn’t going to happen.”56 The weapons amnesty concluded with 
“Operation MARKET SWEEP,” which attempted to crack down on black-market 
arms sales.57  
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In addition to reducing arms among the public, coalition officials had to con-
tend with an array of militias and private security forces that had emerged in the 
postwar chaos. Several political organizations—most notably the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK), the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the Iraqi National Con-
gress (INC), and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)— 
had their own militias, some of which had been supported by the U.S. government 
prior to the war.58 Alongside these militias were private security forces and neighbor-
hood watch groups, most of which were armed and wore some sort of uniform.59 Ini-
tially, coalition authorities issued identity cards to many of these security forces to 
distinguish them from insurgents.60 Later, ORHA and coalition forces announced 
that some of these forces would be disarmed, disbanded, or absorbed into the newly 
emerging Iraqi security forces.61 Implementing this policy, however, proved to be a 
sensitive task. At the end of May 2003, coalition authorities announced that they 
would disarm the INC’s “free Iraqi fighters” but allow the Kurds’ peshmerga to keep 
their weapons. Although the coalition succeeded in disarming the INC, the policy 
produced bitter feelings over perceived favoritism toward the Kurds.62 
Alongside issues of disarmament, coalition forces, their civil affairs units, and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) also began working to resolve Iraq’s water 
and electrical shortages.63 Coalition forces also worked with local leaders, most nota-
bly with clerics and members of mosques, to identify needs and begin improving the 
social welfare of Iraqis.64 Despite improvements, citizens still complained about the 
lack of resources available to them in the new Iraq, particularly jobs. To counter this 
problem, coalition forces began to distribute salaries to former government employ-
ees, and this included erstwhile members of the army, which had employed over 
300,000 Iraqi men.65 However, Iraq’s postwar economy stalled, and high unem-
ployment rates continued to be a problem, breeding discontent within the popula-
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tion.66 ORHA and other agencies in Iraq implemented projects aimed at generating 
jobs and income, but progress was slow.67 
Phase IVb: Recovery Operations 
While the end-state conditions established in CENTCOM planning documents had 
not been fully realized, especially in terms of the security situation, General Franks 
decided to transition to Phase IVb upon the establishment of the Coalition Provi-
sional Authority. Thus, shortly after ORHA transferred political control to CPA in 
May 2003, the control of coalition forces was transferred from CFLCC to a newly 
established Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7). The formal transfer of authority 
to CJTF-7 took place on June 12, and the headquarters for the new command was 
collocated in Baghdad with CPA. 
Organization for Phase IVb 
As portrayed in Figure 7.2, CJTF-7 consisted of the former V Corps headquarters 
and all ground forces that served under the operational control of CFLCC during 
Phase IVa—including the 1st Marine Division, the 3rd Armoured Division (United 
Kingdom), and a Polish mechanized infantry division. In addition, Joint Special Op-
erations Task Force—Arabian Peninsula (JSOTF-AP) was established and placed 
under the operational control of CJTF-7. In essence, CJTF-7 exercised operational 
control of all conventional and special operations forces remaining in theater with the 
exception of JTF-123, which consisted of special operations units associated with the 
Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). 
Along with the establishment of CJTF-7 came new geographic responsibilities. 
Rather than the three geographic areas of operation established by CFLCC for Phase 
IVa, Iraq was now divided into four geographic regions, with responsibility for secu-
rity being assigned as depicted in Figure 7.3. The 3rd Armoured Division (UK) was 
designated the multinational division south (MND-S), and the Polish mechanized 
infantry division was designated the multinational division south central. 
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Figure 7.2 
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The Growing Insurgency 
Coalition forces continued to come under attack from terrorist organizations, foreign 
fighters, and residual forces or individuals loyal to Saddam Hussein well after the col-
lapse of the Iraqi military. In the first week of May 2003, an Iraqi was shot and killed 
as he attempted to run over two Marines with his vehicle at a checkpoint in the city 
of Kut. That same week, grenades were thrown at U.S. soldiers in Fallujah. Four 
members of a civil affairs unit were shot dead in Baghdad.68 In addition to these at-
tacks against coalition forces, Iraqis organized several anti-occupation protests. One 
protest west of Baghdad ended with U.S. troops shooting and killing 18 protesters 
after individuals in the crowd opened fire on U.S. forces.69  
____________ 
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Figure 7.3 
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Initially, attacks against coalition forces appeared to be isolated incidents. As the 
summer of 2003 progressed, however, the attacks became more frequent and more 
sophisticated. In June, soldiers in Baghdad came under increasing “hit and run” at-
tacks throughout the city, including an intense gun battle that resulted in the down-
ing of an Apache helicopter.70 In response, U.S. forces launched Operation DESERT 
SCORPION to uproot Saddam loyalists and thwart resistance fighters.71 In July, the 
New York Times reported that attacks against U.S. forces in Fallujah had increased in 
____________ 
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sophistication from “light arms to rocket-propelled grenades to improvised explosives 
to mortars, which require training to use.”72 Attacks against coalition forces reached a 
new level in the fall of 2003, as CJTF-7 increased its offensive operations; a U.S. 
helicopter was shot down, killing 16 soldiers on board, and a car bomb exploded out-
side Italian military headquarters in Nasiriya, killing more than 20 people.73 With the 
exception of a small spike in attacks that corresponded to the capture of Saddam 
Hussein in December 2003, the average weekly number of attacks against coalition 
forces in the winter of 2003–2004 was lower than that in the fall of 2003. 
In the spring of 2004, one year after OIF began, attacks against coalition forces 
spiked once again. In April, two conflicts heated up simultaneously. First, more than 
1,000 U.S. Marines surrounded and attacked insurgents in Fallujah following the 
brutal murder and public mutilation of four U.S contractors.74 This battle lasted for a 
month before coalition forces negotiated a ceasefire with the insurgents. Almost si-
multaneously, coalition forces confronted the radical Shi’ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr 
by closing his newspaper on March 28, claiming that it was inciting violence against 
the occupation and calling for al-Sadr’s arrest in connection with the murder of a 
Shi’ite cleric in April 2003.75 These acts prompted al-Sadr’s militia, the Mahdi Army, 
to attack coalition forces, forcing a military confrontation that continued throughout 
April and most of May. These two battles made April 2004 an especially deadly 
month in terms of both U.S. and Iraqi casualties.76  
Throughout Phase IVb, coalition forces did succeed in working with local lead-
ers to improve law and order while reducing attacks against their own forces. In June 
2003, U.S. forces called on local Sunni tribal leaders in the Sunni city of Hit to help 
restore order and crack down on insurgents in exchange for pulling out of the city’s 
center and ending house-to-house searches.77 This agreement resulted in the cessation 
of nearly all attacks against U.S. forces in this city.78 U.S. troops also experimented 
with the controversial policy of paying “blood money” for Iraqis killed or wounded 
by coalition forces in raids and patrols, a practice designed to end reprisal attacks and 
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customary throughout the Arab world.79 This policy appeared to have reduced vio-
lence against coalition forces in and around Fallujah as well as in the north.80 
In addition to targeting coalition forces, insurgents also attacked nonmilitary in-
ternational organizations in the country. On August 8, 2003, a suicide bomber 
struck the Jordanian embassy in Baghdad, killing more than 15 people.81 The blast 
was a setback for the newly emerging Iraqi police force, which had been assigned to 
protect the embassy.82 A little over a week later, on August 19, a massive suicide 
bomb exploded at the UN headquarters in Baghdad. This blast claimed more than 
20 lives, including the UN’s special envoy to Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello.83 These 
incidents angered the newly formed Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), which blamed 
the United States for not providing adequate security in the country and for failing 
to allow Iraqi security forces a greater role in protecting their country against insur-
gents.84 
During the late summer and fall of 2003, insurgents began to target the IGC, 
the newly emerging Iraqi security forces, and Iraqi civilians. City council members, 
judges, and other Iraqi officials also came under increasing attack from insurgents, 
who accused these leaders of collaborating with the United States and compromising 
Iraq’s sovereignty.85 On September 25, a member of the IGC, Aqila al-Hashimi, was 
gunned down in her car while in Baghdad. A week later, on November 4, a judge 
was shot in Mosul after being abducted.86 On November 18, an Iraqi education offi-
cial tasked with training the Iraqi police force was killed in the city of Latifiyah.87 In 
May 2004, in the face of a growing insurgency, the Pentagon and White House dis-
cussed transferring the Iraq Survey Group—a body of 1,400 military and civilian 
personnel tasked to search for WMDs—to counterinsurgency intelligence gather-
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ing.88 Death threats against the evolving Iraqi government persisted throughout the 
transfer of authority from CPA to an independent Iraqi government. 
Iraq’s fledgling security forces also came under an increasing number of attacks 
from insurgents. On October 27, 2003, suicide bombers attacked three police sta-
tions in Baghdad, killing 15 officers and wounding over 65.89 On October 30, a sui-
cide bomber disguised as a repairman detonated a car full of explosives at a police 
station in the capital.90 In addition to attacks on police stations, Iraqi officers received 
death threats and threats against their families.91 By the end of November, at least 
five Iraqi police chiefs had been assassinated.92 Also in November, suicide bombers 
targeted the police station in Baquba, killing nearly 20 people.93 By the end of 2003, 
attacks on Iraqi police stations had become a weekly occurrence, and an estimated 
208 Iraq police had been killed since the country’s liberation, 60 in Baghdad alone.94 
In addition to attacking the Iraqi government and the fledgling security forces, 
the insurgency also targeted Iraqi citizens. The Shi’ite holy sites in Karbala and Najaf 
became the scene of several bloody attacks. On August 29, 2003, a car bomb ex-
ploded outside the Imam Ali shrine in Najaf, killing at least 85 people including the 
Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, a prominent leader of the Shi’ite political 
party SCIRI.95 Again on March 2, 2004—during the observation of the Ashura, the 
holiest day in Shi’ite Islam—at least nine simultaneous bombs were detonated 
among thousands of pilgrims in Karbala and Baghdad, killing over 200 people.96 It is 
important to note that Shi’ite militias, volunteer “shrine guards,” and Iraqi police 
guarded these holy sites. While U.S. forces were also in the area, they remained at a 
distance on the exterior perimeter in deference to the religious importance of the day. 
Despite these layers of security, the attackers succeeded in smuggling multiple bombs 
into the city and wreaking havoc. 
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In response to the growing insurgency, the IGC called for Iraqi forces to play a 
greater role in policing and providing security for the country, arguing that the 
highly visible presence of coalition forces was fueling anger among Iraqis. Specifi-
cally, certain members of the IGC proposed deploying their private militias, such as 
the Kurdish peshmerga and the Shi’ite Badr Corps, as an immediate solution to the 
lack of trained Iraqi police and other security forces.97 CPA, however, criticized this 
proposal, arguing that these forces were not trained to work together as one unit and 
that it could not endorse the introduction of ethnic or religious biases into Iraq’s se-
curity forces.98 
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The Coalition Provisional Authority 
In May 2003, the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) 
was officially replaced by the new Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). CPA had a 
much wider mandate than ORHA. Under the direction of Ambassador L. Paul 
Bremer, CPA was tasked with creating new and democratic institutions throughout 
Iraq. Before discussing the substantive activities of CPA—which are addressed in the 
next four chapters of this report—it is important to start by examining the origins, 
goals, structure, and functioning of CPA itself. This chapter also addresses the rela-
tionship between CPA and CJTF-7, the coalition military authority in Iraq during 
the occupation.1 
The Origins and Authorities of CPA 
President George W. Bush appointed Bremer to the position of Presidential Envoy 
to Iraq on May 6, 2003.2 The White House press release announcing the appoint-
ment noted that Bremer would oversee reconstruction and the creation of the institu-
tions that would guide a democratic Iraq. CPA took ORHA’s place just before 
Bremer’s arrival in Baghdad on May 12 and his official designation as the administra-
tor of CPA on May 13, 2003.3 With this appointment, Bremer became the senior 
civilian official in charge of all policy efforts in Iraq.4 As a result, retired Lieutenant 
General Jay M. Garner was no longer in charge of civilian operations in Iraq, al-
though he remained in country until June 1, 2003.5 
____________ 
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The legal basis of CPA was rather unusual, and it created some confusion. The 
organization was simultaneously an international organization and a U.S. govern-
ment entity, enabling it to take advantage of some of the benefits of each. Legally, 
UN Security Council Resolutions 1483 and 1511 recognized the United States and 
the United Kingdom as occupying powers, and CPA as their instrument for conduct-
ing the occupation.6 While a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report assessed 
this dual structure as confusing, there was reportedly little debate within the U.S. 
government or among allies about it.7 Still, as the CRS report notes, although UN 
Security Council resolutions recognize CPA as an entity, the United Nations did not 
in any way authorize its creation. A classified National Security Presidential Directive 
issued in May 2003 by order of the President laid out the authorities of CPA as a 
U.S. government agency. It was further recognized as a U.S. government entity by 
the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Recon-
struction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004 (November 6, 2003).8 
As the administrator, Bremer was the official representative of the occupying 
powers and, regardless of the CPA’s legal status, the proconsul of Iraq. CPA and 
CJTF-7 accepted their role as the occupying powers of Iraq (although their relations 
with each other were sometimes more cooperative and sometimes less, as is discussed 
below) and hence their responsibility to treat both former Iraqi military and Iraqi 
civilians in accordance with the requirements of international law (including the Ge-
neva Conventions).9 Moreover, CPA believed that its role as the political authority, 
when combined with the language in UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 
1483, allowed for a wide range of policy changes. These included the replacement of 
the Saddam-era Iraqi dinar with a new currency, the dissolution of the Iraqi army, 
and the creation of a new police force. As the administrator, Bremer ruled in part by 
issuing orders, decrees that had the force of law in Iraq. These decrees could modify 
or replace existing Iraqi laws. 
There was no question that international law permitted an occupying power to 
delegate authority to CPA to issue orders and take actions in the interest of public 
order and safety. Many of the orders issued early on were fully in line with such 
“housekeeping” requirements, addressing media law, the penal code, and so forth. 
However, as the CPA agenda began to incorporate more fundamental changes in 
Iraq’s governing structures, there was increasing debate among CPA staff and among 
____________ 
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the coalition capitals regarding the legitimacy of the authority to take such steps. The 
language in UNSCR 1483, seen by some as the source of this authority, states that 
the United Nations Security Council: 
Requests the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative for Iraq whose 
independent responsibilities shall involve reporting regularly to the Council on 
his activities under this resolution, coordinating activities of the United Nations 
in post-conflict processes in Iraq, coordinating among United Nations and inter-
national agencies engaged in humanitarian assistance and reconstruction activities 
in Iraq, and, in coordination with the Authority, assisting the people of Iraq 
through: 
(a) coordinating humanitarian and reconstruction assistance by United Na-
tions agencies and between United Nations agencies and nongovernmental 
organizations; 
(b) promoting the safe, orderly, and voluntary return of refugees and displaced 
persons; 
(c) working intensively with the Authority, the people of Iraq, and others 
concerned to advance efforts to restore and establish national and local in-
stitutions for representative governance, including by working together to 
facilitate a process leading to an internationally recognized, representative 
government of Iraq; 
(d) facilitating the reconstruction of key infrastructure, in cooperation with 
other international organizations; 
(e) promoting economic reconstruction and the conditions for sustainable de-
velopment, including through coordination with national and regional or-
ganizations, as appropriate, civil society, donors, and the international fi-
nancial institutions; 
(f) encouraging international efforts to contribute to basic civilian administra-
tion functions; 
(g) promoting the protection of human rights; 
(h) encouraging international efforts to rebuild the capacity of the Iraqi civil-
ian police force; and 
(i) encouraging international efforts to promote legal and judicial reform.10 
The language in subparagraphs (c), (e), and (f) do suggest an expectation that 
CPA (“the Authority”) will play a role in, among other things, building representa-
tive governance and economic and government reform in Iraq. However, this lan-
guage also calls for extensive coordination with a variety of international bodies and 
structures, as well as a sizeable United Nations role. When that United Nations role 
shrank substantially after the August 19, 2003 attack on its headquarters in Baghdad, 
____________ 
10 All UN Security Council Resolutions for 2003 can be found at the following web site, as of October 2007: 
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions03.html 
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coordination became increasingly difficult. CPA officials coordinated their orders 
with the capitals of the three core coalition members (Washington, London, and 
Canberra),11 international financial institutions, the United Nations, and others. 
However, the lack of a UN presence in Baghdad, combined with initial reluctance in 
Washington to give the UN a prominent role, made coordination difficult. 
Furthermore, from the outset, there was a problem regarding the limited in-
volvement of Iraqis in CPA decisionmaking. Although CPA was able over time to 
increase Iraqi participation through the IGC and the development of ministries, and 
there were a number of Iraqi staff in some offices that had involvement in decision-
making (for instance, Iraqi staff in the CPA office of General Counsel assisted in the 
development of some orders), outreach to stakeholders remained uneven throughout 
CPA’s tenure.12 
Goals 
The CPA vision statement, developed after the organization was fully up and run-
ning in July 2003, stated that its goal was: 
A durable peace for a unified and stable, democratic Iraq that provides effective 
and representative government for the Iraqi people; is underpinned by new and 
protected freedoms and a growing market economy; is able to defend itself but no 
longer poses a threat to its neighbors or international security.13 
To achieve this vision, CPA set for itself four principal objectives, which it char-
acterized as four “core foundations”: 
1. Security: establishing a secure and safe environment. 
2. Governance: enabling the transition to transparent and inclusive democratic 
governance. 
3. Economy: creating the conditions for economic growth. 
4. Essential Services: restoring basic services to an acceptable standard.14 
____________ 
11 Coordination with the United Kingdom was required because of the UK’s status as a legal occupier of Iraq, but 
this was not always the case in practice. CPA officials also tried to coordinate many of their actions with Australia, 
despite the fact that Australia was not a legal occupier, because of its military commitment to the coalition. 
12 Interviews with CPA officials, August 2004. 
13 Coalition Provisional Authority, Vision for Iraq, July 11, 2003. 
14 Coalition Provisional Authority, Achieving the Vision: Taking Forward the CPA Strategic Plan for Iraq, July 18, 
2003, p. 1. A fifth pillar, strategic communications, was subsequently added. 
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Throughout its existence, CPA focused with varying intensity on achieving 
these objectives. The inherent dual roles of governing and institution building 
proved difficult to reconcile. Moreover, CPA was constrained by the limits of its ca-
pacity and authority within the U.S. government. Security policy was a clear exam-
ple: CPA’s capacity to establish a secure and safe environment for Iraqis was con-
strained by its staffing and tasks. Clearly it had the role of developing Iraqi internal 
security forces and establishing a legal framework, which are tasks of institution 
building. With regard to day-to-day security, CPA also had a role in efforts to direct 
Iraqi police. These were variably effective, and at times CPA advisors were themselves 
involved in responding to crimes and criminal activity. They lacked, however, the 
numbers and capacity to do this on any large scale, even as these efforts sometimes 
distracted from their ability to focus effort on building Iraqi capacity.  
Moreover, CJTF-7’s role in this effort was unclear. As the occupying military 
power, it had the forces and, many felt, the mission of creating a stable and secure 
environment. It was not, however, prepared or configured for this role. Initially un-
clear about the extent of its policing role, as evidenced by its noninvolvement in the 
massive looting that followed the initial campaign, CJTF-7 focused on active military 
counterinsurgency operations as the insurgencies gathered pace. Thus, despite some 
policing activities, CJTF-7 consistently left a policing vacuum in which the average 
Iraqi citizen was faced with growing concerns about crime and lawlessness. CJTF-7 
also had a role in the training and creation of certain security institutions: the Iraqi 
Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) initially, and, by the end of CPA’s tenure, all Defense 
Ministry and Interior Ministry forces, as will be discussed in Chapter Nine. CJTF-7 
was not under CPA’s chain of command. 
In the essential services sphere, priority was given to ensuring that oil and elec-
tricity were up and running, with attempts to restore power generation and distribu-
tion to prewar levels as quickly as possible. Water supplies were another focus. 
Communications, municipal services, health care, transport, housing, education, so-
cial welfare, and a whole range of central and local governance services were also run 
by CPA, which sought both to reconstruct them and to reform them in line with its 
perceptions of international best practices. While managing and reforming these serv-
ices, CPA also, if late in the day, began efforts to build Iraq’s capacity to manage 
these sectors on its own.15 
The goal of economic policy was to create the institutions of a market economy 
while stimulating economic growth. The security situation made this a challenging 
proposition.16 Finally, CPA was intent on creating the foundations for a democratic 
government, the rule of law, and respect for human rights in Iraq. There was, of 
____________ 
15 See Chapter Twelve for more detail on restoring essential services. 
16 See Chapter Eleven for more detail on economic policy. 
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course, a tension inherent in attempting to do this under conditions of occupation 
marked by a limited Iraqi voice in government.17 
Other Governing Institutions 
Several Iraqi organizations functioned alongside CPA and under its direction. These 
included the government ministries, both those that had existed under Saddam 
Hussein and those set up by CPA. The ministries implemented policy and were 
staffed by Iraqis, who were in turn advised by CPA officials. In addition, a structure 
of local councils in various cities and the Iraqi Governing Council for the country as 
a whole were created to advise coalition personnel and to provide various representa-
tive bodies of Iraqis who could work with CPA to define and implement policy. 
Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) 
The IGC and its structures are discussed in Chapter Ten. From the perspective of 
CPA, however, the IGC functioned largely as an advisory group and, over time, a 
vetting agency of sorts for orders and appointments. Bremer did not formally transfer 
any standing decisionmaking authority to the IGC, although certain authorities were 
delegated to it for specific actions, such as the creation of an Iraqi Special Tribunal 
and responsibility for implementing de-Ba’athification. However, given the absence 
of alternative institutions and the need to put an Iraqi “face” on decisions and hear 
an Iraqi “voice” in making those decisions, the IGC quickly became CPA’s primary 
Iraqi interlocutor and partner in governance. Bremer held regular meetings with the 
IGC covering a wide range of issues. 
CPA also used the IGC to develop agreed-on policy programs. For instance, the 
IGC Security Committee met regularly with the CJTF-7 leadership and senior CPA 
security advisors. Although CPA advisors were also involved in the drafting effort, 
the IGC was primarily responsible for initial, albeit abortive, work on a full constitu-
tion in fall 2003 and for drafting and approving the Transitional Administrative Law 
(TAL), the interim constitution under which the interim government was to operate, 
signed in March 2004. As the June 30, 2004 transfer of authority got closer, the 
IGC’s de facto power to veto or shape policies grew. 
The appropriateness of the IGC as the primary Iraqi voice in governing occu-
pied Iraq was highlighted by the final approval process for the TAL, which demon-
strated that other political forces in Iraq wielded significant power.18 Moreover, there 
were continuing concerns that the IGC, its membership entirely appointed by coali-
____________ 
17 For a broader discussion of the dilemmas posed by instilling democracy through authoritarian means, see 
Simon Chesterman, You, The People, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
18 For more on the adoption of the TAL, see Chapter Ten. 
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tion personnel, was not in any real way representative of Iraq, especially because it 
failed to include a range of important actors—particularly the Sunni elite and relig-
ious and tribal leaders. Among the Iraqi public, the IGC was never particularly popu-
lar or trusted; it was generally seen as composed of expatriates who owed fealty to 
occupation forces. Ironically, the IGC was not, in fact, particularly acquiescent to 
CPA. Over time, it became increasingly assertive in taking positions different from 
those of Bremer and his staff. 
Ministries 
One senior advisor was assigned to each Iraqi ministry.19 The senior advisors had ex-
isted under ORHA, as discussed in Chapter Five, and their fundamental roles and 
structures continued under CPA. Through August 2003, the senior advisor to each 
ministry functioned as the de facto minister; all the Iraqi ministers under Saddam 
had been dismissed. After Iraqi ministers were appointed and approved by the IGC, 
starting in late August 2003, the senior advisors still held veto authority over all deci-
sions until the transfer of authority in June 2004. 
The senior advisors worked to administer their portfolios by relying to a large 
extent on senior Iraqi civil servants who had met the de-Ba’athification criteria. After 
Iraqi ministers were named, the division of authority between the ministers and their 
senior advisors varied significantly from ministry to ministry. Stripped of senior 
Ba’athist officials, most ministries retained many of the structures and staff that had 
existed under Saddam. The exceptions were the Ministries of Displacement and Mi-
gration, Environment, Science and Technology, Human Rights, and Defense. The 
Ministry of Defense was dismantled in May 2003 and a new one created by CPA 
order in March 2004. The other new ministries were created by CPA order, in the 
case of the Ministry of Science and Technology, to replace the dissolved Ministry of 
Atomic Energy.20 
As with CPA as a whole, the senior advisors had dual roles: the operations of 
their ministries and the building of institutions and capacity within them. For exam-
ple, the senior advisor to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs was responsible for 
ensuring that his ministry paid pensions and disability payments on time. The senior 
advisor to the Ministry of Health was responsible for reopening clinics, supplying 
medicines, surgical supplies, and pharmaceuticals to Iraqi dispensaries, and paying 
doctors, nurses, and other medical personnel. Most of these activities were conducted 
by Iraqi employees of the ministries, but because CPA controlled funds and also held 
contracting authority, the senior advisor and his support staff had to ensure that 
____________ 
19 The exception was the senior advisor for national security, who oversaw the creation of a new Ministry of De-
fense and, at times, also oversaw overall Iraqi security policy. This included interaction with CJTF-7 and some 
oversight over the Ministry of Interior as well. 
20 In addition, the Ministry of Public Works was renamed the Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works.  
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funds were released, contracts signed, and supplies delivered where they were needed. 
This meant that the small ministerial staffs at CPA, often just a handful of people, 
tended to concentrate on day-to-day tasks and had little time for longer-term strate-
gic thinking. The institution building mission tended to suffer as a result. Exceptions 
were the staffs responsible for creating new ministries, such as the Ministry of De-
fense, which had the tasks of planning, structuring, and recruiting, giving them the 
opportunity for a broader strategic role. 
The Iraqi ministries had difficulty in working effectively under their CPA advi-
sors. Civil servants had been discouraged from taking initiative during the Saddam 
Hussein regime, and this legacy persisted. Many CPA staff members were surprised 
at the unwillingness of competent Iraqi staff to make recommendations. One Army 
Corps of Engineers officer recounted his experience with an Iraqi counterpart. In the 
course of their working together, the Iraqi engineer provided a complete solution to 
fix a transformer. However, when the Corps of Engineers employee asked that he 
present it in the form of a recommendation, the Iraqi was terrified and refused to 
present his solution in an official form. Problems were exacerbated by the lack of fa-
cilities. Most ministries were gutted in the looting that occurred during and follow-
ing the capture of Baghdad. In a number of instances, staff had nowhere to go and 
no way to work immediately following the end of the conflict. 
CPA staff generally concurred that most Iraqi civil servants were inefficient. 
They put in truncated hours, frequently failed to fulfill assignments, and, in a num-
ber of instances, did not have clear tasks and responsibilities. There were exceptions, 
however. The advisory staff to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs generally reported that 
they were impressed by the professionalism and competence of their Iraqi colleagues. 
Increases in government salaries provided by CPA made government employ-
ment, outside of some security jobs, more attractive than employment in the private 
sector. As a consequence, applicants queued for government jobs. Civil servants and 
ministers, once appointed, frequently rewarded friends and relatives by providing 
jobs. For example, the number of director general positions (equivalent to the assis-
tant secretary level) in the Ministry of Electricity rose from 12 to 80 between August 
2003 and February 2004. Many of these positions were awarded to individuals tied 
to members of the IGC or to ministers. CPA staff did what they could to put a lid on 
such practices, but their limited capacity to oversee all aspects of operations, com-
bined with the need to put an Iraqi face on hiring and other efforts, limited their 
ability to be effective. 
CPA recognized early that it had to not merely get the Iraqi government ma-
chinery operational again; to enable this government to operate in a transparent, ac-
countable, and efficient manner, CPA also had to institute a major overhaul of the 
civil service. This began on an ad hoc basis as CPA advisors to individual ministries 
sought to apply best practices from their home departments, such as establishing 
merit-based personnel structures, devolution of authority, and modern financial 
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management practices. It became evident, however, that a more comprehensive pro-
gram of reform was required. The UK’s Department for International Development 
(DFID) issued a comprehensive plan for emergency public administration reform. As 
of the transfer of authority on June 28, 2004, implementation of this plan was only 
in its very early stages. The program focused initially on key cross-cutting ministries 
(finance, public works, and defense) but also provided initial support to the machin-
ery of central government (cabinet, prime minister’s and president’s offices), envi-
sioning a strong cabinet committee role. The program laid out a multiyear effort to 
turn the top-heavy, hierarchical, bloated, and inefficient civil service into something 
resembling an efficient bureaucracy centered around providing cost-effective citizen 
services rather than serving the ruling elite. 
This was obviously a tall order, and the first indications in early summer 2004 
were that many of the ministers and senior officials in the Iraqi Interim Government 
were unhappy with a program that threatened their ability to use government ap-
pointments as part of their patronage, their “spoils of office.” Thus, the full imple-
mentation of DFID’s program by the Iraqi government was significantly in doubt 
after the transfer of authority on June 28, 2004. 
Organization of CPA 
CPA was structured and run in a way that reflected its dual missions of governing 
Iraq and building Iraqi government institutions. Figure 8.1 shows a July 2003 orga-
nization chart for CPA. As can be seen from the chart, CPA had a somewhat un-
wieldy organizational structure at that time. It consisted of “staff” and “operations” 
components. The “staff” included the General Counsel’s office, Intelligence, an Op-
erations Support Group that included the Facilities Management office and others, 
the Executive Secretariat, the Strategic Policy Office, Financial Oversight, and a Re-
quirements Coordination Office. Strategic Communications, CPA’s public affairs 
office, was eventually added to this group. 
The “operations” components consisted of the senior advisors, described above, 
and their staffs. As noted, those staffs in most cases focused on immediate issues of 
maintaining the ministries’ core operations. Policy planning and formulation were to 
be conducted by even more senior “directors” who often covered several ministries. 
In a number of instances, senior advisors reported to these individuals, who reported 
to Bremer. Other senior advisors reported directly to Bremer. 
Bremer sat at the pinnacle of CPA. He had responsibility for ruling Iraq. Power 
was fully concentrated in his office, with minimal delegation. On occasion, Bremer’s 
management style was to focus on detail to the point of micromanagement. At times, 
this may have hampered his ability to set and supervise the implementation of clear 
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Figure 8.1 
Original Organization of CPA, July 2003 



































































































































priorities for CPA and Iraq. At the same time, a substantial amount of his time was 
spent interacting with Iraqis, giving speeches and press conferences to communicate 
CPA goals, decisions, and thinking to Iraqis, to the citizens of coalition partners, and 
to the international community at large. He also spent a substantial amount of time 
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communicating with his superiors, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and President 
Bush. 
Bremer took a hands-on approach to managing CPA. He held short (10-
minute) daily staff meetings and longer strategy meetings every Friday. In addition, 
his day was filled with meetings with senior administrators at CPA. Functional and 
policy decisions were made at these meetings. 
The organization shown in Figure 8.1 served Bremer poorly. Directors and sen-
ior advisors who participated in meetings with him did not always follow through on 
the directives they received. This failure stemmed partly from the organizational 
structure. No one was responsible for following up to ensure that action was taken. 
While Bremer did not have time to write down decisions and ensure follow up, oth-
ers in the organization lacked the authority to enforce discipline. Ambassador Clay 
McManaway, senior counselor to Bremer, partially filled this role, but he spent much 
of his time filling in for Bremer or pursuing special projects, such as finding a site for 
training Iraqi police. The follow-up function was not built into the organization. 
Coordination within CPA was also somewhat haphazard. The urgency, real and 
perceived, of the work at hand created strong disincentives for approaching other of-
fices for approval of plans and projects. As a result, decisions were generally made by 
small subsets of the CPA staff, often in isolation from other offices in the organiza-
tion.  
In addition to these internal organizational problems, the Department of De-
fense lacked the organization and staffing resources appropriate for a nation-building 
effort. Although the State Department and USAID have had their share of problems 
with these types of operations, they do have staff with significant experience in post-
conflict situations who can be detailed to such assignments. More important, these 
officials know that their performance on these assignments will have career conse-
quences. In contrast, DoD does not have a civilian staff whose job description and 
training prepare them specifically for nation-building efforts. DoD had to recruit 
personnel from inside and outside the government to staff CPA. A number of these 
individuals were drawn from the State Department, but the majority of them were 
not.  
Stays in Baghdad were short, from three to six months, so turnover was much 
more rapid than in other post-conflict situations. Because most staff did not return to 
departments that continued to be engaged in Iraq, much of what they learned was 
lost. Institutional memory was short. 
To compound matters, while CPA in Baghdad was undergoing a revolving door 
of staff changes, CPA “West” in the Pentagon was undergoing a very rapid buildup, 
drawing on individuals throughout the government. Whereas State Department–led 
operations in other post-conflict situations had an institutional anchor already in 
place when the operation began, DoD had to construct its own office to oversee 
CPA, almost from scratch. The role of CPA “West” was to handle recruiting, vetting, 
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and the logistics of deploying civilian employees. It also ostensibly served as a liaison 
between CPA and the interagency community in Washington. In practice, however, 
staff at CPA Baghdad generally communicated directly with senior officials at the 
White House, the Pentagon, and other agencies in Washington, often leaving CPA 
“West” out of the loop on actions and plans. 
Senior officials in Washington also had no compunctions about picking up the 
telephone to get in touch with staff in Baghdad. In principle, CPA “West” had a co-
ordinating role, and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld oversaw the entire effort. In prac-
tice, various CPA offices at times seemed to be reporting to their home organizations 
in Washington—that is, those from which staff were drawn and that were their sub-
stantive counterparts. Each of CPA’s core “foundations” tended to have its own 
chain of command: In general, Economics reported to Treasury; Governance re-
ported to State; Security reported to both the NSC and DoD (creating additional 
complications); and Essential Services interacted with the Army Corps of Engineers. 
Finally, while Bremer and the security offices reported to DoD, all of CPA also re-
ported to Bremer himself, and the organization as a whole often operated on a 
shorter time horizon than one permitting extensive coordination with home agencies. 
Although some CPA staff believed that they continued to report to agencies back 
home, others saw their role as that of a detailee to CPA, which meant that they re-
ported to Ambassador Bremer and not their “home” agencies. These multiple com-
mand chains and reporting channels were confusing, and they resulted in substantial 
duplication of reporting efforts, misunderstanding, and occasional rancor. 
Not surprisingly, the agencies and organizations in Washington often thought 
they had insufficient information about activities in Baghdad. This classic embassy-
capital problem was greatly magnified by the lack of established channels, the absence 
of trained reporting officers, and the chaos and conflict all around. Some offices had 
better records of coordination than others. CPA’s Office of General Counsel held 
regular, often daily, discussions with the Defense Department’s Office of General 
Counsel (as well as other organizations) to discuss relevant legal issues and maintain 
communications. The Office of National Security Affairs remained in close contact 
with both the Defense Department and the White House, although this did not pre-
vent miscommunication and confusion about plans and actions. However, the Gov-
ernance team was broadly seen in Washington as not making sufficient effort to keep 
the capital apprised of its activities, particularly in the first months of CPA’s exis-
tence.21 
The presence of a significant number of non-U.S. staff further complicated 
matters. Like the U.S. staff, these personnel felt a dual loyalty to CPA and to their  
home agencies. Unlike the U.S. staff, their home agencies were not in the U.S.  
____________ 
21 Interviews with CPA officials, July and August 2004. 
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government. Many of them represented the defense ministries of their home coun- 
tries. Some represented their foreign offices and other agencies. The United King-
dom also had a senior ambassador in place in Baghdad. The first of these was John 
Sawyers, who was followed by Sir Jeremy Greenstock, who was in turn replaced by 
David Richmond. Ostensibly, the UK ambassador was to be Bremer’s counterpart, 
but with Bremer as the head of CPA and the Iraqi government, the precise outlines 
of this U.S.-UK relationship were never fully clear. Lack of clarity created some ten-
sion between the two positions and the individuals who filled them, and, at times, 
between the U.S. and British contingents. 
In mid-November 2003, CPA revamped its structure to address some of the 
shortcomings. Figure 8.2 shows a bare-bones organizational chart. Under the new 
organization, Ambassador Richard Jones became the Deputy Administrator and the 
Director of Policy. General Joseph (Keith) Kellogg (ret.) became the Director of Op-
erations. His primary responsibility was the reconstruction effort, and the senior ad-
visors to the “hard” infrastructure ministries reported to him. Other senior advisors 
reported to Jones in principle, although they too often had direct access to Bremer as 
well. 
Ambassador Jones was simultaneously the U.S. ambassador to Kuwait. A senior 
Foreign Service officer, he brought the experience as well as the seniority and prestige 
to chair policy meetings without Bremer. He could also perform the “nag” function, 
insisting that senior administrators follow through on their commitments. 
This delegation of responsibility in November 2003 improved the operations of 
CPA. The structure was cleaner, and it enabled a somewhat more cohesive policy-
formulation process, although reach-back continued to be largely to home agencies 
in Washington and other capitals. Kellogg brought in additional management staff 
who were able to address some of the logistical and programmatic blockages hinder-
ing such ministries as interior and oil. For most people, this meant multiple report-
ing channels, both within CPA and back home, which were relatively effective in 
keeping various agencies informed of developments. It was problematic when differ-
ent guidance was provided by the different agencies, and it imposed a tremendous 
time burden on ministerial advisors. 
Problems of coordination within CPA also continued, although improved per-
sonal relations and concerted efforts by some senior staff members to improve coor-
dination on specific issues (security institution building, for example) did help to in-
crease transparency. Recognition of the benefits of coordinating with staff from other 
offices also grew over time, as a result of both the efforts of various CPA staff to re-
main apprised of events relevant to their work and a push by the Executive Secre-
tariat to ensure the appropriate coordination of memoranda and position papers pro-
vided to Ambassador Bremer. Still, the process remained deeply imperfect 
throughout the existence of CPA. 
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Figure 8.2 
Revised Organization as of November 2003 
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The change in CPA structure coincided with a crucial policy shift. On Novem-
ber 15, 2003, after consultations with President Bush, CPA and the IGC agreed that 
sovereignty would be returned to an interim Iraqi government by July 1, 2004, as 
will be discussed in Chapter Ten. After this November 15 agreement, CPA’s capacity 
to fulfill its dual tasks of governance and institution building was further strained by 
an immediate need to meet the increasingly close deadline for transferring authority. 
While many individuals in CPA remained committed to building effective institu-
tions, the time constraint left them with little choice but to find short-term answers 
that would enable the transfer of sovereignty, rather than long-term approaches that 
might in the end have been more effective. In a number of policy areas, particularly 
economics, governance, and security, this policy decision resulted in CPA’s abandon-
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ing important policy changes or accelerating the standing up of new Iraqi institutions 
at such a pace that the results were counterproductive. 
Location and Staffing 
CPA was headquartered at the former Republican Palace next to the Tigris River in a 
secure area of several square miles called the “Green Zone,” shown in Figure 8.3.22 
Most CPA staff worked in the palace, traveling to ministries and other destinations 
with security guards or secure vehicles or by military convoy. Over time some staff  
 
Figure 8.3 
Location of the Palace in Baghdad 
































22 In addition, several CPA staff members were assigned to governance teams in the provinces. The issues with 
regard to those staffs, and relations between Baghdad and the regions, are discussed in Chapter Ten. 
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were provided with their own vehicles, and they traveled to their destinations with-
out escorts. Nonetheless, providing security for CPA personnel traveling to and from 
downtown Baghdad and to points outside the city became a major task for CJTF-7. 
There were always substantially more requests than available convoys. In the fall of 
2003, trips had to be requested at least one week ahead of time. When the security 
situation was perceived as relatively benign, CPA staff felt more comfortable moving 
around Baghdad. However, two sharp turning points—the New Year’s Eve 2003 at-
tack on a popular Baghdad restaurant and the early April 2004 flare-up of violence in 
Baghdad and throughout the country—significantly constricted CPA staff movement 
outside of the secure area. Staff who had security detachments provided by private 
security firms, including those from USAID, the UK, and Australia, were able to 
travel around Baghdad more easily. 
The food to feed the staff was subject to U.S. Department of Agriculture regula-
tions regarding food fed to U.S. Army forces and was for the most part shipped over 
from the United States, resulting in occasional shortages, particularly in April 2004 
when attacks on coalition vehicles slowed supplies into CPA. Until the October 2003 
attack on the Al Rasheed Hotel on the edge of the Green Zone, substantial numbers 
of CPA staff were housed in that facility. It was evacuated after the attack and not 
reopened for housing while CPA remained in existence. Throughout that time, the 
majority of CPA and CJTF-7 staff members assigned to the palace were housed in 
the numerous trailer parks built and administered by Kellogg, Brown and Root 
(KBR). These were scattered throughout the palace grounds and further out into the 
Green Zone, though there were exceptions: USAID had its own compound, for ex-
ample, and the British moved into a separate compound. However, there were in-
variably more staff members than space in trailers, which were shared by four people, 
two to a room (a situation exacerbated by a growing underground market in trailer 
beds). Personnel awaiting a trailer assignment slept in bunk beds in the palace ball-
room or chapel, often for weeks on end. When space became short in that facility, 
two large tents were set up to accommodate more personnel. Other CPA staff slept 
in their offices. 
CPA had two major branch offices: CPA North in Irbil, the capital of the Kurd-
ish governorates (administrative regions), and CPA South, covering Basra, 
Muthanna, Maysan, and Dhi Qar. By the end of 2003, CPA offices had been set up 
in every one of Iraq’s 18 governorates. These offices were staffed by a combination of 
government detailees (from the State Department and the British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office [FCO]), contractors, and military civil affairs personnel. CPA 
South was very much a British enclave, with the majority of its staffing comprising 
FCO and DFID. Given that the south was also run by a division under British com-
mand, CPA South at times operated semi-autonomously from Baghdad. 
Total employment at CPA probably numbered about 1,500 people, but there 
was never any clear count of CPA staff. The combination of detailees, direct hires, 
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political appointees, and so forth made it difficult to keep track. About half the peo-
ple in the palace at any one time were military officers assigned to CJTF-7. Particu-
larly in the early stages of its work, CPA benefited from large numbers of civil affairs 
officers, almost exclusively reservists, who worked with the senior advisors.23 Some 
USAID contractors were also located in the palace. A large support staff was provided 
by contractors to run telecommunications systems, handle the motor pool, and pro-
vide laundry services, haircuts, security, and other functions. 
As noted above, CPA staff were an eclectic crew. A number of retirees from the 
private sector and the State Department agreed to work for CPA, often at the request 
of senior administration officials. At the other end of the age spectrum, the Defense 
Department hired a substantial number of people in their twenties to staff the minis-
try advisory teams. After some unfavorable news articles printed interviews with for-
mer CPA employees, new employees were closely vetted on the basis of party affilia-
tion. Internships in conservative public policy institutes or recommendations from 
Republican Party leaders were a common route into CPA for such young people.24 
Much of the rest of CPA was staffed with U.S. government civil servants and some 
military personnel.  
All government departments were asked to encourage staff strongly to volunteer 
for duty in Iraq. The quality of the staff deployed was mixed, however. While there 
were a great many supremely competent personnel at CPA, representing the broad 
range of groups and organizations that contributed staff, there were also personnel 
who did not perform adequately. Various agencies and organizations had different 
attitudes toward sacrificing their best people to this mission, and several CPA staff 
members reported having had to fight their leadership to be allowed to deploy to 
Baghdad. Moreover, the broad mix of personnel had advantages and disadvantages. 
For example, the variety of perspectives was likely beneficial, while the lack of gov-
ernment experience of some staff created difficulties when interacting with Washing-
ton. The overall lack of experience among the junior staff also led to some difficulties 
in defining and implementing programs effectively. 
Staff background varied. There were a number of functional experts, particu-
larly among retirees and civil servants, but few regional specialists deployed. Of those 
who were in theater, very few also had subject matter expertise. This created a re-
quirement for communication and information sharing that was not often met. 
Moreover, even the subject matter experts were often quite out of date in their un-
derstanding of Iraq; maintaining a clear sense of developments there had become dif-
ficult after the 1991 Gulf War. The result was that policies were often developed in 
ignorance of their potential impact on Iraqi society. The IGC thus came to be in-
____________ 
23 This number declined when the initial cohort of CJTF-7 officers rotated out in the spring of 2004. 
24 Ariana Eunjung Cha, “In Iraq, the Job Opportunity of a Lifetime,” Washington Post, May 23, 2004; Rajiv 
Chandrasekaran, “Iraq’s Barbed Realities,” Washington Post, October 17, 2004. 
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creasingly used as a source of local expertise that would guide acceptance or rejection 
of policies on the basis of how they would work in Iraq.  
As noted above, other coalition countries’ civil servants and military personnel 
were represented. While the British contingent was the largest, there were also sig-
nificant numbers of Australians, Italians, and Spaniards, as well as some Czechs, 
Ukrainians, Poles, Romanians, and others. The palace also housed the headquarters 
of the Iraq Reconstruction and Development Council (IRDC). This organization of 
about 150 Iraqi expatriates, primarily U.S. citizens, was a contract entity run by 
SAIC for the Defense Department. Its members provided links to Iraqi society, and 
some worked as advisors at ministries and other government institutions. 
Relations with CJTF-7 
The first order signed by Bremer defined the powers of CPA, including its relations 
with the coalition forces. CPA Regulation 1 states that “1) The CPA shall exercise 
powers of government temporarily in order to provide the effective administration of 
Iraq.”25 The order goes on to state, “2) The CPA is vested with all executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial authority necessary to achieve its objectives.” However, CPA was 
strictly a civilian entity. “3) As the Commander of the Coalition Forces, the Com-
mander of U.S. Central Command shall directly support CPA by deterring hostili-
ties; maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity and security; searching for, securing, and 
destroying weapons of mass destruction; and assisting in carrying out Coalition pol-
icy generally.”26 In other words, CENTCOM through CJTF-7 was to support CPA, 
but CPA definitely did not have the authority to command CJTF-7.27 
The degree of coordination between CPA and CJTF-7, at both senior and staff 
levels, varied over time. CJTF-7 had a large office at the palace where CPA was lo-
cated, although its headquarters was at Camp Victory, near Baghdad International 
Airport. Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, the CJTF-7 commander, had daily 
meetings with Ambassador Bremer. Operations were generally discussed in detail be-
fore a decision was made to proceed. CPA and CJTF-7 attempted to coordinate po-
litical strategy, reconstruction efforts, security policies, and strategic communications 
with military operations, but this was done in an ad hoc way. The conventional war-
fare approach of CJTF-7 and the failure of CPA to deploy sufficient staff and re-
____________ 
25 Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation Number 1, Section 1. All of the CPA’s regulations are available at a 
web site, no longer updated, that has been left open for historical purposes. As of October 2007: 
http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/#Regulations 
26 Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation Number 1. 
27 CJTF-7 was not the only coalition structure not under CPA control. Intelligence agency representatives in 
Baghdad did not report to Ambassador Bremer, although they were represented at the palace, and neither did the 
Iraq Survey Group (ISG), whose mission was to seek evidence of WMD in Iraq.  
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sources to fulfill many of its mission areas created tensions. With no requirement to 
coordinate and no single official in charge in theater, it was often difficult to con-
vince busy people of the need to share information—even if the repercussions of a 
failure to do so could be quite serious.  
Although relations were relatively cordial at the highest level, relations between 
civil affairs officers assigned to the regional commands (and lower echelons) and CPA 
staff were sometimes fractious, particularly early in the CPA governance teams’ de-
ployments. The civil affairs officers were the interface between Iraqis living within 
the military commands’ areas of responsibility and various areas within each com-
mand assigned to units under the commander’s control. These officers heard com-
plaints from Iraqis, worked with the local councils and government agencies, and also 
operated as liaisons between local state-owned enterprises, the private sector, and 
ministries in Baghdad. In short, their days were spent solving problems, many of 
which needed to be resolved quickly. They were eventually replaced by individual 
teams in each of Iraq’s 18 governorates. Both groups felt they had insufficient input 
into the policy and funding decisions taken by CPA in Baghdad. Civil affairs officers 
would constantly come across needs within their territories for funds to repair schools 
and other government buildings, pay Iraqi government employees, or invest in local 
enterprises. For their part, CPA employees focused on establishing transparent budg-
eting and payment systems in the ministries and in tracking funds. Requests from 
civil affairs officers sometimes received short shrift. 
CPA also had to contend with ad hoc policy decisions taken within the com-
mands. For example, despite a nationally announced policy of no tariffs on imported 
goods, Major General David Petraeus, who commanded operations in the north, lev-
ied small charges in dollars on trucks entering Iraq through his sector and spent those 
funds on reconstruction activities in his area of operations.28 A bigger policy head-
ache arose from wages paid to local security guards, whose wages were initially 
funded from Commander’s Emergency Response Funds (CERF), money allocated to 
commanders for immediate expenses related to reconstruction and assistance efforts. 
Facilities protection service employees in some parts of the country received higher 
wages than those in other parts of the country. When wage payments for these em-
ployees were transferred to the Iraqi government in 2004, CPA and the Ministry of 
Finance had to contend with a host of unhappy employees whose salaries had to be 
reduced to fit into the new national pay scale. 
____________ 
28 Interview with U.S. civil affairs officer, October 2003. 
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Concluding Observations 
The CPA faced the daunting task of simultaneously governing Iraq and building new 
institutions to manage the political transition and reconstruction effort. It was at 
once a U.S. government organization and an international one. It was one of two 
representatives of the occupation on Iraqi soil, alongside CJTF-7. It was understaffed 
and faced significant logistical and structural problems. Its staff represented various 
U.S. and foreign government organizations and structures, staff members had varying 
levels of experience, and individuals were generally in country for only short periods. 
As time went on, CPA was increasingly driven by near-term deadlines. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that certain tensions were inherent in its work. 
The difficulty of governing and responding to short-term needs, while working to 
build lasting institutions during a time of conflict (when the short-term needs are 
particularly imperative), cannot be overstated. The need to balance the interests of 
the home countries and home agencies of CPA staff with the interests of CPA itself 
also created a range of challenges. Coordination, within CPA, with CJTF-7, and 
with home governments, in a context requiring decisions to be made quickly and 
actions taken immediately, often seemed a burden rather than a useful mechanism 
for facilitating effective work. 
CPA’s role was to administer Iraq for a short period and to make it possible for 
Iraqis to govern themselves after it left. That was a tall order. While it will be some 
decades before historians judge whether the overall endeavor was a success or a fail-
ure, now at least we can draw lessons from CPA’s experience, good and bad, to im-
prove postwar administration and nation-building efforts in the future. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
Building New Iraqi Security Forces 
Defining and Building Iraqi Security Forces 
Certain assumptions lay at the core of prewar and pre-occupation planning for the 
creation of new Iraqi security forces.1 One of the most significant of these was that 
not very much would have to be done. It was expected that police forces, being 
largely non-Ba’ath Party and professional, would remain cohesive and be able to 
maintain law and order in occupied Iraq with limited involvement from the coali-
tion. It was further expected that certain units of the Iraqi armed forces would stand 
aside from the fight and could later be used to assist in reconstruction and security 
efforts. CENTCOM PSYOP campaigns instructed army units to capitulate, i.e., to 
stay in formation and surrender. The processing of these surrendered units was to be 
coordinated through a sizeable disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 
(DDR) plan developed by a contractor. Plans were also developed by U.S. govern-
ment personnel for reforming justice and police functions. These plans assumed 
functioning bureaucracies and an advisory role.2 
These assumptions proved faulty. Coalition forces found that rather than stand-
ing aside from the fight as intact units, the Iraqi army was nowhere to be seen. Some 
of its soldiers may have changed into civilian clothes and gone home, as suggested by 
piles of abandoned military footwear. Many, seeing their senior leadership flee, no 
doubt saw no reason to stick around themselves. They took weapons and other 
equipment that seemed valuable with them, and coalition staff found Iraqi military 
facilities quite thoroughly looted. The police, for their part, had scattered, and there 
was no one to respond to widespread looting—not just of military facilities but of 
government and office buildings, stores, and entire cities. Coalition forces, which had 
____________ 
1 This chapter was co-authored by RAND analysts Heather Gregg and Olga Oliker, the latter of whom worked 
for CPA in Baghdad. All information in this chapter, including that not otherwise attributed, is informed by that 
personal experience. 
2 Mark Magnier and Sonni Efron, “Arrested Development on Iraqi Police Force,” Los Angeles Times, March 31, 
2004; interviews with DoD, ORHA, and CPA officials, November 2003, July 2004, and August 2004. 
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not seen the “post-conflict” phase as a stability operations mission, did not see polic-
ing Iraq as one of their core missions.3 
The decision to disband the Iraqi armed forces was apparently made in Wash-
ington, D.C., in early May 2003, before the deployment of Ambassador L. Paul 
Bremer to Baghdad. The view of decisionmakers at the highest levels of the Defense 
Department, in consultation with Bremer, was that the Iraqi military had already 
“self-demobilized” by leaving their units and going home, and that it would be im-
possible to bring them back into barracks (which no longer existed) to implement the 
DDR plan that had been developed by the contractor in expectation of a significant 
effort. Instead, on May 23, 2003, shortly after Bremer’s arrival in Baghdad, the sec-
ond CPA order issued declared the Iraqi army, Ministry of Defense, Intelligence 
Service, and other related organizations and agencies to be disbanded and dissolved.4 
Thus, CPA was charged with building from scratch a full complement of secu-
rity services. On the one hand, this presented a remarkable opportunity to establish 
democratic and effective security structures for a new Iraq. On the other hand, it was 
to prove a formidable task, as CPA struggled to define Iraqi needs even as it faced the 
requirement to train forces adequately at a time when actual security requirements 
were increasing. The tradeoffs between immediate requirements and long-term insti-
tutional goals were perhaps more stark in this sphere than in any other of the occupa-
tion. 
It was clear from the beginning that CPA staff would have to oversee the proc-
ess of building effective security forces and structures. In March 2003, Walter B. Slo-
combe, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the Clinton administration, 
agreed in principle to head up the effort to restructure the Iraqi Defense Ministry. In 
May, the Defense Department asked Bernard Kerik, former Chief of the New York 
Police Department, to be the senior advisor to the Ministry of Interior. The Ministry 
of Interior oversaw a broad range of internal security functions, including police, 
border police, customs, fire, and emergency personnel. The Defense Ministry func-
tion was more narrowly defined, but Slocombe’s mission was actually broader—he 
was charged not only with overseeing the Defense Ministry, but also with the effort 
to build Interior Ministry forces and any Iraqi intelligence functions to be developed. 
He and his office were also responsible for building broad national security strategy 
and coordination functions for the Iraqi government.5 
____________ 
3 Interviews with OSD, ORHA, CPA, and CJTF-7 officials and personnel, November 2003, June 2004, July 
2004, and August 2004. 
4 Interviews with ORHA and CPA officials, November 2003, December 2003, July 2004, and August 2004. 
CPA Order Number 2, along with all of the CPA’s orders, can be found at a web site, no longer updated, that has 
been left open for historical purposes. As of October 2007: 
http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/#Orders 
5 Interviews with CPA officials, December 2003, July 2004, and August 2004. 
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The structure that eventually emerged comprised several sets of forces. Because 
of Iraq’s historical experience with the domestic use of the Iraqi armed forces, CPA 
and IGC agreed that the primary role for domestic security should lie with the Min-
istry of Interior (MoI). Iraq’s army (including its air and coast guard components) 
would have the responsibility for defense from external threats, although after signifi-
cant discussion between CPA and the IGC it was agreed that in situations of dire 
need, the new Iraqi army could be called upon to support Interior Ministry forces 
within the country. Thus, the forces under MoI control would be the police, the 
border police, the facilities protection service, and two specialized forces: the civil in-
tervention protection service and the emergency response unit. All of these would be 
in various stages of development when CPA went out of existence in June 2004, al-
though none of them would be complete at that time. 
Because the Defense Ministry had been abolished, the forces that would eventu-
ally be placed under it were built and trained by coalition forces without an Iraqi 
ministry involved. First among these were the Iraqi armed forces, which consisted of 
ground, air, and coastal defense forces to start. In time the Iraqi Counterterrorism 
Force, developed by coalition special operations units, was also to be assigned to the 
Defense Ministry, as was the Iraqi Civil Defense Force, which became the Iraqi Na-
tional Guard after the Iraqi Interim Government took power. It was initially built 
and developed by individual CJTF-7 commanders. All of these structures are dis-
cussed at length below, along with the development of Iraqi intelligence structures 
(including those in the Defense and Interior ministries); the creation of the Ministe-
rial Committee for National Security, whose role is to coordinate national security 
police among the ministries and agencies of the Iraqi government; and the question 
of militias. 
Building the MoI 
If the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Iraqi armed forces were to be built from 
scratch, the Ministry of Interior continued as a functioning organization, stripped of 
senior Ba’athists to the best of CPA’s ability but otherwise retaining its own staff, as 
did most of Iraq’s ministries. Kerik had limited preparation for his role as senior ad-
visor to the MoI, leaving for Kuwait just days after agreeing to serve in that role. His 
previous experience was entirely at the municipal level. He was unfamiliar with Iraq, 
with the U.S. federal government, and with the international institutions that had 
supported police training and security sector reform in previous post-conflict envi-
ronments. Beyond being informed that the ministry had oversight of a number of 
forces and structures beyond the police force itself (including customs, immigration, 
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border patrols, fire department, and emergency services),6 Kerik had little informa-
tion about the organization he was to take responsibility for. A team of U.S. State 
Department and Justice Department personnel were already in place as advisors to 
the ministry on his arrival, and they had begun to carry out assessments of needs and 
requirements. The most obvious and fundamental task, however, was to build up a 
police force.7 Kerik hoped not only to reform these services but also to change the 
public’s perceptions of law enforcement; under Saddam, it was seen as a tool of op-
pression and not as a service to the population.8 
The CPA team worked closely with Iraqi MoI staff to attempt to rid the minis-
try of senior Ba’athists and to develop a strategy to get police on the streets quickly. 
They were hampered in this effort by limited information about the backgrounds of 
their interlocutors and others. Throughout CPA’s tenure, advisors to the MoI would 
be torn between the need to define Iraq’s long-term domestic security requirements 
and build forces to address them and the requirement to respond to the immediate 
imperatives of crime in Baghdad and throughout the country. Many of the MoI ad-
visors had police experience in their home countries and were able to apply it to 
problems in Baghdad. However, this meant that they were often out on the streets of 
the city, carrying out policing functions themselves. That left them little time to 
build the institutions Iraq would need to enable Iraqis to take on these roles.9 
Kerik left Baghdad after four months, replaced by former Drug Enforcement 
Agency Intelligence Chief Steven Casteel. Over time, CPA’s bureaucratic structure 
for its MoI-advisory role grew to encompass the many forces under MoI’s control 
and to include a policy office. But the team remained consistently understaffed, for 
policy development, for training functions, for policing, and for mundane tasks of 
keeping the ministry functioning, finding a new ministry building, and so forth. 
Creating the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) 
Unlike other Iraqi security forces under Saddam’s regime—such as the army and the 
Mukhabarat (secret police)—the estimated 20,000-strong prewar Iraqi police force 
was not a primary instrument of dictatorial repression. This led coalition authorities 
to expect that the police could be relied on to maintain law and order after Saddam 
was removed from power, with perhaps some additional training. However, the fail-
ure of police to report for duty after the Iraqi government was ousted, as well as the 
____________ 
6 Amy Waldman, “U.S. Struggles to Transform a Tainted Iraqi Police Force,” New York Times, June 30, 2003. 
7 Interviews with CPA officials, November 2003 and December 2003. 
8 Waldman, “U.S. Struggles to Transform a Tainted Iraqi Police Force.” 
9 Interviews with CPA officials, November 2003 and December 2003. 
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widespread descent into looting and lawlessness, proved this assumption to be faulty. 
The fact was that police under Saddam had little authority, little competence, and 
little commitment to service. They were notoriously corrupt, and they were the least 
trusted of the security services under Saddam. After the war, they also lacked infra-
structure: the widespread looting had included Iraq’s police stations, jails, and court-
houses. In Baghdad alone, 60 of the city’s 61 police stations were destroyed and their 
office equipment stolen.10 
Military forces responsible for the various regions took stopgap measures. In 
early May 2003, coalition forces distributed emergency stipends of $20 to police and 
firemen as incentives for them to return to their jobs.11 Following this initiative, Iraqi 
police began to return to the streets in Baghdad, wearing their old uniforms with new 
insignia.12 Also at this time, newly deployed MPs of the 709th Military Police Battal-
ion began training police in Baghdad and prioritizing equipment needed for the 
force, including radios, patrol cars, and side arms.13 By mid-May, roughly 7,000 of 
Baghdad’s 20,000 police had responded to coalition efforts to recall the force; that 
number reached 10,000 by the end of the month.14 Despite this turnout, looting, 
kidnappings, and armed robbery continued to plague the city.15 The situation was 
not dissimilar elsewhere in the country. 
British forces in southern Iraq moved somewhat more quickly to establish po-
lice forces, working with local religious leaders through mosques to build schools to 
provide emergency police training, which addressed issues such as detention, interro-
gation, and torture. In this way, they got some of the first “trained” police onto the 
streets.16 
Fewer problems arose in the Kurdish-controlled areas in the north, where police 
forces continued to function. There were problems in Mosul and Kirkuk, however. 
Major General David H. Petraeus, commander of the 101st Airborne Division, was 
____________ 
10 Kevin Whitelaw, “Law and Disorder,” U.S. News and World Report, May 26, 2003; interview with CPA offi-
cials, December 2003. 
11 Rubin, “U.S. Struggles in Quicksand of Iraq.” 
12 Mark Fineman, “U.S. Forces Eager to Relinquish Baghdad Beat,” Los Angeles Times, May 3, 2003. 
13 David Josar, “MPs Start Training Police in Baghdad,” European Stars and Stripes, May 5, 2003; John 
Daniszewski, “Baghdad Is Asking, Where Are the Police?” Los Angeles Times, May 27, 2003; Sandra Jontz, “U.S. 
Gives Iraqi Police 3,000 Radios,” European Stars and Stripes, June 5, 2003; Vincent J. Schodolski, “In Baghdad, 
Army MPs Reshaping Wary Police Force,” Chicago Tribune, June 6, 2003. 
14 Betsy Pisik, “U.S. Sees Organized Crime in Baghdad,” Washington Times, May 15, 2003; John Daniszewski, 
“Policing Isn’t Black and White in Baghdad,” Los Angeles Times, May 20, 2003; Marni McEntee, “Joining Forces: 
Iraqis, U.S. on Patrol,” European Stars and Stripes, May 20, 2003. 
15 Daniszewski, “Baghdad Is Asking, Where Are the Police?” 
16 Patrick Healy, “Policing Iraq’s Police,” Boston Globe, May 24, 2003; Matthew Campbell, “Quiet Britons Out-
pace U.S. in Taming Iraq,” Sunday Times (London), December 28, 2003. 
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responsible for the north as a whole, and he took some controversial steps, such as 
reportedly hiring 1,000 former Iraqi army officers to help restore order in Mosul.17 
On his arrival in Baghdad, Kerik saw the police as the first priority, and saw his 
most critical task as getting officers out on the streets, planning to increase the Bagh-
dad force, for example, from 8,000 to 18,000 officers, roughly the prewar force size.18 
By the end of Kerik’s four-month tenure, his office had overseen the opening of 35 
police stations housing 40,000 police.19 But the challenge was not simply one of 
numbers. Determining which of the former police officers willing to return to work 
were not former Ba’athists, in accordance with CPA’s de-Ba’athification program, 
meant that MoI advisors had to rely on reports from their former colleagues and of-
ten make gut decisions on whom to trust. 
Kerik would eventually fire a reported 7,000 officers for their connections with 
the former regime.20 His control of this process outside of Baghdad was limited, 
however, and there were reports that de-Ba’athification was less stringently applied in 
recruiting and restaffing police forces in Tikrit, Kirkuk, Fallujah, and elsewhere.21 
Moreover, vetting was more than a question of Ba’ath Party ties. The poor 
training and capacity of Saddam’s police force and its rampant corruption meant that 
CPA’s broad plans for reform would require lengthy, expensive, and complex meas-
ures. It was one thing to remove the military trappings of the police force formally 
and to abolish the structures of the police that had been termed “administrative” un-
der Saddam’s regime: intelligence, security police, and internal government investiga-
tions. It was quite another to transform the Iraqi police into the community policing 
structure that Kerik and his staff envisioned.22 
On June 29, 2003, Kerik’s office initiated the first Transitional Integration Pro-
gram (TIP) in Baghdad, a three-week course designed to retrain Iraqi police offi-
cers.23 In mid-July, 4,600 Iraqis began training and another 445 applications were 
under review.24 
____________ 
17 Mary Beth Sheridan, “For Help in Rebuilding Mosul, U.S. Turns to Its Former Foes,” Washington Post, April 
25, 2003. 
18 Jontz, “U.S. Gives Iraqi Police 3,000 Radios”; Daniel Williams, “Lack of Security Hampers Efforts to Aid 
Baghdad Police,” Washington Post, June 9, 2003. 
19 Interview with former U.S. government official, December 2003. 
20 Edmund Sanders, “A Delicate Duet of Policing,” Los Angeles Times, August 26, 2003. 
21 Interviews with CPA officials, December 2003. 
22 Interviews with CPA officials, December 2003. It is worth noting that the intelligence function would eventu-
ally be determined sufficiently critical to bring back. 
23 TIP training retrained approximately 14,000 Iraqi police officers by the middle of April 2004. See “Police 
Training Fact Sheet,” Iraqi Ministry of Interior, April 15, 2003. 
24 Higgins. 
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Formal recruitment and training for the Iraqi police services did not get under 
way until the end of August, following the appointment of Ahmed Ibrahim as Iraq’s 
new Deputy Minister of Interior and national chief of police. The Pentagon awarded 
DynCorp the contract to train the police force.25 The CPA’s initial goal was to have 
71,000 Iraqi police deployed throughout the country by September 2004; this goal 
was later accelerated to include 75,000 Iraqi police by June 30, 2004.26 To reach 
these numbers, CPA set the salary for police at $120 a month, prompting thousands 
of Iraqis to apply for the job.27 
Recruitment remained generally successful. By the end of October, the Penta-
gon reported that the Iraqi police force numbered 40,000, comprised primarily of 
police and soldiers from Saddam’s regime.28 A report in Jane’s Defence Weekly noted 
that coalition forces had recruited around 65,000 Iraqis to train for the police force, 
including former police officers, which would form the backbone of Iraq’s new secu-
rity forces.29 In November, CPA announced that the number of Iraqi security forces 
deployed throughout the country totaled 85,000, including 50,000 police.30 By June 
2004, there were some 90,000 police on the books.31 
But recruiting was only part of the equation. The tension between the need to 
get police out on the streets and the need for vetted and trained officers would con-
tinue to be a problem well beyond CPA’s existence. The plan that emerged, for 
phased training and vetting of police already hired, even as new police were brought 
into the force, meant that untrained and unvetted personnel remained in their jobs. 
Many of those who returned to work in response to the call from coalition forces 
would prove problematic for reasons well beyond ties to the Ba’ath Party. 
Initially the Pentagon considered training 28,000 Iraqi police in eight-week in-
tensive courses in Hungary, where it had trained exiled Iraqi militia before the war.32 
However, the Hungarian government did not approve the initiative.33 On September 
29, 2003, the Jordanian government announced that it would train 30,000 Iraqi po-
____________ 
25 Borzou Daragahi, “Use of Private Security Firms in Iraq Draws Concern,” Washington Times, October 6, 
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28 Mike Dorning, “Policing Baghdad Not of the Meek,” Chicago Tribune, November 2, 2003. 
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lice and other security forces, roughly a third of the projected forces slated for train-
ing.34 Alongside Jordan’s initiative, France and Germany expressed a willingness to 
provide officers to help train the new Iraqi police force, although this never bore 
fruit.35 Efforts were further supported by an additional police-training center in the 
United Arab Emirates.36 Training for new recruits was broken down into eight-week 
courses that graduated 1,500 Iraqi officers each.37 For a summary of police force 
training programs, see Table 9.1. 
Implementation of these training efforts was complicated by the difficulty of at-
tracting qualified civilian trainers. Although a number of countries had expressed 
willingness to help, the actual trainers remained in short supply. In late May 2003, a 
U.S. Justice Department team developed a training plan that called for 6,500 civilian 
police advisors from the United States and other coalition countries.38 Subsequent 
plans spoke of numbers between 500 and 1,000, but even those numbers proved dif-
ficult to reach, with the actual count never rising above the dozens during CPA’s ten-
ure.39 Civilian police were deterred by the security situation in Iraq, and little in the 
way of a consistent effort was made by coalition nations to attract qualified people. 
Governments were also concerned about the prospect of sending large numbers  
 
Table 9.1 







TIP training Three-week course to retrain former 
police 
Al Anbar, Baghdad, Baquba, Basra, Diwaniyah, 
Hillah, Karbala, Kirkuk, Mosul, Muthanna, 
Najaf, Al Qaim, Tal Afar, Tikrit, Wasit 
New recruit 
training 
Eight-week course to train new recruits Muwaqqar (Jordan), United Arab Emirates, 
Baghdad, Mosul 
Field training 24-week training and mentoring on the 
job (by international police) 
Throughout the country  
Specialized 
training 
Select officer and special unit training 
in investigation and counterterrorism 
Adnon Palace (except for counterterrorism) 
____________ 
34 Jack Fairweather, “Jordan to Train Iraqi Police Force,” Daily Telegraph (London), September 30, 2003; 
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38 Higgins. 
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of civilians into harm’s way. Training was further hampered by difficulties with 
funding streams and other bureaucratic hassles. For example, continuing delays in 
the release of $800 million in U.S. State Department funds to support civilian police 
trainers throughout Iraq created a significant roadblock.40 
Several steps were taken to change this situation. In November 2003, as part of 
the November 15 timetable to hand over sovereignty to Iraqi leaders, the Pentagon 
announced plans to accelerate the training and deployment of Iraqi security forces 
with the aim of reducing the size of U.S. forces in the country.41 This, however, 
raised questions of whether the quality of training was being compromised in the in-
terest of pushing people through the programs faster. Then, in March 2004, respon-
sibility for training the police was shifted from the CPA MoI team to CJTF-7, the 
military command (in the process putting it under the same umbrella as military 
training, also shifted from CPA to CJTF-7). While CJTF-7 was able to employ mili-
tary personnel as trainers to make up for the absence of civilian trainers, the quality 
of training remained problematic. Major General Paul Eaton, who took over the po-
lice training mission with its shift to CJTF-7, stated in an interview prior to his de-
parture from Iraq in June, “We’ve had the wrong training focus—on individual cops 
rather than their leaders.”42 
By June 2004, with slightly over 90,000 police on the books, some two-thirds 
had not received training.43 For about 21,000 of those who had, the training in ques-
tion was TIP training, which varied significantly—trainers had tremendous discre-
tion in designing and implementing the programs. The result was that some person-
nel received a full three-week complement, some only three days; some received 
classroom and field training, others did not; and so forth.44 Vetting also continued to 
be a problem, as procedures for confirming the acceptability of recruits continued to 
rely on word of mouth and limited centralized data.45 
Training and vetting were not the only problems faced by the Iraqi police. 
CPA’s MoI (until March 2004) and CJTF-7 advisors (after that date) also had re-
sponsibility for equipping the police force and renovating police stations. As previ-
ously mentioned, 60 of the 61 police stations in Baghdad alone had been gutted and 
burned in the weeks following Saddam’s fall; all of these buildings needed to be re-
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built and refurbished for the police force to function effectively.46 Moreover, MoI 
oversaw the awarding of contracts to firms that would supply weapons and other 
necessary equipment to the new police force. In January 2004, the contract for 
equipping Iraq’s forces was awarded to Nour USA Ltd. of Vienna, Virginia—$327 
million for “operational equipment,” including guns, ammunition, armor, vehicles, 
and communications.47 Various problems would plague the equipping effort 
throughout the coming months, including a contract dispute that held up the distri-
bution of materiel.48 Supplies were slow in reaching police on the ground, stemming 
in large part from a contract dispute that left equipment sitting in warehouses in the 
United States and Europe.49 Regional military commanders tried to combat this 
shortage by purchasing necessary equipment with discretionary funds; however, the 
Iraqi police, and other security forces, continued to suffer from the lack of necessary 
equipment through the end of CPA’s tenure.50 
As of March 28, 2004, CPA reported that the Iraqi police had only 41 percent 
of their required patrol vehicles, 63 percent of uniforms, 43 percent of pistols, 21 
percent of hand radios, 7 percent of vehicle radios, and 9 percent of the protective 
vests deemed necessary.51 
The new Iraqi police services were also hindered by the absence of legal codes 
and due process throughout the country. Iraq had an antiquated civil and penal code 
that needed overhauling. Moreover, most citizens were not familiar with the law after 
30 years of oppressive, lawless rule under Saddam Hussein. The country lacked pub-
lic defenders and trained judges, there were no proper jails in which to hold suspects, 
and only four functioning courthouses were in existence to hear cases.52 All of these 
issues slowed and hampered the process of restoring (or, perhaps more accurately, 
creating) law and order in Iraq. 
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Although public opinion polling suggested that of all Iraq’s security services, the 
police were the most trusted; insurgents viewed them as lackeys of the occupation 
and, perhaps more important, as soft targets that clearly and symbolically demon-
strated the coalition’s incapacity to provide security. Police stations and recruitment 
sites increasingly became the targets of insurgent terrorist attacks.53 For example, on 
October 27, 2003, suicide bombers attacked three police stations in Baghdad, killing 
15 and wounding over 65 officers.54 Again on October 30, a suicide bomber dis-
guised as a repairman detonated a car full of explosives at a police station in the capi-
tal.55 In November, suicide bombers targeted the police station in Baquba, killing 
nearly 20 people.56 By the end of 2003, attacks on Iraqi police stations had become a 
weekly occurrence, and an estimated 208 Iraqi police had been killed since the coun-
try’s liberation, 60 in Baghdad alone.57 By the end of March 2004, this number had 
soared to an estimated 350 police officers killed as a result of attacks on police sta-
tions and individual officers.58 This trend persisted throughout 2004, including a 
massive attack in Basra on April 21 that killed more than 60 people, including chil-
dren on a nearby school bus.59 
Under these circumstance, it is perhaps not surprising that many police stations 
failed to stand up to insurgent attacks that began in April 2004. Moqtada al-Sadr’s 
forces found little resistance in the Sadr City section of Baghdad, in Najaf, or in 
other predominantly Shi’ite areas when they moved to take over police stations start-
ing in that time frame. Similar problems occurred in Fallujah. Some police officers 
even reportedly joined the militants.60 
These continued problems created significant questions regarding the capacity 
of Iraqi police to take on the core duties of providing for security and law and order 
in Iraq—and fighting the many internal threats to the country, still deemed to be 
their primary role. Prior to the April attacks, the coalition had taken steps to transfer 
certain authorities to Iraqi police. In February 2004, the Pentagon announced that it 
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would reduce its force size in Baghdad, cutting the number of coalition posts in the 
capital from nearly 60 to 26 and further reducing the number to eight by mid-April; 
in their place, newly trained Iraqi police forces would be deployed.61 U.S. Major 
General Martin Dempsey, the head of the 1st Armored Division in Baghdad, told 
reporters that he believed Iraqi forces were ready to handle the city’s security: “My 
personal opinion is I think the . . . police are a powerful team for this kind of urban 
warfare and urban security challenge.”62 Coalition forces experimented with pulling 
back from certain cities and allowing Iraqis to manage security, such as the Sunni city 
of Ramadi, but they were quick to assert that not all cities were ready to be patrolled 
by only Iraqis.63  
The Facilities Protection Services 
To combat chronic looting and theft in Iraq following the fall of Baghdad in April 
2003, coalition authorities created a force to guard infrastructure, warehouses, gov-
ernment buildings, schools, hospitals, and other important sites. This force, named 
the Facilities Protection Services (FPS), was designed to work alongside an estimated 
15,000 private security forces—such as Custer Battles, tasked with protecting the 
Baghdad airport and Erinys, which was hired to guard Iraq’s oil fields—and replace 
coalition forces charged with guarding Iraq’s infrastructure and public buildings.64  
Coalition authorities and private contractors began training the FPS in June 
2003, making it one of the first forces to receive formal training in Iraq.65 The FPS 
was based in part on a Saddam-era force, the Vital Facilities Protective Service.66 FPS 
recruits were drawn primarily from ex-Iraqi soldiers and guards.67 Candidates were 
given a physical examination and asked to sign two forms denouncing the former 
Ba’athist regime and agreeing to a code of ethics.68 Brigade commanders used CERP 
funds (allocated to them by CPA) to hire individual Iraqis, train them, and put them 
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to work in their sectors. CPA policy was that pay for FPS troops was $50 per month, 
but the individual basis of the recruiting meant that in the early days of the program, 
some FPS personnel were paid as much as twice that.69 Training was conducted by 
coalition forces in coordination with Kroll Inc., a New York-based private security 
firm.70 Most forces were trained at the Baghdad Public Academy, which was also the 
site of training for Iraqi police and border police.71 
The idea behind FPS was that the guards would belong to the specific ministries 
whose facilities they were guarding, which would also be responsible for their pay and 
other costs, while overall policy, training, and standards would be set and coordi-
nated by the MoI. After initial concerns and confusion about resourcing, by fall 2003 
this range of responsibilities was formally transferred from coalition military com-
manders to the Iraqi ministries (and, during CPA’s tenure, their advisors).72 CPA 
Order Number 27, which formally created the FPS, was issued on September 4, 
2003; it spells out the details of this arrangement.73 The majority of FPS personnel 
were trained to guard warehouses, schools, hospitals, and other public buildings. 
Some of them were also trained to guard sites surrounding the oil industry, the coun-
try’s electrical grid, and its port at Umm Qasr. As the June 2004 handover date drew 
closer, more and more FPS personnel were tasked with guarding these sites.74 In ad-
dition, a reported 2,200 FPS personnel were trained for Diplomatic Protection Serv-
ices (DPS), which were tasked specifically with guarding embassies in Iraq.75 For a 
summary of FPS training and tasks, see Table 9.2. 
Coalition authorities set the projected number of FPS personnel at 30,000 by 
the time of the June 28, 2004 handover; this number was later amended to 40,000.76 
At the beginning of August 2003, more than 4,000 FPS had been hired to guard 
Iraqi infrastructure and sites. By the end of August, total personnel had grown to 
17,000.77 This number climbed to a reported 20,000 guards protecting more than  
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Table 9.2 
Facilities Protection Services 
Subdivisions  Purpose Training 
Basic security guards Guard warehouses, museums, 
schools, hospitals, and other public 
buildings 
Three-day training by coalition forces 
and Kroll, Inc. 
Oil infrastructure guards Guard oil infrastructure from 
saboteurs  
Some specialized training 
Electricity guards Guard electrical power-plants from 
saboteurs  
Some specialized training 
Diplomatic Protection 
Services (DPS) 
Guard embassies, diplomats, and 
politicians 
Specialized training; may also be hired 
and trained by diplomats and 
politicians independently 
 
240 sites by mid-October 2003.78 In 2004, the number of FPS continued to climb, 
reaching 40,000 by mid-April.79 At the time of the handover, the reported number of 
FPS was at 74,000, including private contract forces.80 
The FPS had a mixed record in its first months of operation. As previously 
mentioned, the service’s tasks included protecting a wide array of infrastructure: 
power plants, oil fields, convoys, schools, ministries, warehouses, etc.81 However, the 
initial 9,000-man force proved to be unreliable. By the end of 2003, a Washington 
Post article reported that roughly 2,500 FPS personnel were not showing up for 
work.82 Furthermore, FPS personnel were reported to have abandoned their posts 
after receiving threats or coming under attack.83 Iraq’s oil and electric infrastructure 
continued to come under attack from saboteurs throughout 2004. 
As the June 2004 transfer of authority grew closer, the 40,000-strong FPS force 
appeared to be working well with private security teams and coalition troops to miti-
gate threats to Iraq’s infrastructure and to reduce looting of public buildings. As with 
other newly emerging Iraqi security forces, the FPS continued to work alongside in-
ternational forces following the transfer of political authority, providing continuity 
and further training for these new forces. 
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The Border Police 
Iraq’s borders represent one of its most crucial security concerns. Iraq shares frontiers 
with six nations, making for thousands of miles of land borders. Since the end of 
Saddam’s reign, these borders have been exploited by a flow of illegal migrants, 
weapons, goods, and terrorists.84 This situation is further complicated by the several 
Shi’ite Muslim holy sites in Iraq, particularly in Karbala and Najaf, to which Shi’ite 
pilgrims from Iran flock for religious events and festivals, something they could not 
do when Saddam ruled.85 
CPA chose to retain MoI responsibility for the borders, but it also sought to re-
vamp the border policing and guarding service and make it more effective and merit-
based than Saddam’s force had been. As with other services, an additional challenge 
was to integrate border control efforts in the Kurdish-controlled north with those in 
the rest of the country. The Department of Border Enforcement, under the MoI, 
comprised four separate forces: the Border Police, the Bureau of Civil Customs In-
spection, the Bureau of Immigration Inspection, and the Bureau of Nationality and 
Civil Affairs.86 
In January 2004, coalition forces began to train Iraqi police for the specific task 
of guarding Iraq’s borders. The border police received the same eight-week training 
course as the regular police force. Also similar to the IPS, the border police earned 
the same salary of $60 per month, plus hazardous-duty pay. Following basic training, 
the border police also underwent a two-week course that taught specialized skills for 
border patrol.87 The border police were trained at the Baghdad Public Safety Acad-
emy, along with the police and other Iraqi security forces. However, in 2004, CPA 
began construction of a training facility specifically for border enforcement, slated to 
open at the end of the calendar year. This new training facility, located near Sula-
maniya in the predominantly Kurdish north, was designed to train up to 1,000 re-
cruits at a time.88 For a summation of the Department of Border Enforcement’s 
training, see Table 9.3.  
The CPA set the projected number of the Department of Border Enforcement 
at 25,000 by the time of the June 2004 handover.89 By mid-October 2003, from  
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Table 9.3 
Department of Border Enforcement 
Subdivisions  Purpose Training 
Border Police Maintain territorial integrity of Iraq, 
man fixed points of entry into 
country, monitor and defend Iraq’s 
borders 
Same eight-week course as regular 
police plus two-week specialized 
training 
Bureau of Civil Customs 
Inspection  
Regulate flow of goods across Iraq’s 
borders 
Specialized training under 
development 
Bureau of Immigration 
Inspection 
Monitor flow of people across Iraq’s 
borders 
Specialized training under 
development 
Bureau of Nationality 
and Civil Affairs 
Monitor presence of foreign nationals 
in Iraq 
Specialized training under 
development 
 
4,000 to 5,000 border police were reportedly deployed and defending Iraq’s borders 
alongside coalition forces.90 Coupled with other officers of the Department of Border 
Enforcement, the total number of personnel was estimated to reach 12,000 by the 
end of November 2003.91 This number climbed to a reported 23,000 by February 
2004,92 of which an estimated 9,000 were border police.93 At the time of the June 
2004 handover, the number of border police trained and deployed was reported to 
have reached 17,000.94 
These numbers, however, belie continuing problems with border controls. Coa-
lition planners recognized that controlling Iraq’s borders would be an issue but 
lacked the manpower and resources to address it adequately.95 As a result, the borders 
were left unattended for a number of months. Later, as efforts by Iraqi and coalition 
forces to patrol borders were launched, it remained a difficult task, with insufficient 
personnel and reports of corruption and local “taxes” being levied at the borders. De-
spite the training plans detailed above, fewer than 300 of the personnel hired had 
been trained when the Iraqi Interim Government took power.96 
Efforts to better the border regime for crucial Shi’ite holy days, when large 
numbers of Iranian pilgrims crossed into Iraq, sparked some improvement, but prob-
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lems remained, some arising from the nature of these territories (mountains, marsh-
land, desert), which makes them particularly difficult to patrol effectively. Tribal and 
family links often cross national boundaries, and border guards themselves may over-
look smuggling and other activities by those with whom they have tribal or blood 
links.97 Nomads cross the border to Saudi Arabia frequently. Thus, Iraq’s borders 
remained highly porous. According to Iraqi officials, between June 2003 and July 
2004, up to 10,000 foreign agents and spies infiltrated the country.98 
Moreover, it proved no less difficult to recruit effective border police trainers 
from abroad than to recruit police trainers. Even the U.S. Office of Homeland Secu-
rity reportedly declined to support this effort.99 Border units remained undermanned 
and lacked the equipment that could have enabled them to perform surveillance on 
border areas effectively without high numbers of personnel. Border police had less 
effective equipment and vehicles (two-wheel drive versus four-wheel drive) than those 
they were tasked to track and stop.100 
High-End MoI Forces 
Recognition of the need for Iraqi counterinsurgency and counterterrorism forces sur-
faced early in the occupation. Whether such forces would be housed within the Min-
istry of Interior or the Ministry of Defense created some debate within CPA and the 
IGC. Past experience with oppression—both on the part of the domestic intelligence 
service, the Mukhabarat, and by the armed forces, especially as they were used against 
the Kurds—raised significant concerns. However, with primary responsibility for 
domestic security, the MoI unquestionably needed the capacity to respond to high-
end security threats. The exact structures of such forces took some time to define, 
however, and their development and creation took even longer. 
The structure that eventually emerged consisted of some high-end units within 
the police structure (locally based public order and SWAT units) and two additional, 
centrally deployed high-end units within the MoI’s force structure. This Civil Inter-
vention Force was envisioned as having primarily a riot control and counter-civil-
disturbance mission. Its Emergency Response Unit was designed to be more of a 
comprehensive counterterror/counterinsurgency force. In addition, CPA advisors and 
Iraqi personnel agreed in spring 2004 on the importance of developing a structure 
similar to the UK Special Branch, which would work closely with the national intel-
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ligence service but would, as an MoI entity, have arrest and detention authority that 
the intelligence service would not have. 
Training and development of these forces was held up by a number of factors, 
including lack of funding, lack of personnel, and lack of high-level attention to the 
implementation of plans. At the time that CPA dissolved, the Civil Intervention 
Force, with a planned force size of 4,800, had still not begun training and had no 
personnel on the books. The Emergency Response Unit, planned for a total force size 
of 280, had a few dozen personnel on active duty or in training. No progress had 
been made on developing a Special Branch–type structure. 
Ministry of Defense 
The Ministry of Defense had been abolished along with the Iraqi armed forces by 
CPA Order Number 2. The creation of a new Defense Ministry was coordinated out 
of the Office of National Security Affairs. The process of designing and structuring 
the ministry was carried out in large part by that office’s staff of advisors, which in-
cluded military and civilian defense specialists from the United States, United King-
dom, Spain, Italy, Australia, the Czech Republic, and Estonia. This team also over-
saw general defense and national security policy issues, the creation of national 
security institutions, intelligence issues, and, until March 2003, the creation and 
training of the Iraqi armed forces. 
The design of the new ministry reflected in large part the advisors involved in 
this effort, in that in many ways it resembled U.S., British, and to some extent Aus-
tralian models of defense policy, acquisition, and personnel. The ministry’s role was 
to provide policy oversight of the Iraqi armed forces (including the Iraqi Counterter-
rorism Force and the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps) and to formulate overall defense pol-
icy. It was to be responsible for military policy; budget and financial matters; human 
resources, including recruitment and training of civilian and military personnel; ac-
quisition, sustainment, and logistics; infrastructure; and defense intelligence analysis 
and requirements. The ministry was to be civilian-controlled, transparent, profes-
sional, merit-based, and broadly representative of the Iraqi people.101 
The effort to build the Ministry of Defense covered a broad range of tasks, 
ranging from the very mundane to high policy. CPA staff had to identify qualified 
personnel to form the core of the MoD staff and provide for their training (an effort 
carried out through the National Defense University and the U.S. Institute of Peace, 
which provided training modules for newly hired MoD staff). The CPA Office of 
National Security Affairs worked with the IGC Security Committee, headed by Iyad 
Allawi, to identify senior personnel for the MoD. A budget for the ministry had to be 
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developed in concert with the Ministry of Finance (although the assumption that 
U.S. budgetary allocations would end after 2004 led to a significant shortfall in 
budget plans for 2005 and beyond). The legal framework that created the ministry, 
eventually expressed in CPA Order Number 67, had to be defined and framed. Prop-
erty for the ministry’s offices had to be identified, acquired, and refurbished (with a 
short-term location also identified for use until the ministry building was ready). A 
public information campaign had to be designed. In the absence of an Iraqi Defense 
Ministry, all of these tasks fell to CPA. 
In fact, by the time the ministry was officially created by Order Number 67, 
signed on March 21, 2004, it did indeed have a number of key staff members in 
place. Until the opening of the Ministry of Defense Annex building, a former school 
converted to house the fledgling ministry until its permanent building was complete, 
the staff initially reported for work to the Office of National Security Affairs in the 
palace. On April 4, an interim Defense Minister, Ali Allawi, formerly interim Minis-
ter of Trade, was named. He was subsequently replaced by Hazem Sha’alan when the 
interim Iraqi government was appointed at the end of May 2004. 
The Iraqi Armed Forces 
Dissolution of the Iraqi Armed Forces: Aftermath 
The decision to dissolve the Iraqi armed forces in May 2003 was to prove a lightning 
rod for criticism of CPA and Administrator Bremer. A December 2003 report pub-
lished by the International Crisis Group (ICG) exemplified the widespread criticism 
of this decision by arguing, “Disbanding the former army was almost certainly the 
most controversial and arguably the most ill-advised CPA decision.”102 
The critique of this decision had two key components. First, critics argued, the 
dissolution of the military put roughly 350,000 Iraqi men out of work. Following the 
fall of Baghdad on April 9, thousands of Iraqi troops demonstrated in several cities 
and demanded stipends from the coalition authorities, arguing that these payments 
were necessary for the survival of their families.103 Military personnel had not been 
paid by Saddam since February of 2003, and prices in postwar Iraq were rising. 
Many felt they were owed several months of back pay, and some had begun to regis-
ter for emergency payments (coalition personnel were working to establish the struc-
tures for such payments) when CPA decided to formally dissolve the armed forces.104 
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Furthermore, many of the soldiers expressed feelings of betrayal by coalition powers, 
claiming that they had followed prewar instructions not to fight in good faith and 
with the expectation that they would be rewarded after the fall of Saddam.105 One 
Iraqi soldier claimed that “we did what Bush told us to do. He told all the soldiers to 
go home, and we could have been executed if we had been found out.”106 
It is important to reiterate that there had never been any intent to leave the 
Iraqi armed forces exactly as they had been during Saddam’s reign. CENTCOM 
planning included an assumption that members of the Iraq military would undergo a 
DDR process after major combat operations ended. The Ronco Corporation pre-
sented an outline of a comprehensive and costly DDR program to ORHA in March 
2003.107 In April and early May 2003, ORHA considered more detailed plans for a 
pilot program that would set up three DDR centers for former military personnel.108 
However, by the time that Bremer and Slocombe arrived in Iraq to establish CPA, 
the effective self-demobilization of the Iraqi armed forces made a formal DDR proc-
ess unworkable. 
In June, CPA announced that it would pay former officers and NCOs a 
monthly stipend that reflected their military rank and prior pay. The program was 
formally established in July. Eligible personnel included professional (nonconscript 
volunteer) soldiers and officers, Defense Ministry civilians, cadets enrolled in Iraq’s 
military colleges, and the families of POWs and missing in action from the Iran-Iraq 
War. With the exception of the latter, all had to have been on active duty or the 
equivalent as of April 16, 2003, and could not be or have been senior Ba’ath Party 
officials, members of the Special Republican Guard, or Fedayeen Saddam. Stipends 
ranged from $50 per month for enlisted personnel, NCOs, MoD civilians, and ca-
dets to $150 per month for three-star generals. In addition, conscripts, who did not 
receive monthly payments, received a lump-sum payment of $40. Finally, the two 
main Kurdish parties, the KDP and PUK, received bulk payments for distribution to 
their fighters, which were calculated on the basis of those groups’ estimates of their 
numbers and a similar stipend structure (these payments were stopped after two 
months because of a failure by the KDP and PUK to provide promised data on the 
personnel to whom they were distributing the money).109 
Stipends were initially paid at nine payment centers, but this proved to be too 
manpower-intensive, so payment was shifted to 159 bank locations. Payments were 
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also shifted from monthly to quarterly, with the Ministry of Finance authorizing the 
release of funds. Personnel arriving for payment were checked against a database of 
military personnel acquired by CPA. About 280,000 people were receiving regular 
payments by January 2004. Although the protests halted when the program was an-
nounced, some problems continued, as individuals complained of not receiving their 
pay and numerous efforts were made to cheat the system and receive multiple and/or 
unsanctioned payments. The program was criticized both in Iraq and abroad. Some 
Iraqi veterans complained about the payment system and about their lack of work or 
a means of providing for their families.110 The December 2003 ICG report claimed 
that “The humiliating treatment meted out to former soldiers and the absence of a 
plan to get them back to work on reconstruction and humanitarian tasks alienated a 
significant part of the population.”111 A Washington Times article even argued that 
the number of soldiers put out of work coupled with their disappointment over sti-
pend payments helped to fuel the growing insurgency against coalition forces.112 
The second criticism of the dissolution decision was that it underestimated the 
army’s importance as a symbol of Iraqi nationalism. Iraq’s military, created in 1921 
and the fourth largest in the world prior to the 1991 Gulf War, stood as a testimony 
to the country’s strength and perseverance.113 Following Bremer’s order to disband 
the army, protesting soldiers carried banners that read: “Dissolving the Iraqi army is a 
humiliation to the dignity of the nation.”114 IGC interviews with former soldiers and 
officers of the Iraqi military found that “a powerful mix of nationalism, humiliated 
pride and nostalgia (chiefly among the senior corps) for the old institutional benefits 
[of the army] is fueling anger against the decision to dismantle the army.”115 Dis-
banding the military, therefore, was interpreted by many as an attack on Iraqi iden-
tity, not as a means by which to purge the country of Saddam’s influences.116  
Designing a New Force 
The creation of a new structure for Iraq’s new armed forces was never in doubt, how-
ever. As early as April 2003, CENTCOM planners reportedly were discussing the 
recruitment and training of some former Saddam military personnel, brought on as 
individuals rather than units, to assist with internal security functions. The plan that 
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emerged for Iraq’s new force envisaged a three-division structure of about 12,000 
soldiers per division and a total force size of some 40,000 personnel. Such a force 
could, of course, change to reflect Iraq’s future needs, but this basic structure would 
constitute its initial core. The force would be defensive in nature and configured so 
as not to be perceived as aggressive by neighbors. Thus, it would have limited capac-
ity to project or sustain power away from bases. Its primary mission would be defen-
sive against external threats, although it, like any other nation’s military force, could 
be called upon to assist with internal security in a situation of extreme need. CPA 
staff initially planned to call this light, wheeled force without tanks or significant ar-
tillery the New Iraqi Corps (until it was determined that the acronym was unaccept-
able in Iraqi Arabic). After some debate about whether to build the force from the 
top down (that is, by recruiting senior leadership for all three divisions and the over 
structure, then building the remaining force), or bottom up (one unit at a time), the 
latter approach largely prevailed, driven in part by considering the potential dangers 
inherent in appointing senior Iraqi military leaders too early.117  
A concept for the force was developed in May and June of 2003, drawing 
somewhat on the experience of building the Afghan National Army, and presented to 
the Pentagon for approval in early June. The Coalition Military Assistance Training 
Team (CMATT) was created in early June, and Major General Paul Eaton was se-
lected to head this structure, which was to have responsibility for recruiting and 
training the military force. Eaton’s deputy was UK Brigadier General Jonathan Riley 
(who was succeeded by Nigel Aylwin-Foster). The staff would eventually grow to 
some 200 people, and included personnel from the United States, United Kingdom, 
Italy, Spain, Australia, and other coalition countries. A $48-million, one-year con-
tract to assist CMATT in the provision of trainers and other support was awarded to 
the Vinnell Corporation, a subsidiary of Northrop Grumman. Vinnell subcontracted 
the job of training the force to MPRI—a firm based in Alexandria, Virginia, that had 
helped build forces in Bosnia and Croatia.118 
Coalition leaders were adamant that they must forge a corps that balanced Iraq’s 
ethnic, religious, and regional makeup. Saddam’s regime had greatly favored Arab 
Sunnis in the officer corps while Shi’ites were compelled to serve as foot soldiers; coa-
lition personnel strongly believed that this bias had to be corrected in the new 
army.119 
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Building the New Force 
Recruiting began in July, with the establishment of a handful of recruiting stations in 
Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra, to start. In the Kurdish-dominated north, CPA and 
CMATT staff relied on local officials to identify personnel; throughout the rest of 
the country they relied on the recruiting centers and an advertisement campaign fea-
turing recruiting posters to bring in young men. By August 2, 1,000 people were un-
dergoing training. 
Initial plans for recruiting were based on assumptions that proved faulty. For 
example, CPA staff believed that military rank and Ba’ath Party membership were 
correlated and that people above the rank of colonel in the old Iraqi military were 
likely to have been high-level party members, disqualifying them from positions in 
public service, including in the new Iraqi armed forces. Later, when Iraqi personnel 
provided records of the old Iraqi military (records that had disappeared in the looting 
of government and military facilities but were used to develop the stipend payment 
lists), they learned that some lower-level military personnel were senior Ba’ath Party 
members and some high-level personnel, including general officers, were not party 
members at all.120 This realization resulted in a revision of some policies.121 
Nonetheless, the effort to build a new Iraqi military had little need of the large 
number of former generals in Iraq, a result of the top-heavy structure of the old 
army, or even of most former colonels, even if they had no Ba’ath affiliation. The 
new army was envisioned as free of the detritus of the old, with its thousands of gen-
erals and heavy rank inflation. Former colonels did not take well to being told that 
they might be given the rank of major in the new force. This was true not only of 
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officers in the old Saddam military, but also of personnel recruited from the militias 
that had fought Saddam, such as in the Kurdish areas. Generally speaking, CPA staff 
sought to recruit younger people, who, if they had military experience as officers, 
were not above the ranks of captain or major.122 
The initial salary for Iraqi recruits was $60 per month. Over time, salaries 
would be adjusted to rank and position.123 Coalition authorities worked to enlist pro-
spective soldiers from across Iraq’s ethnic and religious groups, seeking physically fit 
personnel between the ages of 18 to 40.124 In July 2003, Major General Eaton an-
nounced plans to have a 1,000-troop light mechanized infantry battalion formed and 
operational by October 2003, with an additional eight battalions ready by the end of 
2004.125 
The new Iraqi army was officially called into being on August 7, 2003, via CPA 
Order Number 22.126 The first recruits reflected coalition aims of creating a new 
army that represented Iraq’s ethnic and religious diversity: 60 percent were Shi’ites, 
25 percent Sunnis, 10 percent Kurds, and 5 percent from other minority groups; 75 
percent of the soldiers came from Saddam’s former army.127 An effort was made to 
ensure a similar ethnic mix down to the smallest unit levels, insofar as possible.128 
The first battalion, which graduated in the fall of 2003, comprised 700 recruits: 65 
officers, 230 noncommissioned officers, and 405 soldiers.129 The second battalion 
graduated on January 6, 2004, Iraq’s national holiday to celebrate the army.130 In 
Jordan, the first batch of 560 Iraqi army officers began their three-month training 
course in 2004.131 In April 2004, ground was broken for a new Iraqi army training 
base outside of Kirkuk.132 
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Changing Goals and Parameters 
Planning for the Iraqi armed forces would continue to evolve throughout CPA’s ten-
ure. Following a series of bomb attacks in August—including attacks on the Jorda-
nian embassy, the UN headquarters, and the main Shi’ite mosque in Najaf—and 
growing attacks against coalition forces, the Pentagon announced plans to speed up 
the deployment of Iraqi forces by cutting training time by two and a half weeks.133 
Slocombe announced that the Pentagon’s new goal was to have 27 battalions ready 
within 12 months, which was twice as fast as the initial deployment plan envis-
aged.134 Moreover, an air force and a coastal defense force contingent were added to 
the planned-for Iraqi force structure.135 The latter two services were included to en-
sure that Iraq would have a full complement of capabilities, albeit on a small scale for 
air and naval components. 
In addition, the Iraqi Counterterrorism Force, a small (envisioned at 200 per-
sonnel), rapidly deployable special operations structure, was assigned to the Iraqi 
armed forces per CPA Order Number 67 (which created the Ministry of Defense).136 
The force had initially been designed with this capability included in the new struc-
ture, but in spring 2004 there had been some discussion within CPA and CJTF-7 
regarding the appropriateness of a requirement to include counterterrorism forces 
within the externally focused Iraqi armed forces. 
Debates over the future of Iraq’s new army intensified when the first battalion 
of new recruits graduated on October 4, 2003, and the recruits began to desert in 
large numbers. By the beginning of December, soldiers reporting for duty had 
dropped from 694 to 455.137 The desertion rate was blamed on the low salaries paid, 
particularly in comparison to other security forces; army soldiers earned between $60 
and $180 a month relative to other forces such as the police and ICDC, which 
earned $10 to $40 a month more.138 Another factor may have been the lack of a clear 
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mission for these forces.139 To combat desertion, coalition forces began offering the 
newly trained forces an additional $72 a month for hazardous duty.140 
The effort to build a new Iraqi military continued. In March 2004, a Pentagon 
decision transferred the CMATT operation from the CPA chain of command to 
CJTF-7, at the same time assigning to it the police training that had previously also 
been under CPA (as discussed above). This changed little in the overall approach to 
training and policy for the Iraqi military, although it did create some confusion over 
reporting chains, because the Iraqi military forces were to be placed under the civilian 
control of the Defense Ministry, which was still the responsibility of CPA.  
As the end of CPA’s existence neared, the appointment of senior-level military 
personnel took on new importance. CPA and CMATT staff interviewed large num-
bers of former military, civilian, and other Iraqi personnel, seeking to identify who 
could serve in the highest positions of the new Iraqi armed forces, as was done in 
identifying senior leadership for the MoD. Personnel were identified through a wide 
variety of methods, including recommendation by IGC members and other Iraqis, 
through CPA and CMATT contacts, and so forth. Personnel were vetted against 
available information in Iraq and in coalition capitals, including through the IGC 
Security Committee, although the process of collecting this information was never 
perfected. In mid-April 2004, General Amer Bakr al-Hashimi was named chief of 
staff of the Iraqi armed forces and Kurdish General Babaker Zebari was named senior 
military advisor to the Defense Minister. Other senior military personnel, such as 
division commanders and the air force’s commanding general, were also named prior 
to the transfer of power.  
Success or Failure? 
Amid concerns about the growing number of attacks against coalition forces and 
Iraqis in the fall of 2003, several U.S. military officials and members of Congress 
proposed calling up the former army as a means of providing better security and in-
telligence, particularly logistical support units and mid-level officers that were not in 
Saddam’s inner circle.141 Some in the IGC also reportedly began to question the 
complete dissolution of the former military and called for the reconstitution of cer-
tain elements of the Saddam-era army.142 CPA rejected this proposal, with Slocombe 
arguing that “Given our objective of replacing Hussein’s regime and not just its 
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leader, it would have been a mistake, I think, to try and convert an army that was a 
principal tool of his oppressive system into the armed guardian of a new democ-
racy.”143 Nonetheless, officials in Washington and Baghdad continued to press for 
the recall of former Iraqi troops.144 
Although the first two battalions to graduate from training were deployed in 
early 2004, the new Iraqi army was not asked to fight until the first coalition-led Fal-
lujah offensive in April that followed the brutal murder and mutilation of four U.S. 
private contractors in late March. In an effort to ensure a visible Iraqi role in the 
military operation, the Iraqi army’s Second Battalion was to be deployed to Fallujah 
to help U.S. Marines conduct the offensive (ICDC and police units also partici-
pated). However, the battalion came under fire while transiting a Shi’ite neighbor-
hood in Baghdad and refused to continue on. A later effort to airlift them to Fallujah 
was aborted because of continued refusal by battalion personnel to proceed.145 The 
Iraqi police and military that fought during the Fallujah offensive were not as reliable 
as the United States had hoped. Major General Martin Dempsey estimated that 
“about 50 percent of the security forces that we’ve built over the past year stood tall 
and firm . . . About 40 percent walked off the job because they were intimidated. 
And about 10 percent actually worked against us.”146 
The experience of using Iraqi armed forces units in Fallujah highlighted the 
critical issue of employing Iraqi armed forces internally. As discussed above, this was 
a difficult historical issue in Iraq, and it also raised questions about the appropriate 
role of military forces in a democracy. The training for Iraqi military forces had also, 
prior to April, been geared primarily to an external threat. In spring 2004, more 
counterinsurgency-type training was added to the program.147 
Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) 
The ICDC developed from the need for coalition commanders to identify Iraqis who 
could perform a range of functions, including static defense and human intelligence 
collection, and to have Iraqis alongside them on patrols. It is not entirely clear 
whether the ICDC evolved from the rather spontaneous initiatives of individual 
commanders to hire and train Iraqis to help them, or whether it was a top-down ini-
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tiative directed by CENTCOM. Regardless, the concept was fully developed by the 
commanders working through CJTF-7 and CENTCOM, and it was presented to 
CPA and Pentagon officials in the summer of 2003. The CPA’s national security 
leadership found the concept acceptable as long as it was not viewed as an alternative 
to the Iraqi armed forces as a whole. The ICDC, after all, would be minimally 
trained and developed fundamentally as a support force, unable to operate independ-
ently. In many ways, that made it possible to begin to employ a sizeable number of 
former Iraqi military personnel (as well as some members of former anti-Saddam mi-
litia structures) while carrying out the slower, more deliberate process of building the 
new Iraqi armed forces.148 
The initial concept for the ICDC envisaged very small, platoon-size units 
equipped only with uniforms, boots, and a weapon. They would be locally based and 
thus needed no housing (they could live in their homes) or other support. Com-
manders funded the ICDC out of CERP funds. The level of training for ICDC 
forces, as well as their duties, varied widely, depending on the coalition forces they 
were attached to. Over time, however, both the responsibilities and the requirements 
of the ICDC as a whole grew. Although it remained a support force for the coalition, 
it grew to company-sized units that provided linguists, intelligence, fixed-site secu-
rity, drivers, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, patrols, convoys, cordons, check 
points, and security for coalition forces. In making it possible to put an Iraqi face on 
operations, through joint patrols and so forth, the ICDC provided a valuable asset 
for coalition forces. Funding allocated to the force by Congress enabled the provision 
of helmets, armor, and vehicles, transforming these units into something resembling 
a wheeled infantry.149 The ICDC was formalized by CPA Order Number 28, signed 
on September 3, 2003.150 
The ICDC structure grew as well. Initially envisioned as perhaps one battalion 
for each subordinate command, for a total of five, it was later decided to build 18 
battalions, one for each governorate, and finally 36.151 The 36th Battalion itself was a 
unique structure, made up of personnel representing various anti-Saddam militias. As 
such, they were more experienced, better trained, and far more capable than other 
ICDC forces (or, perhaps, many other Iraqi security forces). Initially a response to 
the political representatives of the groups that had sponsored those militias, the 36th 
Battalion of the ICDC would prove a crucial unit for the Iraqi armed forces. 
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The numbers grew alongside the structure: at the time of its creation, the Pen-
tagon reported that the ICDC had reached 2,300 troops with plans for a rapid in-
crease in its numbers over the coming months.152 By the end of September, DoD 
announced that the number would likely increase to 9,000.153 By mid-February 
2004, more than 25,000 troops had been hired and trained, with another 3,600 in 
training.154 The projected number of ICDC members at the time of the June 2004 
handover was set at 40,000.155 
The future of the ICDC was a policy concern almost from its inception. Cre-
ated as a temporary force assigned to coalition units, it had no Iraqi government 
structure to which it was responsible, and CPA, Pentagon, CENTCOM, and IGC 
officials debated how long the force would last, what it would transition into (a na-
tional guard, a gendarmerie, or a military reserve were among the options discussed), 
and which ministry (Interior or Defense) it would report to. Eventually, consensus 
was reached that the force should fall under the Ministry of Defense, and this was 
reflected in CPA Order Number 67, creating the ministry, and CPA Order Number 
73, transferring the ICDC to it.156 The decision about the ICDC’s final role was left 
to the Iraqi Interim Government that would take over upon the dissolution of CPA. 
Unlike the Army forces, the ICDC faced military action to varying extents from 
its inception. Although quality and training varied, the Washington Post reported that 
these forces became the most respected troops in certain areas, particularly in the 
Shi’ite neighborhoods of Baghdad.157 In certain regions, however, ICDC troops ex-
pressed fears of becoming too closely associated with occupation forces and thus a 
target of insurgents; this was particularly true in the Sunni Triangle.158 In the early 
April offensive in Fallujah, as well as Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army attacks 
throughout the country at the same time, some ICDC units fought bravely, while 
others deserted or disappeared. Some ICDC checkpoints posted photographs of 
Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq Sadr, Moqtada al-Sadr’s father, although it was 
not clear whether this was done in an effort to ward off attacks by the Mahdi Army 
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158 Jason Keysor, “U.S. Trained Civil Defense Corps Has Started to Show Some Cracks,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 
January 4, 2004; Anthony Shadid, “Iraqi Security Forces Torn Between Loyalties,” Washington Post, November 
25, 2003. 
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or in support of it. The effort to use the 36th Battalion in Fallujah led to accusations 
that the coalition forces had sent Kurds to fight Arabs (an accusation strengthened by 
desertions from the unit at that time, increasing the Kurdish component of its ethnic 
mix).159 In all, the ICDC performance in this crisis was mixed and, as with the armed 
forces as a whole, it raised questions about the effectiveness and reliability of the new 
Iraqi forces. 
Intelligence 
At the inception of the CPA, U.S. officials assigned to it believed that the question of 
an Iraqi intelligence structure and agency was best left to a future Iraqi government. 
Iraq’s history of government oppression, in which the intelligence agency played a 
key role, made CPA staff think that Iraqis would establish an intelligence agency 
when they were ready to do so and that it was not CPA’s role to create one for them. 
It was clear that an intelligence agency was being built, largely with the assistance of 
the CIA, and if any CPA office was to oversee that effort, it would have to be the Of-
fice of National Security Affairs. Moreover, as MoD and MoI structures developed 
and the scope of the insurgency and counterterror challenge to Iraq became clear, it 
also became necessary to consider which intelligence structures should be embedded 
in those ministries as well. Finally, because the ICDC also played a role in intelli-
gence collection, and because the 1st Armored Division had created an Iraqi intelli-
gence cell, called the Collection, Management, and Analysis Directorate (CMAD) to 
support CJTF-7 intelligence efforts,160 the question of how these structures would 
function in Iraq’s new government had to be considered.161 
The concept for an Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) was first briefed at 
CPA in November 2003. Efforts at that time to create a coordinating structure 
within CPA to oversee the development of this service were stillborn. Although Wal-
ter Slocombe did successfully argue that his office should have a role in the process, 
the nature of that role was unclear. The arrival of David Gompert in December as 
senior advisor for National Security Affairs energized the effort to ensure that CPA 
played a role in the development of policy for the INIS. 
____________ 
159 Tony Perry, “At Least One Iraqi Battalion Is Ready to Help U.S.,” Los Angeles Times, April 13, 2004; Debo-
rah Horan, “U.S. Scales Back Hopes for Iraqi Security Forces,” Chicago Tribune, April 22, 2004; Conversations 
with CJTF-7 personnel, April 2004. 
160 CMAD was made up of personnel representing the same parties that had contributed to the 36th Battalion of 
the ICDC. Major General Martin E. Dempsey, Commander, 1st Armored Division, “Coalition Provisional 
Authority Briefing,” March 18, 2004. As of February 2008: 
http://globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2004/03/mil-040318-dod01.htm 
161 Interviews with CPA officials, August 2004. 
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The INIS structure that emerged was that of a collection and analysis agency 
with a domestic focus, without a foreign collection capacity, and with no authority to 
arrest or detain. Although some former members of Iraqi intelligence services would 
initially be hired as INIS staff, the IGC’s Security Committee, which met to review 
the draft charter for the INIS, was assured by CPA that such hires would be mini-
mized to the extent possible and that the involvement of former Iraqi intelligence 
personnel would decrease over time. On April 1, 2004, CPA Order Number 69 
authorized the IGC to create the INIS by issuing a charter for that organization.162 
Mohammed Abdullah Mohammed al-Shehwani, an ethnic Turkoman who had lost 
two sons to Saddam’s regime, was named interim director general of the INIS on 
April 4, 2004. 
The INIS was also to be the “first among equals” as the coordinating body for 
Iraqi intelligence as a whole. The CPA order creating the Defense Ministry includes 
its defense intelligence analysis role.163 MoD intelligence was created as part of a di-
rectorate of communications and intelligence; it was to have an external, rather than 
domestic, purview and an analytic role. This, of course, raised the question of 
whence such an analytical body would receive the information it was to analyze, be-
cause the INIS had no foreign collection role and the MoD had no collection role at 
all. This issue remained unresolved at the time of CPA’s dissolution, as did the ques-
tion of the status of Iraqis involved in intelligence collection for the coalition.164 
MoI’s intelligence functions as envisioned by CPA advisors were to focus on 
criminal intelligence and, insofar as needed to support MoI’s counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency roles, on those issues as well. Also, as discussed above, CPA staff 
advised that MoI develop a Special Branch-type structure to work with the INIS to 
ensure that INIS information could be acted on as necessary. At the time of CPA’s 
dissolution, little or no progress had been made in establishing any of these entities, 
stemming primarily from resource constraints but also from bureaucratic incapacity 
and confusion about roles and missions by both the Iraqis and CPA personnel.165 
National Security Decisionmaking Structures 
Within CPA, the Office of National Security Affairs took it upon itself to ensure co-
ordination of security policy between its own staff, MoI advisors, CJTF-7 personnel, 
____________ 
162 CPA Order Number 69 was the delegation of authority and Annex A to Order Number 69 the charter. 
http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/#Orders 
163 CPA Order Number 67.  
http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/#Orders 
164 See footnote 162. 
165 See footnote 162. 
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and others at CPA with an interest or involvement in these issues. Regular meetings 
at senior and working levels helped facilitate the sharing of information, although the 
structures for doing so remained imperfect (see Chapter Eight for a discussion of co-
ordination within CPA and between CPA and CJTF-7). As the security structures of 
the Iraqi government developed, it was clear that mechanisms of coordination among 
them would be needed as well. 
In March 2004, Ambassador Bremer convened the Ministerial Committee for 
National Security (MCNS). This committee included the ministers of Defense, Jus-
tice, Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Finance (in the case of the Defense Ministry, the 
minister had not yet been named, and its secretary general attended the initial meet-
ings); it was chaired by Ambassador Bremer, as the head of government (it would be 
chaired by the prime minister once one was named). The group met several times 
before being formally established by CPA Order Number 68 on April 4, 2004.166 In 
addition to the head of government and the ministers listed, MCNS meetings were 
also attended by the senior military advisor to the government of Iraq, the director 
general of the INIS, and Iraq’s national security advisor. In accordance with the CPA 
order, the commander of the Multinational Force-Iraq could also be invited to par-
ticipate, and the CJTF-7 commander, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, sat in on 
the meetings in the spring of 2004. Other ministers could be invited to participate as 
relevant, and this, too, was done in several of the initial meetings of this body. 
The MCNS role, as defined by the CPA order, is “to facilitate and coordinate 
national security policy among the Ministries and agencies of the Iraqi government 
tasked with national security issues” and to serve as the “primary forum for Ministe-
rial-level decisionmaking on these issues.” To support the government and the 
MCNS, the Office of the National Security Advisor was established to serve as the 
primary advisor to the head of government and the MCNS on national security is-
sues and to manage and supervise the National Security Advisory Staff. As such, the 
national security advisor has two roles: to provide balanced, impartial advice to the 
head of government and the MCNS, and to facilitate interagency coordination both 
in preparation for meetings of the MCNS and more broadly. IGC member Mowfaq 
al-Rubaie was named interim national security advisor on April 9, 2004. 
The establishment of these structures in the spring of 2004 had an almost im-
mediate effect in one critical sense. Regular meetings between Ambassador Bremer, 
General Sanchez, and the men who had been named to senior ministerial and agency 
posts resulted in freer, more direct communications than were possible through the 
IGC, and a number of frank exchanges of views took place, particularly as the secu-
rity situation turned dire in early April. Through the MCNS, officials of the Iraqi 
____________ 
166 As of October 2007: 
http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/#Orders 
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Interim Government could participate in decisions made about the security of their 
country in an immediate way and to affect the choices made by CPA and CJTF-7. 
Iraqi Armed Forces and the Handover of Power 
Coalition plans for military actions following the handover of power to an interim 
Iraqi government, scheduled for the end of June 2004, had to address the question of 
how Iraqi forces would be used. Critical questions in this regard pertained to which 
forces would be assigned to the MNF-I, what authorities the Iraqi government would 
have to direct those forces, and how those forces would interact with coalition troops.  
CJTF-7 planning expected that Iraqi units would operate as other members of 
the coalition did. They would have their own rules of engagement, and they would 
be free not to participate in certain operations deemed outside the scope of those 
rules. However, this left open the question of internal use of the Iraqi army, which 
had been highlighted by efforts to use Iraqi army personnel in Fallujah; it raised 
questions about the relationship between the MNF-I and the Ministry of Interior 
troops, which ostensibly had responsibility for internal security; and it left open the 
issue of intelligence sharing with Iraqi forces and personnel.  
The structure that evolved reflected the leading role of MoI in Iraqi security. 
MNF-I would operate in support of MoI forces; it would work and coordinate with 
them to the fullest extent possible. The small size and slow training schedule of Iraqi 
army forces also helped postpone the question of their use. ICDC forces could con-
tinue to operate alongside coalition forces much as they had before. Other MOD 
forces could be assigned as necessary over time. They would continue to belong to 
the Defense Ministry, but they would be assigned to the MNF-I just as other coun-
try’s forces were. Thus, Iraq would be contributing units to the coalition force re-
sponsible for ensuring its security and sovereignty. 
The intelligence question raised a knotty issue. Intelligence sharing with alliance 
partners already presented a variety of problems, including logistical difficulties in 
passing classified information, problems related to specific classifications used as a 
matter of course (such as NOFORN, which prevents U.S. personnel from providing 
the material to a national of any other nation), and technical problems created by 
two classified computer networks: one U.S. and one coalition. With Iraq as part of 
the coalition, the problems would be exacerbated. Iraq had yet to establish security 
clearance procedures or security classifications, a necessary first step to developing 
intelligence-sharing mechanisms. Moreover, it was likely that other coalition forces 
would have information that they wished to share with one another but not with the 
Iraqis. This was the case with other countries already, of course, but given the size 
and scope of Iraq’s contribution to the coalition, it was likely to cause problems. 
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Integrating the Armed Forces and Militias Not Under Government 
Control 
One of the most critical questions that faced coalition personnel was the question of 
how to handle the several militias that had fought against Saddam.167 These included 
an estimated 70,000 peshmerga Kurdish forces in the North, several Shi’ite militias 
in the South, and a few secular, Sunni, and other groups throughout the country. 
These militias needed to be either disbanded or somehow brought under the control 
of the newly emerging government in order for Iraq to be a viable country.168 
Some thought was given to this challenging task in the first nine months of 
CPA’s existence, but concerted efforts to address it did not begin until February 
2004. During the first nine months, arrangements had been made that gave various 
groups quasi-official security roles. The peshmerga of the KDP and PUK, for exam-
ple, continued to play a role akin to a Kurdish national guard, as authorized under 
Kurdistan regional government law. This led other groups to resist initiatives to dis-
band or transition their militias and to oppose or thwart reintegration processes. Fur-
thermore, a distinction was made early on between those groups that were willing to 
work inside the political process and those that chose to fight the coalition and the 
new Iraq. This section focuses on those who were willing to work with the govern-
ment. 
The CPA effectively enfranchised several political parties whose sponsors prior 
to OIF (and in some cases afterward as well) covered a wide ideological spectrum. So, 
for example, the Iraqi Communist Party and various Shi’ite parties sponsored by Iran 
were included in the IGC; they came to see their futures as part of the political proc-
ess rather than as resistance groups fighting the coalition. However, this perception 
did not apply to all of the political parties that had resisted Saddam and maintained 
militias or armed forces that would be needed. Others, such as Moqtada al-Sadr, 
could have been made part of the political process but were not. For those who did 
participate in the process, continuing to do so was more attractive than reverting to 
armed resistance. Such participation was instrumental in the success of efforts to dis-
band the militias. 
A critical step in facilitating the transition and reintegration of armed forces and 
militias was the adoption of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) on March 8, 
____________ 
167 The distinction between “armed forces not under government control” and “militias” is both real and politi-
cally important. There was a spectrum of armed forces in Iraq that varied in terms of professionalism and capa-
bilities. By March 2003, at the beginning of OIF, the KDP and PUK had developed what amounted to profes-
sional armies, of which they were justly proud. The Badr Corps, operating out of Iran, had also developed a 
professional organization, though not organized and operated as an army. Other groups possessed paramilitary 
organizations with various levels of training and professionalism, none of which were standing, full-time organiza-
tions. 
168 This point is echoed in International Crisis Group, “Iraq: Building a New Security Structure,” p. i, and in 
Tyler, “U.S.-British Project: To Build a Postwar Iraqi Armed Force of 40,000 Soldiers in 3 Years.” 
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2004. According to the TAL, once it entered into effect, all armed forces and militias 
not under federal control would be illegal, except as provided by law. CPA Order 
Number 91 put this provision into effect prior to the effective date of the TAL and 
defined in greater detail a transition and reintegration program to disband illegal or-
ganizations. It also stipulated penalties for those groups or individuals who failed to 
disband. 
CPA Order Number 91 sought to strike a balance between recognizing the con-
tributions and sacrifices of those who fought against Saddam and the need to elimi-
nate the potential security problem created by armed organizations not under gov-
ernment control. It also laid the legal foundation for creating transition and 
reintegration plans for (and with) the various armed forces and militia leaders. These 
plans were created for three reasons: to facilitate bringing former fighters into the 
Iraqi security forces as individuals; to provide pensions for those qualified; and to 
provide education, job training, and job placement services that would enable them 
to pursue other employment. The plans also established timelines for this to happen 
and for each of the armed groups to draw down as its members moved into one of 
the three tracks. Militia personnel undergoing this process would be legally registered 
and, thus, covered by federal law during the reintegration process. Those that were 
not would be illegal and were subject to legal sanction. 
The process of negotiating these agreements and finding mechanisms to inte-
grate militia members into Iraqi security services proved challenging. Senior members 
of several militias assumed senior positions in the government or the Iraqi security 
forces. Some militia members joined the ICDC and the Iraqi armed forces. The 
ICDC’s 36th Battalion and MoD’s Iraqi Counter Terrorism Forces (ICTF) also in-
cluded representatives from former militia members, but a great many remained to 
be integrated at the time CPA was dissolved. 
A flurry of negotiating activity in the spring of 2004 resulted in agreement with 
nine key parties to disband their militias, including the KDP, the PUK, and the 
SCIRI Party’s Badr Corps (which was renamed the Badr Organization after Saddam 
was overthrown). The others that agreed to transition and reintegration programs 
were the Iraqi Communist Party, one of the oldest and largest groups that remained 
in Iraq during Saddam’s reign; the Iraqi National Accord, the party and militia of 
interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi; the Da’wa Party of Ibrahim al-Jaafari;169 the 
Iraqi National Congress of Ahmed Chalabi; Iraqi Hezballah, led by Abu Hatem;170 
____________ 
169 There are several Da’wa parties. Jaafari’s is one of the largest and most influential. A second Da’wa party ap-
proached CPA and the Iraqi Interim Government to express interest in disbanding its militia as well. 
170 Abu Hatem’s given name is Abdul Karim Muhamadawai. The Iraqi Hezballah party is not related to the 
Lebanese terror organization that uses the same name. Hezballah, perhaps more properly written as Hezb Allah, 
means “Party of God” and so is a common name for political movements in the Middle East. 
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and the Iraqi Islamic Party, the only religious Sunni group to have reached a transi-
tion agreement.  
It is worth noting in this context that even as CPA and CJTF-7 worked to 
eliminate existing militias, short-term requirements led to the creation of at least one 
new one.171 The decision by military commanders on the ground to create a local 
“Fallujah Brigade” composed of local fighters trying to keep order in a city that coali-
tion forces and their Iraqi comrades had continuously failed to pacify, set a strange 
precedent. This brigade represented a structure that stood outside of the Iraqi armed 
forces, composed in part of personnel who had fought the coalition. Coalition mili-
tary commanders gave the brigade control of the city and withdrew U.S. Marines to 
the city’s outskirts.172 After the brigade had spent nearly two months managing the 
city’s security, a U.S. Marine officer questioned the success of the strategy, noting 
that those responsible for killing and mutilating U.S. contractors in March had still 
not been apprehended and the insurgents’ heavy weapons had not yet been confis-
cated.173 Certainly, this brigade sent a conflicting signal to those Iraqis who had 
joined or were urged to join the formal structures of Iraq’s security forces, including 
those representing the anti-Saddam militias. By the time of the June 2004 handover 
of power, coalition forces had not disbanded the Fallujah Brigade. 
Concluding Observations 
CPA and CJTF-7 faced a tremendous challenge in their efforts to simultaneously 
govern Iraq, improve its security situation, and build security forces and institutions 
for it. Assisting in the development of a country’s military and police in a period of 
peace is difficult enough. In Iraq, there was no such luxury: there was no peace. As a 
result, tradeoffs had to be made between hiring police to patrol the streets and ensur-
ing that the police on the streets were well trained; between ensuring an appropriate 
leading role for the MoI in internal security and recognizing the low level of training 
and readiness of MoI forces; between finding people to fill high-level positions prior 
to the transition of power and making sure that the most qualified and most accept-
able people took on those posts. 
CPA and CJTF-7 also had to do all of this without much preparation. Planning 
assumptions had not anticipated either the deterioration of Iraq’s infrastructure or a 
difficult security environment. The decision to dismantle the Defense Ministry and 
____________ 
171 The Fallujah Brigade is a different type of militia than those for which the transition and reintegration pro-
gram was created. As such, its dissolution would not fall under the legal structures set up to take care of those 
militias that fought against Saddam. 
172 Gregg Zoroya, “Falluja Brigade Tries U.S. Patience,” USA Today, June 14, 2004. 
173 Zoroya, “Falluja Brigade Tries U.S. Patience.” 
Building New Iraqi Security Forces    157 
the Iraqi armed forces may or may not have been the only one possible, but the ab-
sence of any structures in those areas created a variety of additional tasks and chal-
lenges for those who had to build new institutions to replace the old. They had to 
take action in an environment of limited information, and with limited resources. 
That the development of security forces and structures lagged behind the initial 
(and evolving) plans for them is therefore not surprising. That training programs 
were not fully effective, and that forces proved less than reliable when called on to 
fight also reflects a variety of understandable factors. That said, some responsibility 
must be laid at the feet of those whose job it was to plan and develop these struc-
tures, both in the coalition capitals and in Baghdad. The failure to recognize the 
critical importance of police forces from the very beginning, as well as to resource 
adequately the effort to build police forces, was a key reason for the many problems 
faced by MoI throughout the occupation and since.  
Other oversights include the failure to recognize the need for effective intelli-
gence structures, as well as a means to integrate them, from an early date. The hope 
that intelligence could be avoided was remarkably optimistic given Iraq’s security en-
vironment even before the scope of the insurgency became clear. As internal unrest 
developed, the need for intelligence collection and analysis capacity within Iraqi secu-
rity structures, particularly the MoI, grew. The failure to recognize this need and to 
act upon it early and effectively is an indictment of the planners, funders, and execu-
tors of this effort. 
New Iraqi military forces initially were built in a more benevolent context. 
With little expectation that these troops would be called on to serve immediately (as 
was the case with police), there was time to recruit and train, it seemed, as well as to 
ensure an adequate ethnic mix. Table 9.4 summarizes the various Iraqi security forces 
that were established during the occupation period. However, insufficient attention 
was paid to the potential problems inherent in sending Iraqi military forces, built and 
trained for an external defense role, to fight in their own cities. Moreover, while coa-
lition officials sought to ensure that both sectarian and ethnic groups were repre-
sented in the armed forces, little attention was paid centrally to ensuring that such 
personnel got along sufficiently well to fight together. The effort to promote recon-
ciliation was left to the discretion of individual trainers.  
The tradeoffs between short-term goals and long-term goals were everywhere. 
The ICDC responded to an immediate need, but raised the question of what to do 
with a huge force incapable of independent action and dependent on coalition per-
sonnel. Excellent plans for much-needed structures, such as high-end MoI capabili-
ties, were drafted but never implemented, as Iraqi and U.S. personnel struggled to 
respond to the emergency of the day.  
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Table 9.4 















85,000 92,000 Maintain domestic 
order, fight crime 
Eight weeks for new 
recruits, three weeks for 





74,000 74,000 Guard public buildings, 
warehouses, embassies 
and infrastructure 
Three-day basic training, 
specialized training for 
oil, electric, and diplomat 
guarding 
Interior 
Border Police 25,000 17,000 Maintain flow of 
people and goods over 
borders 
IPS eight-week training 





270 51 Counterterrorism, 
counterinsurgency  
Seven-week training 
program plus variety of 





4,800 0 Public order Police training plus 
specialized training 
Interior 
ICDC 40,000 25,000 Domestic disturbances, 
natural disaster relief 
Three weeks Defense 
Armed forces 40,000 7,000 Defend Iraqi 
sovereignty 
Six to nine weeks Defense 
a Data from Anthony H. Cordesman, “Inexcusable Failure: Progress in Training the Iraqi Army and Security 
Forces as of Mid-July 2004,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 20, 2004. Dates for data 
not clear. 
It would be easy to say that the lesson of security sector institution building in 
Iraq is that security forces cannot be built in an environment where security is not 
present. In any post-conflict nation-building situation, however, security will, to 
varying extents, be a problem. So perhaps the lesson is rather that we must learn how 
to build such structures and institutions under abysmal conditions—and how to im-
prove the security situation, relying more on our own forces and assets when neces-
sary, as we do so. The United States and the broader international community have 
accumulated a good deal of experience on these issues over the years, much of which 
was ignored during the early months in Iraq. 
In the short term, Iraq’s success or failure is a matter of just holding on. In the 
long term, it is a question of being able to stand on its own to defend itself against 
threats from within and without. The occupation provided the opportunity to lay the 
groundwork for this capacity. To some extent, this was done, albeit imperfectly. 
How well it holds up, and what is built on this foundation, will be the measure of 
success—both of coalition efforts, and of the new Iraq.  
159 
CHAPTER TEN 
Governance and Political Reconstruction 
This chapter addresses governance issues in Iraq before, during, and after major 
combat operations. It starts by examining prewar planning for postwar governance. It 
then assesses each of the major national developments during the occupation period: 
the formation of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), the November 15 agreement 
and the transfer of authority, and the adoption of the Transitional Administrative 
Law (TAL). The chapter also examines governance efforts at the provincial and city 
levels, and concludes with several lessons learned about establishing governance struc-
tures in the aftermath of major combat.  
Prewar Planning for Postwar Governance  
Prior to the beginning of combat operations on March 19, 2003, U.S. government 
planning for political transition relied primarily on Iraqi exiles to run the country 
after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Media reports suggest that several Iraqi exiles lob-
bied Congress and the White House years before the commencement of combat op-
erations in Iraq and that certain individuals had developed influential relationships 
with different branches and agencies in the U.S. government.1  
In the months leading up to war, the White House took measures aimed at in-
cluding Iraqi exiles in both the political and military aspects of the war with Saddam 
Hussein. In October 2002, President Bush allocated $92 million to train Iraqi exile 
militias to aid in toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime. This initiative was an addition 
to the 1998 Iraqi Liberation Act, which allocated $98 million for training Iraqi exiles 
but was restricted to nonlethal means.2 The Washington Post reported that even 
____________ 
1 For example, the Washington Post reports that Ahmed Chalabi, head of the Iraqi National Congress, lobbied 
“the Bush administration to go to war to topple Hussein.” See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Exile Finds Ties to U.S. a 
Boon and a Barrier,” Washington Post, April 27, 2003. 
2 See DeYoung and Williams, “Training of Iraqi Exiles Authorized”; Daniel Williams, “U.S. Army to Train 
1,000 Iraqi Exiles,” Washington Post, December 18, 2002; and Daniel Williams, “Iraqi Exiles Mass for Training,” 
Washington Post, February 1, 2003. 
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though six Iraqi exile groups were named as recipients of U.S. funding and training, 
Ahmed Chalabi’s INC essentially drafted the list of volunteers from within his orga-
nization and received the lion’s share of training and equipment; a reported 5,000 
exiles were trained in all.3 
Inside Iraq, the U.S. government began working with several Kurdish leaders 
and their organizations prior to combat operations. Jane’s Defence Weekly reported in 
March 2003 that CIA operatives were active in the U.S. and UK air-patrolled north-
ern section of Iraq, training fighters and “buying loyalty” of Kurdish politicians.4 
Two Kurdish organizations in particular, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) 
and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), received U.S. aid and military training 
under the October 2002 presidential directive. The U.S. government also attempted 
to work with Shi’ites in the southern portion of the country, mainly by encouraging 
members of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) to rally 
volunteers for its prewar U.S. Army training program. SCIRI, however, boycotted 
the program on the grounds that the U.S. government favored Chalabi and the 
INC.5 
Thus prewar planning for postwar governance following Saddam Hussein’s fall 
concentrated on the role of key Iraqi exiles and Kurds in the north to assume control 
of the government’s infrastructure and pave the way for democratic transition. This 
strategy rested on the assumption that the population would accept exiles as legiti-
mate leaders, Iraq’s governmental infrastructure would be easily transferred to new 
leadership, and overall political transformation would be rapid and relatively easy. 
Postwar Governance: The Iraqi Governing Council 
During major combat operations, the U.S. government continued to rely primarily 
on Iraqi exiles to fill the political vacuum in a post-Saddam government. As retired 
Lieutenant General Jay Garner’s Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assis-
tance (ORHA) staff prepared to move from Kuwait to Baghdad, Iraqi exiles also 
made plans to move into the capital. Media sources reported that the U.S. govern-
ment stepped up its efforts to recruit Iraqi exiles after the commencement of combat 
operations and that, as before the war, Chalabi and the INC were receiving the lion’s 
share of attention and resources.6 The prominence of Chalabi and the INC is re-
ported to have exacerbated tensions between the U.S. Defense and State depart-
____________ 
3 DeYoung and Williams, “Training of Iraqi Exiles Authorized”; Williams, “Iraqi Exiles Mass for Training.” 
4 Andrew Koch, “U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Forces: Covert Warriors,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 12, 
2003. 
5 Williams, “U.S. Army to Train 1,000 Iraqi Exiles.” 
6 Peter Slevin, “U.S. Wary in Choosing Iraq’s New Leadership,” Washington Post, March 23, 2003. 
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ments, the latter of which feared that Chalabi would attempt to step into Iraq’s 
power vacuum independently of U.S. governance.7 Nevertheless, in early April—days 
before the fall of Baghdad—U.S. forces airlifted Chalabi and a reported 600 of his 
Free Iraqi Fighters into the southern city of Nasiriya.8 Other exile groups were not 
given this assistance, a point of contention that surfaced as U.S. forces began to work 
with Iraqis in the postwar phase. 
As U.S. troops moved into Baghdad, the city quickly fell into a state of anarchy. 
Angry citizens stormed through Baghdad’s neighborhoods, looting and destroying 
buildings associated with Saddam’s rule. The destruction caused by weeks of lawless-
ness in the city created several problems for political transition. First, looters took 
property that was essential infrastructure for running a government, including com-
puters, phones, copy machines, and even desks and chairs. These items needed to be 
replaced before ministries could function again. Second, many government buildings 
were burned or demolished, destroying important documents necessary for running 
the government. Third, the sense of lawlessness had a negative psychological impact 
on the city, which made coalition forces’ efforts to gain the public’s trust more diffi-
cult.9 All these factors hindered the development of national governance structures. 
Prior to major combat operations, several key leaders and political parties ex-
isted both in the diaspora and within Iraq. Within weeks of Saddam’s fall, many po-
litical groups sprang up with various designs for a postwar Iraqi government. One 
media source estimated that there were 100 political parties during the first few 
months of liberation.10 Alongside these political parties and organizations, independ-
ent candidates came forward with hopes of participating in Iraq’s political future.11 
Finally, tribal leaders also became active in Iraq’s local and central political develop-
ment. 
From the explosion of political groups in Iraq following the fall of Saddam, six 
key parties emerged as the major political organizations in Iraq. They included two 
main exile groups, the INC and the INA (Iraqi National Accord); two main Kurdish 
groups, the PUK and KDP; and two Shi’ite groups, SCIRI and the Da’wa Party. 
Within these parties, Arab Sunnis—the group most strongly represented in Saddam’s 
____________ 
7 Slevin, “U.S. Wary in Choosing Iraq’s New Leadership.” 
8 Alan Sipress and Carol Morello, “U.S.-Led Gathering to Begin Remaking Iraq,” Washington Post, April 15, 
2003. 
9 John Kifner and John F. Burns, “As Tanks Move in, Young Iraqis Trek Out and Take Anything Not Fastened 
Down,” New York Times, April 9, 2003; Daniel Williams, “Rampant Looting Sweeps Iraq,” Washington Post, 
April 12, 2003. 
10 Monica Basu, “Iraqi Political Parties Vie to Fill Postwar Void,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, June 8, 2003; 
Peter Ford, “Democracy Begins to Sprout in Iraq,” Christian Science Monitor, April 23, 2003. 
11 These included the diplomat Aqila al-Hashimi and former guerilla fighter Abdul Karim “Prince of the 
Marshes” Muhammadaw. See “The Iraqi Council,” Washington Post, July 14, 2003. 
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Ba’ath Party—were greatly underrepresented.12 This presented a growing problem for 
U.S. officials as Iraq continued to develop its own government. It was not until De-
cember 2003 that Sunni Arabs began to organize their own political group called the 
State Council for the Sunnis—which united three subdivisions within the Sunnis, 
the mystical Sufis, the orthodox Salafis, and the leftist Brotherhood—and demanded 
political representation in the new Iraq.13  
The rapid collapse of the Iraqi government during major combat operations 
forced U.S. officials to quickly devise a strategy for setting up an interim governing 
authority. At the beginning of April, the Bush administration announced plans to 
hold a meeting of potential Iraqi leaders to discuss future political development for 
the country.14 On April 11, 2003, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz testi-
fied before the Senate Armed Services Committee that U.S. and British forces would 
lead Iraq’s political transformation and that he imagined it would be an interim 
authority that would be divided into “a representative council and a smaller executive 
committee”; the UN would play a small but important role.15 
On April 12, three days after the fall of Baghdad, ORHA chief Garner an-
nounced plans for a “big tent” meeting that would bring together future Iraqi leaders 
of all backgrounds. The invitations were issued by General Tommy Franks, the 
commander of U.S. Central Command, and hosted by Department of State repre-
sentative Ryan Crocker, Larry Di Rita from the DoD, and Zalmay Khalilzad, repre-
senting the White House National Security Council staff.16 
The first meeting was held in the southern city of Nasiriya on April 15. An es-
timated 75 Iraqis participated, consisting of a mixture of tribal leaders, clerics, and 
political party officials.17 “Local” Iraqis made up around two-thirds of participants 
and exiles the remaining third.18 Despite the “big tent,” certain groups—including 
SCIRI and the Iraqi Communist Party—protested the meeting, claiming that it was 
____________ 
12 The prominent Sunnis in the INC and INA were exiles, and the Shiite and Kurdish groups did not have 
known Sunni Arab members. 
13 Edward Wong, “Sunnis in Iraq Form Own Political Council,” New York Times, December 26, 2003; Alan 
Sipress, “Once-Dominant Minority Forms Council to Counter Shiite and Negotiate Future,” Washington Post, 
January 6, 2004; Edward Wong, “Once-Ruling Sunnis Unite to Regain a Piece of the Pie,” New York Times, 
January 12, 2004. 
14 “U.S. Prepares Meeting of Iraqi Exiles and Contenders for Leadership,” Washington Post, April 9, 2003. 
15 Eric Schmitt and Steven R. Weisman, “U.S. to Recruit Iraqi Civilians to Interim Posts,” New York Times, 
April 11, 2003. 
16 Paul Martin, “General Promises a ‘Big Tent’ for Iraqis,” Washington Times, April 13, 2003. 
17 Marc Santora with Patrick E. Tyler, “Pledge Made to Democracy by Exiles, Sheiks and Clerics,” New York 
Times, April 16, 2003; Keith B. Richburg, “Iraqi Leaders Gather Under U.S. Tent,” Washington Post, April 16, 
2003. 
18 Martin, “General Promises a ‘Big Tent’ for Iraqis.” 
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a ruse for occupation or that they had been shut out from the meetings.19 Notwith-
standing these protests, the meeting produced a 13-point memorandum on the crea-
tion of a new Iraq, which included the points that the government must be democ-
ratic and that the plurality of ethnicity, race, tribe, and religion must be respected.20 
Of particular importance for future discussions between an emerging Iraqi political 
voice and coalition authorities was point 7: “That Iraqis must choose their leaders 
[and] not have them imposed from the outside.” As discussed below, this point be-
came a serious issue of contention in following months. 
One of the first issues the U.S. government faced in forging a new Iraqi political 
landscape was the tension between Iraqi exiles, favored by the United States, and 
leaders who had remained in Iraq under Saddam’s rule. In particular, the U.S. gov-
ernment’s decision to airlift Chalabi and his Free Iraqi Fighters into Iraq toward the 
end of major combat operations sparked animosity among other political groups, 
which interpreted this act as U.S. favoritism toward the INC.21 Furthermore, Chalabi 
created tensions between the INC and ORHA by boycotting the April 15 Nasiriya 
meeting, choosing instead to drive into Baghdad and there issue his own 14-point 
plan for political progress.22 By the end of April 2003, it was reported that DoD and 
ORHA were taking steps to distance themselves from Chalabi and the INC.23 
The Bush administration announced plans to have an appointed interim 
authority in place by June 3, to coincide with the expiration of the UN Oil for Food 
mandate.24 Alongside this announcement, administration officials pledged to con-
tinue meeting with emerging Iraqi leaders and political organizations and, in particu-
lar, to bring SCIRI and other Shi’ite groups into the coalition-run process. To this 
end, ORHA began calling weekly meetings of Iraqi leaders and coalition forces. On 
April 28, a meeting of around 300 Iraqis, including members of SCIRI, agreed to 
hold a conference within a month in order to select an interim government.25 A 
smaller follow-up meeting was held on April 30 to further discuss the selection proc-
ess for attendees at May’s meeting.26 
____________ 
19 Richburg, “Iraqi Leaders Gather Under U.S. Tent.” 
20 For all 13 points, see “A ‘Federal System’ with Leaders Chosen by the People,” New York Times, April 16, 
2003. 
21 Richburg, “Iraqi Leaders Gather Under U.S. Tent.” 
22 Molly Knight, “Exile Groups Frustrated by U.S. Role in Meeting,” Baltimore Sun, April 17, 2003. 
23 Tracy Wilkinson, “Fresh Rulers to Emerge, Garner Says,” Los Angeles Times, April 25, 2003. 
24 Karen DeYoung and Glenn Kessler, “U.S. to Seek Iraqi Interim Authority,” Washington Post, April 24, 2003. 
25 Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Monte Reel, “Iraqis Set Timetable to Take Power,” Washington Post, April 29, 
2003. 
26 Sharon Behn, “Iraqi Leaders Meet to Plan Reconstruction,” Washington Times, April 30, 2003. 
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In response to these meetings, the Bush administration reiterated its vision of 
political transition, which called for the creation of a “transitional government” by 
the end of May that would have power over “nonsensitive” government ministries 
such as education and health care. This would be followed by the formation of a 
“provisional government” within “six months to two years after the interim authority 
was created.” That government would have greater powers than its predecessor and 
be tasked with writing a constitution. The political transition would end with na-
tional elections for a permanent government.27  
On April 24, just three days after his arrival in Baghdad, Garner was informed 
by the White House that he would be succeeded by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, a 
terrorism expert and former career diplomat from the State Department.28 With this 
change in leadership, the White House and DoD also announced plans for the crea-
tion of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which officially replaced ORHA 
on May 16.  
Prior to Bremer’s arrival, ORHA continued to work toward the creation of an 
Iraqi transitional authority. On May 5, the United States announced that “eight or 
nine” Iraqi leaders would be selected to form the interim authority, specifically nam-
ing the five leaders most likely to be selected: Ahmed Chalabi of the INC, Massoud 
Barzani of the KDP, Jalal Talabani of the PUK, Abdel-Aziz al-Hakim of SCIRI, and 
Iyad Allawi of the INA.29 These political parties, in turn, announced that they would 
help organize a national assembly of around 350 deputies—two-thirds of whom 
would be “local” (not exiled) Iraqis—who would select an executive committee or 
possibly an interim Iraqi leader. They planned to identify the deputies by going out 
into each of Iraq’s 18 provinces and meeting with local leaders.30 Both ORHA and 
the above-mentioned leaders aimed to have an implementable plan prior to Bremer’s 
arrival. 
Bremer arrived in Baghdad on May 12. Within weeks, he and his staff insti-
tuted several controversial policy changes. On May 23, in CPA Order Number 2, 
Bremer announced that the Iraqi armed forces would be officially disbanded. As dis-
cussed in Chapter Nine, this policy came to be one of the most widely criticized deci-
sions Bremer implemented while overseeing Iraq’s reconstruction.  
Another policy shift that Bremer instituted involved plans to purge more than 
just the highest-ranking Ba’athists from the government. This policy was announced 
____________ 
27 Douglas Jehl, with Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Reported to Push for Iraqi Government, with Pentagon Prevailing,” 
New York Times, April 30, 2003. 
28 See Chapter Five for more on this decision. 
29 Carol Morello, “‘Nucleus’ of Iraqi Leaders Emerge,” Washington Post, May 6, 2003. 
30 Patrick E. Tyler, “Opposition Groups to Help Create Assembly in Iraq,” New York Times, May 6, 2003. 
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on May 16, 2003, in CPA Order Number 1.31 The policy appeared to have followed 
the logic that those attached to the former regime should be punished for their com-
plicity in Saddam’s crimes. However, as with the military, the policy left an estimated 
15,000 to 30,000 civil servants unemployed, in addition to creating a shortage of 
qualified workers to run the government.32 The decision also hit Sunni Arabs the 
hardest, further alienating this group from the postwar reconstruction process.  
The alienation of Sunni Arabs from coalition plans for post-Saddam Iraq be-
came an increasingly difficult problem for coalition forces. Under the former regime, 
Sunni Arabs received the lion’s share of resources and held the most prominent posi-
tions within the government and military.33 Saddam’s fall, therefore, compromised 
their position of privilege, inspiring some to call for violence in hopes of returning to 
the prewar status quo. In June, a month after Bremer’s decision to disband the Iraqi 
armed forces and expunge Ba’ath Party members from the Iraqi government, an Arab 
Sunni cleric in the “Sunni Triangle”—the area west and north of Baghdad including 
Fallujah, Tikrit, Ramadi, and Samara—called for a jihad against the United States 
and for Arab Sunnis to rise up and overthrow their occupiers.34 Throughout CPA’s 
tenure, an increasingly well-organized insurgency against coalition forces grew in the 
Sunni Triangle.  
At the end of May, Bremer announced that he would delay the selection of a 
transitional Iraqi authority—slated under Garner’s leadership to occur before June 
3—claiming that the decision could not be made for at least another seven weeks due 
to security concerns.35 Furthermore, Bremer announced that CPA would select the 
leaders for the interim authority, reversing the proposal made by Garner’s office to 
have a large assembly of around 350 delegates help in the selection process.36 These 
changes exacerbated growing tensions within Iraq over the slowness with which nor-
malcy was returning to the country and magnified perceptions that the United States 
____________ 
31 CPA Order Number 1 states: “On April 16, 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority disestablished the 
Ba’ath Party of Iraq . . . Full members of the Ba’ath Party . . . are hereby removed from the positions and banned 
from future employment in the public sector . . . Those suspected of criminal conduct shall be investigated and, if 
deemed a threat to security or a flight risk, detained or placed under house arrest.” See “Coalition Provisional 
Authority Order Number 1: De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society,” May 16, 2003. As of October 2007: 
http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/#Orders 
32 Interviews with CPA officials, July 2004; Pamela Constable, “New Policy Unveiled for Ex-Baathists,” Washing-
ton Post, January 12, 2004. 
33 Susan Sachs, “Iraqi Tribes, Asked to Help G.I.’s, Say They Can’t,” New York Times, November 11, 2003; 
Kenneth M. Pollack, “After Saddam: Assessing the Reconstruction of Iraq,” the Brookings Institution, January 7, 
2004. 
34 Edmund L. Andrews and Patrick E. Tyler, “As Iraqis’ Disaffection Grows, U.S. Offers Them a Greater Politi-
cal Role,” New York Times, June 7, 2003. 
35 Scott Wilson, “U.S. Delays Timeline for Iraqi Government,” Washington Post, May 22, 2003. 
36 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “U.S. to Appoint Council in Iraq,” Washington Post, June 2, 2003. 
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had no intentions of ending its occupation of Iraq;37 the United States was even ac-
cused of reneging on its previous promises.38 In the following weeks, voices from 
within the key Iraqi political organizations threatened to boycott Bremer’s plan and 
to hold a national assembly without CPA’s blessing.39  
On July 13, after several rounds of negotiations between CPA and key Iraqi 
leaders, Bremer announced the selection of an Iraqi interim authority, to be called 
the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC). The IGC consisted of six major political par-
ties—the INC, the INA, the KDP, the PUK, SCIRI, and the Da’wa Party—in addi-
tion to minor parties and independent leaders.40 As noted in Table 10.1, it had 25 
members (including three women): 13 Shi’ites, 11 Sunnis (including five Kurds, five 
Arabs, and a Turkoman), and one Assyrian Christian. CPA staff tasked with selecting 
IGC members sought to balance Iraq’s diverse ethnic, religious, and political groups 
in the new federal body. However, the lack of access to and information about Iraqis 
who had stayed in the country during Saddam’s reign created challenges in identify-
ing appropriate participants.41 Sixteen members came from either outside the country 
or from the autonomous north.42  
The IGC’s role was not to govern, since CPA remained the highest governing 
authority in Iraq. It served instead as the Iraqi face of the occupation, tasked by CPA 
to carry out certain efforts. Over time, it increasingly became a real partner in gov-
ernance, having a de facto veto over certain CPA actions. The IGC’s first acts were to 
select a delegation to travel to UN headquarters in New York for a July 22 meeting 
and to establish three subcommittees tasked with drafting bylaws, a political state-
ment, and an agenda for future meetings.43 The CPA also requested that the IGC 
select an interim leader from among its ranks and that it begin to take steps to draft a 
constitution.44 
The IGC faced domestic and international challenges to its standing and role 
within the first few months of operation. Domestically, most Iraqis had not heard of 
 
____________ 
37 Wilson, “U.S. Delays Timeline for Iraqi Government.”  
38 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Iraqis Assail U.S. Plans for Council,” Washington Post, June 3, 2003. 
39 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Iraqis Vow to Hold National Assembly,” Washington Post, June 4, 2003; Patrick E. 
Tyler, “Political Leaders Resisting U.S. Plan to Govern Iraq,” New York Times, June 5, 2003. 
40 Patrick E. Tyler, “Iraqis Set to Form an Interim Council with Wide Power,” New York Times, July 11, 2003. 
41 Interview with CPA officials, July 2004. 
42 “The Iraqi Council,” Washington Post, July 14, 2003; “Iraqi Governing Council Members,” BBC News Online, 
July 14, 2003; “A Look at New Iraqi Leaders,” Baltimore Sun, July 16, 2003. 
43 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Appointed Iraqi Council Assumes Limited Role,” Washington Post, July 14, 2003. 
44 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Iraqi Council Postpones Selection of a Leader,” Washington Post, July 15, 2003. 
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Table 10.1 









Samir Shakir Mahmoud Independent Sunni Local 
Sondul Chapouk (woman) Independent Turkoman  Local 
Ahmed Chalabi Iraqi National Congress Shi’ite  Exile 
Naseer al-Chaderchi National Democratic Party Sunni Local 
Adnan Pachachi Independent Democratic Movement Sunni Exile 
Mohammed Bahr al-Ulloum Independent Shi’ite cleric  Exile 
Massoud Barzani Kurdistan Democratic Party Kurd Exile (north) 
Jalal Talabani Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Kurd Exile (north) 
Abdel-Aziz al-Hakim SCIRI Shi’ite  Exile 
Ahmed al-Barak Independent Shi’ite  Local 
Ibrahim al-Jaafari Da’wa Party Shi’ite Exile 
Raja Habib al-Khuzaai (woman) Independent Shi’ite Local 
Aqila al-Hashimi (woman) Independent Shi’ite Local 
Younadem Kana Assyrian Democratic Movement Assyrian 
Christian 
Local 
Salaheddine Bahaaeddin Kurdistan Islamic Union Kurd Exile (north) 
Mahmoud Othman  Kurdish Socialist Party Kurd Exile 
Hamid Majid Mousa Communist Party Shi’ite  Exile (north) 
Ghazi Mashal Ajil al-Yawer Independent Sunni  
(tribal leader) 
Exile 
Abdul Zahra Othman 
Muhammad (Izzedin Salim) 
Da’wa Party Shi’ite Local 
Mohsen Abdel Hamid Iraqi Islamic Party (Ikwan) Sunni Local 
Iyad Allawi Iraqi National Accord Shi’ite  Exile 
Wael Abdul Latif Independent Shi’ite Local 
Mouwafak al-Rubai Independent Shi’ite (secular) Exile 
Dara Noor Alzin Independent Kurd Local 
Abdel-Karim Mahoud al-
Mohammedawi 





the IGC, nor were they familiar with the council members. This continued to be a 
problem throughout the IGC’s tenure.45 The CPA attempted to spread the word on 
the IGC to outlying provinces, but the campaign failed to effectively engage Iraqi 
television and newspaper media, and information that reached the Iraqi public re-
____________ 
45 At the end of October, for example, a poll showed that the majority of Iraqis still did not know about the IGC; 
see Dan Murphy, “Baghdad’s Tale of Two Councils,” Christian Science Monitor, October 29, 2003. 
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mained scanty.46 Moreover, the IGC also faced challenges to its legitimacy. Many 
criticized the selection of IGC members by CPA and called for a process that would 
allow Iraqis to choose their own leaders. In response, one of Iraq’s most influential 
Shi’ite clerics, the Ayatollah Ali Sistani, issued a fatwa—a religious legal edict—on 
June 28 calling for direct elections of Iraq’s leaders and those responsible for drafting 
a constitution.47 As discussed below, Sistani’s fatwa proved to be a major stumbling 
block to both the perceived legitimacy of the IGC and CPA’s plans for political de-
velopment in Iraq.  
The growing insurgency also challenged the IGC’s legitimacy. Insurgents ac-
cused members of collaborating with the United States, and IGC members became 
targets of violence.48 On September 25, 2003, IGC member Aqila al-Hashimi was 
gunned down in her car while in Baghdad.49 On May 17, 2004, the acting Iraqi 
president for the month of May, Izzedin Salim, was assassinated in Baghdad.50 Other 
government officials were also targeted. On November 4, 2003, a judge was shot in 
Mosul after being abducted. A few weeks later, on November 18, an Iraqi education 
official involved in training the Iraqi police force was killed in the city of Latifiyah.51 
This troubling trend persisted throughout the transfer of power from coalition forces 
to Iraqis.  
The IGC also faced challenges to its legitimacy in international circles. On July 
22, 2003, three delegates from the IGC—Ahmed Chalabi, Adnan Pachachi, and 
Aqila al-Hashimi—traveled to New York to meet with UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan and push for UN recognition of the IGC and its right to occupy Iraq’s chair 
at the General Assembly. The UN did not grant this recognition immediately, citing 
the fact that the IGC was appointed and not elected as grounds for withholding full 
recognition. After prodding from the United States and the United Kingdom, the 
UN officially recognized the right of the IGC to represent Iraq on August 14 and 
agreed to establish a UN mission in Iraq, building on its preexisting presence in the 
country.52 Tragically, UN headquarters in Baghdad were bombed just five days after 
____________ 
46 Murphy, “Baghdad’s Tale of Two Councils”; “Iraq’s Interim Leaders Review Transition Plans in Face of Shiite 
Poll Demand,” Associated Foreign Press, November 29, 2003. 
47 For a detailed account of the circumstances leading up to Sistani’s fatwa and its effects on political develop-
ment in Iraq, see Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “How Cleric Trumped U.S. Plan for Iraq,” Washington Post, November 
26, 2003. 
48 Yochi J. Dreazen, “Insurgents Turn Guns on Iraqis Backing Democracy,” Wall Street Journal, December 10, 
2003. 
49 Gregg Zoroya, “Danger Puts Distance Between Council, People,” USA Today, October 21, 2003. 
50 Scott Wilson, “Iraqi Council’s Leader Is Slain,” Washington Post, May 18, 2004. 
51 Dreazen, “Insurgents Turn Guns on Iraqis Backing Democracy.” 
52 Paul Richter, “Security Council Endorses Iraq’s New Governing Body,” Los Angeles Times, August 15, 2003. 
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this announcement, killing UN special envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello and over 20 
others.53 As a result, the UN withdrew its non-Iraqi officials from the country.  
Regional organizations were also reluctant to recognize the IGC as the new rep-
resentative of Iraq. The 22-member Arab League announced at the end of July 2003 
that it would not recognize the IGC, citing fears that recognition would legitimize a 
U.S. presence in the country.54 As with the UN, the Bush administration began rig-
orously lobbying the Arab League, attaining its recognition of the IGC on September 
9, 2003.55 The IGC also managed to gain recognition from the International Mone-
tary Fund and World Bank in September and to occupy Iraq’s seat in the Organiza-
tion of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).56 In February 2004, the World 
Trade Organization granted the IGC observer status.57 
Alongside domestic and international challenges to the IGC’s legitimacy, the 
body also faced challenges in the tasks it was asked to perform. Some limited suc-
cesses marked the IGC’s first few months in office. It succeeded in declaring April 9, 
the day of Baghdad’s liberation, a national holiday. It also made positive steps toward 
the creation of a tribunal, which will be discussed further below. However, the IGC 
was slow in implementing several tasks presented to it by CPA. First, CPA asked the 
IGC to select an interim leader from among its ranks. After several weeks of negotia-
tions, the IGC announced that it would not have one leader but nine who would 
rotate, in order of the Arabic alphabet, on a monthly basis.58 According to this logic, 
Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the leader of the Da’wa Party, would be the first president for the 
month of August.59 The CPA greeted this decision with skepticism and raised con-
cerns that it would prevent the council from making decisions.  
The second task CPA asked the IGC to perform was to appoint cabinet mem-
bers for its various ministries. After six weeks of negotiations, the IGC succeeded in 
selecting cabinet members, but only after considerable disagreement and a compromise 
that increased the number of portfolios from 21 to 25.60 As Table 10.2 shows, the 
____________ 
53 Dexter Filkins and Richard A. Oppel, Jr., “Truck Bombing; Huge Suicide Blast Demolishes U.N. Headquar-
ters in Baghdad,” New York Times, August 20, 2003. The number of dead was later raised to 25. See Colum 
Lynch, “Brahimi to Be U.N. Adviser on Iraq,” Washington Post, January 12, 2004. 
54 Steven R. Hurst, “Shi’ite Picked to Be Iraq’s First President,” Washington Times, July 31, 2003. 
55 “Arab League Nations Agree to Grant Seat to Iraq’s Council,” New York Times, September 9, 2003; John 
Daniszewski and Jailan Zayan, “Iraqi Council’s Foreign Minister Takes a Seat at the Arab League’s Table,” Los 
Angeles Times, September 10, 2003. 
56 Bruce Stanley, “Iraq to Attend Next Week’s OPEC Meeting,” New York Times, September 17, 2003. 
57 John Zarocostas, “WTO Expected to Grant Iraq Observer Status Despite Baghdad’s Lack of Customs Con-
trol,” Washington Times, February 8, 2004. 
58 Robyn Dixon, “Iraq Council Picks 9 Leaders Instead of 1,” Los Angeles Times, July 30, 2003. 
59 Hurst, “Shi’ite Picked to be Iraq’s First President.” 
60 Carol J. Williams, “Iraqi Council’s Most Pressing Task: Legitimacy,” Los Angeles Times, August 28, 2003. 
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highest-profile ministries—Foreign, Finance, Interior, and Oil—went to Zebari (a 
Kurd), Kilani (a Sunni Arab), Badran (a secular Shi’ite), and Bahr al-Uloom (a relig-
ious Shi’ite), respectively.61 The performance of the ministries was variable; some 
were excellent while others were less successful. Of the 25 ministers selected, eight were 
to stay on beyond the June 2004 political handover: Foreign Affairs, Electricity, 
 
Table 10.2 
Cabinet Appointments, September 2003 
Ministry Name Ethnicity/Religion 
Oil Ibrahim Mohammad Bahr al-Uloom Shi’ite 
Interior Nuri Badran (until April 8, 2004) 
Samir Shakir Mahmoud (April–June 2004) 
Shi’ite 
Sunni 
Trade Ali Alawi Shi’ite 
Finance Kamal al-Kilani Sunni 
Labor Sami Azara al-Majun Shi’ite 
Culture Mufid Mohammad Jawad al-Jazairi Shi’ite 
Education Alla Abdessaheb al-Alwan Shi’ite 
Foreign Hoshyar Zebari Kurd 
Planning Mahdi al-Hafez Shi’ite 
Public Works Nisrin Mustafa al-Barwari Kurd 
Transport Behnam Ziya Bulis Assyrian Christian 
Electricity Ayham al-Samarrai Sunni 
Health Khodayyir Abbas Shi’ite 
Housing and Construction Bayan Baqir Solagh Shi’ite 
Science and Technology Rashad Umar Mandan Turkoman 
Human Rights Abd al-Basit Turki Sunni 
Industry and Minerals Muhammad Tawfiq Rahim Kurd 
Migration and Immigration Muhammad Jasim Khudayyir Shi’ite 
Water Abd al Latif Jamal Rashid Kurd 
Communications Haidar Jawad al-Abadi Shi’ite 
Agriculture Abd al-Amir Abbud Rahima Shi’ite 
Youth and Sports Ali Faiq al-Ghabban Shi’ite 
Environment Abd al-Rahman Saddiq Karim Kurd 
Defense Iyad Alawi (assigned on April 4, 2004) Shi’ite 
Information Not assigned  
 
____________ 
61 Dexter Filkins, “Iraqi Council Picks a Cabinet to Run Key State Affairs,” New York Times, September 2, 2003. 
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Public Works, Culture, Planning, Water Resources, Communications, and Youth 
and Sports. The remaining positions were filled primarily by apolitical technocrats.62 
The third task that CPA hoped the IGC would accomplish was to create a proc-
ess whereby the constitution could be drafted, a document that CPA believed was 
necessary to create before holding elections. After considerable debate, the IGC suc-
ceeded in selecting a 25-member committee of lawyers, intellectuals, and former 
judges to propose the process whereby a constitution would be created, not actually 
drafting the document.63 As will be discussed below, the committee quickly bogged 
down in debates over the structure of government and the role of religion and relig-
ious law in the new Iraq, preventing significant progress on this task.  
In addition to performing tasks assigned by CPA, the IGC also autonomously 
asserted its power by initiating several controversial policies. Most notably, the IGC 
chose on several occasions to ban Arab media outlets that they accused of fostering 
violence in Iraq. On September 23, 2003, the IGC banned the Bahrain-based Al 
Jazeera news station along with Al Arabiya, the Qatari station, on grounds that they 
were encouraging violence and provoking sectarian strife.64 On November 24, the 
IGC issued orders to have Al Arabiya’s offices raided, claiming that it was encourag-
ing the anti-coalition insurgency.65 These decisions raised concerns with international 
groups committed to press freedoms.66  
The November 15 Agreement and the Transfer of Authority 
By November 2003, the lack of progress toward an elected government and im-
provements in the security situation in Iraq had generated domestic and international 
criticism, most of which was directed toward Bremer and CPA. In response, Bremer 
abruptly flew to Washington on November 10 to hold meetings with officials in the 
White House and the Pentagon. While Bremer was in the United States, a car bomb 
exploded in Nasiriya, killing 18 Italian servicemen. Also while Bremer was in Wash-
ington, a CIA report dated November 10 was leaked to the press. It claimed that 
Iraqi citizens were losing faith in the United States and reconstruction efforts, and 
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that this loss of faith was providing a foundation for armed insurgency.67 These de-
velopments further heightened the sense of urgency to create a new action plan in 
Iraq that would accelerate the transfer of political power to Iraqis.68 
On November 15, CPA and the IGC released a new timeline for the transfer of 
power to an Iraqi governing body. It called for the construction of a “Basic Law”—
the forerunner to a constitution—by February 28, 2004; the creation of a larger Iraqi 
council by May 2004; the dissolution of CPA by July 1, 2004; the election of an in-
terim government by the transitional council; and full elections by the end of 2005.69 
This plan, while not spelling out the details of each stage, offered a timeline for po-
litical independence, something that CPA had not previously articulated. 
The November 15 agreement infused new life into the process of political de-
velopment in Iraq and brought into focus several key challenges to the creation of a 
new Iraqi government. One of the first issues to arise was the method of selecting the 
next central political body, the “transitional authority.” The CPA envisioned the 
creation of caucuses within Iraq’s 18 provinces that would, in turn, appoint members 
of the transitional authority.70 However, Iraqis from most religious, regional, and 
ethnic constituencies called for national elections to select this governing body; the 
call included the IGC, which voted unanimously at the end of November 2003 for 
full national elections to select an interim authority.71 Ayatollah Sistani’s June 28 
fatwa, which called for national elections to select both the country’s political leaders 
and the body responsible for drafting Iraq’s new constitution, continued to pressure 
CPA to open the political process up to Iraqi citizens immediately instead of in 2005, 
as CPA had planned.  
The CPA objected to immediate direct elections, citing the need for a new na-
tional census (the last one had been taken in 1997) that would assess the total num-
ber of Iraqis and allow for voter registration; CPA argued that a proper census would 
take roughly a year to conduct. However, the newly formed Iraqi Census Bureau 
claimed that it could do the job in a matter of months, a proposal that was largely 
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ignored.72 Proponents of direct elections further suggested that UN Oil for Food ra-
tion cards, which were well organized and pervasive throughout the country, could 
be used for voter registration. The CPA countered this proposal by pointing out that 
those imprisoned under Saddam’s regime had had their UN identity cards revoked as 
punishment; this approach, therefore, could potentially exclude the groups most per-
secuted by the previous regime, specifically the Kurds and the Shi’ites.73  
Increasingly, the debate over the method of selecting new leadership polarized 
into two camps: those who favored caucuses for selecting an interim authority, most 
notably CPA, and those who backed Sistani’s fatwa calling for direct elections. The 
CPA was criticized for not having taken Sistani’s fatwa seriously when it was first is-
sued in June and for failing to realize that most Shi’ites in the country would not go 
against his edict. Sistani refused to meet directly with Bremer or other officials in 
CPA, corresponding with them only through letters and via SCIRI’s director of the 
party’s bureau, Adel Abdel-Mehdi.74 This often resulted in confusion and miscom-
munication. For example, CPA staff reported that they had been under the impres-
sion that Sistani had approved the November 15 agreement, but this turned out not 
to be the case.75 As a stalemate became evident, CPA proposed a compromise, sug-
gesting that direct elections for a transitional authority could be held in certain prov-
inces or districts and leaders could be chosen via caucus nominations in areas where 
elections were not feasible.76  
Following several months of fruitless efforts to work around Sistani’s fatwa, 
CPA and IGC turned to the UN as a possible mediating force. Calling on the UN, 
however, presented its own set of problems, because of lingering disagreements about 
the origins of the war and the fact that the UN had not been integrated into CPA’s 
postwar reconstruction efforts. In January 2004, the IGC sent a delegation to the 
UN in hopes of securing UN aid in the electoral process. Its petition was backed by 
the U.S. government, which had begun to see that the plan to have caucuses select an 
interim government was too complicated.77 Sistani and several members of the IGC 
asked, in particular, if the UN could help facilitate national elections before the July 
1, 2004 departure of CPA. After dispatching a team of elections experts to Iraq at the 
end of January, the UN concluded that national elections could not be held before 
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July, but that Iraqis had other options for selecting an interim authority.78 In Febru-
ary, Secretary General Annan dispatched to Iraq Lakhdar Brahimi—the former UN 
special envoy tasked with fostering political transition in Afghanistan. He concluded 
that Iraq could hold national elections at the end of 2004 or the beginning of 2005 
at the very earliest. He cited the poor security environment as one key obstacle to 
holding elections.79 Sistani accepted these findings but called for elections to be held 
at the end of 2004.80  
In addition to debating the method of selecting an interim authority in Iraq, the 
IGC also clashed with CPA over the length of the IGC’s tenure as a governing body 
and its role in the future Iraqi government. Amid outcries from local and interna-
tional voices over the shortcomings of the IGC, CPA prescribed the dissolution of 
the IGC following the selection of an interim authority in May 2004.81 Several 
members of the IGC, including Ahmad Chalabi, Iyad Allawi, and Adnan Pachachi, 
disagreed with this formula for the transfer of power and called for the maintenance 
of the IGC after July as some form of advisory committee or perhaps even as one 
chamber within a bicameral government.82 These proposals raised fears that the IGC 
would not willingly relinquish power within the proposed timeframe put forward by 
CPA and the Bush administration. 
Following the February UN report that discouraged national elections before 
the end of 2004, CPA and the UN began discussing possible alternatives to creating 
an interim government. In February, the UN proposed two plans for an interim gov-
ernment. The first called for convening “a national conference of tribal, political, and 
religious leaders that reflects Iraq’s disparate population to select a provisional gov-
ernment”; such a conference would be similar to the loya jirga held in Afghanistan.83 
The second proposal suggested expanding the existing IGC to around 100 members 
to create an interim body that could minimally govern until full elections.84 Rumors 
circulated that the U.S. government preferred the latter plan.85  
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On March 17, the IGC formally petitioned the UN for help in forming an in-
terim government.86 In response, Brahimi returned to Iraq in early April to deter-
mine how to form an interim government for the June transfer of power.87 On April 
14, Brahimi announced his recommendations: that the IGC should be completely 
dissolved; that the UN should appoint an interim president and two vice presidents 
consisting of a Sunni, a Shi’ite, and a Kurd; and that politically neutral technocrats 
should run the ministries. Brahimi further called for a national conference in July 
2004 to elect a consultative assembly.88 This proposal prompted outcries from several 
members of the IGC—most notably Ahmad Chalabi—who claimed that this ap-
proach was anti-democratic and would be politically destabilizing.89 The Bush ad-
ministration, however, agreed to the UN plan.90 At the end of April, Brahimi pro-
posed that the new interim body should be selected by the end of May in order to 
allow for a smooth transition in July.91 
After several weeks of negotiations between Brahimi, Bremer, White House en-
voy Robert Blackwill, and the IGC, the new interim government, called the Iraqi 
Interim Government (IIG), was announced on June 1, 2004. Ghazi al-Yawer, a 45-
year-old Sunni tribal chief, was named as the country’s new interim president. It was 
reported that Yawar was neither Blackwill’s nor Bremer’s first choice—they had fa-
vored Adnan Pachachi, the 80-year-old former Iraqi foreign minister—but that the 
IGC had staunchly opposed that nomination and favored Yawar instead.92 Similarly, 
the selection of the prime minister, the most influential position, was hotly debated 
among the different parties selecting the new government. Brahimi reportedly fa-
vored Hussain Shahristani, a Shi’ite nuclear scientist, who was also rejected by the 
IGC. Bremer and Blackwill pushed for Iyad Allawi, who eventually won the blessings 
of Brahimi and the IGC, despite concerns that he was too close to the U.S. govern-
ment. Brahimi later complained that he was under “terrible pressure” to conform to 
Bremer’s and Blackwill’s preferences.93 In addition to the new president and prime 
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minister, two deputy presidents were also chosen, Ibrahim al-Jafaari of the Shi’ite 
Da’wa party and Rowsch Shaways of the Kurdish KDP.  
Brahimi was also tasked with naming a new cabinet. As previously mentioned, 
Brahimi called for the interim government to be staffed primarily with apolitical 
technocrats, who would run the county until full national elections could be held. 
Brahimi succeeded in selecting a 32-member cabinet that included several women 
and had only six ministers affiliated with the major political parties: Foreign Affairs 
(KDP), Finance (SCIRI), Public Works (KDP), Communications (PUK), Youth and 
Sports (SCIRI), and Women (PUK); none of the cabinet ministers were from 
Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress party. Media sources reported that, unlike the se-
lection of the president and prime minister, Brahimi was responsible for the selection 
of all but two of the cabinet members.94 Table 10.3 lists all the members of the IIG. 
Unlike its predecessor, the IIG received validation from prominent individuals and 
organizations almost immediately. On June 3, the Ayatollah Sistani issued a state-
ment that formally endorsed the IIG, although Sistani continued to call for full na-
tional elections by the end of 2004.95 Likewise, on June 17, the 57-member Organi-
zation of Islamic Conference (OIC) officially acknowledged the new government and 
vowed to “actively assist” its leaders as it prepared to take political control of Iraq.96 
Perhaps most important to the new government, polling data taken at the end of 
June showed that the majority of Iraqis were familiar with the new government’s 
various members: 68 percent had “confidence” in their leadership; 73 percent ap-
proved of Allawi as the prime minister; 84 percent approved of President Yawar.97 
Thus, the IIG received popular, religious, and organizational backing almost imme-
diately following its creation.  
The IIG faced several challenges leading up to the June 30, 2004 political hand-
over. First, the new political body had to work with the UN Security Council to se-
cure a new Security Council resolution officially ending political occupation of the 
country. Resolution 1546 was passed unanimously on June 8 after five versions of 
the proposal were debated among the Security Council’s 15 members. The final ver-
sion granted the IIG full political and economic control of Iraq, including its oil in-
dustry, with the caveat that contracts agreed to under CPA would be honored be-
yond the June handover. Furthermore, the resolution gave Prime Minister Allawi 
control of Iraqi forces and, in theory, the right to dismiss the multinational forces.  
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Table 10.3 









President Ghazi Mashal Ajil al-Yawer  Sunni 
Deputy President Ibrahim al-Ushayqir (al-Jafaari) Da’wa Shi’ite 
Deputy President Rowsch Shaways KDP Kurd 
Prime Minister Iyad Alawi INA Shi’ite 
Deputy PM for National Security Barham Salih PUK Kurd 
Foreign Affairs Hoshyar Mahmud Muhammad al-Zibari KDP Kurd 
Oil Thamir Abbas Ghadhban  Sunni 
Finance Adl Abd al-Mahdi SCIRI Shi’ite 
Interior Falah Hasan al-Naqib Iraqi National 
Movement  
Sunni 
Justice Malik Duhan al-Hasan  Sunni 
Trade Muhammad al-Jiburi  Sunni 
Defense Hazim Shalan  Shi’ite 
Education Sami al-Mudhaffar  Shi’ite 




Public Works Nasrin Mustafa Sadiq Barwari (woman) KDP Kurd 
Health Ala al-Din Abd al-Sahib Alwan  Shi’ite 
Higher Education Tahir Khalaf Jabar al-Bakaa  Shi’ite 
Housing and Construction Umar al-Faruq Saim al-Damluji  Sunni 
Science and Technology Rashad Umar Mandan  Turkoman 
Culture Mufid Muhammad Jawad al-Jazairi ICP Shi’ite 
Human Rights Bakhtyar Amin  Kurd 
Industry and Minerals Hashim M. al-Hasani Iraqi Islamic 
Party 
Sunni 
Labor and Social Affairs Layla Abd al-Latif (woman)  Shi’ite 







Planning Mahdi al-Hafidh  Shi’ite 
Water Abd al-Latif Jamal Rashid PUK Kurd 
Communications Mohammad Ali al-Hakim  Shi’ite 
Agriculture Sawsan Ali Majid al-Sharifi (woman)  Shi’ite 
Transportation and 
Telecommunications 
Luay Hatim Sultan al-Aras  Shi’ite 
Environment Mishkat Mumin  Sunni 
Youth and Sports Ali Faiq al-Ghabban SCIRI Shi’ite 
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Minister of State 
• No portfolio 
• No portfolio 




• Qasim Daud 
• Mamu Farham Utham Brali 
• Adnan al-Janabi 
• Wail Abd al-Latif 














However, the United States succeeded in preserving the right to conduct offensive 
military operations, with the promise that they would be closely coordinated with 
Iraqi authorities. Although unanimously agreed to, the new resolution did raise con-
cerns as to how it would play out in practice. Overall, however, the resolution was 
warmly received by members of the Security Council and was heralded as a “major 
step forward.”98  
The second major issue that the IIG faced in its preparations for political hand-
over was the security problem presented by the persistent insurgency, particularly in 
the Sunni Triangle and with al-Sadr’s forces in Najaf and eastern Baghdad. On June 
20, the New York Times reported that Prime Minister Allawi was considering impos-
ing a state of emergency following the June handover of power in order to consoli-
date authority and fight the growing insurgency.99 This suggestion received condem-
nation from Bremer and other U.S. diplomats, who maintained that only the United 
States, as head of the multinational forces, had the right to declare a state of emer-
gency or martial law in Iraq. U.S. officials claimed that Resolution 1546 stipulated 
this by granting foreign forces “all necessary measures” to ensure security in Iraq in-
cluding, they argued, martial law. IIG members backed away from the proposed state 
of emergency, despite continued insurgent activity.100 
The IIG also faced time constraints in preparing for the political handover 
scheduled at the end of the month. On June 4, the UN handed over the manage-
ment of preparations for Iraq’s national elections to a seven-member team chosen at 
the end of May.101 This new team was to prepare for the national conference, tenta-
tively scheduled for July 2004, that was to elect Iraq’s consultative assembly, in addi-
tion to preparing for full national elections in 2005. On June 9, CPA transferred 
authority over Iraq’s oil industry to the newly appointed minister, Thamir Abbas 
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Ghadhban.102 On June 25, just days before the political handover, CPA handed the 
final 11 ministries still under its authority over to the new Iraqi government, includ-
ing some “sensitive” ministries such as Defense, Interior, and Trade.103 On June 28, 
two days before the scheduled handover, with hopes of thwarting planned insurgency 
attacks, Ambassador Bremer officially handed the country’s political reins over to the 
IIG, effectively dissolving CPA.104 
The Transitional Administrative Law 
One of the major obstacles to political development in Iraq involved the drafting of a 
full-fledged constitution. Initially, the U.S. government’s plans for political develop-
ment in Iraq called for the drafting of a constitution first, followed by national elec-
tions for an Iraqi government.105 U.S. officials believed that a constitution would 
help mitigate Iraq’s contentious issues—such as religious freedom, federalism, and 
the protection of minorities—and prevent radicalism and sectarianism from taking 
root. These issues were elucidated in the April 15, 2003 meeting in Nasiriya that 
produced the 13-point memorandum.106 
Time and experience revealed, however, that in order to write a constitution, 
the divisive political issues facing Iraq had to be addressed first. As previously men-
tioned, one of CPA’s first assignments for the newly formed IGC was to select a body 
that would be responsible for drafting a constitution, something that CPA hoped the 
new governing body would do quickly.107 With difficulty, the IGC succeeded in se-
lecting a 25-member Constitution Preparation Committee (CPC)—composed of 
judges, attorneys, and scholars—that would propose the process for drafting and rati-
fying a constitution, rather than actually writing the document.108 As had happened 
with selecting leaders for the IGC, debates broke out over the qualifications and se-
lection of the drafters. Some favored a nomination process, while others, most nota-
bly Ayatollah Sistani, called for elections.109 
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At the end of September, the committee presented its findings on how to pro-
ceed with drafting a constitution. It highlighted the key challenges it believed Iraq 
faced in creating a new political system, including how to treat the role of religion in 
the government, how to reconcile exiles and Iraqi locals, how to improve Iraq’s secu-
rity problems, and how to prevent the United States from dominating the political 
process.110 The committee also announced that it was deadlocked over how to pro-
ceed with selecting drafters. Many believed that ignoring Sistani’s fatwa for direct 
elections could result in the Shi’ites breaking away from the political process and that 
this issue had to be resolved before a constitution could be created. The committee 
concluded by claiming it would take at least a year for a constitution to be drafted; 
hence, political development should proceed by holding elections first.111 Despite 
these findings and recommendations, CPA continued to pressure the IGC to begin 
drafting a constitution.112  
The November 15 agreement between CPA and the IGC eased tensions over 
the imperative of drafting a constitution quickly. The establishment of an Iraqi gov-
erning body—first through the IGC, next through an interim authority, and then 
through national elections for a full-fledged Iraqi government—became the primary 
focus of political development. However, alongside the evolution of an Iraqi gov-
ernment, CPA set a February 28, 2004 deadline for the creation of a set of “Basic 
Laws,” or governing principles that would effectively serve as an “interim constitu-
tion.”113 These Basic Laws, not unlike the 13-point memorandum developed at the 
April 15, 2003 Nasiriya meeting, would set the stage for the key challenges facing 
political development in Iraq: the role of religion in Iraqi law and politics, the struc-
ture of the new government, and the representation of religious, ethnic, and tribal 
groups.  
In November, the IGC began to propose various drafts of an interim constitu-
tion, working closely with CPA staff to refine issues. Some of the key topics debated 
were the role of Islam in the new government, the creation of quotas for women in 
parliament, and the right to free speech and privacy. The question of regional auton-
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omy, specifically Kurdish autonomy, was sidelined for future discussion.114 The CPA 
expressed particular concern over the role of Islam in the interim constitution, and in 
mid-February, Bremer threatened to block proposals that would make Islamic law 
the “backbone” of an interim constitution.115  
On March 1—two days after the proposed deadline—the IGC agreed with “full 
consensus” to a Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), touted as the “most progres-
sive” document of its kind in the Middle East. In addition to enshrining individual 
rights in a 13-article bill of rights, the document also succeeded in giving Islam a 
place as “a source” of law but stopped short of naming it as the primary source. 
Moreover, the document earmarked 25 percent of parliament’s seats for women.116 
Administratively, the document stipulated that elections for a 275-member transi-
tional assembly would be held in January 2005.117 It also gave Kurds “broad auton-
omy,” essentially preserving the status quo.118 
Ratification of the document, however, was delayed following a series of attacks 
on Shi’ite shrines on March 2, 2004, during the religious holiday of Ashura. These 
attacks killed nearly 200 pilgrims in Karbala and Baghdad.119 In the days following, 
Shi’ite leaders, backed by a statement from Ayatollah Sistani, retracted their approval 
of the document, claiming that one of its clauses could allow Kurds or Sunnis to veto 
a final constitution, even if it were ratified by popular vote. After some negotiation, 
however, religious Shi’ites in the IGC agreed to sign the document on March 8, 
bringing the Transitional Administrative Law to life.120 Ayatollah Sistani issued a 
statement promising to amend the questionable clause in the future.121  
Despite the IGC’s success in drafting and ratifying an “interim constitution,” 
the TAL contained several potential pitfalls. First, the document did not resolve 
Kurdish aspirations for independence and, in particular, left unanswered the fate of 
the ethnically diverse city of Kirkuk, which most Kurds claim as Kurdish by historic 
right. Second, some argued that the TAL set an unreasonable deadline for national 
elections of the drafters of Iraq’s final constitution, calling for these to be held in 
January 2005. Finally, there were concerns that the Iraqi Interim Government might 
____________ 
114 Interviews with CPA officials, July 2004; International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Constitutional Challenge”; Dex-
ter Filkins, “Panel Starts to Draw Up Constitution for Short Run,” New York Times, February 3, 2004. 
115 Robert H. Ried, “Bremer to Block Islamic Charter,” Washington Times, February 17, 2004. 
116 Dexter Filkins, “Iraqi Leadership Gains Agreement on Constitution,” New York Times, March 1, 2004. 
117 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Shiites to Seek Changes,” Washington Post, March 9, 2004. 
118 Dexter Filkins, “Iraqis Receive U.S. Approval of Constitution,” New York Times, March 2, 2004. 
119 Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Anthony Shadid, “Shiites Massacred in Iraq Blasts,” Washington Post, March 3, 
2004; “Iraq Constitution Delayed, Leaders Call for Calm,” New York Times on the Web, March 3, 2004. 
120 Dexter Filkins, “Top Shiites Drop Their Resistance to Iraqi Charter,” New York Times, March 8, 2004. 
121 Chandrasekaran, “Shiites to Seek Changes.” 
182    After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq 
choose to ignore some—or perhaps even all—of the TAL’s provisions after the trans-
fer of authority. 
Provincial and City Governance  
Virtually independent of initial U.S. efforts to create a federal government with ex-
iled Iraqis, coalition military efforts to create local Iraqi governing bodies developed 
alongside spontaneous “grass roots” movements to form city and regional govern-
ments as Saddam’s government collapsed. Military personnel, as the coalition’s repre-
sentatives on the ground, sought to help structure local governing authorities both to 
serve as their interlocutors and to ensure functioning governance in the regions. The 
congruence of these efforts with indigenous Iraqi moves toward self-government var-
ied. In the south, Shi’ite leaders organized groups to provide security, oversee the dis-
tribution of essential goods, and keep city governments running.122 The ability of 
southern, Shi’ite-dominated cities to establish de facto governments and provide for 
their citizens raised fears within the U.S. government that they would impose an Ira-
nian-style government in Iraq, either through force or—with 60 percent of the popu-
lation—via majority rule in elections.  
On April 11, 2003, the Pentagon awarded the Research Triangle Institute 
(RTI) in North Carolina a contract to help facilitate political development in Iraq.123 
RTI worked in coordination with CPA, the emerging Iraqi federal government, and 
USAID to build Iraq’s political infrastructure “from the ground up.”124 Together, 
RTI and USAID launched three initiatives aimed at fostering local governance in 
Iraq: the Local Governance Program, which specifically worked to develop neighbor-
hood and city councils; Community Action Programs, which focused on developing 
community groups to address critical needs in neighborhoods and supplying infor-
mation through those groups; and the Iraq Transition Initiative, which concentrated 
on rebuilding critical infrastructure, such as municipal buildings, schools, and clinics, 
in addition to fostering civil society and the media.125 
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In May, just one month after Saddam’s government fell, several cities began to 
show signs of political development by electing governing councils and mayors. On 
May 5, 2003, Mosul, with support of U.S. military personnel, chose a 24-member 
interim government, which in turn selected a mayor.126 In the southern Shi’ite city of 
Amara, local resistance fighters overthrew Iraqi forces in the early days of the war and 
established a city council that included a body of 27 people picked to run local facili-
ties.127 On May 15, British forces handed over the southern port city of Umm Qasr 
to a 12-member council, followed by the transfer of the port to Iraqi leaders on May 
22.128 And on May 24, 300 Iraqi delegates elected a council in the northern city of 
Kirkuk. The U.S. military oversaw the election, which included all three of the city’s 
major ethnic groups, Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomans.129 The council, in turn, elected 
a mayor on May 28.130  
However, coalition authorities also clamped down on the creation of local gov-
ernments in certain areas. In June 2003, citizens of Basra protested British forces’ 
selection of leaders and technocrats for the city, particularly criticizing the absence of 
clergy in the appointed government.131 They demanded the right to run their own 
city.132 CPA halted elections in the southern Shi’ite city of Najaf, claiming that con-
ditions were not appropriate for elections. Despite U.S. Marines having overseen the 
process,133 CPA appointed a former Iraqi military officer (who was later sacked on 
corruption charges) to the post of mayor.134 Similarly, U.S. forces halted elections in 
Samara on June 28 and appointed a leader, angering citizens there. In total, CPA re-
portedly appointed mayors in a dozen cities.135 These policies, coupled with censor-
ing certain groups’ political rhetoric, bred resentment within the population and led 
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to accusations that the United States had no intention of bringing democracy to the 
country.136  
This somewhat haphazard variety of means for establishing local governments—
including elections held in some areas and appointments by CPA or the coalition in 
others—confused and frustrated the local populations.137 So CPA began to construct 
several teams, each with two purposes: first, to coordinate different agencies working 
on political development in Iraq, including the military, civilians, government agen-
cies such as USAID, and NGOs mandated to work on governance issues; and sec-
ond, to foster local political development and government building at provincial, dis-
trict, and city levels more consistently throughout Iraq. 
Each of these teams had four subdivisions. One subdivision was made up of 
CPA representatives, primarily from the United States, United Kingdom, and Italy. 
It was tasked with overseeing developments at the provincial level and acting as a liai-
son between officials at the federal and local levels. A second subdivision was USAID 
and RTI workers, whose job was to help Iraqis facilitate town hall meetings, build 
civil society, and teach political culture. A third subdivision was the Iraqi Reconstruc-
tion and Development Council (IRDC), a body created in February 2003, consisting 
of exiles who could offer technical expertise in running the government.138 The 
fourth subdivision was made up of coalition military forces, including civil affairs 
personnel, already on the ground and aiding in political development. Finally, the 
governorate coordinator, who acted as the shadow governor of a province, oversaw 
the four subdivisions.139 The size of these teams varied from province to province. 
Basra’s team, for example, had around 500 members, while others were much 
smaller.140  
Beginning in November 2003, following creation of the governance teams, 
CPA initiated a “refreshment” process for local governance in which current leaders 
were evaluated on their progress. The goal of the refreshment process was to increase 
the legitimacy of the provincial and city governments with their constituents, par-
ticularly those governments appointed by CPA.141 In each of Iraq’s provinces, the 
process called for the creation of local caucuses made up of individuals from each of 
the province’s social, religious, and ethnic groups. These caucuses, in turn, debated 
the performance of current provincial leadership and made recommendations for 
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new appointments. Overall, CPA viewed the refreshment process as successfully 
achieving its goal.  
To further increase the legitimacy of “refreshed” provincial governments, CPA 
also initiated a policy that allowed provincial governments to spend discretionary 
funds independently of the federal government’s budget. CPA gave $1 million to 
each provincial government that successfully refreshed its leaders, with the possibility 
for additional funds after the initial sum was spent. This money allowed local minis-
tries to create proposals for projects, get bids from Iraqi contractors, hire laborers, 
and oversee projects. This initiative had a twofold effect. First, work was completed 
more quickly if the proposal did not have to go through Baghdad for approval. Sec-
ond, it empowered local governments to respond directly to constituent needs, in-
creasing their legitimacy.142  
The CPA also worked to resolve structural pathologies created by Saddam’s re-
gime between the federal and provincial governments. Under Saddam’s rule, legisla-
tive and fiscal policies were established almost exclusively in Baghdad. This meant 
that nearly all decisions at the provincial level had to go through Baghdad before ac-
tion could be taken. Provincial and city governments, therefore, were weak and 
strongly tied to the federal government. The CPA aimed to build greater autonomy 
at the provincial level, particularly in the area of fiscal policy. It also gave local gov-
ernments the authority to dismiss province-level ministerial authorities and to fire 
officials found guilty of corruption.143  
In addition to CPA’s efforts to develop provincial and city governments 
throughout Iraq, the creation of a government for the city of Baghdad presented its 
own challenges to coalition authorities and received special attention. Prior to Gar-
ner’s arrival in the capital on April 21, Iraqi leaders had moved into Baghdad with 
independent plans to govern the city. Most notably, while U.S. officials convened the 
April 15 meeting near Ur, Chalabi and other members of the INC headed to the 
newly liberated capital, claiming that U.S. forces had granted them authority to gov-
ern the city.144 On April 16, Mohammed Mohsen Zubeidi of the INC announced 
that the United States had selected him as Baghdad’s mayor, an assertion that a 
CENTCOM officer later denied.145 On April 22, the Pentagon announced it had 
selected a U.S. official to run the city, Barbara Bodine, and that it did not recognize 
Zubeidi’s authority. In response to this announcement, the INC claimed that 
Zubeidi was only loosely connected to its organization and that he was “acting with-
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out orders” and “off the reservation.”146 Despite this disclaimer, Zubeidi continued to 
speak as the de facto mayor of the city until U.S. troops had him arrested on April 
27.147 Amid this political turmoil, the city continued to suffer from crime, looting, 
and general lawlessness. Bodine’s tenure lasted only weeks before she was replaced in 
early May amid local and international criticism over the lack of progress in restoring 
order to the city, as well as interagency disagreements in Washington.148  
A governing council for Baghdad slowly took shape during the month of June. 
Bremer’s office announced the creation of the Interim City Advisory Council on July 
7, consisting of 37 delegates—including six women—representing 88 neighbor-
hoods. The council’s powers were primarily advisory, with the hope of providing a 
link between Baghdad’s five million citizens, its leaders, and CPA.149  
Despite these successes in creating a Baghdad city council, the new governing 
body had some shortcomings. It was given no budget and therefore lacked the power 
to implement its own programs. This, in turn, undercut the council’s credibility; citi-
zens of Baghdad quickly learned that their complaints to council members would not 
result in any changes. The CPA took action to resolve this problem by giving the 
council a small discretionary fund, but only after months had passed and council 
members and citizens had complained of the body’s inability to implement change.150 
However, despite these shortcomings, the creation of the Baghdad city council was 
heralded by a U.S. official as “a major step in turning over the running of Baghdad to 
Iraqis.”151  
Overall, efforts to develop local governance in Iraq had mixed results. Through-
out CPA’s tenure, RTI and USAID boasted that positive developments on local gov-
ernance issues were considerable. The May 2004 USAID bulletin, Democracy in Iraq, 
reported that USAID’s Local Governance Program had assisted “445 neighborhoods, 
194 sub-districts, 90 districts, and 16 governorate councils” in their efforts to achieve 
greater participation in Iraq’s civic and political life.152 More than 660 community 
action groups had been established in 17 governorates, which helped to initiate 1,395 
projects aimed at building civil society. And the Iraq Transition Initiative had issued 
“more than $48 million in 700 small grants for civic education, civil society and me-
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dia, women’s participation, conflict mitigation and transitional justice,” in addition 
to aiding in the reconstruction of schools, clinics, and municipal buildings.153 
USAID’s annual report, A Year in Iraq, further boasted, “More than 80 percent of 
Iraq’s adult population had been engaged—either directly or indirectly—in democ-
racy or governance at the local level because of U.S. programs.”154  
However, many local governance issues remained unresolved at the time of the 
June 2004 transfer of authority. In particular, provincial and city governments were 
only beginning to develop and follow such democratic procedures as holding meet-
ings, taking notes, filing reports, creating and approving budgets, and preparing for 
elections. Moreover, some provinces were still struggling to create local governments 
at the time of the handover, and the governments in some were being contested. The 
government of Najaf, in particular, faced challenges to its legitimacy from Moqtada 
al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army. CPA officials and international aid workers in Iraqi 
noted that such challenges could cause local governments to collapse if not properly 
mentored over the next decade. Despite the departure of CPA, agencies such as 
USAID and RTI remained in the country to help work on the many challenges that 
continued to face local governance in Iraq.155 
Lessons Learned  
Efforts to address governance issues in Iraq offer valuable insights into nation build-
ing in general and the transition to democracy in particular. This chapter concludes 
by considering six issues that plagued coalition authorities in their 15-month effort to 
create an independent Iraqi political system: the importance of security for political 
development; the role of exiles in a new government; bringing all ethnic and religious 
groups into the political process; flexibility in sequencing political developments and 
constructing reasonable timelines; publicizing political events and informing the 
public; and recognizing that civil society and political culture take time to foster. 
Security and Political Development 
The security environment posed perhaps the single greatest obstacle for ORHA and 
CPA in their efforts to rebuild Iraq’s political system. Beginning with rampant loot-
ing and violence throughout the country following the fall of Baghdad on April 9, 
coalition forces lost time and the trust of the population by failing to control the se-
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curity environment. The looting caused substantial damage to the government’s in-
frastructure—including the destruction of most federal buildings and police stations, 
and many museums, schools, and hospitals—which, in turn, required coalition 
authorities to rebuild many of these institutions from the ground up, thus delaying 
political development. Furthermore, rampant unchecked looting made the popula-
tion question coalition forces’ capabilities and intentions in invading and occupying 
the country, including coalition plans to create a new Iraqi government.156  
Throughout the occupation period, the lack of security in Iraq continued to 
hinder coalition authorities’ efforts to establish a new Iraqi government. Following 
the appointment of the IGC and the establishment of a judiciary, Iraqis holding po-
sitions in either became targets of abduction and assassination. As noted earlier, two 
members of the IGC were assassinated while in office and several judges, mayors, and 
other officials were targeted between April 2003 and June 30, 2004. These assassina-
tions were not only costly given the loss of Iraqi leadership, but they also created a 
more general atmosphere of insecurity. Most Iraqis blamed coalition authorities for 
failing to improve the security environment, further diminishing trust in the motives 
and intentions of the coalition’s occupying powers.157 
Finally, the UN named the poor security environment in Iraq as one reason for 
delaying elections until January 2005. The UN envoy argued that elections would 
not be feasible if security could not be ensured at voting stations.158 Thus, continued 
violence helped to delay one of the key demands of most Iraqis—to select their lead-
ers through popular votes. The failure of coalition forces to improve the security en-
vironment adversely affected the safety and productivity of the Iraqi Interim Gov-
ernment. It also damaged Iraqi perceptions of the occupying powers’ motives and 
intentions toward the country.  
The Role of Exiles in the New Government  
Coalition authorities, and the United States in particular, emphasized the role of 
Iraqi exiles in creating a new political system in Iraq. Prior to the initiation of major 
combat operations on March 19, 2003, the United States spent considerable re-
sources building a cadre of Iraqi exiles that could help with military operations in the 
country and then run Iraq’s various ministries and other infrastructure. Relying on 
exiles, however, caused several problems. First, and most important, most of these 
exiles had been out of the country for at least a decade and were both out of touch 
with the situation in Iraq and unknown by the population. Many exiles were given 
positions of authority in the interim government, including in the IGC. The number 
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of IGC leaders unknown to the public was named as one problem contributing to 
that body’s lack of legitimacy with Iraqi citizens.159  
Second, the trust that the U.S. government placed in some of the Iraqi  
exiles—such as Ahmed Chalabi—may have been misplaced. Chalabi, for example, 
was accused of offering bogus intelligence to the U.S. government leading up to the 
war.160 In May 2004, Iraqi police raided Chalabi’s offices in Baghdad because they 
suspected he was embezzling funds and leaking intelligence to Iran.161 
Bringing All Groups into the Political Process 
Iraq has a population that is both ethnically and religiously diverse. This includes 
two main ethnic groups, Arabs and Kurds, the majority of whom are either Shi’ite or 
Sunni Muslims, in addition to other ethnic and religious minorities. Such diversity 
presented challenges to coalition authorities in their efforts to forge a transitional 
government in Iraq.  
The most important challenge resulted from the fact that ORHA and CPA were 
slow to bring Sunni Arabs into the political process. CPA’s controversial policies, 
such as completely disbanding an Iraqi army whose officer corps was predominantly 
Sunni Arab and its strict de-Ba’athification program, hit Sunni Arabs the hardest, 
blocking many from participating in Iraq’s new political and security infrastructure. 
These obstacles were exacerbated by the Sunni Arabs’ own lack of political organiza-
tion. Prior to major combat operations in Iraq, most Sunni Arabs were represented 
by the Ba’ath Party. Under occupation, however, the Ba’ath Party was banned, effec-
tively dissolving the Sunnis’ main vehicle for representation. It was not until six 
months after the fall of Saddam that Sunni Arabs succeeded in forming their own 
political party, the State Council for Sunnis, which brought together various ethnic 
and religious factions within the Sunni Arab population. This put Sunni Arabs at a 
perceived disadvantage relative to other ethnic and religious groups, most of which 
had political organizations prior to the fall of Saddam that coalition authorities al-
lowed to participate in the new Iraqi political arena.  
Starting in April 2004, partly in response to growing insurgency and violence 
throughout the country, efforts were made to soften the blow of the de-
Ba’athification policy and to assure former Ba’athists that they, too, would have a 
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place in the new Iraq. While the policy had always been that even senior Ba’athists 
could appeal decisions excluding them from public service, the process was an oner-
ous one. CPA officials promised to make it easier, particularly in order to attract 
former military personnel, teachers, engineers, and bureaucrats, whose skills and ex-
pertise were deemed necessary. In addition, CPA officials hoped this change in atti-
tude might mitigate some of the Sunni hostility toward the coalition. From April to 
June 2004, CPA officials considered a range of initiatives to promote reconciliation 
and to include roles for former Ba’athists and the Sunni public as a whole.162 By this 
time, however, many Sunnis did not trust the occupation authorities, and feared that 
they would be excluded from or underrepresented in the new Iraqi government. 
Flexibility in Creating a New Government and Establishing Reasonable Timelines  
Within months of the fall of Baghdad, ORHA and CPA identified a series of mile-
stones they considered essential to creating democracy in Iraq. The first task was cre-
ating a new Iraqi constitution, followed by selecting an interim government via cau-
cuses, and ending with full national elections. Interspersed between these milestones 
were other developments, such as the appointment of an interim cabinet, the crea-
tion of a judiciary, and the training and deployment of new Iraqi security forces.  
Such progressive steps, however, proved to be unnatural for Iraq’s political de-
velopment. Specifically, coalition authorities’ insistence that Iraqis draft a constitu-
tion before selecting an interim government stalled the political process. Before CPA 
and the Bush administration stepped in and reordered the sequence of events in the 
November 15 agreement, the IGC struggled for five months to secure an agreement 
on who should be allowed to draft the new constitution without reaching definitive 
conclusions. The new agreement placed greater emphasis on the selection of an in-
terim government, calling on the UN to help resolve disputes between CPA and the 
IGC over the method of selection, and postponing the drafting of a constitution un-
til later. In place of a permanent constitution, the November 15 agreement called for 
creation of an interim constitution, which Iraqis succeeded in drafting and ratifying 
in March 2004. Thus, the political process was stalled for five months by CPA’s in-
sistence that a constitution had to come first. If coalition authorities had demon-
strated greater flexibility in the sequence of events leading toward Iraqi democracy, 
this time might not have been lost.  
The November 15 agreement between CPA and the IGC not only rearranged 
priorities for what needed to be accomplished in Iraq’s political development, it also 
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created a timeline for achieving these goals. While some welcomed the introduction 
of a timeline and, specifically, the selection of June 30, 2004 as the date for CPA to 
hand over authority to an Iraqi interim government, in practice the timeline was un-
realistic given what still needed to be accomplished. In just over seven months, CPA 
and the IGC had to determine what body would inherit Iraq’s political reins, how 
that body would be selected, and which basic laws would govern the country in lieu 
of a constitution.  
Moreover, this timeline put pressure on the training and deployment of Iraqi 
security forces. As discussed in Chapter Nine, coalition forces accelerated the training 
of Iraqi forces, in some cases cutting training time in half.163 As the June 30 date for 
political handover grew closer, violence in Iraq increased significantly, especially in 
April.164 This put pressure on both coalition troops and Iraq’s fledgling security 
forces. It also revealed that some Iraqi forces were unwilling to oppose their own 
people in battle, throwing into question their ability to contain Iraq’s insurgency in 
the near future.165  
Thus coalition authorities lost time in the first months of occupation by insist-
ing on a sequence of events for a political process that was ill suited to Iraq’s needs. 
The November 15 agreement, in contrast, reprioritized the sequence of events but 
established an unreasonably short period of time in which to accomplish monumen-
tal tasks necessary for Iraq’s political viability. 
Publicizing Political Developments and Informing the Population 
Throughout their tenure in Iraq, ORHA and CPA struggled with informing the 
country of developments in the capital. This problem surfaced immediately following 
the fall of Baghdad when coalition forces attempted to issue a decree calling for new 
tactics toward looters, but there was no mechanism by which to publicize the an-
nouncement.166 Following the selection of the IGC, in July 2003, CPA failed to cir-
culate information either within Baghdad or throughout the country on this impor-
tant development. As a result, many Iraqis had no idea what the IGC was or who its 
members were. At the end of October 2003, more than three months after its crea-
tion, a poll showed that the majority of Iraqis still did not know about the IGC.167 
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The lack of information on political developments within the federal government 
thus presented another obstacle to popular participation in the political development 
of Iraq.  
Moreover, ORHA and CPA had to contend with competing sources of infor-
mation. Specifically they had to vie with two Arab satellite networks, Al Jazeera and 
Al Arabiya, which had cameras and reporters on the ground throughout the country 
and could broadcast events in near real time. Both CPA and the IGC had run-ins 
with these news stations, including the IGC’s decision to temporarily ban them in 
September 2003 on charges of inciting violence against coalition forces.168 The U.S. 
government made several attempts to provide alternatives to these news sources; in 
particular, it established the Iraqi Media Network beginning in May 2003. That 
network included radio stations, a local TV station, a daily newspaper, and, begin-
ning in January 2004, a satellite station called Al Hurra.169 Yet Al Jazeera and Al 
Arabiya remained the primary sources of information for the Iraqi population. 
ORHA and CPA were thus slow in: creating means for spreading information 
on developments in the capital; competing with Arab media sources—which were 
seldom complimentary toward the occupation; and putting down rumors when they 
arose. These informational problems did not help further Iraq’s political progress. In 
particular, they did not bring the country’s population on board by improving access 
to political developments in the capital. 
The Importance of Civil Society and Political Culture  
Finally, as argued by scholars of democracy theory,170 democracy cannot flourish 
without civil society, which consists of voluntary, “organized collective participation 
in the public space between individuals and the state,”171 including such groups as 
“associations, clubs, guilds, syndicates, federations, unions, [and] parties.”172 Nor can 
it flourish without a democratic political culture, defined as “values and behavioral 
codes of tolerating—if not accepting—others and a tacit or explicit commitment to 
____________ 
168 Chandrasekaran, “Iraqi Council Denies Access to Two Arab Satellite Networks.” 
169 Interview with ORHA official, October 2003. For more on Al Hurra, see Jim Rutenberg, “The Struggle for 
Iraq: Hearts and Minds,” New York Times, December 17, 2004; William A. Rugh, testimony to the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, April 29, 2004. 
170 See Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.), Politics in Developing Countries, Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner, 1990.  
171 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World: An Overview,” in Rex Brynen, 
Bahgat Korany, and Paul Noble (eds.), Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, Volume I: 
Theoretical Perspectives, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995, p. 29. 
172 Augustus Richard Norton, “Introduction,” in Augustus Richard Norton (ed.), Civil Society in the Middle East, 
Volume I, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995, p. 7. 
Governance and Political Reconstruction    193 
the peaceful management of differences among individuals and collectivities sharing 
the same ‘public space’—that is, the polity.”173  
Both civil society and political culture had languished in Iraq under Saddam’s 
rule. Civil associations were highly regulated by the state or banned altogether. 
Moreover, key political leaders in Iraq not aligned with Saddam and his Ba’ath Party 
were subjected to arrest, torture, and execution, forcing many elites to flee the coun-
try, which drained Iraq of intellectual and political capital. Likewise, in addition to 
restrictions on civil associations, the Iraqi people have developed a political culture 
that corresponds to more than 30 years of oppressive, dictatorial rule in which the 
only real means of attempting to change the system was to violently overthrow it. In 
other words, the population is not accustomed to organizing and working nonvio-
lently for political change through the system. 
Thus, while Iraq successfully held its first set of national elections in January 
2005, this milestone will not necessarily make Iraq a democracy. Rather, Iraq’s tran-
sition to a truly healthy functioning democracy will require educating the popula-
tion, both formally and informally, to accept democratic values, norms, and institu-
tions and encouraging the growth of civil associations, which could take a decade or 
longer to foster. Iraq cannot establish these values and institutions alone. The task 
may require a sustained commitment from the United States, its partners, and the 
international community, if Iraq is to become a stable and lasting democracy. 
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This chapter describes economic conditions at the time of invasion, the economic 
problems facing the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and the policies that 
CPA adopted to solve these problems. The chapter concludes with a discussion of 
tasks that were not fully implemented by the transition to Iraqi rule at the end of 
June 2004.1 
Economic Conditions in Iraq at the End of Major Combat 
Iraq’s economy was in poor shape at the time of invasion, as a consequence of eco-
nomic mismanagement on the part of the Iraqi regime, a quarter of a century of con-
flict, and more than a decade of economic sanctions. Output and incomes had fallen 
dramatically from Iraq’s economic heyday of the oil boom years of 1979 and 1980. 
The Iran-Iraq War had saddled the country with debt. The 1991 Gulf War had de-
stroyed key pieces of the country’s infrastructure. Sanctions and economic misman-
agement curbed the investment needed to repair the damage and replace depreciated 
equipment. Although the statistics are problematic,2 real per capita GDP fell from a 
peak of $4,080 in 1980 to $1,021 in 2002, a quarter of the 1980 peak. In real terms, 
incomes had fallen even more dramatically. Infant mortality, closely related to eco-
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nomic well-being, rose from 54 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1979–1984 to 108 in 
1994–1999.3 
Some of the decline in economic output and increase in infant mortality has 
been blamed on economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations. The UN im-
posed a comprehensive trade embargo on Iraq and froze Iraqi assets held in foreign 
banks on August 6, 1990, in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Following the 
ceasefire in August 1991, the UN passed Resolution 687, which relaxed the embargo, 
permitting Iraq to export oil to generate revenues to pay for war reparations and hu-
manitarian needs. However, the UN tied the end of sanctions to Iraq’s compliance 
with agreements to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. Because Saddam refused 
to cooperate, sanctions remained in force. Consequently, oil export revenues fell 
from $23.3 billion in 1988 to just $2.2 billion in 1992 and 1993. In the face of de-
clining food consumption and health, in April 1995 the UN passed Resolution 986, 
which set up the Oil for Food program. Under this resolution, all export revenues 
were to be channeled through accounts controlled by the UN. Revenues were to be 
used to provide food rations to all Iraqis and pharmaceuticals and other medical sup-
plies for Iraq’s state-run public health system. However, Saddam haggled over the 
proposal until 1996, when he finally acquiesced to UN terms and the program began 
to function.  
Compounding the effects of sanctions, Saddam’s economic policies contributed 
to the destruction of the Iraqi economy. The government, through the Ministry of 
Trade, controlled imports: only favored individuals were permitted to purchase im-
ports.4 They were also given permission to purchase dollars at the artificial official 
rate of 3.22 U.S. dollars per Iraqi dinar, while the black market exchange rate ran 
1,900 dinars per dollar. Business owners who supported the regime were able to ob-
tain the large number of licenses and registrations required to operate legally. The 
central bank was subordinated to the government. If Saddam needed more cash, he 
demanded that the requested amount be printed. Not surprisingly, inflation ran to 
458 percent in 1994 and stayed in triple digits throughout the first half of the 
1990s.5  
The 2003 war further exacerbated Iraq’s economic problems. When major 
combat ended on April 9, 2003, the Iraqi economy had come to a standstill. Oil ex-
ports had been halted, as pipelines were closed. As a consequence, oil production had 
to be severely curtailed. Iraq’s rickety telecommunications system shut down when 
the major switches were destroyed in the war or damaged during looting. Although 
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the electric power system had not been attacked, looters destroyed important con-
trols; organized gangs began to blow up power line pylons to steal the metal, further 
reducing the availability of electricity. Without electricity, pumps needed to operate 
the water systems failed, resulting in sharp reductions in the availability of water. 
Government ministries that managed most of the economy were also looted, destroy-
ing many of the records and accounts needed for the economy to function. 
Economic Policies Pursued by CPA 
It does not appear that much thought was given to economic policy before the war. 
ORHA focused primarily on humanitarian assistance and immediate reconstruction 
needs, as discussed in Chapter Five. Once CPA was set up, L. Paul Bremer created 
the Office of Economic Policy under Peter McPherson, a former Under Secretary of 
the Treasury and administrator of USAID. Initially, economic policies were formu-
lated by the Office of Economic Policy and presented in the form of action memos 
that were to become the basis for orders signed by Bremer. Subsequently, some of the 
functions of the Office of Economic Policy were delegated to other units. Thomas 
Foley was recruited to head up the Office of Private Sector Development. David 
Oliver was given responsibility for developing budgets in a new unit, the Office of 
Management and Budget. Day-to-day operations proceeded independently within 
each of these offices. However, committees were set up to create common positions 
for such cross-cutting economic policy changes as price liberalization.  
McPherson focused on reducing government controls and trying to create a 
climate for foreign direct investment. However, the Office of Economic Policy faced 
three major hurdles to making major economic policy changes. It was hampered by 
concerns about CPA’s authority to enact irreversible reforms under Article 64 of the 
Geneva Convention of 1949; CPA wished to ensure that economic policies were po-
litically acceptable so that they would not be reversed when an Iraqi government 
took over; and economic advisors had to contend with the security situation, which 
hampered CPA efforts to work with Iraqi ministries. In order to address the issue of 
political acceptability, the Iraqi ministers and the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) 
had to agree on all economic policy proposals. Although some of the ministers were 
supportive of change, the IGC generally supported the status quo. Opposition from 
the IGC greatly slowed economic policymaking and derailed a number of initiatives.  
Restarting the Economy  
CPA’s immediate task was to restart the economy. The Iraqi economy can be divided 
into three major components:  
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• the state-owned energy sector, which is dominated by the Ministry of Oil but 
also includes the Ministry of Electricity, formerly the Commission of Electric 
Power;  
• the other state-sponsored economic activities, including education and public 
health, but also the nonenergy state-owned companies; and  
• the private sector, most of which consists of the informal sector, small unincor-
porated businesses involved in trade, transport, and consumer services.  
Different policies were adopted to stimulate activity in each of these segments. 
A first priority was to get the oil sector and public utilities operating again. 
Here, a number of agencies were involved. The Army Corps of Engineers had been 
given responsibility and contracting authority to resuscitate the oil sector. It issued a 
sole-source contract to Halliburton on March 24, 2003, not only to put out oil fires 
but also to restart oil production and exports.6 USAID took the lead on electric 
power and water systems, issuing a sole-source contract to Bechtel on April 17, 2003 
to rehabilitate the electric power sector and rebuild government buildings, including 
schools.7  
Resuming the Provision of Government Services  
Another priority, almost as important as the first, was to resume the provision of 
government services and payments. First and foremost, CPA had to start paying Iraqi 
civil servants. As the interim authority in Iraq, CPA had responsibility for making 
payments to government employees, pensioners, and employees of state-owned en-
terprises (SOEs) after the war ended. In late 2002, U.S. Treasury officials worked out 
a payments strategy that would be funded with assets seized from the Ba’athist gov-
ernment during the Gulf War. On March 20, 2003, President Bush issued an order 
that these assets, of which $1.7 billion had been identified, were to be “vested” in a 
special account, the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) in the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York. These assets were to be used to pay for reconstruction costs, govern-
ment salaries, and other expenditures that would directly benefit the Iraqi people.  
Because of the breakdown in government operations, the Iraqi Ministry of Fi-
nance lacked cash to make salary payments immediately following major combat op-
erations. Consequently, the coalition used dollars and what dinars were available in 
government coffers to pay salaries. Dollar bills (mostly in ones and fives) were flown 
from the United States to Camp Arifjan in Kuwait. Coalition economic advisors 
learned that Iraq’s existing cash-based salary system could function in the post-
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combat environment with only a few modifications. The main tactical issues would 
be how to move the cash around the country and confirm the accuracy of employee 
lists. CJTF-7 played a key role in setting up distribution centers and guarding pay-
rolls so that civil servants, pensioners, teachers, and other government employees 
could be paid. The major modification to the payments system imposed by the coali-
tion was to compress the previous salary schedule, widely perceived as unfair to those 
at the bottom, into a temporary schedule of four pay grades.8  
Controlling Inflation  
Reviving the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI). CPA and the U.S. Treasury were wor-
ried about controlling inflation in Iraq. They rightfully feared that rapid rates of in-
flation would be highly unpopular, generating political unrest.9 Rapid inflation can 
be debilitating. It raises the cost of investing, as lenders have to charge increasingly 
higher interest rates to recoup principal as well as the cost of capital from loans. Buy-
ers and sellers in high-inflation countries find it difficult to react judiciously to 
changes in relative prices. Governments have great difficulty in budgeting. As a con-
sequence, high-inflation countries are prone to severe boom-bust cycles and have 
lower rates of economic growth than low-inflation countries.  
A strong central bank is the best antidote to inflation. CPA immediately rein-
vigorated the Central Bank of Iraq. During the looting, the CBI had shut down. 
CPA called employees back to work, appointed an interim governor, and ordered the 
central bank to stop printing new currency immediately in order to forestall a surge 
in inflation. Over the course of the next several months, CPA helped introduce new 
accounting, statistics collection, and operating systems in the CBI. In addition, CBI 
branches were linked electronically with the headquarters in Baghdad, beginning the 
process of integrating activities of the branches with headquarters on a daily basis. 
These measures started the process of building a professional central bank in Iraq.  
Currency exchange. The CPA quickly realized that the old Iraqi currency, the 
dinar, needed to be exchanged for a new currency. Immediately following the con-
flict, presses, plates, and paper for printing the 10,000-dinar note, worth about $5 in 
mid-summer 2003, were stolen from the central bank’s Dar Al-Nahrain printing 
works.10 As a consequence, counterfeit Iraqi 10,000-dinar notes were of the highest 
quality. To forestall massive counterfeiting, CPA needed to replace old currency with 
new as soon as possible.  
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Notes from the 1990s carried Saddam’s visage, but earlier notes did not. Fortu-
nately, plates for the earlier notes had not been stolen and were available. CPA con-
tracted with a European firm to use these plates to print millions of new bills in a 
number of denominations. The new bills were airlifted to Jordan and Kuwait in 
747s. Because U.S. military aircraft were completely engaged, CPA chartered aircraft 
and pilots from a Belarusian company to fly the new notes to bank branches around 
the country and return old notes that had been rendered worthless by dipping them 
in a red dye. The whole operation lasted three months, from mid-October 2003 to 
mid-January 2004. CJTF-7 played a key role in the success of the operation, provid-
ing security to banks and for local deliveries of cash.  
Although the exchange was successful, a substantial amount of counterfeit cash 
appears to have been converted into the new currency, as the total amount converted 
exceeded the central bank’s account of the old currency that had been issued. Either 
some of the new currency was exchanged for counterfeit as reported, or some old cur-
rency was not destroyed but instead returned to circulation and exchanged for new 
again.11 Those who were able to make these illegal exchanges benefited handsomely, 
since they exchanged worthless paper for real money.  
Foreign exchange auction. Aside from regulating the quantity of dinars it 
prints, the CBI had little in the way of policy instruments to control the supply of 
money. Iraqis have kept savings in dollars since before the Gulf War because they 
lack confidence in the domestic currency. Consequently, Iraq has been a dual-
currency economy, using both dollars and Iraqi dinars for transactions. Thus, the 
total money supply in Iraq is determined by stocks of dollars as well as dinars and the 
rate of exchange between the two currencies. In dual-currency economies the rate of 
exchange is extraordinarily important for inflation. Households and businesses tend 
to hold most of their savings in dollars because dollars hold their value and can be 
used outside and inside Iraq. In dual-currency economies, even small declines in the 
exchange rate can trigger a flight to dollars, sometimes triggering a run on the local 
currency. Since imported goods are paid for in dollars, a decline in the value of the 
dinar immediately shows up in increased dinar prices for imported goods. Most con-
sumption goods in Iraq, including food, clothing, and pharmaceuticals, are im-
ported. Thus, an increase in the prices of imports has an immediate impact on con-
sumer welfare.  
Iraq did not have an official foreign exchange market under Saddam; the gov-
ernment controlled exchange rates by fiat. Dollars were sold unofficially by money-
changers; rates varied from city to city depending on local conditions. With the assis-
tance of CPA, the CBI started a foreign exchange auction on October 4, 2003. By 
establishing a central foreign exchange market, the CBI could better monitor ex-
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change rate developments, provide the country with a clear, daily indicator of trends 
in the exchange rate (a key economic indicator), and attempt to influence the ex-
change rate to moderate inflationary forces. Volumes grew rapidly, in great part be-
cause the Ministry of Finance needed to convert a steady stream of the dollars it 
earned from oil exports into dinars to make salary and other payments in the domes-
tic economy.  
The auction became a success, with tens of millions of dollars exchanged on a 
daily basis. However, it did have some teething problems. Historically, Baghdad’s 
money dealers congregated around the headquarters of the Rasheed Bank; an infor-
mal foreign exchange market among moneychangers had developed there. In order to 
eliminate settlement risk, only banks with accounts at the CBI were permitted to par-
ticipate in the auctions. The moneychangers, who did not have banking licenses, had 
to bid for dollars through banks. Many of those in Baghdad met before the auction. 
Their aggregated bids went through the Rasheed Bank and frequently accounted for 
half of the total bids received, thus raising some concern about collusion on the part 
of those bidding through Rasheed. For its part, the CBI was not always transparent. 
Initially, the CBI chose a sell rate as much as 10 percent below the market rate to 
encourage participation. This rate often fell below both the buy and sell rates on the 
local market. Thus, banks had access to dollars sold at a discount. The discount was 
gradually eliminated, and by the first quarter of 2004 some dollars were sold as well 
as bought on the local market.  
Tariffs and Taxes  
Most of the Iraqi government’s budget is financed from oil export revenues. The 
government does not tax oil: it takes all export revenues directly into government 
coffers. Revenues from traditional taxes were very small in that part of the country 
controlled by Saddam; the quasi-independent Kurdish area in the north had its own 
tax system, including tariffs and income taxes.  
On June 8, 2003, CPA declared a tax holiday for the remainder of the calendar 
year. Tariffs and import licensing requirements were lifted. Because neither the tax 
administration nor the customs agency were functional at the time, the decision was 
partially one of necessity. However, the economic rationale was sound. The combi-
nation of UN sanctions and Saddam’s tight control over foreign exchange and im-
ports had prevented Iraqis from freely purchasing foreign goods. CPA’s decision fa-
cilitated the beginning of the integration of Iraq into the world economy. Opening 
the country to imports was a key factor spurring economic activity, as wholesalers, 
transporters, and retailers expanded their operations to satisfy consumer demand.  
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Some observers criticized CPA’s decision to eliminate tariffs, arguing that this 
would expose Iraqi manufacturers to unwarranted competition.12 Because Iraq does 
not produce most of the imported products, these arguments are not very convinc-
ing. SOEs that manufactured products like clothing, which might compete with im-
ports, were often sold only to the old Iraqi military because quality was so poor that 
consumers would not buy these goods.  
The Budget  
A large number of the few dozen CPA staff members involved in economic policy 
were engaged in writing and implementing the Iraqi budget. The first budget was for 
the second half of 2003. It was prepared using the traditional budgetary procedures 
of the Ministry of Finance. Expenditures and revenues were calculated in dollars. In 
tandem with the second-half 2003 budget, CPA and the Ministry of Finance began 
to write the 2004 budget. CPA was intent on restoring a more “normal” budgeting 
system for Iraq. Consequently, this budget was issued in the national currency, the 
dinar, not in dollars. Concurrently, CPA employed BearingPoint, a consulting firm, 
to introduce and train Ministry of Finance personnel in a modern Financial Man-
agement Information System (FMIS). The system was rolled out during the second 
half of 2003 and the first half of 2004. It improved control over budgetary expendi-
tures, sped information flows, and provided a better basis for the development and 
implementation of future Iraqi budgets.  
Like the second-half 2003 budget, the 2004 budget was put together quickly. 
Under the assumption that most of the costs of reconstruction would be financed 
from foreign assistance, most of the budget consisted of operating expenditures and 
social transfers. CPA counted on the U.S. supplemental appropriation and a donors’ 
conference held in Madrid on October 23 and 24, 2003, to provide funding for re-
construction. Consequently, CPA staff were under the gun to complete the 2004 
budget in time for the donors’ conference so as to provide donors with information 
on areas that needed additional funding.  
Law on Foreign Direct Investment  
On September 21, 2003, Iraqi Finance Minister Kamal al-Kilani announced that 
CPA had issued an order on foreign investment, providing the same treatment for  
foreign-owned companies as for domestically owned companies. The order allowed 
foreign investors to own 100 percent of businesses outside of the natural resource 
sector. Investors faced no barriers or additional taxes on remitted profits. However, 
foreign investment in the oil industry remained prohibited, and strictures were also 
applied in banking and other financial services. In addition, foreigners were prohib-
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ited from purchasing land, and foreign retailers had to post a $100,000 bond with 
the government.  
Although Iraq had allowed individuals and companies from Arab countries to 
invest in Iraq, going so far as to promulgate an “Arab investment law” in 2002, inves-
tors from non-Arab countries had been barred from legally investing in the country. 
This law was not universally popular. Many Iraqi businessmen feared foreign compe-
tition, and the populace remained concerned that the oil sector would be sold to for-
eign investors. The order was one of the most controversial reforms advanced by 
CPA and the IGC. To date, it has had a modest effect on Iraq’s economy. Because of 
the security situation, foreign investment in Iraq has been very limited. Ironically, the 
most prominent investments (mobile telephones, banking) have been primarily un-
dertaken by Arab investors.  
Economic Policy Changes That Were Not Fully Implemented  
Price Liberalization  
Under Saddam, Iraq operated with a blend of market and controlled prices, some of 
which were highly distorted. In addition, food was distributed virtually gratis 
through the Public Distribution System, a food rationing system set up by Saddam 
immediately following the Gulf War. Outside of food, which is discussed in detail 
below, the most distorted prices were for energy. As of mid-year 2004, gasoline and 
diesel fuel were sold at less than a nickel a gallon.  
The sale of refined oil products at such distorted prices had many pernicious  
effects on the Iraqi economy. Because fuel is so cheap, fuel consumption is much 
higher than it would be if prices were set by markets. To satisfy this additional con-
sumption, the Oil Ministry had been pressed to invest in additional refining capacity 
that under market prices would be unnecessary. However, at these low prices, no 
amount of additional capacity can satisfy demand. As a consequence, gasoline and 
diesel fuel are allocated by queuing as customers attempt to obtain limited supplies 
before they run out.  
Because domestic fuels are much cheaper than those sold at market prices in 
neighboring countries, gasoline and diesel is smuggled out of the country to markets 
where it can be sold at a profit. The Iraqi government has attempted to prevent 
smuggling by setting up cumbersome regulatory schemes and using customs agents 
to prevent the export of refined oil products. These schemes have not functioned 
well. Exporters have generally found it possible to avoid such restrictions through 
smuggling and bribing customs and other government officials.  
The Iraqi government suffers enormous losses in forgone revenues from price 
controls, an estimated $4.9 billion in 2003, close to 25 percent of GDP. Moreover, 
the implicit fuel price subsidies go to the rich, not the poor. In Iraq, car ownership is 
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concentrated in the top 20 percent of households by income, while poor Iraqis do 
not own cars. Consequently, upper-income households benefit more from fuel subsi-
dies than lower-income households.  
Although Bremer supported the concept of price liberalization, this policy 
change was never implemented even though CPA advisors presented a number of 
policy options for liberalizing prices. Opposition to immediate change came from a 
variety of sources. Regional coalition military commanders and civil affairs officers 
were concerned about the popular reaction to price increases. Riots in Basra in the 
summer of 2003—ironically over the length of lines for gasoline, a consequence of 
fuel price controls—had made commanders wary of tampering with the existing sys-
tem. However, by early 2004, CJTF-7 was increasingly supportive of gradual price 
increases as the military recognized the security dangers of the long lines and massive 
imports of gasoline and diesel that were the result of not raising prices. Diplomats 
assigned to CPA also frequently took a negative view. Many had served in countries 
where price increases had been followed by riots. Although dozens of countries have 
successfully liberalized gasoline and diesel prices over the last three decades, diplo-
mats focused on such countries as Nigeria and Zimbabwe where price increases had 
been followed by violence. Finally, the IGC had no stomach for difficult policy 
changes and generally opposed price increases of any kind.  
Reforming the Food Rationing System  
Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq had since 1991 had a system of publicly provided food 
rations, known as the Public Distribution System (PDS) for food. Saddam set up the 
system following the Gulf War to ensure that every Iraqi had a minimum amount of 
food. The system was needed because of the economic consequences of the UN trade 
sanctions. In August 1991, the UN relaxed the trade embargo; it passed Resolutions 
706 and 712 permitting Iraq to sell oil through an escrow account to be used for 
food imports. Saddam rejected this arrangement. In April 1995 the UN and Iraq 
came to an agreement in the form of Resolution 986 to create the Oil for Food 
(OFF) Program, which with some modifications is the basis for financing the current 
system.  
Under OFF, oil revenues deposited in escrow accounts abroad could be used to 
purchase food, medical supplies, and parts and equipment needed to keep the econ-
omy running.13 In the Kurdish areas in the north, the UN’s World Food Programme 
(WFP) hired local staff to distribute food and other supplies through leased ware-
houses. In the south, food and other supplies were shipped to the port of Umm Qasr; 
the Ministry of Trade handled distribution and transportation from the port to 
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warehouses from which food was distributed to licensed food distributors (shops and 
bakeries).  
Under the PDS, Iraqis received a monthly ration of rice, flour, sugar, legumes, 
soap, and tea. Families with infants received dried milk, baby food, and detergent. 
According to WFP vulnerability assessments, most Iraqi households continued to 
depend on the program in 2004. Based on surveys contracted by the WFP and pro-
gram data, prior to OIF, 80 percent of Iraqis picked up their food rations and 60 
percent depended on the ration for a major share of their food.14 The Iraqi Ministry 
of Trade continued to operate under these assumptions. Initially, under the OFF 
agreement everything had to be imported so that the UN could monitor what was 
being purchased with the escrow monies. Subsequently, some home-grown foods 
were eligible for purchase. As of June 28, 2004, more food was being purchased do-
mestically, but most products were still imported.  
The program has successfully fed the Iraqi populace and contributed to reduc-
ing infant mortality. However, it has a number of negative side effects. First, it de-
prives local farmers of most of their market, retarding increases in agricultural output 
and penalizing some of the poorest people in Iraq, its farmers. Poor families who 
need cash for other expenditures are forced to sell part of their ration for money. Be-
cause Iraq is awash in rationed commodities, sellers receive only a pittance for these 
goods. The products are often of very low quality. In the north, which is a little bet-
ter off, most families leave their ration at the local store, which then gives them a dis-
count on better quality foods and soaps. Traders circulate among the local stores, 
purchasing this food at knockdown prices and then trucking it to Iran and Turkey 
for sale to poor people in those countries.15 The program has also been subject to cor-
ruption up and down the entire supply chain.16  
CPA failed to change this system. In September 2003, Bremer agreed that the 
in-kind system should be replaced with a cash payment. This policy change would 
permit Iraqis to purchase locally grown food of their own choice. It would also pro-
vide them with funds to obtain items other than food, such as shoes and clothing. 
Various options were debated for changing the system, and one option calling for a 
gradual replacement of food rations with a cash-based system, neighborhood by 
neighborhood, was presented to the Iraqi Minister of Trade in November 2003. 
However, the IGC did not wish to make major policy changes in 2004 because of its 
concerns that any policy change would serve to increase political discontent with 
____________ 
14 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “U.N. Official Warns of Iraqi Food Crisis,” Washington Post, February 28, 2003. 
15 Interviews with Iraqi recipients, October 2003. 
16 U.S. General Accounting Office, “United Nations: Observations on the Oil for Food Program and Iraq’s Secu-
rity,” testimony before the Committee on Agriculture, Statement of Joseph A. Christoff, Director, International 
Affairs and Trade, U.S. General Accounting Office, June 16, 2004, p. 1. 
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CPA, thereby fanning the insurgency. In addition, because of the complexity of mov-
ing to a new system, policy change in this area was not pursued further by CPA.  
Rationalizing State-Owned Enterprises  
Virtually all industrial assets in Iraq were and still are owned by the state: the oil in-
dustry, the electric power industry, and most manufacturing enterprises. As the rep-
resentative of the occupying power, CPA was responsible for managing these SOEs. 
Under Saddam the SOEs were managed through ministries: the Ministry of Oil, the 
Commission of Electric Power, the Ministry of Trade, and the Ministry of Industry 
and Minerals. CPA maintained this management strategy, with some modifications. 
In the case of critical enterprises, such as those involved in oil production or electric 
power generation and distribution, CPA placed a priority on restoring former output 
levels, focusing the reconstruction effort on these industries. The Army Corps of En-
gineers, USAID contractors like Halliburton (oil) and Bechtel (electric power and 
other infrastructure), and the Iraqi ministries all worked to restore and improve op-
erations. However, none of these entities tried to introduce organizational changes. 
In general, the approach was business as usual. However, improved systems of con-
trol and accounting were often installed along with new equipment.  
Most of the remaining SOEs received relatively little attention. The Ministry of 
Industry and Minerals was responsible for 180 factories, all of which suffered under 
severe challenges. All contended with a lack of security. The Facilities Protection 
Services, the security force in charge of protecting equipment and employees, proved 
incapable of ensuring security at most factories, as discussed in Chapter Nine. Most 
enterprises, along with the rest of Iraq, did not have reliable power. Hence, they were 
unable to operate on a steady basis. Some had no power at all. Most of the top man-
agement was fired during de-Ba’athification. However, even if those managers had 
not been fired, it is not clear whether they would have managed the companies better 
than their successors. The Iraqi system of state control of enterprises was extraordi-
narily centralized: revenues went directly to the ministry, and the ministry, not the 
enterprise, was often the source of operating as well as investment expenditures. 
Management had never operated in the free market and had no idea how to respond. 
Top managers often did not even know the source of their raw materials or who their 
final customers were. 
Under this system, neither the ministries nor local management provided em-
ployees with incentives to perform. Of more than 107,000 employees in the Ministry 
of Industry and Minerals, few cared about restarting operations. They were paid to 
stay home. When the Mishraq Sulfur Company staff was asked to go back to work, 
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they destroyed the facility and set $40 million worth of sulfur on fire, completely de-
stroying it.17 They did not wish to return to work.  
All the SOEs had suffered extensive damage from looting, the war, and 13 years 
of sanctions, during which time their capital stock deteriorated as production lines 
were cannibalized to keep the remaining lines open. Even before the war, these en-
terprises were not very productive. They survived on government subsidies and fa-
vorable treatment. There was little to suggest that such enterprises could be made 
productive. In some instances, enterprises destroyed value: the cost of imported 
components and materials needed to produce the final product were more valuable 
than the product that was manufactured.  
Only a handful of people were assigned as advisors to the Ministry of Industry 
and Minerals. USAID money could have been used to pay for local advisors, but 
other tasks were given higher priority. Officers in the divisional commands ultimately 
became responsible for many of these enterprises. They petitioned CPA and the min-
istries for funds, fuels, and electric power. They attempted to restart production and 
protect the remaining assets of the facilities.18  
Senior officials in CPA did examine a number of options for restructuring the 
SOEs. Because these enterprises offered little chance for success, CPA focused on 
other issues. A substantial amount of press attention was paid to suggestions that the 
SOEs be privatized. However, CPA never attempted to seriously implement such a 
policy. Most enterprises were in no shape to be sold: they had no accounts and no 
balance sheets. An investor would have had no way of knowing what he or she was 
buying. Giving the enterprise to employees or managers or using vouchers could have 
circumvented the immediate problem of defining the enterprise’s assets, but there 
seemed to be little or no interest among Iraqis in privatization. Rather, opinion polls 
and public statements by Iraqis indicated that privatization was highly unpopular.  
CPA intended to adopt a policy of downsizing SOEs, especially because of the 
way in which they were operated. SOEs were going to be forced to become self-
sufficient in 2004. According to the original 2004 budget, the state would no longer 
provide SOEs with funds from the budget after December 31, 2003. Once cash ran 
out, unprofitable SOEs would have had to cease paying wages and close. Due to op-
position from the IGC, however, this policy was never implemented. SOEs remain a 
drain on the budget and show little prospect of ever becoming competitive.  
____________ 
17 Memo from CPA staff advising Ministry of Industry and Minerals. 
18 The British enjoyed more success in their sector with SOEs. The Department for International Development 
assigned a number of advisors to SOEs in that region. Many were restarted and some become profitable. 
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Lessons Learned  
CPA had successes and failures in economic policy. CPA quickly restored the opera-
tions of the Ministry of Finance, especially the payment of government employees. 
Once government employees received their paychecks on a regular basis and minis-
tries had access to operating budgets, ministers were able to reopen schools and clin-
ics, pay pensioners and demobilized soldiers, and distribute food rations. CPA also 
successfully revamped operations of the Central Bank of Iraq, exchanging old cur-
rency for new and setting up a foreign exchange auction. CPA drew up two budgets 
(second-half 2003 and full-year 2004) and implemented the former. Iraqi households 
benefited from the influx of consumer goods, abetted by the policy of zero tariffs. In 
many instances, these goods had not been readily available to Iraqi households under 
Saddam. The revival of trade that zero tariffs helped facilitate contributed to a surge 
of economic activity in retailing, wholesaling, and transport. 
CJTF-7 played an important role in many of these successes. Coalition forces 
played primary roles in guarding, transporting, and distributing wages and pensions 
to government employees, pensioners, and demobilized soldiers. CJTF-7 also 
guarded banks from the day the currency exchange began. Without CJTF-7’s sup-
port, CPA would not have been able to restart the provision of government services 
so quickly.  
CPA failed to implement a number of key policies. The failure to liberalize en-
ergy prices was the most significant. Price controls and subsidies on refined oil prod-
ucts remain one of the most debilitating economic policies in Iraq. They are extraor-
dinarily expensive, equal to almost a quarter of GDP in 2003; they encourage 
smuggling and corruption; and their benefit primarily accrues to higher-income indi-
viduals. Shortages of gasoline due to price controls have resulted in riots and deaths 
of coalition soldiers. The persistence of these subsidies will retard economic growth 
and severely distort Iraq’s economy in the years ahead. In this instance, resistance to 
raising prices within CPA, CJTF-7, and Washington had deleterious implications for 
the economy.  
The failure to provide a better alternative to the Public Distribution System for 
food was also unfortunate. The existing system functioned; there was a consensus 
that any new system had to be in place and functioning before the existing system 
was dismantled. Most proposals for new systems entailed setting up processes to dis-
tribute cash. These new systems would involve setting up new distribution proce-
dures and making major changes in supply chains. CPA and CJTF-7 staff needed to 
see that the new systems worked before they would be willing to dismantle the old 
one.  
The failure to improve the operations of state-owned enterprises was less under-
standable. Some attempt was made to categorize the enterprises into salvageable and 
unsalvageable, but virtually nothing was done to provide enterprises with the ac-
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counting, billing, and purchasing systems they needed to become independent oper-
ating units. Managers did not have access to training or advisors. CPA also failed to 
set up employee buyout and restructuring programs that might have encouraged em-
ployees to exit the wage rolls so that enterprises could be either officially closed or 
restructured to become profitable.  
The failure of CPA to make progress on liberalizing prices, revamping the food 
ration system, or restructuring state-owned enterprises left a legacy of misguided eco-
nomic policies to the new Iraqi government. Although a number of Middle Eastern 
countries suffer from the ill effects of similar programs, Iraq has some of the most 
dysfunctional economic policies and institutions in the world. Although the deterio-
rating security situation made it increasingly difficult to change these policies and 
institutions, the new Iraqi government has been left to face the pernicious legacies of 
Saddam Hussein. Based on the poor track record of other Middle Eastern govern-
ments in tackling problems posed by fuel subsidies, food supports, and SOEs, it is 
doubtful that these issues will be addressed by any Iraqi government for the foresee-
able future.  
The misallocation of resources caused by implicit subsidization of gasoline, die-
sel fuel, and the food ration system will impose a heavy economic price on Iraq. As 
noted above, roughly $5 billion dollars of potential government revenues are squan-
dered by keeping gasoline and diesel prices at 100 Iraqi dinars per liter, less than a 
nickel a gallon. This is equivalent to more than a quarter of the U.S. supplemental 
funding and almost a quarter of Iraq’s entire budget. In light of the many needs for 
reconstruction and government services, these subsidies constitute an enormous 
waste of resources.  
Although continued provision of food rations has successfully forestalled wide-
spread hunger and malnutrition, this program is on the verge of outliving its useful-
ness. The program centralizes food procurement in the hands of the Ministry of 
Trade. Most purchases consist of imported items, many of poor quality. Iraqi farm-
ers, retailers, and wholesalers find that most of their potential market is supplied 
through imported products provided through the food ration program, depriving 






Essential Services and Infrastructure 
This chapter describes the condition of Iraq’s infrastructure at the time of the inva-
sion, the problems facing CPA and coalition forces in reconstructing this infrastruc-
ture and restoring essential services, the means that CPA and the U.S. government 
employed to achieve these goals, and their accomplishments in terms of restoring ba-
sic services through June 28, 2004.1  
Status at the End of Major Combat  
Before the onset of combat operations in 2003, Iraq’s infrastructure was in such dis-
repair that electricity was available for only a few hours a day, and many Iraqis no 
longer had access to piped, potable water. Before the 1991 Gulf War, times were bet-
ter. In 1990, Iraq had a functional installed generating capacity of 9,295 megawatts 
(MW) with peak demand of about 5,100 MW.2 At that time, 87 percent of the 
population had access to electric power and 95 percent of the urban population and 
75 percent of the rural population had access to potable water.  
By the end of the Gulf War, wartime damage had reduced generating capacity 
to 2,325 MW. In the immediate aftermath of that conflict, the Iraqi government was 
unable to invest in repairing infrastructure because of the UN trade embargo. How-
ever, by 1996 the Saddam government had agreed to the Oil for Food program, 
which placed oil export revenues in an offshore account under the control of the UN. 
Iraq, with UN approval, could use funds not only for food imports, but also to pur-
chase equipment for the repair and construction of critical infrastructure. On the eve 
of the 2003 war, $8.9 billion of contracts were outstanding, of which about $4.9 bil-
lion were for equipment and other nonfood items.3  
____________ 
1 This chapter is based on the experiences of RAND analyst Keith Crane and his colleagues at CPA between May 
2003 and June 2004, official CPA memoranda, various official reports, and press accounts. 
2 United Nations and World Bank, Joint Iraq Needs Assessment, October 2003, pp. 19 and 28. 
3 “Secretary General to Administer Iraq’s Oil-For-Food Program,” International Information Programs, U.S. 
Department of State, March 28, 2003.   
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Despite these investments, Iraq’s infrastructure was severely degraded by 2003 
compared to its condition in 1990. U.S. engineers were both amazed and horrified at 
the stopgap measures devised by the Iraqis to keep the electric power system up and 
running, from ingenious substitutes for important components to running power 
lines around circuit breakers, endangering the entire system. Needs assessments con-
ducted by U.S. contractors and the United Nations and World Bank found 
multibillion-dollar backlogs of maintenance, refurbishment, and new investment 
needed to restore power supplies, increase supplies of potable water, and treat sewage. 
Investment in telecommunications and the oil sector had also been very limited. As a 
consequence, on a per capita basis the provision of electricity and water had fallen 
sharply. Although the population has grown by half since the end of the Gulf War, 
by 2002 functioning generating capacity had only been restored to 4,500 MW.  
As noted in Chapter Eleven, OIF and the subsequent looting resulted in addi-
tional damage to Iraq’s infrastructure and reductions in output of electricity and oil, 
and in the provision of water. After the looting ended in mid-April, the Iraqi econ-
omy had come to a standstill. Oil exports had been halted because pipelines were 
closed. Oil production had to be severely cut back. Iraq’s rickety telecommunications 
system had shut down because the major switches had been destroyed in the war or 
damaged during looting. Although the electric power system had not been attacked 
by the coalition, looters destroyed important controls. To compound the problems 
posed by looting, organized gangs knocked down power line pylons to steal the metal 
in the cables, further reducing the availability of electricity. In early May 2003, elec-
tric power generation was one-third of output levels in the previous year; for the en-
tire month, output was 56 percent of May 2002 levels.4 Without electricity, pumps 
needed to operate the water systems failed, resulting in sharp reductions in the avail-
ability of potable water. Sewage treatment plants were also unable to operate prop-
erly.  
Prewar Assumptions  
Although substantial planning was undertaken to forestall a humanitarian catastro-
phe and to prevent destruction of the oil fields, there was little planning prior to the 
war for the restoration of essential services.  
An interagency team started working on humanitarian assistance and recon-
struction in the fall of 2002, as discussed in Chapter Three. Plans were developed for 
water and sanitation, electricity, telecommunications, shelter, and transportation, in 
addition to health, education, governance and the rule of law, agriculture and rural 
development, and economic and financial policy. Among other agencies, USAID was 
____________ 
4 Data provided by Iraqi Ministry of Electricity. 
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involved in this process. Subsequently, that planning process and some of the associ-
ated staff were transferred to ORHA when it was set up early in 2003.5  
ORHA put a great deal of effort into planning for a potential humanitarian dis-
aster, as discussed in Chapters Five and Six. The U.S. government estimated that 
800,000 Iraqis were internally displaced and 740,000 were refugees, primarily in 
Iran, at the beginning of 2003, and that as many as 2,000,000 other Iraqis might flee 
abroad or internally.6 ORHA planned to provide water, food, and shelter to refugee 
populations; to counteract the effects of chemical and biological weapons attacks on 
the civilian population; to provide emergency health care; and to restore water and 
sewage services.  
ORHA did attempt to identify infrastructure before the war that would be 
needed to keep the country functioning. In contrast to the 1991 Gulf War, 
CENTCOM chose not to target critical infrastructure (except for telephone 
switches) so that electric power and other services could be quickly restored to the 
Iraqi population following the war. Before OIF, ORHA knew that electrical genera-
tion plants, transmission lines, and water treatment and sewage plants would not be 
struck.7  
Before the war, the Department of Defense engaged in detailed planning to 
avoid damage to the oil industry. Units were assigned to quickly seize and guard oil 
fields and installations to prevent sabotage. DoD was especially concerned about 
Iraqi agents setting fire to oil wells as they had done in the Kuwaiti fields during the 
Gulf War. In the event, only nine fires were lit in the important Southern Rumaila 
field,8 in part because of the speed at which U.S. forces moved and in part because 
Iraqi oil engineers were loath to destroy their own facilities.9  
Aside from planning to protect the oil industry and avoid targeting utility in-
stallations, little effort was spent planning to restart and rehabilitate Iraqi infrastruc-
ture. One reason for the lack of planning for post-conflict reconstruction was that 
DoD underestimated the magnitude of the reconstruction program needed to meet 
its prewar goals. Prior to the conflict, the Deputies Committee set the goal of restor-
ing essential services to their prewar levels, and it subsequently added the goal of re-
habilitating 6,000 schools. However, planners assumed restoration of pre-conflict 
service levels would be feasible by repairing damage to infrastructure suffered during 
the 2003 war or still stemming from the Gulf War. Since CENTCOM was not 
____________ 
5 U.S. General Accounting Office, Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and Management 
Challenges, GAO-04-605, Washington, D.C., June 2004, p. 6. 
6 Woodward, p. 276. 
7 Interview with ORHA official, July 2004. 
8 Christina Reed, “Burning Assets: Oil Fires in Iraq,” Geotimes, May 2003.  
9 Interviews with CPA officials and CENTCOM staff, October 2003. 
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planning on targeting infrastructure and planners did not envisage damage from 
looting, this task did not seem that daunting. DoD did not intend to rehabilitate 
Iraq’s entire electric power or water systems.  
When CPA was created in May 2003, it took on a number of responsibilities 
for governing the country, as dictated by the Geneva Convention.10 CPA interpreted 
its responsibilities to include the provision of public services that had been provided 
by the former regime: electricity, water, garbage pickup, and sewage, where munici-
pal facilities existed. CPA set itself the task of increasing the average hours of electric 
power available by geographic region and the share of population with potable water 
and adequate sewage compared to conditions under Saddam.  
Political imperatives forced CPA to focus on turning on the lights and taps and 
restoring oil production. Demonstrations and opinion polls all pointed to high ex-
pectations from Iraqis for a speedy restoration of services, followed by considerable 
improvement. When these expectations were not met, levels of dissatisfaction were 
high. During the summer of 2003, shortages of gasoline and diesel fuel were blamed 
for triggering riots and disturbances, including a major riot in Basra that led to a 
number of deaths.11 In short, CPA’s goal shifted from repairing damage inflicted dur-
ing the two wars to providing Iraqi citizens with a basic level of services, especially 
electricity and water.  
CPA’s ability to achieve its goals was hampered by poor information. Informa-
tion on the extent and condition of Iraq’s electric power and water systems was frag-
mentary and often wrong. U.S. policymakers operated under the assumption that the 
electric power and water systems were in much better shape than was the case and 
that Iraqi personnel were technically proficient.12 They also assumed that the Iraqis 
would be willing and able to bring the systems back on line quickly. As CPA at-
tempted to restore power and water, engineers found that the infrastructure for them 
was operating on shoestrings and sealing wax; it would need massive investments just 
to maintain previous levels of service.  
The use of erroneous information for planning appears to have stemmed from 
ignorance of other information sources, which was compounded by attempts to limit 
the number of individuals involved in the planning process.13 Better information was 
available from government sources, individuals who had visited Iraq, and scholars of 
____________ 
10 RAND staff seconded to CPA were involved in monitoring and reporting on the provision of essential services 
to the Iraqi population. This section is based on RAND staff experiences and interviews with CPA staff in Bagh-
dad as well as on published documents. 
11 Charles Recknagel, “Iraq: Al-Basrah Riot Underlines Frustration with Energy Shortages,” Radio Free Europe, 
August 11, 2003. 
12 Interviews with ORHA officials, July 2004. 
13 Interviews with ORHA officials, July 2004. 
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Iraq and the Middle East all resident in the United States.14 Interviewees claimed that 
knowledgeable individuals had been excluded from the planning process and that 
many of the Iraqi expatriates who provided much of the information about the con-
dition of Iraqi infrastructure had not been in Iraq for a considerable period of time.15 
To compound matters, there was no contingency planning in the event that the ini-
tial assumptions did not hold. 
One of the coalition’s major failures was to not plan adequately to safeguard fa-
cilities from looters. Far more damage was done to Iraq’s infrastructure by looting 
than by military action.16 Using lists compiled by the U.S. military and the CIA, 
ORHA put together a roster of facilities to be safeguarded following major combat 
operations and sent it to CENTCOM. CENTCOM did not use this list to deploy 
guard units to designated facilities after they had been seized. U.S. military officers 
said that they lacked sufficient troops to guard all the selected critical facilities.  
A number of U.S. officers noted that looting should not have been a surprise 
and that a number of measures could have been adopted to suppress it. Units should 
have been prepared to combat looters and given the appropriate rules of engagement 
to do so. One officer stated that, according to the Geneva Convention, Iraqi forces 
could have been mustered into a constabulary and assigned to guard facilities under 
the command of U.S. forces. Briefings had been prepared by military staff to address 
these issues, but senior commanders turned down opportunities to hear them in the 
run-up to the war.17  
Contracting for the Resumption of Essential Services  
Not surprisingly, the coalition put a high priority on resuming the provision of water 
and electric power for political and humanitarian reasons, as well as on oil produc-
tion and exports for economic reasons. Without water, Iraq was vulnerable to out-
breaks of cholera and other infectious diseases. Without electricity, water treatment 
plants could not operate. And without fuel, electric power generators could not run. 
Consequently, the resumption of electric power generation and oil production was 
imperative.  
To restore the provision of government services and repair Iraqi infrastructure, 
the U.S. government turned to contractors and went through three stages of con-
tracting for the reconstruction of infrastructure in Iraq.  
____________ 
14 Interviews with National Defense University officials, July 2004. 
15 Interviews with National Defense University officials, July 2004. 
16 Interviews with Army Corps of Engineers personnel, October 2003. 
17 Interviews with CJTF-7 officers, October 2003. 
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Initial Contracts  
Even though the interagency planning process started in August 2002, most of the 
agencies involved were not requested to start procurement actions for reconstruction 
until early 2003. Consequently, agencies had only a few weeks before the war to set 
up contracts for reconstruction.18 Facing such tight deadlines, agencies took two ap-
proaches: letting new contracts or issuing task orders to existing contracts.  
The U.S. government let several large contracts prior to or during the war, to 
ensure the rapid resumption of essential services (especially water and electric power), 
restore transportation systems, resume oil production, and minimize damage to oil 
fields. On March 24, 2003, the Defense Department, through the Army Corps of 
Engineers, gave a sole-source contract to Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR), a subsidi-
ary of Halliburton, to put out oil fires and to restart oil production and exports.19 
USAID let two contracts prior to the end of major combat operations for the repair 
of infrastructure. One went to Bechtel for electric power, reconstruction of govern-
ment buildings (including schools), dredging and repairing the Umm Qasr seaport, 
and other construction projects.20 A third contract to Bechtel was let on April 17, 
2003, after major combat ended—which included financing for an assessment of 
Iraqi infrastructure needs. The other contract went to SkyLink Air and Logistic Sup-
port for repairing airports. A third USAID contract went to Stevedoring Service of 
America to operate the port of Umm Qasr; it covered the operation of the port rather 
than its reconstruction, which was handled by Bechtel.  
In addition, both USAID and DoD wrote task orders under existing contracts 
for early work on reconstruction. For example, a task order was written under a Lo-
gistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract to commission work by 
KBR on contingency planning for the reconstruction of Iraq’s oil industry. 
Initially, none of the contracts were let under standard contracting procedures 
that call for open competition. As noted above, the Army Corps of Engineers issued a 
sole-source contract, and USAID employed limited competition. The Corps of En-
gineers has been heavily criticized for giving Halliburton a sole-source contract for 
the reconstruction of Iraq’s oil industry.21 A U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) 
report stated that the Corps properly justified the award under U.S. legal provisions 
____________ 
18 U.S. General Accounting Office, Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and Management 
Challenges, p. 7. 
19 Rosenberg, Horowitz, and Alessandrini. 
20 Rosenberg, Horowitz, and Alessandrini. 
21 See, for example, “Democratic Policy Committee Hearing on Iraq Contracting Abuses,” February 13, 2004.  
As of October 2007: 
http://democrats.senate.gov/dpc/hearings/hearing12/transcript.pdf 
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for circumventing normal competitive procedures.22 USAID’s contracts received less 
criticism in the press. USAID may have been better able to deflect such criticism be-
cause its contracts were awarded on the basis of limited competition rather than sole-
source procurements. Because of the press and public focus on Halliburton as a result 
of Vice President Cheney’s past position as the company’s CEO, it is not clear 
whether criticism of the Army Corps of Engineers would have been any less had it 
opted for limited competition rather than sole-source procurement.  
Virtually all of the contracts and task orders issued before and during CPA’s ex-
istence were on an indefinite quantity/indefinite cost basis. Contractors were to be 
reimbursed for permitted costs plus a fee. To encourage contractors to operate effi-
ciently, the U.S. government provides incentives for them to provide goods and serv-
ices at lower cost or more efficaciously. These incentives are tied to detailed descrip-
tions of tasks and the terms under which they are to be completed. The process of 
defining tasks and performance metrics is called “definitization.”  
Post-Conflict Contracts in FY2003  
Through the end of FY2003, 100 contracts or task orders were awarded or issued for 
the reconstruction of Iraq or the provision of services for CPA. Of these, eight were 
awarded by the Army Corps of Engineers and three by USAID for reconstruction of 
infrastructure. These 11 contracts and task orders were the most important by value, 
running $2.755 billion in total, three-quarters of the total obligated in FY2003.23  
Following the end of major combat operations, more contracts were let using 
full and open competition. Of the 100 contracts and task orders, 14 new contracts 
were awarded using other than full and open competition: five sole-source contracts 
and nine limited-competition contracts. Only in one instance, a contract issued by 
the State Department, did GAO find that agency officials had not adequately justi-
fied awarding contracts on a basis other than full and open competitive procedures.24 
GAO was more critical about the process of issuing task orders. Of eleven task orders 
reviewed by GAO, seven were not within the scope of the initial contract and two 
were questionable. The task order issued by the Army Field Support Command un-
der its contract with KBR was deemed to have been outside the scope of the original 
contract and should not have been granted.25 GAO also criticized the way that the 
____________ 
22 U.S. General Accounting Office, Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and Management 
Challenges, p. 11. 
23 U.S. General Accounting Office, Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and Management 
Challenges, pp. 36 and 39. 
24 U.S. General Accounting Office, Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and Management 
Challenges, p. 12. 
25 U.S. General Accounting Office, Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and Management 
Challenges, pp. 4–5. 
218    After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq 
Corps of Engineers handled three major contracts. In March 2003, the Corps let 
three contracts for construction-related activities in CENTCOM’s area of responsi-
bility. The contracts were let on the basis of limited competition and had a maxi-
mum value of $100 million each. GAO found that task orders issued under each of 
these contracts for rehabilitating the Iraqi electric power system violated legal provi-
sions: the task orders exceeded the size of the contracts, they were issued in a non-
competitive manner, and they were issued without written justification.26 
The Project Management Office  
In November 2003, CPA set up a Project Management Office (PMO) to handle 
contracting. This occurred shortly before passage of the Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan. 
The PMO was headed by Admiral David Nash (ret.). The supplemental legislation 
stipulated that Congress be informed no later than seven calendar days before any 
contract of $5 million or more was awarded and that all contracts be awarded on the 
basis of full and open competition procedures.27 Nash was intent on ensuring that 
CPA satisfy these legislative stipulations and that the newly appropriated $18.4 bil-
lion for Iraq be spent in an accountable fashion. CPA had been criticized for not be-
ing able to account for the $3.7 billion obligated for contracts in FY2003.  
The PMO adopted a strategy of issuing one program management support con-
tract to support its own office and to oversee reconstruction efforts in specific sectors. 
In addition, six program management contracts were let to coordinate the recon-
struction efforts in the six sectors: electricity, oil, public works and water, security 
and justice, transportation and communications, and buildings and health. Finally, 
15 to 20 design-build contracts were to be awarded to execute specific tasks.28  
These contracts were to be let through a variety of channels. By March 2004, 17 
contracts had been awarded on behalf of CPA by various offices in DoD. The 17 
contracts included all 7 program management contracts and 10 design-build con-
tracts. In addition, the Corps of Engineers and USAID continued to receive funds 
for reconstruction, which were obligated through their own contracting mechanisms. 
____________ 
26 U.S. General Accounting Office, Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and Management 
Challenges, pp. 20–21. 
27 U.S. General Accounting Office, Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and Management 
Challenges, p. 9. 
28 U.S. General Accounting Office, Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and Management 
Challenges, pp. 27–28. 
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The Players: Who Was Involved in Reconstruction 
Iraqi Ministries and State-Owned Enterprises  
A number of actors have been involved in the reconstruction of Iraq. On the Iraqi 
government side, the Ministry of Oil, the Ministry of Electricity (formerly the 
Commission of Electric Power), the Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works 
(water and sewage), the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Communications, 
and the Ministry of Water (irrigation) played the primary roles in managing Iraq’s 
infrastructure. In conjunction with the Finance Ministry, ministries made decisions 
on operating expenditures. Under Saddam, decisions on major investments were 
made in a highly centralized fashion. The Ministry of Planning took the lead on ma-
jor infrastructure projects, with the Ministry of Finance and the line ministries par-
ticipating. Stronger line ministries like Oil and Electricity played major roles in deci-
sions on key investments. Weaker ministries found their priorities receiving less 
attention.  
All of the major utilities and the entire oil sector are state-owned in Iraq. They 
form major components of the line industries: enterprises in the oil industry are part 
of the Ministry of Oil, water treatment plants are part of the Ministry of Municipali-
ties and Public Works, etc. The state-owned sector in Iraq is extraordinarily central-
ized. Enterprise managers have very little decisionmaking authority: managers of op-
erating units have no control over revenues, have little authority to make payments 
for operating expenditures, and have virtually no control over investment. Invest-
ment decisions are still taken at the ministry level. Operating units play a limited role 
in investment decisions, primarily as providers of information concerning bottlenecks 
and unsatisfied demand.  
CPA  
The CPA senior advisors played a major role in the day-to-day operations of the min-
istries and in planning. Until ministers were appointed by the Iraqi Governing 
Council (IGC) and the CPA Administrator in September 2003, the CPA senior advi-
sors to these ministries had executive authority. Even after ministers were appointed, 
the senior advisor had veto authority over the minister’s decisions, until the ministry 
was officially “graduated.” The graduation process only began in early 2004. Thus, 
the senior advisors played important roles not only in day-to-day operations, but in 
establishing priorities.  
To establish cross-ministry expenditure priorities, CPA set up a Program Re-
view Board (PRB). This board consisted of senior CPA staff, including individuals 
from CPA’s Office of Management and Budget, which was responsible for the Iraqi 
budget, the Economics Group, and other senior staffers. The PRB made decisions on 
all major CPA expenditures involving Iraqi money—Iraqi assets that had been fro-
zen, as well as revenues from oil sales through the Oil for Food program.  
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Regional Military Commanders  
Much of the day-to-day governance of Iraq took place through the regional military 
commands. Given the need for day-to-day contact with civil servants in the minis-
tries, senior advisors spent most of their time in Baghdad. Because of the security 
situation and shortages of staff, CPA had little presence at the regional or governorate 
level. Moreover, regional and local commanders played a very important role in gov-
ernment at the local level because military units were widely deployed throughout the 
country, and because CPA lacked the regional and local presence necessary to do this 
work. Regional commanders and their subordinate officers were in day-to-day con-
tact with their local communities. These commanders and officers, primarily through 
their civil affairs officers, engaged with the local community. They conveyed local 
concerns and priorities to CPA, though they often believed that CPA’s presence in-
side the Green Zone and its focus on Baghdad made it unresponsive to the needs of 
other parts of the country. In addition, through the use of Commanders’ Emergency 
Response Funds (CERF) and other resources, local commanders were able to repair 
and rehabilitate local infrastructure, especially buildings.  
U.S. Government Contracting Institutions  
Although the CPA Administrator was the governing authority in Iraq, CPA did little 
of the actual contracting for Iraqi reconstruction. Initially, USAID and the Army 
Corps of Engineers had the money and the contracting authority for reconstruction 
projects, subject to CPA oversight. Subsequently, the Project Management Office 
was given this authority, although it continued to work with and through the Corps 
of Engineers, USAID, and other agencies that had the authority to issue contracts. 
These agencies wrote the task orders and handled the contracting. Although all task 
orders and contracts had to pass CPA’s PRB and later the PMO, the contracting 
agencies played an important implicit role in setting priorities.  
International Institutions  
Despite their absence from Iraq following the August 2003 bombing of the UN mis-
sion in Baghdad, the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) played roles in reconstruction. They conducted initial needs assessments 
that were used as a basis for funding requests at the October 2003 Madrid donors’ 
conference. They were also charged with creating and managing two trust funds that 
would be used for foreign assistance.  
Contractors  
Contractors are doing the actual work of reconstruction and rehabilitation in Iraq. 
Contractors design projects; organize teams, usually involving a number of subcon-
tractors, to build or repair a facility; manufacture or purchase equipment; install the 
equipment; and begin operations. Contractors were also responsible for providing for 
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their own security. Because of the scale of the reconstruction effort, the U.S. gov-
ernment chose to give very large contracts to a few lead contractors who then broke 
out individual projects. Table 12.1 shows a partial list of major contractors for infra-
structure projects as of September 30, 2003. 
Financing 
A tremendous amount of money is being dedicated to the reconstruction of Iraq. As 
of April 30, 2004, the GAO estimated that $58 billion in grants, loans, assets, and 
revenues from various sources had been pledged or made available for the provision 
of government services and reconstruction. Of this amount, the United States appro-
priated about $24 billion, of which $4.5 billion was appropriated in FY2003, primar-
ily through the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act enacted in 
April 2003. Of the remainder, $18.4 billion was appropriated through the Emer-
gency Supplemental Appropriations Act passed on November 6, 2003.29 The second-
largest source of funds is Iraq’s earnings from oil exports, totaling $18 billion  
 
Table 12.1 










Corps of Engineers   
Brown and Root Services Oil 1,390.1 
Washington International Corporation Electricity 111.0 
Fluor Intercontinental, Inc. Electricity 102.5 
Perini Corporation Electricity 66.6 
IAP Worldwide Services Supplied diesel generators 11.9 
Michael Baker Jr., Inc. Program management support 4.4 
Stanley Consultants, Inc. Program management support 4.4 
USAID   
Bechtel National Inc. Reconstruction, including electricity 1,029.8 
Stevedoring Service of America Port management 14.3 
SkyLink Air and Logistic Support USA Inc. Airports 17.5 
SOURCE: U.S. General Accounting Office, Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures 
and Management Challenges, pp. 36 and 39. 
____________ 
29 U.S. General Accounting Office, Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Over-
sight Issues, GAO-04902R, Washington, D.C., June 2004, p. 11. 
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since oil exports were restarted after OIF ended. These funds have been deposited in 
the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI), and they constitute the principal source of 
Iraqi government revenues. In addition to ongoing earnings from oil exports, Iraq 
has accrued assets to draw upon. Some of these are assets formerly controlled by Sad-
dam or the Ba’ath Party that have been seized abroad and deposited in the DFI. 
Other assets include funds transferred from the Oil for Food account set up and run 
by the United Nations. A number of rehabilitation and repair projects had been 
started before the invasion. Oil for Food funds were obligated to pay for these pro-
jects. Non-U.S. donors promised an additional $3.6 billion in grant aid and about 
$10 billion in the form of subsidized loans ($9.6 billion to $13.3 billion).30 Table 
12.2 provides a breakdown of estimated funds as of April 2004. 
U.S. assistance to Iraq has been extraordinary. The November 2003 supplemen-
tal appropriation was 2.5 times the entire budget request for USAID in 2002. Total 
U.S. appropriations through April 2004 exceeded Iraq’s estimated GDP for 2003.  
The magnitude of foreign assistance to Iraq is also unusual in that the Iraqi gov-
ernment has a ready source of funds in the form of oil revenues. In other post-
conflict situations where foreign assistance has been a large share of GDP, such as 
Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor, the local governments lacked ready sources of tax 
revenue. Foreign assistance helped jump-start the economy by supporting govern-
ment operations during a period when traditional tax revenues were impossible to 
collect. In the case of Iraq, the government has large streams of export earnings that 
it can tap for expenditures.  
Actual figures on planned spending on infrastructure are difficult to come by 
because of the many sources of funding and differing definitions of infrastructure.  
 
Table 12.2  
Total Funds Available, Obligated, and Disbursed for Iraq by Source as of April 2004 (in 
billions of U.S. dollars)  
Source Made Available Obligated Disbursed 
United States 24.00 8.2 3.0 
Development Fund for Iraq 18.00 13.0 8.3 
Vested and seized assets 2.65 2.5 2.4 
International pledges 13.60 N/A N/A 
Total 58.25 23.7 13.7 
SOURCE: U.S. General Accounting Office, Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, 
Essential Services, and Oversight Issues, p. 10. 
____________ 
30 U.S. General Accounting Office, Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Over-
sight Issues, p. 20. 
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According to CPA, of the U.S. supplemental appropriation, two-thirds ($12.4 bil-
lion) was earmarked for construction projects. In addition to these monies, some 
CERP funds and funds for the Rapid Regional Response Program (RRRP), a DoD-
funded program for commanders to use for local and regional projects, were used for 
infrastructure projects. Total spending on the CERP and the RRRP were $550 mil-
lion and $430 million, respectively, through April 2004.31  
Most of the Iraqi monies were being spent on government operations and trans-
fers to the Iraqi people. The Iraqi state budget for 2004 earmarked $2.5 billion for 
capital projects, financed from oil revenues and Iraqi assets, out of a total budget of 
$22.4 billion.32 As noted above, according to the GAO, about three-fourths of the 
U.S. contribution, or $2.755 billion total obligated assistance for Iraq in FY2003, 
was for infrastructure projects.33 Total funding for spending on infrastructure from 
the end of OIF to the end of 2004 was $18.8 billion, excluding non-U.S. donor 
funding for infrastructure projects. Of the $13.6 billion in non-U.S. pledges, roughly 
$10 billion (the subsidized credits) or more went to infrastructure. This funding has 
been slow to arrive. Thus, out of $58.25 billion dollars in pledged funding, more 
than half, $30 billion, may be designated for infrastructure. Of this, $5.447 billion 
was obligated for the reconstruction of infrastructure and the provision of essential 
services as of April 2004, more than 70 percent of which was provided by the United 
States.34 For the next few years, more than 90 percent of projected spending on infra-
structure is to be financed from foreign assistance.  
U.S. assistance for the reconstruction of infrastructure is extraordinary not only 
for its size, but also because of the form it has taken: grants rather than loans. The 
use of grant aid to finance infrastructure projects is highly unusual. Grant aid is gen-
erally considered best spent on projects for which it is difficult to arrange loans, such 
as education, improving government operations, and developing health care systems. 
Long-term investments in electric power, water systems, and the oil sector are almost 
invariably financed through equity or loans. These projects are very expensive, and 
they produce goods and services that are sold to consumers, generating revenue 
streams that can be used to make debt payments. The use of loan financing generally 
imposes a discipline on project design and implementation that grant aid often does 
not. The process of obtaining a loan to finance a project forces the borrower to 
____________ 
31 U.S. General Accounting Office, Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Over-
sight Issues, p. 15. 
32 Coalition Provisional Authority, “Working Papers: Iraq Status,” unclassified briefing, June 29, 2004, slides 14 
and 18. 
33 U.S. General Accounting Office, Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and Management 
Challenges, pp. 36 and 39. 
34 U.S. General Accounting Office, Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Over-
sight Issues, p. 14. 
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evaluate the project in terms of rate of return. In the course of this appraisal, borrow-
ers are forced to tailor the size and design of the project to projected demand and, 
hence, revenue streams, which can lead to more efficient use of funds and more at-
tention to revenue generation and collection, a deficiency that plagues many projects 
in Iraq.  
Coordinating and Implementing Reconstruction Projects  
The diverse sources of funding and the many actors engaged in reconstruction com-
plicated the process of coordinating and implementing reconstruction projects in 
Iraq. Participants had to reach decisions on the selection of projects, the allocation of 
funds, and the choice of contractors. Contractors had to design projects, order and 
obtain equipment, materials, machinery, and men, and complete the projects. Gov-
ernments and agencies needed to perform financial and project audits to ensure that 
the promised goods and services were provided and that charges conformed to the 
law.  
Project Selection  
CPA had to start project selection virtually from scratch. Although the Ministry of 
Planning had official responsibility for planning investments under Saddam, little 
planning took place in the 1990s because of the dearth of funds. Consequently, a 
new list of projects needed to be identified. What little investment was made in infra-
structure during the 1990s was determined primarily by the line ministries as they 
struggled to maintain services. These ministries had identified a number of rehabilita-
tion and investment projects for which imported components had been approved by 
the UN under the Oil for Food program. Because contracts under the Oil for Food 
program had already been let, these projects generally proceeded, although in some 
instances CPA canceled them if they seemed unwarranted.  
Sectoral needs assessments completed in the summer of 2003 provided the ini-
tial basis to select projects for reconstruction. USAID and DoD tasked two contrac-
tors, Bechtel and KBR, to assess Iraqi investment needs. KBR assessed the oil indus-
try, while Bechtel assessed the electric power, transportation, communications, and 
other infrastructure. In October 2003, the World Bank and UNDP published a 
broader joint assessment of needs that covered many of the same sectors as the 
Bechtel report but excluded the oil sector so as not to duplicate the KBR report.35 In 
addition to evaluations of physical infrastructure needs, the report also included as-
sessments of human needs that Bechtel was not asked or equipped to address. Be-
cause the World Bank and UNDP effectively withdrew from Iraq after the August 
____________ 
35 United Nations and World Bank, Joint Iraq Needs Assessment. 
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2003 bombing of UN headquarters and because Bechtel and KBR won major recon-
struction contracts, the Bechtel and KBR needs assessments became the operational 
documents for Iraqi reconstruction. Forward Engineering Support Teams (FESTs) 
from the Corps of Engineers also conducted assessments. However, the UNDP/ 
World Bank report played a major role in requests for donor funding at the Madrid 
conference. The Bechtel report also drew upon and referred to some of the analysis 
and findings in the UNDP/World Bank studies.  
In some ministries, detailed project plans were developed by the senior advisors 
and Iraqi civil servants, the Corps of Engineers, USAID, and contractors. For exam-
ple, in October 2003, the Ministry of Electricity and the CPA Electricity Advisory 
Team published a detailed plan for increasing power output.36 The plan was based on 
the Bechtel and UNDP/World Bank electric power sector needs assessments, but it 
also incorporated ministry analysis of crucial needs. It included detailed plans for 
scheduling fall and spring maintenance of power plants and transmission and distri-
bution systems, plans that had not been developed for more than a decade. This was 
an operational plan, and it included a level of detail that neither Bechtel nor the 
UNDP/World Bank teams had addressed. The Bechtel and UNDP/World Bank 
teams noted that they sometimes could not make site visits during their surveys be-
cause of the security situation. Consequently, the Commission of Electric Power’s 
October plan incorporated information to which Bechtel and UNDP/World Bank 
teams did not have access.  
Reconstruction and Project Management 
Because of separate sources of funding, reconstruction sometimes proceeded on sepa-
rate tracks. In the case of the oil and electric power industries, two special task forces 
were set up outside the Iraqi ministries: Project Restore Iraqi Oil (RIO) started in the 
fall of 2002, and Project Restore Iraqi Electricity (RIE) commenced in late summer 
2003. Both projects were under the auspices of the Army Corps of Engineers. 
Reconstructing the oil industry. Project RIO was set up under the auspices of 
the Corps of Engineers. It was initially designed to repair damage to Iraq’s oil indus-
try stemming from the war, including putting out oil well fires. Subsequently, it was 
given responsibility for reconstructing the entire oil industry. Project RIO main-
tained responsibility for supervising the KBR oil contract. Project RIO staff played a 
major role in project selection, using the KBR report but also incorporating addi-
tional information from the Ministry of Oil. Project managers and contractors coop-
erated with the Iraqi Ministry of Oil and the senior advisor on choices of projects. 
However, Project RIO took the lead in managing the reconstruction and rehabilita-
tion of the oil sector. It, not the Oil Ministry and senior advisor, monitored contrac-
____________ 
36 U.S. General Accounting Office, Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Over-
sight Issues, p. 86. 
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tors in terms of progress, charges, and quality of work, because it controlled funding 
through the Corps of Engineers, which selected the contractors. The Corps of Engi-
neers’ Project RIO was generally credited with successfully restoring oil output and 
exports. 
Reconstructing the electric power industry. Project RIE was more complicated. 
By late summer 2003, the CPA Administrator and CJTF-7 had become quite con-
cerned about progress in increasing the output of electricity. Popular dissatisfaction 
with CPA was ascribed to power outages. Senior policymakers hoped that if electric 
power provision improved, popular dissatisfaction, and hence support for the nascent 
insurgency, would decline. 
General John Abizaid sponsored a conference on this topic in late summer 2003 
at CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa. Based on the favorable experience with Pro-
ject RIO, the Corps of Engineers was charged with creating Task Force Restore Iraqi 
Electricity (RIE). Brigadier General Steven Hawkins from the Corps of Engineers 
was brought back to Iraq run Project RIE.37 Project RIE was expected to accelerate 
the reconstruction of the electric power sector because the Corps had the ability to let 
emergency contracts.  
As noted above, the Corps had awarded three construction contracts in March 
2003, to Washington International Corporation, Fluor Intercontinental, Inc., and 
Perini Corporation on the basis of limited competition. Once Project RIE was ap-
proved, the Corps issued task orders under these contracts for reconstruction and 
rehabilitation work in the electric power sector.  
Some acrimony arose among the various participants over the coordination of 
reconstruction efforts for the electric power sector. In contrast to Project RIO, Pro-
ject RIE was not the only organization working on electricity. Bechtel had a large 
contract through USAID to rehabilitate the power sector, and Iraq’s Commission of 
Electric Power had more than a billion dollars in equipment and supplies on order 
and in the process of delivery for projects begun under Saddam’s regime. The com-
mission had its own engineers and project planners. In March 2004, the Program 
Management Office awarded three additional contracts for expanding electric power 
generating capacity—outside of Project RIE.38  
Iraqi engineers from the Commission of Electric Power complained that their 
expertise had not been recognized or utilized to the extent it should have been. 
Knowledgeable Americans, however, claimed that the commission did not have the 
expertise or capability to successfully manage new projects. Meanwhile, GAO criti-
cized the Corps of Engineers for improperly issuing task orders to the three main 
____________ 
37 Hawkins had worked on electricity reconstruction activities for a few months after Task Force IV disbanded. 
See Chapter Four. 
38 U.S. General Accounting Office, Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Over-
sight Issues, p. 87. 
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contractors under Project RIE, for not establishing detailed work assignments, and 
for not opening the task orders to competition.39  
The Department of Defense initially allocated $350 million for RIE, with a 
promise of an additional appropriation of $730 million. RIE made obligations on the 
assumption that its total budget would be close to $1 billion, but the additional 
funds never materialized. Bremer was forced to use DFI funds to cover RIE’s expen-
ditures once the initial $350 million was gone, which was very frustrating for CPA 
officials.40  
Some participants believed that USAID’s contract with Bechtel was too expen-
sive. Because USAID has no in-house engineers, it contracted with the Corps of En-
gineers to provide quality assurance and quality control for its contract with Bechtel. 
Consequently, the chain of institutions involved was quite long: CPA, USAID, 
Corps of Engineers, Bechtel, major subcontractors such as General Electric and Sie-
mens, and so on. This complicated structure raised concerns that unnecessary costs 
were being added to the contract. The PMO apparently found neither Project RIE 
nor USAID totally satisfactory, because it chose to separately fund new contracts for 
the rehabilitation of the electric power sector. Despite these problems, participants 
stated that turf wars were rare, because all parties realized that there was more than 
enough work to go around. Each organization and contracting group reportedly fo-
cused on areas where it had particular expertise.41  
Reconstructing public buildings, bridges, and roads. CPA gave reconstruction 
of public buildings, bridges, and roads lower priority than the big three: telecommu-
nications, electric power, and water. However, while CPA struggled to restore power, 
Iraqis complained to local commanders that the Americans had made no improve-
ments or, in some instances, that life had been better under Saddam. Commanders 
attempted to address these complaints by using funds from the CERP and RRRP to 
repair local buildings and other community projects. These projects were much more 
visible and also employed local people. Commanders also complained that school 
reconstruction under the Bechtel contract was proceeding too slowly, that work was 
sometimes substandard, and that subcontractors were overpaid.  
CERP and RRRP deserve praise for providing local commanders with the flexi-
bility and the resources to address immediate local problems. However, these pro-
grams and the school reconstruction projects under Bechtel have also been criticized. 
CPA had set itself the goal of creating a secure, democratic Iraq with a flourishing 
market economy. To achieve this vision, CPA needed to set up mechanisms for re-
ducing corruption and encouraging free and fair competition. Commanders fre-
____________ 
39 U.S. General Accounting Office, Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and Management 
Challenges, pp. 20–21. 
40 Interviews with USAID official, July 2004, and CPA official, September 2004. 
41 Interview with USAID official, July 2004. 
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quently did not set up competitive bidding mechanisms and, in a number of in-
stances, awarded contracts to politically important locals even after other Iraqis un-
derbid them. Civil affairs officers stated that this approach to contracting left local 
Iraqis with the impression that it was “business as usual.” Political connections often 
determined awards, not the lowest bid. In addition, Iraqis claimed that some of the 
reconstruction work was shoddy. In light of the amount of money being paid, com-
munities thought they could have done a better job themselves.42  
Allocation of Funds  
CPA did not have a good system for making decisions on the allocation of funds for 
infrastructure and other projects. The request for the largest source of funding, the 
November 2003 supplemental, was drawn up by a few people in CPA’s Office of 
Management and Budget. Senior advisors and USAID staff complained that they 
were excluded from the process of putting together the final funding request. They 
argued that as a consequence, the original supplemental request did not allocate re-
sources in a manner best designed to improve security, foster democracy, and create a 
basis for sustained economic growth.  
Critics point to the $2 billion request for funding to create an Iraqi army, while 
the request for the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps was $76 million. The police were allo-
cated $150 million for equipment and refurbishing stations, while $400 million was 
requested for a maximum security prison, $100 million for a witness protection pro-
gram, and $100 million for investigative support for crimes against humanity.  
As noted above, supplemental funds were skewed toward investment in infra-
structure, especially electric power. Out of a $20.3 billion total request for Iraq, 
$5.675 billion was designated for electric power. This allocation was made without 
addressing the question of solvent demand for power in Iraq—the amount that peo-
ple would consume if they knew they had to pay for it. Because users are not com-
pelled to pay for power, nor do they face realistic prices, demand for power in Iraq is 
unconstrained by price. Increases in capacity to be financed under the supplemental 
would move power availability in Iraq above per capita levels in other Middle Eastern 
states, including states with substantially higher per capita incomes and much more 
developed industrial structures.  
Meanwhile, movement toward creating a regulatory structure and a proper me-
tering and billing system languished. Not surprisingly, because of the lack of con-
straints on demand, power availability (the number of hours per day power was avail-
able) was no higher at the end of May 2004 than it had been prior to the war, despite 
expenditures of $1.38 billion by Project RIE alone.43 
____________ 
42 Interview with civil affairs officer, August 2004. 
43 U.S. General Accounting Office, Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Over-
sight Issues, pp. 85–86. 
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Results as of June 28, 2004  
Resuming the Provision of Essential Services  
Despite large sums committed to the reconstruction of Iraq, the coalition had mixed 
success in restoring Iraqi services. After rising sharply from May 2003 to October 
2003, electric power generation stopped rising rapidly: production fell in April 
2004.44 By June 28, 2004, output still ran at about the same level as before the war. 
Hours of availability in May 2004 were 90 percent of what they were in May 2002.45  
Oil production had failed to reach its pre-conflict peak by mid-year 2004. At 
the end of June 2004, sabotage, an ongoing problem, had reduced output to just 1.1 
million barrels per day (mbd), a level last seen just after the war, compared to the 
prewar peak of 2.5 mbd.46  
On the other hand, the provision of water did improve. Municipal water sys-
tems were being expanded throughout the country as of June 28, 2004. Sewage sys-
tems were also operating more efficiently and were being expanded. After three mo-
bile telephone licenses were granted in 2003, mobile telephone service was being 
rapidly introduced. Although the number of subscribers to fixed line services still 
lagged pre-conflict numbers, which consisted of a little more than 800,000 lines, Iraq 
soon signed up 457,000 cell phone subscribers.  
The slower than planned pace at which electricity and oil production were re-
stored stems from a variety of reasons. First, the coalition underestimated the magni-
tude of the task. Not only did the coalition have to repair war damage, but years of 
poor maintenance and underinvestment had caught up with Iraq. In many instances, 
electric power-generating equipment was not worth repairing; it had to be replaced. 
This slowed the process of reconstruction. Second, looting immediately after the war 
and ongoing sabotage knocked out refurbished installations, resulting in frequent 
setbacks in restoring service levels. Third, the continued use of subsidies and price 
controls has exacerbated problems. Iraqis have used their rising incomes to purchase 
refrigerators and air conditioners that have increased the demand for electric power, 
power for which they do not pay. Price controls on diesel fuel have encouraged the 
Ministry of Electricity to use diesel for power generation and discouraged the devel-
opment of natural gas. Not surprisingly, diesel fuel is in short supply. The Ministry 
of Electricity has not been able to operate newly installed generating capacity because 
of shortages of fuel. Fourth, the lack of security has slowed contractor work and 
added to costs. Project RIE missed many of its deadlines for providing additional ca-
____________ 
44 Coalition Provisional Authority, “Working Papers: Iraq Status,” slide 20. 
45 It is worth noting, however, that the levels in May 2004 exceeded the levels reached in 1999–2000 by 20 per-
cent. Interview with CPA official, September 2004. 
46 Coalition Provisional Authority, “Working Papers: Iraq Status,” slide 22. 
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pacity. The inability of contractors to work because of violence and threats contrib-
uted to these delays.47  
Expenditures  
The PMO has been criticized for not spending the supplemental more rapidly. De-
spite Nash’s experience in government contracting procedures, it took some months 
before sizeable numbers of contracts could be awarded and funds spent. When CPA 
ceased to exist on June 28, 2004, $5.291 billion of the $18.439 billion supplemental 
had been obligated; only $366 million had been spent. Of the $12.406 billion of the 
supplemental to be spent on construction, $3.562 billion had been obligated by that 
date.48  
Reconstruction fell behind the initially optimistic timelines set for it, stemming 
in part from the difficulty in contracting for and implementing projects. U.S. con-
gressional concerns about properly monitoring contract expenditures cannot be satis-
fied without a reasonable period of time for issuing requests for proposals, evaluating 
bids, and choosing winners. Only after the winning bidders have been selected does 
the process of developing specific projects, contracting for equipment, and installing 
equipment begin. The time needed to manage this process correctly stretched out the 
reconstruction timeline. Finally, the high degree of violence has raised contractor 
costs, slowed reconstruction, and generally retarded the effort.  
It is not clear that a more rapid rate of expenditures would have been in the best 
interest of Iraq or U.S. taxpayers. As noted above, total U.S. appropriations for assis-
tance to Iraq since the end of the war have exceeded the best estimates of Iraq’s GDP 
for 2003. Trying to spend that amount of money in one or two years would be 
equivalent to pushing $11 trillion, roughly the size of the United States’ GDP at that 
time, through the U.S. economy in 24 months. Sums of this magnitude have highly 
distorting effects on demand and prices for construction inputs: labor, land, materi-
als, transport, and so on.  
Costs  
Because of the desire to provide assistance quickly and the highly uncertain nature of 
the venture, all major contracts for reconstructing Iraqi infrastructure are based on 
cost reimbursement plus a fee. These types of contracts do not lend themselves to 
encouraging cost savings. DoD has addressed the inherent lack of incentives to save 
by providing financial incentives for exceeding performance criteria set down in task 
orders.  
____________ 
47 U.S. General Accounting Office, Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Over-
sight Issues, pp. 90–92. 
48 Coalition Provisional Authority, “Working Papers: Iraq Status,” slide 14. 
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We do not have enough information at this point to make a judgment on the 
costs of infrastructure projects in Iraq. We do know that Project RIE has experienced 
several significant cost overruns, in part because of the increased costs of security.49 
The GAO report criticizes the Army Corps of Engineers for failing to come to early 
agreements with KBR on definitions of task orders. These definitions are the basis for 
rewarding contractors for achieving cost savings and providing services in an efficient 
manner. The Corps failed to define criteria for either the March 2003 contract or 
one of its contracts for rehabilitating the Iraqi electric power industry.50 In part be-
cause of the lack of incentives and oversight, GAO “saw very little concern for cost 
considerations.”51  
Quality Control  
Neither official government reports nor interview data suggest that quality has been a 
problem in reconstruction projects involving electric power, the oil sector, or water 
systems. Some interviewees and press reports have been critical of the quality of work 
under the Bechtel contract pertaining to school rehabilitation. In some instances, lo-
cal subcontractors used poor-quality materials and provided shoddy workmanship.52 
Although this contract does not cover major reconstruction and repairs, anecdotal 
reports suggest that quality was inadequate in certain cases. 
____________ 
49 U.S. General Accounting Office, Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Over-
sight Issues, pp. 90–92. 
50 U.S. General Accounting Office, Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and Management 
Challenges, p. 21. 
51 U.S. General Accounting Office, Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and Management 
Challenges, p. 10. 




Assessing Postwar Efforts 
The United States did not plan well for the complexities and violence of post-
Saddam Iraq. Although many U.S. government agencies invested a lot of time and 
effort in identifying possible reconstruction requirements for postwar Iraq, the basic 
plan for war largely pushed these requirements aside. Indeed, in overlooking the need 
to enforce security in the immediate aftermath of Saddam’s fall, the warplan may 
well have contributed to the problems U.S. forces face. 
How did this happen? More important, what can be done to avoid the flaws of 
the OIF warplan in the future? After all, Iraq and Afghanistan may not be the only 
state-sized battlegrounds of the war on terrorism. Insofar as terrorists find safe haven 
in states like Afghanistan, or exploit the weaknesses of failing states generally, regime 
change, state-building, reconstruction, governance—the missions U.S. forces have 
taken on in Iraq—are likely to recur in future military operations. Although these 
missions call on the forces of all services as well as those of other states, they fall 
mainly to ground forces, for the obvious reason that only ground forces can seize, 
hold, and control territory and people. 
The challenge to the Army is critical but especially vexing. As they do in Iraq 
today, Army forces play a major role in post-conflict operations. Yet they are only 
part of a much larger planning process1 that includes large sections of the govern-
ment and is driven, rightly, by the nation’s and the Defense Department’s civilian 
leadership. The Army can shape doctrine and forces to better take on counterinsur-
gency and stability operations, but the larger issue raised in this report is how it can 
help to better shape a planning process much larger than itself. 
Shaping the Plan 
If myriad voices within and outside the U.S. government sought to call attention to 
the possible challenges of post-Saddam Iraq, why did the planning process fail to ac-
____________ 
1 Operational planning is largely the purview of the combatant commands, while strategic planning is controlled 
by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
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count for these possibilities? The story begins at a fairly high level, where key as-
sumptions about post-Saddam Iraq remained largely unchallenged. But even at this 
high level, military voices could have sounded a louder warning than they did. In 
fact, the plan was shaped by a rough convergence of civilian assumptions about post-
Saddam Iraq and military views about responsibility for handling that part of the op-
eration that together downplayed post-Saddam challenges and the role military forces 
should play in meeting them. 
Unchallenged Assumptions and Expectations 
U.S. government planning was driven by a particular view, held by senior policy-
makers in key positions in the government, of what would emerge as a result of com-
bat operations and what would be required thereafter. While alternative views and 
outcomes were examined by the various organizations described in previous chapters, 
none of them formed a consistent basis for planning throughout the U.S. govern-
ment. The high-level civilian view that prevailed was based on the following assump-
tions:  
• The military campaign would have a decisive end and would produce a stable 
security environment. As discussed in Chapter Two, the civilian leadership be-
lieved that military operations would end once Saddam Hussein was removed 
from power, giving rise to a largely stable situation during the reconstruction 
phase. Local forces, particularly the police and the regular army, would be capa-
ble of providing law and order, so U.S. and coalition military forces could be 
withdrawn rapidly from Iraq. Administration officials had hoped to shrink the 
U.S. military presence to two divisions—between 30,000 and 40,000 troops— 
by the fall of 2003.2 Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz succinctly ex-
pressed this assumption in his testimony to Congress on February 27, 2003, 
when he stated “it’s hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide 
stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and to 
secure the surrender of Saddam’s security forces and his army.”3  
• U.S. and coalition forces would be greeted as liberators. After Saddam was re-
moved from power, the Iraqi population was expected to support the U.S. pres-
ence. Three days before the war, Vice President Cheney clearly articulated this 
____________ 
2 Interview with V Corps official, January 2005. These plans called for a third division, from a yet-to-be-
determined coalition country, to join the two U.S. divisions in Iraq. Michael R. Gordon with Eric Schmitt, “U.S. 
Plans to Reduce Forces in Iraq, with Help of Allies,” New York Times, May 3, 2003; Esther Schrader and Paul 
Richter, “U.S. Delays Pullout in Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, July 15, 2003. 
3 Paul Wolfowitz, testimony to the House Budget Committee, February 27, 2003. It is worth noting that this 
assumption stood in stark contrast to the force estimates developed by the military. General Franks believed that 
the number of troops would have to be increased to 250,000 before being reduced, and General Shinseki, Task 
Force IV, and the Army staff estimated that the reconstruction phase would involve multiple hundreds of thou-
sands of troops. See Chapters Two and Four. 
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view by stating “my belief is we will, in fact, be greeted as liberators.”4 Iraqi exiles 
emphasized that the Iraqis would greet U.S. forces with “sweets and flowers,”5 
and CENTCOM commander General Franks worked from the assumption that 
the Iraqis would support U.S. forces, and perhaps even join them in combat, once 
they believed that the United States was serious about removing Saddam from 
power.6 It may be that U.S. officials insisted on the vision of the United States as 
a liberator as a way to avoid the responsibilities of occupying powers under the 
Geneva Conventions.7 Yet regardless of whether this view was ideological or in-
strumental, it was one of the reasons why U.S. forces on the ground after the fall 
of Baghdad did not take steps to restore public order.8  
• Government ministries would continue to function. Because the Ba’ath regime 
maintained a tightly centralized grip on power throughout the country, U.S. of-
ficials assumed that government ministries were largely effective state structures. 
As discussed in Chapter Five, they assumed that the top leadership of each min-
istry could be replaced, leaving the remaining technocrats and civil servants to 
continue running the state. 
• Humanitarian relief requirements would be extensive. Humanitarian relief was 
the one area where U.S. officials assumed Phase III and Phase IV might overlap. 
They prepared for the possibility that more than a million people would flee 
their homes to avoid the effects of combat, and they worried that those numbers 
might be even higher if Saddam Hussein used weapons of mass destruction dur-
ing the military campaign. They also assumed that hunger would be wide-
spread, due to disruptions in the food distribution system, and that Iraq might 
experience significant sanitation problems as well.  
• Infrastructure throughout the country would remain largely intact. The mili-
tary campaign was designed to damage as little of Iraq’s infrastructure as possi-
____________ 
4 Vice President Richard Cheney, remarks made on Meet the Press, televised March 16, 2003. 
5 Kanan Makiya, one of the Iraqi participants in the Future of Iraq project, acknowledged after the war that this 
had been his message to President Bush, and he stated “I admit I was wrong.” Joel Brinkley and Eric Schmitt, 
“Iraqi Leaders Say U.S. Was Warned of Disorder After Hussein, but Little Was Done,” New York Times, No-
vember 30, 2003. See also Woodward, p. 259. 
6 Woodward, p. 81. 
7 Sandra Mitchell, vice president of the International Rescue Committee, recounted that she and other NGO 
representatives discussed the responsibilities of occupying powers under the Fourth Geneva Convention with 
representatives of the U.S. Agency for International Development. She noted, “we were corrected when we raised 
this point. The American troops would be ‘liberators’ rather than ‘occupiers,’ so that the obligations did not ap-
ply.” Quote from Fallows, p. 63. 
8 As the 3rd Infantry Division noted in its after action report, “Because of the refusal to acknowledge occupier status, 
commanders did not initially take measures available to occupying powers, such as imposing curfews, directing civil-
ians to work and controlling the local governments and populace. The failure to act after we displaced the regime 
created a power vacuum, which others immediately tried to fill.” Quote from John J. Lumpkin and Dafna Linzer, 
“Army Says Policy Choice Led to Chaos in Iraq,” Philadelphia Inquirer, November 28, 2003. 
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ble, focusing instead on regime centers of power. U.S. officials were concerned 
that Saddam might torch the oil fields during the war, so they took special pre-
cautions to prevent that. Generally speaking, however, they expected the oil sec-
tor, the power grid, and other key aspects of Iraq’s infrastructure to remain 
mostly unaffected by the war, with only minimal reconstruction required after-
ward.  
Actual postwar events proved most of these assumptions to be faulty. Phase III 
combat operations did not end neatly, and the United States was not greeted as a lib-
erator.9 An insurgency started developing almost immediately, suggesting that Gen-
eral Shinseki’s estimate that postwar operations would require “something on the or-
der of several hundred thousand soldiers”10 may have been closer to the mark than 
the administration’s optimistic assumption had been. Humanitarian relief require-
ments were minimal, which meant that the one contingency for which detailed plans 
had been developed never arose. Although the military campaign left most of Iraq’s 
infrastructure intact, extensive looting in the aftermath of the conflict severely dam-
aged infrastructure throughout the country. Moreover, U.S. analysts had underesti-
mated the level of debilitation to Iraq’s infrastructure after more than a decade of 
sanctions.11 Government ministries turned out to be hollow, without the capabilities 
and resources necessary to run the country once the Ba’athists were removed from 
power. Wolfowitz later acknowledged that defense officials had erred by making as-
sumptions that “turned out to underestimate the problem” in postwar Iraq.12 Iraq’s 
reconstruction became the major undertaking described in Chapters Eight through 
Twelve.  
Although the prevailing assumptions proved to be wrong, they were not unrea-
sonable—or at least they were no less reasonable than a variety of other, less optimis-
tic sets of assumptions. The problem was that the prevailing assumptions were never 
seriously challenged. Despite a predilection for questioning virtually all operational 
____________ 
9 Ten days after the war started, an unnamed senior administration official was already quoted in the press as 
questioning this assumption: “We underestimated their capacity to put up resistance. We underestimated the role 
of nationalism. And we overestimated the appeal of liberation.” Bob Drogin and Greg Miller, “Plan’s Defect: No 
Defectors,” Los Angeles Times, March 28, 2003. 
10 General Eric Shinseki, testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 25, 2003. 
11 For more on the failure to correctly assess the status of Iraq’s infrastructure, see Rajiv Chandrasekaran, 
“Crossed Wires Kept Power Off in Iraq,” Washington Post, September 25, 2003. 
12 Wolfowitz identified three conditions that were worse than defense officials had anticipated: the failure of Iraqi 
army units to fight alongside the United States and assist in the reconstruction; the requirement to rebuild the 
police forces; and the difficulty of imagining that Ba’ath Party remnants would continue to fight. See U.S. De-
partment of Defense News Transcript, “Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Briefing on His Recent Trip to Iraq,” July 
23, 2003. As of October 2007: 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2872 
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military assumptions from several directions,13 and despite the existence of alternative 
analyses within the government, those charged with planning for Iraq assumed that 
one particular scenario would play out and did not plan for other possible contingen-
cies that had been identified both inside and outside the U.S. government.14 
What explains the failure to challenge assumptions and develop alternate scenar-
ios? One factor was the context in which the decision to go to war was being debated. 
Proponents of the intervention, within the administration and without, tended to 
argue that post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction would be manageable in 
terms of cost, time, and effort, while opponents argued the contrary. Once the basic 
decision to intervene had been made, reservations about the scale of effort needed for 
stabilization and reconstruction may have been interpreted as a form of bureaucratic 
obstruction—as obstacles to be overcome rather than valid concerns to be addressed.  
Meanwhile, in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Con-
gress and the country as a whole were disinclined to challenge the administration on 
national security judgments. As a result, the decision to intervene received less con-
gressional and media scrutiny than might have been the case under other circum-
stances. The administration’s early and rapid success in installing a successor to the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan only weeks after the initial entry of U.S. troops also 
engendered optimism that a similarly quick transition might be made in Iraq.  
Ineffective Interagency Coordination  
The dominance of a single set of assumptions about postwar Iraq suggests the ab-
sence of a robust interagency coordination process. Several U.S. government organi-
zations, particularly the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the State Depart-
ment, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the National 
Security Council (NSC), and the military commands conducted separate studies of 
postwar possibilities. Looking back, some of these studies appear to have been rea-
sonably prescient. The problem, therefore, was not that the U.S. government failed 
to plan for the postwar period. Instead, it was the failure to effectively coordinate and 
integrate these various planning efforts.  
Those functions normally fall to the National Security Council staff, which has 
overall responsibility for coordinating U.S. foreign and defense policies. In fact, as 
outlined in previous chapters, the NSC staff oversaw several interagency working 
groups that brought together representatives from DoD, State, CIA, and other orga-
____________ 
13 See Woodward and Franks for more detailed discussions. 
14 The Defence Committee of the British House of Commons reached the same conclusion after an extensive 
inquiry into postwar planning and operations. After stating that a “wide range of predictions for the post-conflict 
situation in Iraq were made in advance of the conflict,” the committee notes that “there is some evidence that the 
extensive planning, which we know took place in both the U.S. and the U.K., did not fully reflect the extent of 
that range.” See United Kingdom House of Commons Defence Committee, Iraq: An Initial Assessment of Post-
Conflict Operations, Volume I, Sixth Report of Session 2004–05, March 16, 2005, p. 3. 
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nizations. Most of these working groups focused on the conduct of the war, but the 
Iraq Relief and Reconstruction (IR+R) Working Group did focus on postwar plans. 
This group produced fairly detailed humanitarian relief plans, while its reconstruc-
tion plans remained vague—reflecting the assumptions described earlier in this chap-
ter. These assumptions appear to have dominated the NSC staff’s approach to plan-
ning as well.  
If the NSC staff failed to consider alternative scenarios that might pose differing 
requirements, neither did it provide strategic guidance on various aspects of U.S. pol-
icy during the postwar period. Repeated requests for policy guidance from 
CENTCOM, Task Force IV, ORHA, and others went unanswered, leaving each 
agency to make its own assumptions about key aspects of the postwar period.15 Key 
questions, such as whether the U.S. postwar authority would be military or civilian in 
nature, went unanswered throughout the planning process. When the NSC finally 
did issue strategic guidance in late March 2003 (as discussed in Chapter Three), the 
war was already under way. As a result, the various planning processes that occurred 
throughout the U.S. government were neither coordinated nor guided by a set of 
consistent goals and objectives.  
Above all, the NSC seems not to have mediated the persistent disagreement be-
tween the Defense Department and the State Department that existed throughout 
the planning process. Secretary of State Powell influenced a few key diplomatic deci-
sions—notably the decision to take the case for war with Iraq to the United Nations 
in September 200216—but the Defense Department controlled most planning deci-
sions. Richard Haass, then the Director of Policy Planning at the State Department, 
later stated that he realized the decision to confront Iraq had already been made in 
July 2002, despite continuing opposition from State.17 As discussed in Chapter 
Three, State’s main postwar planning effort, the Future of Iraq project, was largely 
ignored by the Defense Department throughout 2002. And as noted in Chapter 
Five, in February 2003 DoD prevented Tom Warrick, the study’s leader, from work-
ing for ORHA.18  
The Department of Defense was named the lead agency for postwar Iraq in 
January 2003, on grounds that the civilian and military authorities in postwar Iraq 
would coordinate more effectively if they both reported to the Secretary of Defense, 
____________ 
15 See, for example, the discussion of CENTCOM’s frustration with the lack of policy guidance in Fineman, 
Wright, and McManus. 
16 Woodward, especially pp. 148–153. 
17 Haass stated that during a conversation with National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice held in the first week 
of July 2002, “I raised this issue about were we really sure that we wanted to put Iraq front and center at this 
point, given the war on terrorism and other issues. And she said, essentially, that that decision’s been made, don’t 
waste your breath . . . it was that meeting with Condi that made me realize it was farther along than I had real-
ized.” Nicholas Lemann, “How It Came to War,” The New Yorker, March 31, 2003. 
18 For more on tension between DoD and State, see Rieff, “Blueprint for a Mess.” 
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rather than having the civilian authorities reporting to State and the military authori-
ties reporting to DoD. While this may have made sense in theory, it did not work in 
practice. DoD’s understandable emphasis on military operations led it to form 
ORHA, the civilian planning agency, only eight weeks before combat operations be-
gan, and more than a year after CENTCOM began military planning for the war. 
But DoD lacked the expertise and personnel necessary to address the civilian aspects 
of reconstruction, and it did not possess enough bureaucratic leverage to compel 
other U.S. agencies to provide experienced personnel. DoD’s lack of capacity for ci-
vilian reconstruction planning and execution continued to pose problems throughout 
the occupation period.  
Security as the Key Postwar Task 
The biggest failure of both military planning and the interagency process was the 
failure to assign responsibility and resources for providing security in the immediate 
aftermath of the war. Clearly, this failure stemmed directly from the assumptions 
identified at the beginning of this chapter: the Iraqi population would generally sup-
port the U.S. military presence, and the Iraqi police would maintain law and order 
throughout the country. Postwar planning did not account for the insurgency that 
emerged as soon as major combat ended and did not anticipate that all of Iraq’s secu-
rity structures, including the police, would essentially disintegrate and prove incapa-
ble of providing security.  
The failure is all the more glaring for the presence of countering advice available 
to planners. The question of post-conflict security was addressed explicitly at the 
February 2003 rock drill, as discussed in Chapter Five, but was never satisfactorily 
resolved. Ron Adams, the deputy director of ORHA, later recalled that “There were 
some of us saying, right from the get-go, ‘We think there’s a troops-to-task mismatch 
here—I’m not sure there are enough troops here to maintain security.’”19 Meanwhile, 
General Anthony Zinni (ret.), the CENTCOM commander before General Franks, 
noted after the war that the warplans he developed for potential operations against 
Saddam did include enough forces for post-combat stability operations. Zinni argues 
that DoD leaders were “very proud that they didn’t have the kind of numbers [of 
troops] my plan had called for. The reason we had those two extra divisions was the 
security situation. Revenge killings, crime, chaos—this was all foreseeable.”20  
In the event, Secretary Rumsfeld and General Franks chose to stop the flow of 
forces into Iraq sooner than their planners had envisioned, further reducing the 
forces available to provide security. As discussed in Chapter Two, senior commanders 
believed that forces would continue to flow into theater until after end-state condi-
____________ 
19 Michael Elliott, “So, What Went Wrong?” Time, October 6, 2003. 
20 Fallows, p. 65. 
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tions were met for both Phases III and IV. The decision to stop the flow of forces 
(notably the 1st Cavalry Division) into theater prior to that point was, in effect, a 
change to OPLAN 1003V. It further exacerbated a shortfall in the number of troops 
required to simultaneously complete Phase III and begin Phase IV operations. 
Significantly, few military voices besides that of Army Chief of Staff Shinseki 
protested these force levels. Clearly one reason was that the military operated within 
the prevailing assumptions outlined earlier in this chapter, which did not identify 
security as a problem. Yet another part of the answer lies in the reluctance of the 
military to take responsibility for security and stabilization missions in the aftermath 
of major combat—though that reluctance was, in part, due to the failure to ade-
quately resource Phase IV operations.  
The CENTCOM commander, General Tommy Franks, unintentionally shows 
this reluctance in his memoirs. He mentions the importance of Phase IV throughout 
his book, but never identifies the specific mission that U.S. forces should have had 
during that time. To the contrary, he expresses the strong statement that his civilian 
superiors should focus on the postwar while he focused on the war itself.21 He goes 
on to argue that civic action sets the preconditions for security rather than the other 
way around.22 And he justifies his decision to retire right after combat ended because 
the mission was changing and a new commander should be there throughout Phase 
IV.23 These statements reveal a mindset that sees major combat operations during 
Phase III as fundamentally distinct from Phase IV stability and reconstruction re-
quirements.  
We know now, of course, that the failure to plan for and adequately resource 
stability operations had serious repercussions that affected the United States 
throughout the occupation period and continue to affect U.S. military forces in Iraq. 
Because U.S. forces were not directed to establish law and order—and may not have 
had sufficient capabilities to do so—they stood aside while looters ravaged Iraq’s in-
frastructure and destroyed the facilities that the military campaign took great pains to 
ensure remained intact, creating greater reconstruction requirements than existed 
when major combat ended. Because U.S. forces have had to focus far more on pro-
viding security for U.S. personnel (both military and civilian) than on providing se-
____________ 
21 Franks states, “While we at CENTCOM were executing the warplan, Washington should focus on policy-level 
issues . . . I knew the President and Don Rumsfeld would back me up, so I felt free to pass the message along to 
the bureaucracy beneath them: You pay attention to the day after and I’ll pay attention to the day of.” Franks,  
p. 441. Emphasis in the original. 
22 Franks writes, “As I had said throughout our planning sessions, civic action and security were linked— inextri-
cably linked. There was a commonly held belief that civil action would not be possible in Iraq without security. I 
would continue to argue that there could be no security without civic action.” Franks, p. 526. Emphasis in the 
original. 
23 Franks, p. 530. 
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curity for Iraqis, ordinary Iraqis started growing frustrated with the lack of law and 
order in their country soon after Saddam was removed from power. 
This trend has only gotten worse since the insurgency began, as U.S. forces have 
had to assume that ordinary citizens may be potential belligerents and that civilians 
are often caught in the crossfire. A consistent majority of the Iraqi population identi-
fied security and safety as the most urgent issue facing Iraq throughout the occupa-
tion period.24 The failure to stabilize and secure Iraq has therefore had the inadver-
tent effect of strengthening the insurgency, as Iraqis witness many of the negative 
effects of the U.S. military presence without seeing positive progress on the issues 
that matter to them most. The insurgency has also been aided by the failure of U.S. 
military forces to prioritize the mission of sealing the country’s borders during the 
occupation period, which enabled critical foreign support to flow into Iraq.  
Lessons for the Army 
This experience provides several lessons for how the military in general, and the na-
tion’s ground forces in particular, can seek to avoid or at least ameliorate in the fu-
ture the problems that it now faces in Iraq. Arguably, three of those lessons are par-
ticularly helpful in shaping a new approach to military planning aimed at improving 
post-conflict operations. 
• First, it should be clear from U.S. interventions not just in Iraq, but in Afghani-
stan, Kosovo, and Bosnia, that wars do not end when major conflict ends. Wars 
emerge from an unsatisfactory set of political circumstances, and they end with 
the creation of new political circumstances that are more favorable to the vic-
tor—in this case, circumstances more favorable to U.S. interests. Creating those 
new circumstances may not involve continuing conflict, and even if conflict is 
involved, it may not be as intense as the counterinsurgency operations confront-
ing U.S. forces in Iraq. But given the likely security vacuum in the immediate 
aftermath of major conflict, planners cannot avoid considering a variety of pos-
sible missions and scenarios. 
• Second, these post-conflict missions will almost unavoidably fall to forces pre-
sent on the ground at the time. To some extent the security missions that follow 
____________ 
24 This trend continued after the June 28, 2004 transfer of authority. Results do vary somewhat by city. Between 
January and August 2004, the percentage of the population identifying safety and security as the most urgent 
issue averaged 63 percent in Baquba; 60 percent in Mosul; 53 percent in Baghdad; 47 percent in Najaf; and 30 
percent in Basra. When asked “How safe do you feel in your neighborhood?” the number of respondents who 
answered “not very safe” or “not safe at all” averaged 63 percent in Basra; 58 percent in Baquba; 57 percent in 
Baghdad and Najaf; 46 percent in Mosul; and 33 percent in Karbala. See “Opinion Analysis,” U.S. Department 
of State Office of Research, M-106-04, September 16, 2004, Appendix 6A. 
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major conflict are legitimate tasks for ground forces that, by virtue of their pos-
session of the instruments of violence, can impose security in such situations. 
But the absence of security makes it unlikely that the civilian organizations that 
would normally handle reconstruction tasks will be available quickly to take on 
those roles. In the immediate aftermath of major conflict, and perhaps for a 
good deal longer, “civilian” as well as “military” missions will fall to forces on 
the ground. 
• Finally, it should be clear that the way the actual conflict unfolds greatly influ-
ences the situation that emerges and evolves after the major conflict ends. In or-
der to provide security in the aftermath of Saddam’s fall, the invading force 
needed more troops. These observations testify to the dangerous artificiality of 
the distinction between Phase IV and the phases that preceded it. They are not 
distinct phases; planning for them sequentially can produce unhappy outcomes. 
These lessons have significance for the U.S. Army’s Title 10 role of organizing, 
training, and equipping forces for use by combatant commanders in major conflicts. 
The Army must put real meaning into the phrase “full spectrum force.” It must be 
able to fight and dominate an adversary in a major conflict. But as Iraq demonstrates, 
Army forces must also be prepared to provide security to a civilian populace, recon-
stitute and retrain local security forces, reconstruct infrastructure as necessary, escort 
children safely to school, perhaps even help clear raw sewage from the streets. They 
will usually do so in a cultural environment foreign to them, yet those missions will 
require them to have at least enough cultural awareness to avoid undermining the 
mission. 
But the more crucial significance of these basic lessons comes at the level of 
military and strategic planning. Clearly these lessons produce a very different view of 
the military planning process than the one recorded in this report. Military planning 
must start with a view of the desired outcome of the war—not the outcome of major 
conflict, but the creation of the desired political circumstances that signal the true 
end of the war. They must do so both because their forces, and especially forces on 
the ground, will be intimately involved in creating those circumstances, and because 
the way in which military action unfolds will heavily shape subsequent developments. 
One way to capture this lesson is to say that military planners must start with 
“Phase IV.” A still more productive approach would be to dispense with phases, 
which inevitably produce sequenced plans that risk missing crucial connections from 
phase to phase. Planners must start with strategic guidance from the civilian leader-
ship on where they want to be, strategically, when the war ends. They can then work 
backward to points of major conflict, shaping plans for those in ways that contribute 
to the larger and longer-term strategic goal. 
Starting to plan in this way will ensure that “Phase IV” will not be ignored or 
underplayed in the planning process. As planning for OIF makes clear, it is essential 
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that planners entertain a full array of possible scenarios for getting to that strategic 
end point. Even the most reasonable assumptions must be challenged, and hedging 
actions must be an integral part of the plan. Recognizing that military forces—largely 
U.S. Army forces—will play a role in these activities should give the combatant 
commander good reason to force this conversation into the planning process. 
They may not have to “force” anything, of course. Every planning process is dif-
ferent, and many may be open to the kind of questions that were not seriously con-
sidered in planning for Phase IV of OIF. The point is that military commanders and 
planners have a right and a responsibility to raise questions about so-called post-
conflict activity, the “stability operations” assumed to follow a major combat opera-
tion. At the very least, the way these questions are answered will shape plans for ma-
jor combat operations. It may also be the case, as it has been in Iraq, that military 
forces will be engaged in fashioning a favorable political outcome to a particular con-




Strategic Studies Institute’s Mission Matrix for Iraq 
As described in Chapter Three, the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War 
College issued a report in February 2003 called Reconstructing Iraq. It contains the 
single most comprehensive list of postwar reconstruction tasks produced either inside 
or outside the U.S. government before the war. This mission matrix, as it is called in 
the report, is reproduced here. It divides the reconstruction period into four phases: 
providing security (up to six months); stabilization (six months to one year); building 
institutions (one to two years); and handing power to local authorities (more than 
two years). It then identifies 135 tasks that must be accomplished during reconstruc-
tion, and names the organizations or agencies that should be responsible for each task 
during each of the four phases. It also assigns a priority to each task, defined as fol-
lows:  
Critical: “If the commander of coalition military forces does not put immediate 
emphasis and resources on these activities he risks mission failure.” 
Essential: “These tasks also require quick attention and resources from the 
commander of coalition military forces, though they are generally not as time 
sensitive as the critical tasks. However, failure in accomplishing them will have 
significant impact on the overall mission.”  
Important: “These tasks must still be performed to create and maintain a viable 
state, but they are more important in later phases of transition and/or primarily 
the responsibility of nonmilitary agencies.” 
Based largely on this matrix, the report concluded that military leaders, particu-
larly within the U.S. Army, should conduct more detailed analyses of their responsi-
bilities and missions in postwar Iraq before major combat commences. 
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Major Security Activities 
1A. Secure/Destroy WMD Critical Coalition Coalition, 
State, 
UNMOVIC 
State, UNMOVIC Transparent Iraqi 
government 
1B. Stop Intra- and Inter-
factional Fighting 
Critical Coalition Coalition Coalition, Iraqi 
army 
Iraqi army 
1C. Train New Iraqi Army Essential Coalition Coalition Coalition 
(broadened) 
U.S. Army 
1D. Round Up Regime Critical Coalition Coalition, CIA, 
DOJ 
Coalition, CIA, DOJ — 
1E. Eliminate Pockets of 
Resistence 
Critical Coalition Coalition Coalition — 











1G. Secure Borders Critical Coalition Coalition Coalition, Iraqi 
army 
Iraqi army 
1H. Seize and Secure Oil 
Facilities 
Critical Coalition Coalition Coalition, Iraqi 
army 
Iraqi army 
1I. Plan and Conduct Conse-
quence Management 
Critical Coalition Coalition Coalition, Iraqi 
army 
Iraqi army 
1J. Plan and Conduct Theater 
Information Operations 
Critical Coalition Coalition Coalition, Iraqi 
army 
Iraqi army 
1K. Maintain Freedom of 
Movement 
Critical Coalition Coalition Coalition, Iraqi 
army 
Iraqi army 
1L. Regulate Freedom of 
Movement 




2A. Establish and Assist 
Regional and Local 
Governments 
Critical Coalition Coalition, 
USAID, NED, 
State, IOs 




2B. Establish and Assist 
National Legislative 
System 
Important Coalition USAID, NED, 
State, IOs, 
Coalition 




2C. Establish and Assist 





















2E.  Preserve and Improve 
Public Records System 
Essential Coalition, 
DOJ 
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DOJ, Arab League, 
Iraqis, State 
Arab League, Iraqis 







DOJ, Arab League, 
Iraqis, State 
Arab League, Iraqis 
3C. Establish and Operate 
System to Enact and 
Publicize Laws 






Arab League, Iraqis 









DOJ, Arab League, 
Iraqis, State 
Arab League, 
UNDP, ICM, Iraqis 
3E. Support and Conduct War 
Crimes Tribunals 
Essential Coalition Coalition, DOJ, 
State 
Coalition and ICC 
or Tribunal 
Iraqi institutions 







Arab League, Iraqis 
3G. Protect Human Rights Important Coalition State, USAID, 
Coalition, 
NGOs 









World Bank, IMF 
World Bank, IMF, 
Iraqis 








World Bank, IMF 
World Bank, IMF, 
Iraqis 
4C. Establish Private Financial 
Institutions 
Important — Treasury, 
USAID 
Treasury, USAID, 
World Bank, IMF 
World Bank, IMF, 
Iraqis 
4D. Conduct Foreign Currency 
Exchange 
Important Treasury Treasury, 
USAID 
Treasury, USAID, 
World Bank, IMF 
World Bank, IMF, 
Iraqis 
4E. Pay Government Civil and 
Military Employees 





World Bank, Iraqis 
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5A. Restore and Maintain 
Newspapers and Print 
Media 





5B. Restore and Maintain 
Government Radio System 







5C. Restore and Maintain 
Government Television 
System 







5D. Establish Private TV System Important — USAID, FCC USAID, FCC Iraqis 
5E. Establish Private Radio 
System 
Important — USAID, FCC USAID, FCC Iraqis 
5F. Develop Censorship and 
Libel Laws 







Arab League, Iraqis 
5G. Restore and Maintain 
Cable Systems 






5H. Coordinate U.S. Gov./ 





State, Coalition State 
Historical, Cultural, and Recreational Services 
6A. Maintain Art and Cultural 
Institutions 









State, DOJ, USAID, 
Iraqis, UNESCO 
UNESCO, Iraqis 
6C. Maintain Sports and 
Recreational Systems 











Iraqi Forces — 
Public Safety 
7A. Establish and Maintain 
Police Systems and 
Operations 
Critical Coalition DOJ, State, 
Coalition, APA 
DOJ, State, APA, 
UN Police 
APA, Iraqis 
7B. Train Police Important — DOJ, State, 
APA 
DOJ, State, APA, 
UN Police 
APA, Iraqis 
7C. Maintain Penal System Essential Coalition USAID, DOJ, 
Coalition, 
Arab League 
USAID, DOJ, Arab 
League 
Arab League, Iraqis 
7D. Provide and Support Fire 
Fighting Systems 
Important Coalition USAID, FEMA, 
Coalition 
USAID, FEMA Iraqis 
7E. Conduct Explosive 
Ordnance Disposal and 
Demining 
Essential Coalition Coalition, 
USAID, State, 
NGOs 
USAID, State, UN, 
NGOs 
UN, Iraqis, NGOs 
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Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration 
8A. Demobilize and 
Reorganize Army, Security 





Coalition, State — 
8B. Transfer and Reorient to 
Integrate into Civil Sector 
Important — USAID, 
Coalition 
USAID, Coalition — 
8C. Reintegrate Demobilized 
Persons Into Civil Sector 
Important — USAID, State USAID, State — 
8D. Restructure and 
Reorganize New Civil 
Security Forces 





8E. Dismantle Ba’ath Party Essential — NED, USAID, 
State, CIA 
NED, USAID, State, 
CIA 
— 
8F.  Disarm and Secure 
Weapons 
Critical Coalition Coalition — — 
Electoral Process for More Participatory Government 
9A. Plan Local Elections Important Coalition NED, USAID, 
State 
NED, USAID, State, 
NGOs 
NGOs 
9B. Plan National Elections Important — NED, USAID, 
State 
NED, USAID, State, 
NGOs 
NGOs 
9C. Prepare Local Elections Important Coalition NED, USAID, 
State 
NED, USAID, State, 
NGOs 
NGOs 
9D. Prepare National Elections Important — NED, USAID, 
State 
NED, USAID, State, 
NGOs 
NGOs 
9E. Assist Conduct of Local 
Elections 
Important Coalition NED, USAID, 
State, 
Coalition 
NED, USAID, State, 
Coalition, NGOs 
NGOs 
9F. Assist Conduct of National 
Elections 
Important — NED, USAID, 
State, 
Coalition 
NED, USAID, State, 
Coalition, NGOs 
NGOs 
9G. Provide Post Local Election 
Support 
Important — NED, USAID, 
State 
NED, USAID, State, 
NGOs 
NGOs 
9H. Provide Post National 
Election Support 
Important — NED, USAID, 
State 
NED, USAID, State, 
NGOs 
NGOs 
9I. Plan for Constitutional 
Convention 
Important — NED, USAID, 
State 
NED, USAID, State, 
NGOs 
NGOs 
9J. Assist Conduct of 
Constitutional Convention 
Important — NED, USAID, 
State, 
Coalition 
NED, USAID, State, 
Coalition NGOs 
NGOs 
9K. Assist Conduct of 
Constitutional 
Referendum 
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Disaster Preparedness and Response 
10A. Provide Emergency 
Warning Systems 






10B. Provide Emergency 
Evacuation and Treatment 






10C. Provide Post Disaster 
Recovery 






10D. Conduct Pre-Disaster 
Planning 






























Task Force, UNDP 
Interagency Task 
Force, UNDP, Iraqis 



















12A. Restore and Maintain 
Power Systems 
Critical Coalition USAID, DOE USAID, DOE, UNDP UNDP, Iraqis 
12B. Restore and Maintain 
Water Systems 
Critical Coalition USAID, HHS USAID, HHS, 
UNDP, WHO 
UNDP, WHO, Iraqis 
12C. Restore and Maintain Gas 
Systems 
Important Coalition USAID, DOE USAID, DOE, UNDP UNDP, Iraqis 
12D. Restore and Maintain 
Sewage Systems 
Critical Coalition USAID, HHS USAID, HHS, 
UNDP, WHO 
UNDP, WHO, Iraqis 
12E. Restore and Maintain 
Garbage Collection 
Essential Coalition USAID USAID, UNDP UNDP, Iraqis 
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Telecommunications and Public Communications 
13A. Restore and Maintain 
Telecommunications 
System 
Essential Coalition USAID, FCC USAID, FCC, IPU IPU, Iraqis 
13B. Restore and Maintain 
Broadcasting Systems 
Critical Coalition USAID, FCC USAID, FCC, IPU IPU, Iraqis 
13C. Restore and Maintain 
Postal System 
Important Coalition USAID, USPS USAID, USPS, IPU IPU, Iraqis 
Education 
14A. Operate Public School 
System 
Essential Coalition USAID, 
Education 
USAID, Education, 
UN, World Bank 
UN, World Bank, 
Iraqis 
14B. Operate Private School 
System 
Important — USAID, 
Education 
USAID, Education, 
UN, World Bank 
UN, World Bank, 
Iraqis 
14C. Provide Adult Education 
Services 





14D. Provide Job Training 
Programs 





14E. Provide University 
Education 














USAID, FEMA, IT, 
UN, ICRC, NGOs 
UN, ICRC, NGO, 
Iraqis 
15B. Operate Hospitals Essential Coalition, IT USAID, HHS, 
WHO, NGOs, 
IT 
USAID, HHS, WHO, 
NGOs, IT 
WHO, NGOs, Iraqis 
15C. Provide Doctors and 
Health Professionals 
Essential Coalition, IT USAID, HHS, 
WHO, NGOs, 
IT 
USAID, HHS, WHO, 
NGOs, IT 
WHO, NGOs, Iraqis 
15D. Provide and Distribute 
Pharmaceutical Supplies 
Essential Coalition USAID, HHS, 
WHO, NGOs, 
Coalition 
USAID, HHS, WHO, 
NGOs, Coalition 
WHO, NGOs, Iraqis 
15E. Provide and Distribute 
Non-Pharmaceutical 
Medical Supplies 
Essential Coalition USAID, HHS, 
WHO, NGOs, 
Coalition 
USAID, HHS, WHO, 
NGOs, Coalition 
WHO, NGOs, Iraqis 
15F. Dispose of Medical Waste Essential Coalition USAID, HHS, 
WHO 
USAID, HHS, WHO WHO, Iraqis 
15G. Provide Vector Control 
Systems 






15H. Provide Garbage Disposal 
System 
Essential Coalition USAID USAID, UNDP UNDP, Iraqis 
15I. Ensure Proper Sanitation Essential Coalition USAID, HHS, 
WHO, NGOs 
USAID, HHS, WHO, 
NGOs, UNDP 
WHO, UNDP, Iraqis 
15J. Perform Preventive 
Medicine 
Important Coalition USAID, HHS, 
WHO, NGOs 
USAID, HHS, WHO, 
NGOs, UNDP 
UNDP, Iraqis 
15K. Provide Mortuary Services Important Coalition USAID, HHS USAID, HHS, UNDP UNDP, Iraqis 
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Public Welfare and Humanitarian Relief 
16A. Provide Assistance to Poor Important Coalition USAID, USDA, 
WFP, NGOs 
USAID, USDA, 
WFP, NGOs, UNDP 
UNDP, WFP, NGOs, 
Iraqis 
16B. Provide Emergency Relief Important Coalition USAID, DoD USAID, DoD, ICRC ICRC, Iraqis 




16D.  Provide Care for Aged Important Coalition USAID, HHS USAID, HHS,  
WHO, NGOs 
WHO, NGOs, Iraqis 
16E. Provide Psychological 
Assistance 
Important Coalition USAID, HHS USAID, HHS, WHO, 
NGOs 
WHO, NGOs, Iraqis 
16F. Care for and Relocate 
Refugees 





USAID, UN, NGOs, 
OCHA 
OCHA, NGOs, Iraqis 











OCHA, NGOs, Iraqis 











OCHA, NGOs, Iraqis 
16I. Administer Oil for Food 
Program 
Critical Coalition, UN UN UN — 
Economics and Commerce 
17A. Revitalize Commercial 
Sector 




Treasury, IT, World 
Bank 
World Bank, Iraqis 




Treasury, IT, World 
Bank 
World Bank, Iraqis 
17C. Repair and Maintain Oil 
Facilities 
Essential Coalition, IT USAID, 
Education, IT 
USAID, UNDP, IT UNDP, Iraqi 




Treasury, DOE, UN. 
World Bank, Iraqis 
UN, World Bank, 
Iraqis 
17E. Implement Wage and Price 
Controls 




World Bank, Iraqis 
17F. Maintain Foreign Trade 
System 





World Bank, IMF, 
Iraqis 








USAID — — 
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18A. Establish and Provide 
Employment Services and 
Benefits 
Important — USAID, Labor USAID, Labor, ILO ILO, Iraqis 
18B. Establish and Maintain 
System to Resolve 
Management-Labor 
Disputes 





18C. Establish and Monitor 
Worker Safety Programs 






19A. Establish and Enforce 
Ownership System for Real 
Property 






19B. Establish and Enforce 
Ownership System for 
Personal Property 






Food, Agriculture, and Fisheries 
20A. Maintain Production 
System 
Important Coalition, IT USAID, USDA, 
IT 
USAID, USDA, IT, 
UNFAO 
UNFAO, Iraqis 
20B. Maintain Processing 
System 
Important Coalition, IT USAID, USDA, 
IT 
USAID, USDA, IT, 
UNFAO 
UNFAO, Iraqis 
20C. Maintain Distribution 
System 
Important Coalition, IT USAID, USDA, 
IT 
USAID, USDA, IT, 
UNFAO 
UNFAO, Iraqis 
20D. Maintain Retail Sales 
System 





20E. Establish and Execute 
Inspection System 
Important Coalition USAID, USDA USAID, USDA Iraqis 
20F. Maintain Irrigation System Important Coalition, IT USAID, USDA, 
IT 
USAID, USDA, IT, 
UNFAO 
UNFAO, Iraqis 





21A. Operate Ports Critical Coalition, IT USAID, 
Coalition, 
DOT, IT, State 
USAID, Coalition, 
DOT, IT, State, 
UNDP 
UNDP, Iraqis 
21B. Operate Rail System Critical Coalition, IT USAID, 
Coalition, 
DOT, IT, State 
USAID, Coalition, 
DOT, IT, State, 
UNDP 
UNDP, Iraqis 
21C. Maintain Intercity Road 
Network 




DOT, State, UNDP 
UNDP, Iraqis 
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21E. Operate Air System 
(Including Airspace 
Management) 






UNDP, IATA, Iraqis 
21F. Operate Pipelines Critical Coalition, IT USAID, DOE, 
IT, State 
USAID, DOE, IT, 
State, UNDP 
UNDP, Iraqis 
SOURCE: Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions 
for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies 
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